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This thesis provides an empirical illustration of the state in Africa through the experiences of 
people living in two rural localities in different regions of Ethiopia. It investigates how the state 
in Africa is constructed as a discrete political actor, both separate from and elevated above the 
population it governs. Instead of viewing the state in Africa merely as a mimetic of the Western 
model or as an extension of precolonial forms of social organisation, the thesis examines the 
everyday and ongoing governance practices that produce it as a seemingly autonomous entity 
but also embed it socially. It analyses the discursive and material manifestations of the state by 
looking at bureaucratic routines, public development and corruption discourses, everyday 
interactions between state functionaries and local people as well as those of the staff of various 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and variously positioned local residents. In so doing, 
the thesis argues that the state in Africa is re/produced by embedding itself socially while 
ceaselessly enacting bureaucratic and spatial hierarchy through mundane governance practices 
and development discourses that position it as a seemingly coherent, dominant and unified 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: Studying the sub-Saharan African state 
This thesis explores everyday governance practices and the construction of the idea of the state 
in Africa through the case of Ethiopia. At one and the same time it offers an illustration of the 
ways in which the state in Africa is experienced and imagined in the everyday context of local 
life. The thesis makes no assumption about the conduct or final form of the state in Africa. 
Instead of viewing it merely as a mimetic of the Western model or as an extension of 
precolonial forms of social organisation, the thesis examines the everyday and ongoing 
governance practices that produce the state in Africa as a seemingly autonomous entity but 
which also embed it socially. The main focus of the thesis is on processes such as mundane 
bureaucratic routines, public development and corruption discourses, development project 
implementation and administration and everyday interactions between state functionaries and 
local people as well as those of the staff of various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and variously positioned local residents. I approach these processes by looking at the 
experiences of people living in two rural kebeles in different regions of Ethiopia and by 
studying their relationships within the wider social and political contexts.  
The thesis problematises and places at the forefront of its investigation the idea of the state 
and the issue of society-society relations. The central question of the thesis is as follows: What 
are the processes in which the state in Ethiopia is simultaneously being embedded, enacted and 
re/produced at the local level against the backdrop of changes in the national economy? It 
specifically asks: What are the everyday governance modalities by which the state comes to be 
constructed as both separate from and elevated above society? How do local development 
practices promote the imagination of the state by differently positioned individuals, including 
the state and NGO employees? To what extent is the state operating and thereby imagined and 
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experienced differentially/in different ways across different geographic regions? Overall, what 
does a focus on the local level reveal about the state in sub-Saharan Africa? In addressing these 
questions the thesis investigates the ways in which the state comes to be constructed in 
everyday life through the mediation of a range of practices (governance, development, 
bureaucratic and discourses).  
In this introductory chapter, after offering a brief overview of the existing predominant 
approaches to the study of the state in Africa, I outline the main arguments of the thesis. I then 
present the kebele institution vis-à-vis the Ethiopian state system. Finally, I introduce the 
fieldwork sites, discuss the issues relating to the selection of those fieldwork sites and provide 
an outline of the chapters of the thesis.  
1.1.The study of the sub-Saharan African state 
In working towards an anthropology of the state, this thesis aims to highlight the potential for 
a contribution to the general debate on state formation in Africa. Hence, I begin my exploration 
with a review of the existing literature on the state in Africa. It is not my intention here, 
however, to provide an exhaustive review. Instead, I will provide a broad overview of the 
existing approaches and highlight some of the key works that have influenced this study.  
Since the early 1960s scholars have articulated a number of approaches to understanding 
the nature and character of the postcolonial African state, focusing mainly on those questions 
that address the ‘crisis of authority’ (Lonsdale 1981: 168), the ‘crisis of state capacity’ 
(Englebert 2002: 55), the ‘crisis of governance’ (Mamdani 2005: 3), the ‘African crisis’ 
(Ferguson 2006) and so on. Much of the writing on African state formation, drawing from a 
Weberian understanding of the state as an organisation, deals with the nature and role of the 
postcolonial state. Here, African states are portrayed as being ‘weak’ and ‘soft’ that ‘fall short 
of the requirements of statehood’ (Englebert 2002: 74). The state is seen as a colonial invention 
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and as an ‘exogenous’ structure grafted onto African societies (Englebert 2002). As a result, it 
is argued, African states have been distant from the populations they govern. For example, 
Goran Hyden (1983: 7) conceptualised African states as being ‘suspended in “mid-air” over 
society’ and ‘not an integral mechanism of the day-to-day productive activities of society’. 
Jackson and Rosberg (1982) similarly argued that Africa’s ‘quasi-states’ (Jackson 1990) lack 
‘empirical statehood’. They go on to argue that the survival and persistence of sub-Saharan 
African states is ensured by international diplomacy and international institutions that give 
them juridical recognition. This view has been supported by scholars like Englebert (2013: 
150), who argued that the state in Africa is ‘socially-neutral’ in that it derives its legitimacy 
from ‘outside the state and its population’.  
One of the arguments that emerges from this literature is that African states are neo-
patrimonial (see Médard 1982; Clapham 1982; Bratton and van de Walle 1994). Neo-
patrimonialism is often used to describe a diverse collection of phenomena and modes of 
exercise of state power in Africa. These include the concentration of power in one individual 
who acts as the patron or ‘big man’ (Bratton and van de Walle 1994), practices of ‘despotism, 
clannish behaviour’, so-called ‘tribalism’, regionalism, patronage and ‘cronyism, corruption, 
predation, factionalism’ (Bach 2012: 221). Useful as it has been in illuminating our 
understanding of why and how African states suffer political instability, this approach tends to 
generalise the nature of the African state as fragile (Cheeseman, Death and Whitfield 2017: 
20). 
Despite its diversity, the failed state and neo-patrimonial literature generally assumes the 
state to be an autonomous and centralised apparatus. More specifically, as a number of authors 
have pointed out (see Roitman 2004; Ferguson 2006; Hagmann and Péclard 2011; Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan 2006), these studies are constrained by the Weberian ideal characterisation 
of the state as a system of administration with legitimate and effective control over its territory 
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and population. Yet such framings are not without truth with regard to Africa’s past and present 
multifaceted problems and therefore cannot be dismissed merely as Eurocentric or Afro- 
pessimistic views. However, while it is important to acknowledge the empirical realities of 
African lack and failure, I concur with the critique that we need to be suspicious of accounts 
that tell us ‘nearly everything that African states … are not’ (Mbembe 2001: 9) without telling 
us ‘what they actually are’ (Ferguson 2006: 10). 
This view of the state fits into another approach by Mamdani (1996). Although not 
necessarily taking state failure as their analytical departure point, these scholars have 
conceptualised the postcolonial state and modes of governance as a product of colonialism. 
Mahmood Mamdani (1996) views the crises of the postcolonial state in Africa as a direct result 
of the continued legacy of colonial modes of governance. He argues that the institutional 
framework forged by colonial rule, that is, the direct rule of citizens by civil law and the indirect 
rule of natives/subjects by customary law, has produced a dichotomised society and a ‘regime 
of compulsions’ in postcolonial Africa. Although Mamdani provides valuable insights, this 
study distances itself from approaches that place too much stress on ‘how modern state 
structures have been imposed and implanted in the African countryside’ (Bonne 2003: 2). 
Instead, in the view of this study, we should look at the way in which contemporary regimes 
of power operate in their own logic and give emphasis to dynamics of local politics in 
postcolonial Africa.  
Overall, in most of the above observations, the relationship between state and society is 
understood in terms of modes of governance associated with ‘authoritarianism’, whereby the 
postcolonial state is conceptualised as being presided over, in the same way as the colonial 
state, by an elite that is elevated above the society over which it rules. Such a view of the state 
in Africa fails to recognise that the appearance of the state-society distinction is socially 
constructed through governance and development practices by various actors.  
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Conversely, others call for a rejection of the ‘paradigm of the yoke’ (Bayart 2009) which 
depicts the state in Africa as a colonial product, an external structure, elevated above African 
societies. Within a point of departure in the historicity of African societies, scholars such as 
Bayart (2009) and Chabal and Daloz (1999) have focused on cultural patterns that stretch back 
to precolonial traditions but which, they argue, have also played a role in shaping the character 
of postcolonial African states. These authors suggest that contemporary African states are 
deeply entangled in social relations, in which state power is captured by particularistic interest 
groups. The consequence is argued to be that the state is unable to maintain institutional 
autonomy vis-à-vis society. On the contrary, social groups have been able to profoundly 
penetrate the state through primordial networks of kinship and patronage politics. Bayart 
(2009) developed the metaphor of ‘the politics of the belly’, referring to the idea that African 
states are characterised by modes of governance associated with the elite’s predatory pursuit 
of spoils, wealth and power. He argues that predatory politics is not simply about a corruption 
of the state but rather ‘it is the state’s fabric’ (2009: 89). The state in Africa, he argues, is built 
on a network of personal loyalties that spreads in every direction like a ‘rhizome’ to link various 
patrons and their clients to the informal distributive network.  
Bayart’s longue durée and Foucauldian analysis of the state in Africa breaks away from the 
institutionalist and Weberian approaches in which the state is viewed as imported and 
transplanted. Instead, he concentrates on lines of ‘historical concatenation’ of political 
rationalities of governance (the politics of the belly) that persist across precolonial, colonial 
and postcolonial periods. Yet, in the view of this thesis, a focus on continuity conceals the 
historically contingent regimes of practices and overlooks events that precipitate radical change 
such as war, failing states and refugee crises (Clapham 1994).  
William Reno (2000) characterised the state in Africa as ineffectual and as an empty façade 
of the more powerful informal networks of patronage and corrupt ‘shadow states’ that divert 
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state resources for personal enrichment and support for their protégés. Likewise, Chabal and 
Daloz (1999: 14) argue that states in Africa, in the sense defined by Weber, are vacuous and 
ineffectual, ‘so poorly institutionalised, and so weakly emancipated from society’. Overall, in 
these studies, the relationship between state and society is understood as a problem of 
institutionalisation. The state in Africa is viewed as being completely captured by informal, 
personalised and traditionalist politics (Chabal and Daloz 1999). These works provide 
interesting analysis and innovative approaches to the study of the state in Africa, but their 
limitation for this study is that they fail to ask whether the everyday social realm may also be 
shaped by the bureaucracy and contemporary development practices, and through the 
operations, of state officials. 
However, my argument above that the social realm can be shaped by the bureaucracy and 
those practices associated with development activities as well as through the operations of state 
officials may well raise the question of the existence of state infrastructure. Jeffrey Herbst 
(2000), for instance, has demonstrated forcefully that African states have a slim presence 
outside capital cities. He argues that a lack of external threats and the ability to survive through 
foreign aid and taxes on primary commodities discourages African leaders from investing in 
bureaucracies in ways similar to those undertaken by European state-builders. However, as 
becomes clear in this study, the state in Africa has recently come to establish a wide 
geographical reach and numerous local ties. This is not idiosyncratic to Ethiopia. More works 
have recently emerged which stress the importance of the bureaucracy in other parts of Africa 
(Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Erdmann and Engel 2007; Olivier de Sardan 2014). My thesis 
works with this understanding of the bureaucracy in Africa in mind. In addition to this, as 
discussed in the next chapter, I recognise the literature that seeks to study the African state by 
looking at the multiplicity of (state and non-state) institutions at the local level (Lund 2006; 
Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014; Blundo and Le Meur 2009).  
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In most of the different approaches discussed thus far we find a tendency to view the 
postcolonial state as being characterised by two contradictory attributes: on the one hand, it is 
characterised as an exogenous structure detached from and elevated above society, while on 
the other it is an empty shell and vacuous institution absorbed by social forces and 
particularistic interests. In the first view, the state is reduced to a mere exogenous institution. 
In the second, it is interpreted as a structural outcome of precolonial African political culture. 
In the view of this study, both approaches result in a reductionist and essentialised 
conceptualisation of the state in Africa.  
1.2. Theoretical positioning and departures 
The most important question, then, is how can we avoid reducing the state to a mere exogenous 
institution or treating it as a structural outcome of African political culture? This section 
outlines an alternative theoretical approach that the thesis adopts with regard to understanding 
the state in Africa. The theoretical approach taken in this thesis and which is elaborated upon 
in the next chapter is an anthropological scholarship on state formation that seeks to redress 
the top-down and reified understanding of the sub-Saharan African state as either an extension 
of the colonial state or as an extension of precolonial patrimonial forms of social organisation. 
This approach has been variously referred to as ‘ethnography of the state’ (Gupta 1995), 
‘anthropology of the state’ (Das and Poole 2004; Sharma and Gupta 2006; Hansen and 
Stepputat 2001), ‘state-in-society’ (Migdal 2001) and ‘the state as cultural practice’ (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2010). Rather than taking the state to be a predefined organisation (by external actors 
or pre-existing traditions), it recognises that the state is an effect of ongoing processes and 
governance practices. Such an approach aims to disaggregate the purported coherence of the 
state by looking at the local interactions and heterogeneous (bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic) 
practices of governance and discourses, rather than static structures, that produce it.  
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This study is an attempt to expand upon, and contribute to, a number of the issues that arise 
from these approaches to the study of the state. It argues that the state in Africa, as elsewhere, 
is not a coherent structure or a subject that is separate from society but rather that it is a 
structural ‘effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist’ (Mitchell 1999: 89). 
An ethnographic analysis of the state as the structural effect of practices is an analysis of the 
practices and power relations that characterise social life at the level of both the institutional 
mechanics of government and of the social actors who are positioned in a multidimensional 
social space (Migdal 2001; Mitchell 1999). This means paying attention to the ways in which 
the state is re/defined and becomes a material reality within the everyday context of local life. 
This thesis particularly identifies and investigates four sets of everyday practices (governance, 
bureaucratic, development and discursive practices) that make the state structure appear to 
exist. In the next chapter, I discuss each of these concepts in much more detail. However, to 
make my argument plain from the outset, the concept of governance as it is applied in this 
thesis is drawn from Bevir and Rhodes’s (2010) ‘decentred approach’ to governance which 
views the state as a ‘cultural practice’ and acknowledges the existence of diverse actions and 
the fragmentation and diffusion of power relations.  
The ways in which I understand development activities are drawn from Norman Long’s 
‘actor-oriented’ and ‘interface’ approach, which recognises that instead of operating in a top-
down fashion, development functions through multiple social realities, dispersed power 
relations and the diverse practices of various actors. This approach helps us to grasp the diverse 
ways in which the state is constructed, contested and appropriated differently by differently 
positioned actors, and how ‘interface situations’ (Long 1992) encourage the production of the 
state-society boundary. I will also draw on Ferguson’s (1994: 256) concept of ‘instrument-
effects’ to highlight the unintended consequences of development practices in producing the 
state-society boundary. The ways in which I use the concept of bureaucratic practices are drawn 
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from Ferguson and Gupta’s (2000) concepts of ‘verticality’ and ‘encompassment’, Kapferer 
and Bertelsen’s (2009) concept of ‘society of the state’ and Sharma and Gupta’s (2006) concept 
of representations. I argue that the construction of the idea of the state is partly possible in its 
bureaucratic presence, that is, in the way the institutions that make up the state operate on the 
ground and interact with local people both in informal ways and through activities such as 
sedentarisation and territorialisation. The concept of discourse I utilise in this thesis is situated 
in the terrain between scholars like Foucault (1972: 49), who developed the concept of 
discursive practices, and Bevir and Rhodes (2015), who chose to employ the concept of 
tradition to balance their concept of situated agency. Overall, my conceptual approach elicits a 
number of methodological strategies. The thesis therefore applies two varieties of interpretive 
methods and the situational analysis method to the study of governance. These methods are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
Throughout the thesis, as I outline in the next chapter, I overlay the different sets of practices 
with Foucault’s idea of ‘dispersed’ power and analyse the complex, diverse and contingent 
actions of the situated actors and the production of the idea of the state. In so doing, I argue 
that these sets of practices produce the effect of the state as an autonomous entity, separate 
from and suspended over and above society, with the appearance of clear functional 
differentiation, an inherent agency of state and institutional coherence. State power arises 
through the mediation of various practices associated with development administration and 
bureaucratic routines that mobilise, coordinate and articulate diffuse and local sites of power 
relations (family, public spaces, schools, etc.) into ‘general mechanisms and forms … of 
domination’ (Jessop 2007: 36). Following Mitchell (1999: 84), I also argue that the appearance 
of state-society distinction creates the ‘effect of agency, with concrete consequences’ and such 
agency, as I will show empirically in Chapter 6, is ‘contingent upon the production of 
difference’ through boundary-making processes. 
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This representation of the state as a unitary actor gives the impression that ‘it’ exists as a 
concrete entity, whereas in reality there is only a dispersed ensemble of institutions, practices 
and social relations. I will demonstrate that the image of an autonomous state that stands 
separate from society is challenged by the existence of diverse sites of power relations such as 
non-state forms of authority (Lund 2006). In this sense, non-state authorities take the form of 
locally notable social, economic and political elites, who collapse the distinction between 
formal and informal, state and non-state domains in their multiple positions as politicians, 
religious leaders, community elders, traders, etc. and whose networks of patronage traverse 
hierarchies. 
The thesis seeks at once to examine the local context of more general processes – 
specifically, the production of the state as an idea – but also to disaggregate and demystify 
(Abrams 1988) popular imaginations of a unitary, homogeneous and autonomous state in order 
to demonstrate its social embeddedness. The core argument of the thesis is that the state in 
Ethiopia is re/produced by embedding itself1 socially while ceaselessly enacting bureaucratic 
and spatial hierarchy through mundane governance practices and development discourses that 
position it as a seemingly coherent, dominant and unified entity, separate from and suspended 
over and above society. 
It must be noted that in studying the state as a structural effect of practices (Mitchell 1991; 
Jessop 2007) and through the specific contexts of local social processes, I do not deny the 
organisational existence and immense importance of central state institutions, policies and 
regulations in shaping local lives. On the contrary, I argue that state formation is shaped by 
central state institutional and policy interventions. This is in keeping with Foucault, who argues 
                                                 
1 I am aware that my use of the state as a subject/political actor reifies the very concept I wish to interrogate. I 
choose to retain it here only for the sake of clarity of my argument.  
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that ‘I do not want to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of 
power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits 
of the State . . . because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being 
able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations’ (Foucault 1980: 122).  
However, it must be reiterated that approaching state formation as such is not to concur with 
the ‘top-down approach’ that depicts state formation as a process of ‘violent penetration of the 
territory by the army, bureaucracy and capital’ (Stepputat 2001: 285). I argue that the top-down 
approach leads only to a reified conceptualisation of the state as separate from the dynamics of 
the local. In other words, it fails to capture the intersection between the national and the local 
and mediations by non-state authorities such as NGOs. The thesis (in Chapter 9) demonstrates 
that central state projects (such as sedentarisation and territorialisation) are mediated by NGOs 
and shaped by entrenched local social interests and interactions with the local population.  
This thesis does not assume the prior existence of either a particular ‘African political 
culture’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999) or a persistent and distinctive form of ‘African way of doing 
things’. Instead, inspired by interpretative approaches to the study of culture and governance 
(see Chapter 3), it seeks to unpack the diverse and contingent discourses and practices of the 
situated actors through which power is coordinated and articulated. Here my aim is not to 
discount the importance of the continuity of traditions but rather to direct attention to and 
unearth the complex specificity, multiplicity and heterogeneity of practices and meaning in 
context. At a broader level, avoiding the reified notion of African political culture enables us 
to locate the question of state formation within the broader changing context of African 
political economy. Here I approach the current infatuation with developmentalism as a prism 
through which to understand everyday forms of state formation. In so doing, I argue that the 
logic of garnering legitimacy in Africa is no longer solely predicated upon the ability of its 
leaders to forge patrimonial networks. New ideas of legitimacy, such as development rhetoric, 
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are redefining the terrain in which African politics operates. A number of African states2 are 
making efforts to institutionalise development as the main raison d’être of the state, by way of 
introducing ambitious national development plans, projects and programmes whose primary 
orientations are towards legitimising state authority. In other words, discourses and practices 
of development, in many contemporary African states, provide a dominant ‘ideological 
formation’ (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 15) that define the character of the state and how 
politics is supposed to be conducted and how state institutions should function. 
1.3.Why Ethiopia? 
In chapter four I discuss at length the major reason that influenced me to choose Ethiopia as a 
case. My specific reason for choosing Ethiopia lies in the fact that it provides an excellent case 
of an African state which has positioned itself at the front and centre of the economic 
transformation (see Chapter 2) agenda and that has tied its legitimacy to rapid economic growth 
and poverty reduction efforts. The Ethiopian government, through its two five-year Growth 
and Transformation Plans (GTPs),3 has adopted for itself a utopian and ambitious project of 
creating a middle-income country by the period 2020–23, with a target of 11 per cent annual 
economic growth (Assefa 2014). The strategic pillars for attaining these goals include 
increasing agricultural output and productivity, promoting industrialisation and public 
investment in infrastructure. This emphasis on structural transformation is accompanied by a 
desire to improve the livelihood of the country’s predominantly rural population (80% of the 
total population) through the provision of basic development services. To achieve this, the 
government, along with its international development partners, has launched an extraordinary 
range of development programmes, including the promotion of basic services (school, health 
                                                 
2 Developmental states in Africa include Tanzania, Botswana, Rwanda, South Africa and Ethiopia (Routley 2014). 
3 The first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I) was implemented from 2010/11 to 2014/15 and the second 
(2015/16-2019/20) was launched in October 2015 (MoFED 2010, 215).  
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centres, roads, agricultural services, etc.), resettlement and sedentarisation programmes, 
irrigation projects, group-based participatory programmes (such as the Productive Safety Net) 
and cooperative schemes. While Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in Africa, the 
expansion of such development projects has brought about the momentous spread of state 
bureaucracy. For example, between 2005 and 2009, 264,000 school teachers and 34,000 health 
extension workers were hired (Lefort 2015: 370). There are now 63,000 agricultural extension 
workers spread across all kebeles. Each woreda has more than one farmer training centre.4 
Since 2002, the number of farmer training centres in the country has increased to 8,500 (Nigatu 
2013). The number of primary cooperatives5 rose from 19,147 in 2005 to 53,982 at the end of 
2014, while the total number of members increased from 3.9 million to 8.3 million (9.8% of 
the population) during the same period (Bezabih 2009; Kifle 2015). 
The significance of the expansion of basic development projects and the concomitant growth 
and spread of state bureaucracy and development discourses, I argue, lay in that it helped to 
represent the state to its population and provided multiple avenues and possibilities for state-
society encounters. As will be discussed in greater detail throughout the thesis, local people are 
now expected to mobilise and participate both within and outside the state structure as 
stakeholders in local and national development initiatives. Significantly, development 
discourses entered the everyday life of rural subjects. Such specific contemporary modes of 
governance and the ways in which they are popularly experienced in Ethiopia, I argue, are 
                                                 
4 The farmer training centres provide a wide range services including ‘farmer training and extension services on 
improved farming techniques (through training courses, exhibits, demonstration farms, field days and farmer-to-
farmer extension); market-oriented information and advisory services; meeting and communication facilities; and 
seed and seedlings of new crops, vegetables, fruit and forage varieties’ (Nigatu 2013: 77). 
5  The primary cooperatives are organised around 36 different types of economic activities, including grain 
marketing, coffee marketing, saving and credit services, fruit and vegetable production and marketing, dairy 
production and marketing and livestock marketing, etc. (Bezabih 2009).  
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crucial in shaping both local encounters between state officials and local people and the ways 
in which the state is understood, imagined and reproduced. 
The remainder of this chapter describes the fieldwork sites and issues relating to the 
selection of fieldwork sites, and provides an outline of the chapters of the thesis. But before I 
do so, however, it will briefly describe the position of the kebele institution vis-à-vis the 
Ethiopian state system. 
1.4. The administrative layers of the Ethiopian state  
The Ethiopian state bureaucracy is organised into multiple hierarchical administrative levels. 
At the top of this structure is the federal government, below which lie regional state 
governments. The constitution establishes nine federated regional states and two city 
administrations along the lines of language groups. The nine states are Oromia, Amhara, 
Tigray, Afar, Somalia and Harari (organised along dominant languages) and Gambella, 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) 
(organised through the amalgamation of smaller language groups). The two municipalities are 
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (Vaughan 2015).  
Each regional state is divided into several zones which comprise a number of woredas 
(districts), with each woreda in turn composed of several kebeles (roughly meaning 
neighbourhood). The woreda is the most important administrative unit of each region and has 
‘its own administrative apparatus, police and security force, judges and prosecutors and 
increasingly, power and resources to prepare and determine economic and social plans in the 
area under its authority’ (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 42). There are 550 woredas and several 
special woredas spread across the country, each with an average population of more than 
150,000. The kebele is the lowest administrative unit and typically has a population of between 
5,000 and 10,000 people. Each kebele has its own council which, in theory at least, makes 
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decisions on locally relevant matters. Moreover, each kebele is represented on the woreda 
council by three individuals (Poluha and Elehu 2016).  
I initiated my fieldwork at the kebele level since, as the lowest tier of governance, the kebele 
allowed me to observe the everyday interactions of the state (through its functionaries) and the 
ordinary people who come to the kebele for a variety of reasons. The kebele is also the local 
level at which state policies are implemented, and, as a result, it constitutes a crucial part of the 
trans-local network of power (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 2002). Therefore, the kebele is not 
taken as an administratively bounded place of politics but rather as an important nodal point 
within a national network of power where development policies (see Chapter 9) and large-scale 
development projects (see Chapter 6) take place and are enacted by different state agents 
(woreda-, zone-, regional- and federal-level officials). On the other hand, as the lowest point 
of contact between the people and the state, the kebele offered me a unique position from which 
to consider how ordinary people construct a particular image of the Ethiopian state. 
1.5. Field sites: Zonal and Kebele setting 
The first fieldwork site is the Degga kebele6 in the highland agrarian community of the West 
Gojjam zone in Amhara regional state, which was part of Ethiopia’s historic core, or the 
Abyssinian 7  kingdom. At the time of the fieldwork, the kebele contained about 1,400 
                                                 
6 The name Degga is a pseudonym to provide anonymity to the residents. In order to protect my interlocutors’ 
anonymity, the names of the woreda and the woreda town have been withheld. 
7 Abyssinia was an area to the north-west of Addis Ababa in modern-day Ethiopia that comprised two politically 
powerful ethnic groups – the Amhara and Tigray. It was the precursor to the modern Ethiopian state. Abyssinia 
provided the basic institutional underpinnings – the land tenure system, Amharic language and Orthodox 
Christianity – of the contemporary Ethiopian state. Because the Abyssinians historically occupied a position of 
cultural and political hegemony within the Ethiopian state system, they came to be seen as ‘state builders’ (See 
Ullendorff 1955; Crummey 1980; Donham 1986; Gebru 1996; Markakis 2011). 
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households and had a total population of almost 10,000. Most of its residents live in houses 
made of mud and straw or corrugated tin.  
West Gojjam is a predominantly agrarian zone, with a high proportion of its population, 
over 91 per cent, living in rural areas and engaged mainly in agriculture (CSA 2008). The 
population of the zone is predominantly Orthodox Christian. Prior to the 1974 land reform, the 
area was part of what was known as the rist system. Under this system, each individual was 
assured of distinct claims to land which were inheritable and inalienable (Hoben 1973). 
Superimposed over the rist tenure was an institution of tax and labour extraction known as gult. 
Gult was usually granted by the crown to the aristocracy and local gentry as a reward for their 
political loyalty, and to churches and monasteries as endowments (Hoben 1973).  
Since the 1970s two developments in national politics have been significant in the 
transformation of Gojjam. The first involved the establishment of peasant associations. As in 
other rural parts of Ethiopia, following the 1974 revolution, in Gojjam farmers were organised 
into peasant associations on an 800-hectare area (Dessalegn 1984). The kebeles in Gojjam, as 
elsewhere in the country, were charged with implementing land reform, administering public 
property such as land, establishing service co-operatives, building schools and health centres 
and carrying out villagisation programmes. Additional roles were later introduced, including 
judicial tribunals and necessary security and defence activities (Dessalegn 1984). This had the 
effect of transforming kebeles into permanent territorial and administrative entities. 
Significantly, this created different hierarchies between the kebele bureaucracy and the local 
population. Today, the kebele is a central figure in the daily life of rural people.  
The second development involved the introduction in 1995 of agricultural extension 
programmes. These programmes were aimed at transforming the livelihoods of rural people 
through the dissemination of agricultural technologies such as chemical fertilisers and hybrid 
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varieties of seeds and pesticides, in addition to through the provision of training and credit 
services (Teferi 2004). It resulted in the generation of some dynamism in agricultural 
productivity and gave rise to new classes (Abeje and Ezana 2011). However, farming 
techniques and cultivation methods have changed little in the years since the introduction of 
the agricultural extension programmes. Farmers in Degga, for example, continue to rely on ox 
power for cultivation.  
Land scarcity is yet another issue affecting productivity. At the time of the fieldwork, Degga 
kebele inhabitants possess only small plots of land. Some of them are sharecroppers with 
wealthy farmers. Land scarcity is due partly, as Svein Ege (2017) suggests in the case of Shewa, 
to increasing land rentals, latent rights and partible land inheritance. Households in the kebele 
are primarily engaged in the growth of cereal crops, which are used mainly for subsistence. 
Rich farmers also grow onions and wheat varieties for the government. Onion and wheat 
production takes place on irrigation land. This has led to increasing reliance on and demand for 
chemical fertilisers, irrigated water and pesticides, etc. In addition, people engage in a diverse 
range of income-generating activities, including working in local sawmills, the production and 
sale of alcohol and providing casual labour. These processes involve the local people in 
complex power relations within their day-to-day lives. This thesis attempts to situate state 
formation within this context.  
My second fieldwork site is Odda8 kebele, which is located in a semi-pastoral lowland 
community in the Borana zone of Oromia regional state. The Borana people live both in 
Ethiopia and the northern part of Kenya, straddling the border between the two countries. In 
Ethiopia, the Borana number almost 1 million people (CSA 2008). The Borana are organised 
                                                 
8 The name Odda is a pseudonym to provide anonymity to the residents. The names of the woreda and the woreda 
town have been withheld to protect the anonymity of the state employees and NGO workers. 
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around two exogamous and patrilineal moieties called the Sabbo and Gona. Each moiety is 
subdivided into several clans, with the Sabbo comprising three clans and the Gona containing 
fifteen clans. These eighteen clans are geographically dispersed and intersect in every aspect 
of everyday life. The social and political life of the Borana is organised around gadaa and 
qaalluu institutions (Bassi 2010). The gadaa is an age grade and generational class system in 
which five generational classes (gogeessa; also called luba) alternate in assuming power every 
eight years (a gadaa period) (Asmerom 1973). Once in every gadaa period, a pan-Borana 
assembly known as the Gumi Gayo convenes to evaluate the performance of the gadaa-set in 
power, to revise existing aadaa seera Borana (customary laws) and proclaim new ones.  
In contrast to the gadaa, the qaalluu is a hereditary office (Bassi 2010). The two Borana 
moieties have their own qaalluus. Together, the two institutions constitute ‘a differentiated 
institutional leadership, assuring the governance and participation of the entire group by 
exercising their political and juridical influence in different types of meetings, assemblies and 
councils’ (Bassi 2010: 222). 
The Borana’s pattern of settlement and movement is dictated by seera marraa bisanii – ‘the 
law of grass and water’ (Samuel et al. 2016: 47), which governs the community’s seasonal need 
to be based near to water wells as well as their maintenance and regulations for dry-and wet-
season pasture-use patterns. This way the Borana are able to survive in a semi-arid environment 
that is characterised by a high level of rainfall variability and frequent droughts. 
In the aftermath of their incorporation into Ethiopia during the last quarter of the 19th 
century (Markakis 2011; Oba 2013), the Borana were affected by the central state in many 
different ways. However, they were seldom participants in governance process and the state 
remained marginal in the everyday lives of the local people. During the imperial period, the 
focus was on periodical tax extraction, and the customary institutions were tolerated. The Derg 
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was aloof towards pastoralists. When Marco Bassi conducted his PhD fieldwork in 1994, he 
found a ‘division of competences between the administrative and the customary structures’ 
(2010: 222).  
At the time of my fieldwork, however, this ‘division of competences’ was dissipating and 
the Borana were rapidly sedentarising (see Chapter 9). As I will describe in greater detail in 
Chapter 9, the majority of the people in Odda kebele have resided in permanent settlements 
since the early 2000s. At the time of the fieldwork, the kebele contained about 1,300 households 
and had a total population of nearly 9,000. The kebele is subdivided into three sub-kebeles. 
The kebele has an elementary school and three satellite schools in the sub-kebeles (for primary-
age children in the faraway villages). The habitations of the Odda kebele people are mostly 
mud and straw huts. Households in the kebele are engaged in small-scale agricultural 
production and cattle, sheep and goat herding. Compared to Dagga, the people are vulnerable 
to recurrent droughts and suffer from shortages of water and food. The majority of families are 
unable to make ends meet without some form of NGO/government support. This is partly 
because the changes of the state have disrupted the regulatory system of the Borana. 
1.6. Selection of field sites  
The selection of my two fieldwork sites was ‘strategic’ (Marcus 1995). First, my choice of two 
fieldwork sites in different regions of Ethiopia was theoretically informed. My choice was 
specifically influenced by the centre-periphery/frontier approach to the study of the Ethiopian 
state and society. Over the past several decades, as I will describe in greater detail in Chapter 
4, several scholars have pointed out that the Ethiopian state is bifurcated along a centre-
periphery axis. The objective in selecting two fieldwork sites was, in part, to investigate the 
usefulness of the centre/periphery dichotomy. As we shall see, this dichotomy did not fit my 
ethnographic observations.  
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Second, my particular choice of the zones of Borana and West Gojjam was intended to have 
an exploratory advantage because they are ‘atypical’ (Marcus 1995) to one another and are 
located in two of the largest regional states in Ethiopia. As outlined in the previous section, the 
two sites are set apart by their distinctive cultural, geographic and political characteristics. 
Although their overt diversity provided different vantage points for exploring how ideas about 
the state are variably manifest in different geographic, cultural and economic contexts, my 
cases are representative of neither the centre-periphery distinction nor the cultural diversity of 
Ethiopia as a whole. An ethnographic study based on two locations cannot be seen to assume 
a representative character. However, anthropologists are rarely concerned with the 
representativeness of their cases. The primary objective of an ethnographic study is to capture 
the meanings of banal and ordinary activities, social processes and dynamics (Marcus 1995; 
Geertz 1973). ‘One might ask; why are we here, in a village of no particular significance …. 
The justification for such an enterprise must lie precisely in its banality - in the fact that these 
circumstances are the normal context in which class conflict has historically occurred’ (Scott 
1985: 27). Following Scott, I argue that a micro-level enquiry based on one or two localities 
offers insights into the multiple and complex ways through which local social and political 
relations constitute and are interconnected with the dynamics of the macro-level, wider national 
political life.  
Third, my choice of rural settings, as opposed to urban centres, is influenced by the spread 
of development practices and discourses which, through the state policy of all-encompassing 
rural development, are leading people at the local level to become increasingly involved in 
development activities as part of their day-to-day lives. This process is more evident in rural 
areas, where a wide range of development programmes, including the provision of schools, 
health centres, roads, agricultural services and sedentarisation programmes, irrigation projects 
and cooperative schemes, are being implemented through the kebeles. This, as Teferi (2004: 
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613) notes in the case of decentralisation, ‘has increased the significance of local government 
as a site for struggle over the meanings of ‘state’ and ‘people’’. The selection of rural areas 
was therefore intended to situate the study of the state in the context of the social, economic 
and political transformations. It must be acknowledged here, however, that in focusing on rural 
settings, where people are homogeneous in terms of their ethnicity and religion, I was not able 
to take advantage of the diversity of urban Ethiopia’s population. My research questions could 
have provoked a different response in urban areas, where people may approach the state with 
a diverse and contrasting set of experiences and values. 
Finally, my particular choice of the areas of Degga in Gojjam and Odda in Borana was 
influenced by both their location in relation to their respective woreda towns, where the 
administrative offices are located and where I conducted a multi-sited ethnography (see 
Chapter 3), and by my personal contacts.  
The selection of two research sites raises the question of comparison. An uncritical 
application of the comparative method to the study of culture and society has long been well 
criticised by several anthropologists (see, among others, Gluckman 1964; Clifford 1986; 
Marcus 1995). Bruce Kapferer (2011: 26), for example, summarising Gluckman’s view, 
cautioned that one should not compare cultures without paying close attention to the ‘principles 
engaged in structures of meaning’. This becomes even more important in the Ethiopian context 
where there is a long-standing propensity among scholars to engage in a comparison of cultures, 
very often with little attention paid to defining those principles that inform cultural practices. 
Cultures compared in this way, as Kapferer notes, are ‘drained of their particular import and 
are reduced to each other [and] become subordinated to theory’ (26). There are, however, a few 
notable exceptions. One such exception is Donald Levine’s seminal work Greater Ethiopia in 
which he, rather than engaging in direct comparisons, juxtaposed Amhara/Tigray and Oromo 
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traditions focusing, in Kapferer’s (2011: ix) words, on their ‘positive singularities’ to highlight 
their contributions to the making of Greater Ethiopia. However, his method seemed to reduce 
the concept of culture to a series of traits, while at the same time implicitly constructing 
similarities and differences between cultures in an objectivist sense (Messay 1999).  
Therefore, in this thesis, the two sites are not used in the conventional comparative model 
but instead are set to elucidate one another with the intention of shedding light on the larger 
national cultural, economic and political issues that feed into state formation. Bruce Kapferer, 
in his book Legends of People, Myths of State (1988 [2011]), follows a similar strategy in his 
account of nationalism in Australia and Sri Lanka. In his juxtaposition of two forms of 
nationalist spheres – Australian egalitarian Christian ontology and Sri Lankan encompassing 
hierarchical ontology, Kapferer investigated nationalist cosmologies ‘on their own terms and 
in the contexts of their ideas’ (1988: xii). In so doing he demonstrated convincingly the 
complexity of different styles of nationalist imaginations in the contemporary world. Here, in 
juxtaposing the two sites, I do not view them as self-contained and discreet cultural units. 
Instead, using interpretative and situational analysis methods,9 I draw on field materials to 
examine the ways in which the idea of the state is re/produced in relation to the different sets 
of practices that individuals are exposed to in the everyday context of local life. In this way, I 
will attempt to generate dialogues across specific contexts on the common processes of state 
formation for the purpose of understanding the heterogeneous process of state formation. 
That being said, my lack of knowledge of Afaan Oromo meant that I was not able to collect 
comparable data, especially data concerning the cultural norms (idioms, metaphors, etc.) that 
inform everyday life and ‘structures of meaning’ (Kapferer 2011) between my fieldwork sites. 
I was also not able to observe and participate in local official and informal public meetings in 
                                                 
9 The methods employed in conducting the fieldwork are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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a comparable way (see Chapter 3). My analyses of state formation in Odda (Chapters 9 and 10) 
are predominantly based on the interviews and conversations that I conducted with a wide 
range of actors. The difference between the types and depths of field material has therefore led 
to different levels of analysis for the two cases, which is focused more on West Gojjam. This 
does not mean, however, that the two cases explain different processes or phenomena. Instead, 
they explain the multiplicity of ways through which the state is re/produced and comes to be 
imagined in Ethiopia. 
In other words, I juxtapose the two field sites to demonstrate the numerous ‘referents’ of the 
state (the social practices and local institutions through which the discreteness of the state is 
established vis-à-vis society) across context, space and time (Jessop 2007: 3). Each chapter in 
this thesis therefore takes a different angle to explore and demonstrate the various aspects of 
the governance process and state formation in comprehensive pieces across context, time and 
space, etc. The thesis therefore situates the field material from the two sites on a continuum 
along Burawoy’s (2009: 45; see also de Vries 2012) four ‘extensions’ of the extended case 
method. That is, five chapters (Chapters 5 to 8 and Chapter 9) discuss the first extension, 
namely the extension into the life and world of the participants. The other extensions that 
Burawoy describes are over time (discussed at various points, including in Chapters 4 and 9) 
and space (Chapters 5 and 9), from micro processes to macro forces to explore connections 
between geographical sites (discussed in Chapter 9) and, finally, the extension of the theory 
(used at various points, including in Chapters 2 and 11). As such, at the same time as Burawoy’s 
(2009: 45) four ‘extensions’ allow us to account for the heterogeneity of governance practices 
and the complexity of the everyday aspects of state formation, they also provide the unity of 
the thesis.  
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1.7.Outline of chapters  
Chapter Two establishes the main theoretical and conceptual grounds upon which this thesis 
stands. It also provides further context to the thesis by describing issues relating to the 
vernacular conception of the state in Ethiopia and the relationship between the ruling party and 
the state. Chapter Three outlines the methodology adopted in the research, describing the 
situational analysis and interpretive methods. It also presents the processes and techniques of 
data collection and analysis.  
Chapter Four provides a broad overview of the existing literature on the state and society in 
Ethiopia. In so doing, it first questions the widely held assumption that Ethiopia is an anomaly 
within Africa. Second, it examines how the Ethiopian state has been analysed and understood.  
Chapter Five discusses the modalities by which state power and authority circulate and 
how hierarchy is reproduced through the regularising of specific sets of activities and 
bureaucratic rituals. Here, I examine the nature and pattern of interactions among state 
functionaries and also encounters between kebele officials and local people. I argued that banal 
local bureaucratic practices perform the function of reproducing and representing a reified 
image of the state as a distinctive, vertical and detached (from society) actor. 
Chapter Six, instead of taking the state-society boundary to be self-evident, examines how 
it is constructed through development and governance practices. It does this using the lens of 
an important local development scheme: the Koga irrigation and watershed management 
project. The chapter will ask how local- and high-level state functionaries engage in activities 
that differentiate the state from society by articulating what community is and ought to do and 
also where the state begins and ends (in terms of its development responsibilities) as opposed 
to other forms of authority such as community associations. The exploration in this chapter 
seeks to answer the following questions: How have institutional arrangements during different 
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stages promoted division between the state and local people? How has this impacted on the 
self-perception of the people? The overall objective is to tease out the processes and 
instruments by which state discreteness is produced.  
From a rather bureaucratic-centric analysis of state formation, I next turn attention to public 
discourses in Chapter Seven, which deals with how the state comes to be imagined as an 
authoritative centre of power by focusing on local public discourses of corruption. It will also 
look at the role of religious metaphors in helping people constitute a particular image of the 
state.  
The above three fieldwork chapters contribute to an overall picture of how the state as a 
political centre of authority, elevated above and set off from society, is produced as a result of 
governance practices. In Chapter Eight, the argument takes a different turn. It explores the 
everyday patterns of interaction between state and non-state actors and argues that the state and 
society, instead of being separate domains, are in fact part of the same sociocultural and 
political complex. This chapter will take us a step further to understanding state formation as 
embedded and grounded in the everyday realities of social relations.  
Chapters Nine and Ten concentrate on case studies from my second fieldwork site. These 
chapters add a further layer to the thesis by looking at the multifaceted interplay between the 
central government and local interests as well as the role played by NGOs in the everyday 
processes of state formation. Focusing on local sedentarisation and territorialisation activities, 
Chapter Nine points to the constitutive effect of a wide range of actors (state officials, NGOs, 
local elites and the people) for every state formation. Chapter Ten explores how changes 
induced by the interaction of state and non-state actors – the creation of a new spatial and 
bureaucratic order – promote a variegated understanding of the state. By drawing on the 
experiences of state employees, NGO staff and local people, the chapter sketches a broad 
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spectrum of discourses and understandings of the state. In so doing, it argues that because the 
state appears in people’s lives in different and multiple ways, it is experienced and imagined 
differently.  
Chapter Eleven concludes the thesis by weaving together the main findings of the study 




Rethinking the state: theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
This chapter discusses the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that will enable an 
ethnographic analysis of the state in sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter is divided into two 
sections. In the first section, I outline my overall ethnographic framework of analysis. I do so 
by first exploring the anthropological approaches to the study of the state. I then outline four 
sets of practices (governance, bureaucratic, development and discursive) as conceptual tools 
capable of capturing the process of state formation at work in Ethiopia and locate them in the 
theoretical literature. The section furthermore makes two additions to the conceptual 
framework: the centrality of power and class. In the second section, I provide further context 
to the thesis by describing the vernacular term mengist (which refers to both the state and 
government) as well as providing analysis of the interface of the state and party politics in 
Ethiopia. There is no doubt that each of these topics warrants exhaustive consideration in its 
own right. However, given the scope of the thesis, I provide only a general overview with the 
aim of establishing some national political context for the everyday forms of state formation.  
2.1.Anthropological approaches to the state 
The study of the state has been an important and long-standing preoccupation of social 
scientists for over a century. Yet, the concept remains elusive. As Philip Abrams (1988: 49) 
rightly notes, ‘we have come to take the state for granted as an object of political practice and 
political analysis while remaining quite spectacularly unclear as to what the state is’. Scholars 
have long, either consciously or unconsciously, taken the state to be an autonomous and 
coherent unit with extraordinary means to dominate. Partly underlying this understanding is 
Max Weber’s (1948: 78) famous definition of the state as ‘a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
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territory’. Although, as Joe Migdal (2001: 14) points out, Weber’s intention was to provide 
only ‘a heuristic, ideal type state’, others subsequently stretched the concept to refer to real-life 
states. There is, however, a growing body of literature that is at variance with the Weberian 
assumption that the state as a discrete entity could be studied apart from society. In the 
following, I would like to draw attention to the works of scholars who challenged the Weberian 
understanding of the state.  
In the preface to African Political Systems (1940: xxiii), Radcliffe-Brown laid a foundation 
for an alternative understanding of political systems by advising us to abandon the study of the 
state altogether, because, he argues, the state as being ‘an entity over and above the human 
individuals that make up a society … does not exist in the phenomenal world; it is a fiction of 
the philosophers’. What exists, he argues, is an ‘organisation i.e. a collection of individual 
human beings connected by a complex system of relations … there is no such thing as the 
power of the state; there are only, in reality, powers of individuals—kings, prime ministers, 
magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters’ (xxiii). He argues that scholars should focus 
on studying government and politics.  
In a posthumously published influential article, Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State 
(1988), Philip Abrams urges social scientists to follow Radcliffe-Brown’s lead and abandon 
studying the state as if it existed as a unified and concrete entity. He argues ‘the state is not the 
reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents 
our seeing political practice as it is’. Contrary to Radcliffe-Brown’s radical proposal, Abrams 
emphasises that we should study the idea of the state ‘extremely seriously’ while suspending a 
belief in the concrete existence of the state as a political reality. In studying the state, he argues, 
a distinction should be made between the ‘state system’ and ‘state idea’ (58). The former, he 
argues, is a cluster of institutions and their practices that surround the governmental system; 
the latter refers to the image the state holds and projects about itself.  
29 
 
It is important, for the purposes of this study, to point out that Abrams’ alternative reading 
of the state was specifically directed against Marxist notions of the capitalist state.10 In the 
context of African societies, however, where the majority of the population are agrarian and 
qualities of governance are not exclusively confined to government institutions, Abrams’ 
proposal is clearly not comprehensive enough to explore state-society relations. Nevertheless, 
Abrams’s distinction between the state idea and state system, as I demonstrate later, remains 
useful for the aim this thesis to make sense of how the state is produced as something separate 
from society.  
Subsequently, Timothy Mitchell (1991; 1999) takes up Abrams argument, but rather than 
distinguish between the state system and the state idea, he argues that they should be viewed 
as two sides of the same process. This is because, as Mitchell maintains, the state idea is not a 
purely ideological construct and it does not occur as a subjective belief that exists in the heads 
of individuals, but rather it is given substance by real material processes. Mitchell draws on 
Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power to emphasise that the abstract expressions of the state, 
or what Abrams calls the state idea, ‘arises from techniques that enable mundane practices to 
take on the appearance of an abstract, nonmaterial form’. The very ‘appearance of a world 
fundamentally divided into state and society’ is, as Mitchell argues, an effect of the ‘spatial 
organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and 
surveillance’ that we attribute to the state (1991: 95). These mundane practices of disciplinary 
power practices and discoursers, according to Mitchell, produce the effect of the state as an 
autonomous entity. The distinction between state and society, Mitchell therefore argues, is not 
an expression of functional differentiation or a historically given fact but a product of an elusive 
                                                 
10 More specifically, his writing addressed the works of two Marxist scholars, Ralph Miliband and Nicolas 
Poulantzas, who, he argues, developed a reified notion of the state in capitalist societies. He argues, ‘both 
perceived the non-entity of the state and failed to cling to the logic of that perception’ (1988: 69). 
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‘structural effect’. The porous, elusive and uncertain line between the state and society does 
not therefore create two fundamentally separate and opposing realms Instead, Mitchell (1991: 
78) writes: ‘the distinction must be taken not as the boundary between two discrete entities, but 
as a line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a 
social and political order is maintained’ This leads him to the conclusion that the state is neither 
pure practice nor pure abstraction; it is an effect of all the above activities. 
Mitchell’s central argument that the state is the ‘metaphysical effect’ of everyday practices 
is well received, and it finds resonance in anthropology within the work of many scholars who, 
for instance, view the state as a fetish, an ‘invented whole of materialized artifice into whose 
woeful insufficiency of being we have placed soulstuff’ (Taussig 1997: 3); as a myth, which is 
sustained by ‘the rather mundane practices of authorization and recognition carried out by the 
state’ (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 21); as a set of cultural practices (Bevir and Rhodes 2010); 
and as an idea, rather than a coherent set of institutions, imagined on the basis of practices 
(Joseph and Nugent 1994; Gupta 1995; Nuijten 2003; Migdal 2001; Sharma and Gupta 2006; 
Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Das and Poole 2004).  
Based on the insights of these scholars, this thesis takes an ethnographic approach to the 
study of the state in Ethiopia, thereby countering the long-standing propensity among scholars 
to reify the state in Africa as an imported, vacuous and inefficient ensemble of institutions that 
is elevated above society and separate from it. As such, it heeds Timothy Mitchell’s call to 
study the state as ‘a powerful, metaphysical effect of practices’11 (89) rather than as a thing. 
                                                 
11 That said, however, African states lack the type of panoptic and disciplinary biopower (Foucault 1977) that 
emerged in Western welfare states. Hence, as I demonstrate below, this thesis adopts Bevir and Rhodes’s (2010) 
decentred approach to governance. The issue of power will be considered in detail later in this chapter. 
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Thus, the thesis, instead of viewing the Ethiopian state as a monolithic actor, deals with the 
modalities by which its discreteness, as separate from and above society, is re/produced.  
How, then, does one locate the state in its empirical sense? Hansen and Stepputat (2001: 8) 
suggest the study of the state should encompass both ‘the practical languages of governance’ 
and ‘the symbolic languages of authority’12. A similar approach was advanced by Akhil Gupta, 
who suggests that the study of the state should involve ‘both the analysis of the everyday 
practices of local bureaucracies and the discursive construction of the state in public culture’ 
(Gupta 1995: 3750). Much work on postcolonial states has drawn attention to corruption as a 
fruitful research focus (Corbridge et al. 2005; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006; Roitman 
2005; Gupta, 1995; Taussig, 1997). Works inspired by Foucault’s writings emphasise the need 
to explore the ways in which individuals are induced to conduct themselves (Rose 1996) and 
how people react to the state’s ‘everydayness and their senses of what it is to be a citizen’ 
(Corbridge et al. 2005: 8).  
Ethnographic studies from West Africa stress the multiplicity of authorities in the context 
of public administration and collective service delivery. These studies, as I will discuss in 
greater detail later, emphasis on modes of governance and power relations within a variety of 
local institutions, paying close attention to themes such as public education provision (Korling 
2010), public health care provision (Jaffre and Olivier de Sardan 2003) and corruption (Blundo 
and Olivier de Sardan 2006; Routley 2016). Some work on the postcolonial state in Africa has 
emphasised the importance of ‘political imagination’ (Friedman 2011) and the construction of 
                                                 
12 The language of governance involves the assertion of territorial sovereignty, the monopolization of violence, 
and the management of the national economy; whereas the language of authority involves the institutionalisation 
of the law, the materialisation of the state in signs and rituals, and the nationalization of the territory and the 
institutions of the state through the inscription of a history and a shared community of landscapes and cultural 
practices’ (Hansen and Stepputat: 2001:8). 
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the idea of the state. Hagmann and Péclard (2010) suggested the analytical framework of 
‘negotiating statehood’, arguing the need to study the state in Africa in relation to power 
relations and negotiations at the intersection of the local, national and international levels. 
Together, the preceding overview of the theoretical underpinnings of this work offers a 
multiplicity of entry points for the study of the state. However, what it also brings into view is 
an understanding that ‘the state’s referents vary so widely across different times, places, and 
contexts’ (Jessop 2015: 21). There is no single point of departure allowing one to analytically 
grasp the variations in power relations and multitude of experiences that produce state effects. 
This suggests that the state can only be grasped as part of an empirical analysis of the many 
ways in which people enact their agency in everyday life and make sense of politics.  
For this reason, to capture the many referents of the state in Ethiopia and underpin my 
ethnographic perspective on state formation, drawing on ethnographic materials, I employ four 
conceptual themes: governance, bureaucratic, development and discursive practices. The 
analytical benefit of using these themes is that they shed light on the heterogeneity of practices 
and discourses that produce the state as a seemingly coherent entity. However, the distinction 
between them should be seen only as a heuristic for understanding the process of state 
formation. They are in fact intertwined and intersecting concepts. Governance, for instance, is 
too broad and elusive concept; it can subsume and encompass bureaucratic, development and 
discursive practices. It is also impossible to make a distinction between bureaucratic and 
development practices, especially in the Ethiopian context, where bureaucracy is used as an 
instrument for development administration. The analytical distinction, however, remains useful 
for capturing the processes and practices in which the state comes to be re/produced.  
 That said, it is essential to note that, in the literature reviewed above, the concept of practice 
cuts across various themes and emerges as central to understanding and conceptualising the 
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various ways through which the state effect is produced in everyday life. My analytical 
approach therefore invokes the concept of practice in order to establish an analytical link 
between the four key concepts of this study. I use the concept of practice to refer to governance, 
bureaucratic and development activities and discursive practices as ‘a set of actions’ that 
‘exhibit a pattern, perhaps even a pattern that remains relatively stable across time’ (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2010: 75). My use of the term practice resembles Bourdieu’s notion in a sense that it 
is postulated in relation to the concept of habitus, the system of ‘durable, transposable 
dispositions’ (1977: 72). As such, this thesis views practices as social processes through which 
identities are negotiated and local interests are articulated and the state comes to be constituted 
and entwined with the everyday context of local life, which is the source of my ethnographic 
data. Yet, unlike Bourdieu, I argue that agents can change ‘acquired, permanent, and generative 
dispositions’ (1990: 290) and ‘reason and act in novel ways’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2006: 4). 
Viewed this way, practices allow us to postulate beliefs and discourses that are inscribed in 
diverse and contingent actions of agents within each theme. It is these contingent and unstable 
practices that help to constitute the state. 
Governance practices  
The conception of governance from which this thesis develops is rooted in the decentred theory 
of governance generated by Bevir and Rhodes (2010, 2016). Before outlining this approach, it 
may be worthwhile reviewing some of the governance literature on Africa. However, the 
literature on governance is too vast and very rich to be comprehensively surveyed here. Given 
the scope of this study, I provide only a more general overview, focusing largely on works that 
are relevant to my research focus.  
Studies on governance in Africa have traditionally been concerned with understanding the 
multiplicity of governance norms, mostly focusing on what Oliver de Sardan (2015) calls the 
‘problem of the gap’ (20), i.e. the gap between ‘the official norms that govern institutions’ and 
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‘the actual behaviour of public agents’ (19). This discrepancy has been theorised in the 
literature on the state in Africa in two predominant ways. The first set of literature sees the 
discrepancy of norms as arising from ‘the problematic intersection of tradition and modernity 
within Africa’ (Routley 2016). This intersection has often been framed from a neo-patrimonial 
perspective. The neo-patrimonial literature views governance in Africa as characterised by 
predation, clientelism and corruption, resulting in state crises and failure (see Clapham 1996; 
Jackson 1990; Thomson 2000; van de Walle 2001). This approach has been criticised widely 
for a number of reasons, not least because it is ‘too blunt and too formulaic an instrument for 
understanding the variety of African experiences and the contradictory interests, ideologies, 
and motivations of social actors involved’ (Mkandawire 2013: 52).  
The second approach sees the discrepancy between norms as reflecting the 
‘incommensurability’ (Herdt and Olivier de Sardan 2015: 5) between Weberian bureaucracy 
and the enduring precolonial ‘African political culture’. Bayart (2009), for instance, talks about 
‘creolisation’, i.e. the dynamic process by which hybrid governance forms are produced and 
actors adopt and draw from a variety of discursive genres. Both these approaches have been 
widely criticised because of their emphasis on the lack or presence of norms rather than on 
practices (Blundo and Le Meur 2009; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014; Olivier de 
Sardan 2015).  
The importance of focusing on ‘real governance’ on the basis of empirical case studies 
beyond policy-driven process and the ‘schematic theses’ which either ‘euphemise or 
pathologise’ (Blundo and Le Meur 2009: 2) the state in Africa has emerged in a number of 
recent studies on governance in Africa. Very broadly, I distinguish between and present two of 
these dominant approaches. The first approach analyses governance in Africa in terms of 
provision of public service from an empirical basis (Blundo and Le Meur 2009; Bierschenk 
and Olivier de Sardan 2014). It draws critical attention to the ‘complex configurations in which 
35 
 
the African state is no longer the only actor of economic and social change and sole provider 
of public and collective services’ (Blundo and Le Meur 2009). The emphasis here is on the 
multiplicity of modes of governance and institutions of a non-state nature that are engaged in 
the production of collective goods and services. In his synoptic account of governance literature 
in Africa, Olivier de Sardan (2009, 2014), for example, offers a typology of ‘eight modes of 
local governance’ based on the experience of Niger: chiefly (exercised by customary or 
traditional leaders); the bureaucratic mode of governance (state); communal (municipal and 
local councils that arise recent from decentralisation); project based (development agencies, 
national and international NGOs); associational (cooperatives etc.); sponsorship based 
(involving sponsors and big men); religious mode of governance (churches and brotherhoods) 
and a merchant based (private operators delivering public services). He argues that each of 
these modes of governance has its own distinctive character, its own actors, ‘specific forms of 
authority and legitimacy’, and that each has its own norms (Olivier de Sardan 2009: 8).  
This approach presents an important point of entry to the study of the state in Africa because 
it unpacks the assumed boundary between state and society. However, it is anchored in a 
‘utilitarian’ conception of public goods, especially on a predefined notion of ‘public service’ 
and, as a result, it loses its analytical traction to ‘profile the articulation of public interest in 
specific settings’ (Koechlin 2015: 2).  
The second position focuses on an understanding of governance in terms of ‘institutionalised 
modes of social coordination that produce and implement collectively binding rules or to 
provide collective goods’ (Risse 2011: 9). The main emphasis here is put on ‘areas of limited 
statehood in … sub-Saharan Africa, where the state monopoly over the use of force is 
systematically lacking’ (Risse 2011: 5). This approach has informed the analysis of 
‘governance without government’ (Raeymaekers et al. 2008) in the cases of, for example, 
Somalia (Menkhaus 2006), Congo and the Central African Republic (Liese and Beisheim 2011) 
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as a legitimate form of governance. Scholars working within this framework maintain that 
governance should be understood as a process and a structure in an empirically grounded way, 
and in so doing they seek to unearth the ways in which effective and legitimate governance 
sustain in areas of limited statehood (Draude 2007, Raeymaekers et al. 2008, Borzel and Risse 
2010). The main drawback of this approach, however, is that it fails to elaborate state-society 
relations in terms of the multiplicity of actors, contexts of overlapping spheres and networks 
of both state and non-state actors. Significantly, there is a distinct absence of personal agency 
in this approach (Koechlin and Forster 2015).  
While I broadly agree with the literature reviewed above, I find that these approaches 
provide a limitation to my study by assuming a priori the existence of certain arrangements and 
governance mechanisms, thereby foreclosing the study of practices of governance which may 
show contingent patterns and dynamics. For this reason, I choose to use a decentred approach 
to governance (Bevir and Rhodes 2010, 2016). Hence, following Bevir (2013: 1), I 
conceptualise governance as ‘a set of diverse practices that people are constantly creating and 
re-creating through their concrete activities’. This approach emphasises not only the diversity 
of governance arrangements but also their contingency and contestability. As such, governance 
is defined and redefined through social actors and thus cannot be captured by a focus on 
disembedded structures or reified institutions. Hence, the study of governance requires 
discerning contexts in politics and social life, actors, the response of individuals to the 
dilemmas they encounter and the interpretations that actors attach to practice, actions and 
institutions (Bevir and Rhodes 2010, 2016).  
Bevir and Rhodes (2016) articulated this theory in terms of a process involving the shift 
from government to governance and hierarchy to network in the context of Europe. It must be 
stressed here that while I agree with and use the decentred approach as a conceptual foundation 
for exploring state formation in Ethiopia, I do not find the distinction made by Bevir and 
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Rhodes (2010) between hierarchy and network to be applicable in the context of Africa, 
particularly that of Ethiopia. As we shall see throughout the thesis, the role of the central state 
and political institutions in Ethiopia are quite important and surely assume more than ‘a less 
hands-on role’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2010: 94).  
This thesis thus examines the practices and processes by which governance takes place 
‘through a maze of networks’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2006: 76) at the boundary of state and society. 
This is in line with the ethnographic literature on the state reviewed in the preceding section 
that emphasises the importance of focusing on local social realities that shape governance 
practices (Sharma and Gupta 2006; Hansen and Stepputat 2001). Further, the study also 
explores the dynamics of personalised and informal patterns of relationships that occur within 
the institutions that constitute the state and investigates the type of local actors and the nature 
of the public spaces in which governance practices take place.  
The thesis also focuses on and recognises that ‘everyday practices arise from situated agents 
whose beliefs and actions are informed by traditions and expressed in stories’ (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2006: 94). This aspect draws attention to the ways in which state actors are imbricated 
in rituals and routines, and how they are socialised into a specific contingent of conducting 
business, etc. In this sense, governance constitutes ‘the stories people use to construct, convey, 
and explain traditions, dilemmas, beliefs and practices’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010: 94).  
Bureaucratic practices 
The significance of bureaucracy in the implementation of development policy, as I discuss in 
the next section, has long been recognised (Ferguson 1994; Scott 1998; Long 1992; Lewis and 
Moss 2006). However, little attention has been paid to the ways in which it contributes to the 
process of state formation. Too often political scientists tend to dismiss the bureaucracy in 
Africa merely as a façade of a Western style of governance, arguing that behind the façade lies 
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the real, ‘the African way of doing things’. There are however convincing studies of the state 
that start with the postulation that the bureaucracy in Africa should be seen and interrogated as 
part of the ‘real’ (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006; Routley 2010). Studying the state in 
Africa requires taking seriously the bureaucracy as constitutive of power relations and 
governance practices. This study particularly examines the dynamic in which the bureaucracy 
is oriented towards redrawing social realities or in the production of ‘the society of the state’,13 
i.e. the creation of a society in which the very sovereignty and authority of the state is defined. 
Chapter 9 demonstrates how specific bureaucratic practices (land survey and classification and 
the introduction of state legal norms) help to transform the Borana into ‘the society of the state’ 
in Ethiopia.  
In pursuing the state in Ethiopia through the lens of bureaucratic practices, I also pay 
attention to the everyday nature of power and the articulation of hierarchy within the 
bureaucracy. I examine the ways in which state authority and hierarchy are reproduced and 
installed through a regularised set of bureaucratic practices (everyday institutional rites such as 
meetings), interactions between officials and the local people (public meetings) and ordinary 
people interacting with the institution of the kebele. In so doing, I build on anthropological 
insights about performance (Gluckman 1958; Turner 1974). In addition to the focus on 
performance, in drawing inspiration from the work of Ferguson and Gupta (2002), the thesis 
investigates how bureaucratic activities contribute to the reification of state power across two 
spatial metaphors: verticality and encompassment. Verticality refers to the ways in which the 
hierarchy and dominance of the state vis-à-vis society are produced, and encompassment is the 
process which metaphorically locates the state ‘within an ever widening series of circles that 
                                                 
13 This takes place through ‘a diversity of procedures among them being the incorporation and regulation or else 
the exclusion, marginalization, or suppression of communities, organizations or other forms of sociopolitical 




begins with family and local community and ends with the system of nation-states’ (982). 
These spatial metaphors are particularly useful in understanding the processes by which the 
state embeds itself socially while ceaselessly enacting a hierarchy in which it positions itself 
as a dominant entity over and above the non-state realm (society and NGOs).  
Finally, the thesis explores the images and bureaucratic representations that influence 
people’s perceptions of ‘what the state is’ (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 18). Representations of 
the state such as ‘organisational charts, official seals and photographs of state leaders’ help to 
create the appearance of coherence to the institutions that constitute the state (Sharma and 
Gupta 2006: 19). 
Development practices  
In trying to make sense of the process by which the state comes to be constituted as a thing that 
appears separate from society, I found it useful to explore the practices of development project 
implementations. These practices include, but are not limited to, the construction and 
management of an irrigation facility, the management of agricultural resources, sedentarisation 
and territorialisation projects, food distribution mechanisms and also NGOs’ development-
related activities.  
There is a rich body of literature on development planning and practices (for an overview 
see Lewis and Moss 2006). In many of these studies, scholars have engaged with how realities 
are re/constituted through practices of development planning. James Scott, for example, 
examines how ‘high modernist’ – the belief in scientific progress that informs state 
development practices – interventions can lead to unintended consequences that are ‘potentially 
lethal’ (Scott 1998: 5). Similarly, Ferguson (1994) talks about the ‘instrument-effect’ of 
development – side effects unintended by planners. In his case of Lesotho, Ferguson argues 
that such side effects include the expansion of bureaucratic state power and depoliticisation of 
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poverty through the establishment of an ‘anti-politics machine’ (256). These effects, Ferguson 
(1994) argues, form a ‘strategically coherent or intelligible whole’ and thus serve as a way of 
exercising power.  
 There are numerous studies dealing with patterns of ‘state-society synergy’ (Evans1997) in 
development administration, which tackles the general themes of community participation, 
social capital and the role of bureaucracy in development efforts (for an overview see Lange 
and Rueschemeyer 2005). There is a particularly extensive literature that focuses on the role of 
the state and society in irrigation management (Wade 1982; Uphoff 1991; Lam 1996). Many 
of these studies reject the top down bureaucratic form of centralised implementation and 
management of most irrigation systems. They argue that top down bureaucratic irrigation 
management destroys community social capital. They instead suggest that a state-society 
partnership is instrumental to promoting accountability, optimising irrigation performance, and 
enhancing farmers’ participation (see Uphoff 1991; Lam 1996, 1997). Uphoff (1991), for 
example, through the case of the Gal Oya irrigation scheme in Sri Lanka, demonstrates that a 
participatory irrigation scheme that mobilised farmers to self-manage water improves equity 
of water distribution and contribute to the creation of social solidarity. 
This thesis (in Chapter 6) explores the manner in which the idea of ‘state-society synergy’ 
(Evans1997) produces an ‘instrument-effect’ (Ferguson 1994) of creating and sustaining the 
distinction between state and society (i.e. community). It does so by examining the process of 
construction of an important local development scheme, the Koga irrigation and watershed 
management project. It unpacks assumptions that policymakers and development practitioners 
make about a priori existence of community and the state distinction and arranges them as 
functionally differentiated entities. I will also pay attention to the effects produced by the 
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‘boundary-making’ 14  (Mayrl and Quinn 2016) logic of the project. My ethnographic 
descriptions of the effects of the Koga irrigation and watershed management project broadly 
echo Ferguson’s observations about the depoliticising effects of development practices. But it 
goes further to argue that the process of production of the state-society boundary not only 
depoliticises inequality, prevents meaningful participation and reproduces power hierarchies 
but also ghettoises abuses, corruption and resource conflicts by presenting them as community 
issues, as opposed to those of the state.  
Related to the issue of development bureaucracy and interventions is the question of who 
performs and enacts practices, and how do they do it? This thesis engages with the 
heterogeneous nature of development actors, their performance and how their actions feed into 
the process of state formation. Here, I draw inspiration from Norman Long’s (1992, 2001) 
‘actor-oriented’ and interface analysis of development. Long defined the ‘actor-oriented’ 
approach as an ‘ethnographic understanding of the “social life” of development projects – from 
conception to realisation – as well as the responses and lived experiences of the variously 
located and affected social actors’ (2001: 14–15). This approach moves away from the simple 
hegemonic and top-down approaches to development practices that framed the relationship 
between policies and their implementation as a linear process. Key to this actor-oriented 
understanding of development are the ‘multiple’ and ‘diverse social realities’ and dispersed 
notion of power and ‘interface situations’ (Long 1992: 6) in which different world views meet, 
interpenetrate and clash. The interfaces between the actors are ‘characterised by discontinuities 
in interests, values and power, and their dynamic entails negotiation, accommodation and the 
struggle over definitions and boundaries’ (Long and Villarreal 1993: 143).  
                                                 
14 I will elaborate what I mean by this in Chapter 6. 
42 
 
This thesis builds on these insights and uncovers how development meanings and practices 
are re/produced, contested and negotiated in practice. This approach helps us to grasp the 
enactment of power and production of identities. It also helps us understand how different 
actors’ understandings of development relate to their social positions and the ways in which 
the state is differently constructed by differently positioned actors.  
Importantly, it also brings out the differences, tensions and contradictions between formal 
development objectives and the strategies pursued by actors at different levels of the state 
bureaucracy. As will be shown in this thesis, this helps to capture the dynamic interplay and 
tension between a) the constitutive effects of central state strategies of development and their 
appropriations and enactments by locally situated actors (state and non-state officials); and b) 
attempts to separate the realms of responsibilities and activities between the state and 
community and the practices of and interactions between local state officials, local residents 
and customary leaders that blur the boundaries between state and society.  
I see some of these contradictions and tensions as both productive and as a ‘resource of 
power’ (Mitchell 1999). They are productive because they create the appearance of a 
distinction between the state and society; they are a ‘resource of power’ because, although the 
boundary is permeable in practice, it enables institutions that constitute the state to mobilise 
labour and other resources for development initiatives (see Chapter 6). In this study, 
development practices are approached as part of the process through which the Ethiopian state 
comes into being.  
Discourses and state imagination  
In addition to governance, bureaucratic and development practices, I follow Abrams’ (1988: 
79) call to focus on ‘the cogency of the idea of the state as an ideological power and treat that 
as a compelling object of analyses’. In so doing, I seek to capture the idea of the Ethiopian state 
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in the imagination of the people who inhabit it. Here, imagination refers to the multiple ways 
through which ordinary people ‘perceive, and talk about, represent and construct, and 
experience’ (Friedman 2011: 8) the state. Political imagination, although susceptible to 
illusions, exaggeration, falsehood and fantasies (Friedman 2011), arises as an effect of local 
discursive practices (Tsing 1993: 25) and is therefore crucial for the representation of the state 
as a coherent entity (Nugent 2001). My use of the concept of discourse requires some 
qualification. The concept of discourse as developed by Foucault is more than just language. 
Discourses, Foucault (1972: 49) maintains, are ‘practices that systematically form the objects 
of which they speak’. However, Foucault also argues that central to an understanding of 
practices is the multiple meanings that make practices possible (Bevir and Rhodes 2015). Here 
Foucault, as Bevir and Rhodes (2015: 13) point out, appears to suggest that ‘discourses develop 
randomly as products of time and chance’. Hence Bevir and Rhodes (2015) suggest replacing 
the concept of discourse with tradition. However, instead of abandoning the concept of 
discourse in favour of tradition, I treat it as a contingent mode of action and set of social 
practices that arise from situated agents, their experience and their beliefs and which are 
expressed in language. To treat discourses as both manifest and produced by human agents 
helps us to bring governance, bureaucratic and development practices to the fore. These 
practices relate to peoples’ lived experience and social interactions, which simultaneously 
relate to knowledge and discourses. As a result, discourses construct and reveal links between 
practices and the cultural meaning of practices. I view state imagination as a product of this 
process.  
Against this background, to demonstrate how the state is popularly imagined, I analyse the 
corruption and development discourses (and counter-discourses) found in kebele public 
domains. By the kebele public domain, I mean the habitual social spaces such as tea and coffee 
houses, tella bet (literally meaning beer house) and the informal roadside gatherings where 
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local inhabitants engage with a variety of issues that shape the idea of state and moral rights 
and wrongs. As the next section will argue, a discussion on discourses must also be aware of 
the importance of power and what Foucault calls ‘counter discourse’/ ‘critical attitude’.  
In addition to analysing the state imaginations arising from public space, I pay attention to 
‘the practices of representation and interpretation which characterise the relationship between 
people and the state bureaucracy and through which the idea of the state is constructed’ (Nuijten 
2003: 17). Nuijten’s (2003) study on issues of power and communal property in Mexico 
provides us with the view that the cultural construction of the state generates both hope and 
despair. On the one hand the state is constructed as a ‘hope generating machine’ while on the 
other, it is represented as ‘opacity, distrust and conspiracy, which always surrounds conflicts, 
negotiations and dealings with the bureaucracy’ (2003: 17). Thomas Blom Hansen (2001) 
offers us another view on how the imagination of the state, in the case of Mumbai, was marked 
by a constitutive split between its ‘sublime’ and ‘profane’ dimensions. These distinctions are 
important and they are also important in the development of this thesis. The finding of the 
thesis demonstrates how people in Degga and Odda make distinctions between a corrupt local 
bureaucracy and an impartial central state. The hopes and expectations generated by the 
bureaucratic machine are constitutive of state power and serve the important function of 
producing legitimacy for the national leadership. 
Yet state imagination is not solely a product of modernist practices and people’s interaction 
with the bureaucracy. It is also intimately tied to the cultural world view of the local people. In 
the view of this study, the latter cannot be divorced from particular bureaucratic practices and 
power relations. The state, after all, is a cultural construction (Bevir and Rhodes 2010; Sharma 
and Gupta 2006) built around a complex matrix of social relations and cultural contexts. In my 
attempt to demonstrate the modalities by which the state comes to be imagined, I therefore pay 
attention to the religious language and metaphors that make for a particular political culture. 
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By political culture, I mean the system of signs and meaning through which people make sense 
of politics. My contention is that the political-cultural is not a self-evident repertoire of political 
common sense or a source of legitimacy for political authority but rather a contingent process 
that is ceaselessly constructed and reconstructed through a power/knowledge nexus. One site 
through which power and political culture in North Ethiopia operate and are instituted is the 
church. In Chapter 7, I will demonstrate how religious language and metaphors enable people 
to imagine the state. I do not, however, address religious discourses directly but instead make 
reference to the metaphors, expressed through narratives, which denote the cultural 
understanding and world views relevant to state imagination and the elements of particular 
principles that underlay relationships.  
Power and class  
This thesis builds on two additional analytical frameworks. First, cutting across the four 
dimensions outlined above is power. Second, governance and power dynamics allow for the 
emergence of class. In what follows I outline in more detail how these concepts inform this 
thesis. 
Power  
This thesis builds on Foucault’s work which treats power as a relational and diffused concept. 
For Foucault, power is not a system of domination which is exclusive to the state, a social class 
or other social group. He argues that power does not emanate from a particular agent but is in 
fact embedded in all social relations. Power relations, Foucault (1980: 142) argues, are 
‘interwoven with other kinds of relations (production, kinship, family, sexuality) for which 
they play at once a conditioning and conditioned role’, and hence ‘power is co-extensive with 
the social body’. Power is exercised and flows through and within discourses and as a result, 
rather than search for its origin, Foucault argues, it should be investigated as a network of 
connections and through its effects on social relations.  
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Foucault’s understanding of power helps us to move away from the conventional 
dichotomies between state and society, centre and periphery, and private and public. This thesis 
emphasises the dispersed character of power and argues that it is the primary mode through 
which underdeveloped subjectivities are formed (see Chapters 6 and 9) and the idea of the state 
is produced. However, Foucault’s decoupling of power and agency allows little room to trace 
how social and political processes are mediated, shaped and reshaped by situated actors within 
a particular tradition. It also leads to the idea that meanings that inform practices stem from 
disembodied ‘quasi-structures’ such as ideology, discourse and language. To come to terms 
with the problem of agency and practice, Bevir and Rhodes (2010) distinguish between agency 
and autonomy. They argue that individuals can act and reason in novel ways, albeit against the 
background of the tradition and contexts that influence them. Therefore, they argued for the 
concept of ‘situated agency’.  
The concept of ‘situated agency’ provides us with some much-needed space for exploring 
how governance is made possible by the contingent activities of individuals and how the state 
comes to be imagined by people enacting their political agency within the banality of everyday 
life. Bevir and Rhodes’s (2010) concept of situated agency resonates with Norman Long’s 
conception of the actor. Like Bevir and Rhodes’s (2010) situated agent, the actor for Long is a 
social and cultural being who is knowledgeable and capable but at the same time shaped by 
intersubjective reality. In this context, Long argues, ‘power is composed here and now by 
enrolling many actors in a given political and social scheme’ (Latour 1986: 264 cited in Long 
2001: 17). Hence, Long argues, agency (and power) depend crucially upon the emergence of a 
network of actors who become partially, though hardly ever completely, enrolled in the 
‘“project” of some other person or persons’ (Long 2001: 17). I treat individuals as 
‘knowledgeable’ and ‘capable’ (Giddens 1984: 1–16) of dealing with ‘dilemmas’ (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2010), and as a conceptual point of entry to grasp practices and the way in which 
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knowledge is produced and circulated. The concept of power as applied in the thesis is therefore 
linked to agency.  
I want to make two more points here that are of particular importance to this thesis. First, in 
placing power at the front and centre of this study, I am not arguing that the state is an effect 
of the sum total of micro-networks of power relations, as alluded by Mitchell, or as an 
‘institutional condensation of social relations’ as emphasised by Poulantzas (cited in Joseph 
2002: 90). In the case of Europe, as Foucault points out, political forces select, codify and apply 
different techniques of power from institutions such as schools, prisons, the army, the police, 
hospitals and factories. Hence, the techniques of governance that underpin power relations arise 
from below (see Jessop 2007). However, in the case of Africa, the techniques and technologies 
of domination do not always emerge from below or within African societies (Roitman 2004). 
Instead, one of the ways in which social forces acquire techniques and technologies of 
domination, articulate ideologies and purse particular interests in Africa is through what Bayart 
(2009) calls resources of extraversion (international connections), which include diplomatic, 
military, cultural resources and Western know-how. In regard to the latter, Bayart argues that 
‘mastery of western knowledge also conditions mastery of the state and the economy’ (75). 
Here, I do not dispute – in fact, I underscore – the importance of social relations and political 
culture in shaping the state in Africa. The point is rather that state formation is informed by a 
wider matrix of power relations than I am able to fully explore. 
Second, I argue that Foucault’s notion of power, specifically his emphasis on ‘counter-
conduct’ as a critical element of power, has broader implications for the understanding of state 
and society in Ethiopia. It opens the way for an exploration of how ‘counter-conduct’ is 
inscribed in everyday life. Foucault used the term ‘counter-conduct’ to denote the pursuit of ‘a 
different form of conduct ... wanting to be conducted differently by other leaders … towards 
other objectives … through other procedures and methods’ (Foucault 2007: 194–5). For 
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Foucault, the question of governing is inseparable from the critical attitude of ‘how not to be 
governed’ and ‘the art of not being governed quite so much’ (ibid). He contends that resistance 
is integral to power: ‘where there is power, there is resistance’ (1978: 95).  
The question, then, is how does the attitude of counter-conduct emerge? Foucault 
identifies three ‘historical anchoring points’ (1997: 27) in the interaction between the ‘art of 
governing’ and the attitude of being critical. First, he points to the art of governance in 
Medieval Europe, where the mentalities of individuals were shaped by scriptures and the art 
of governance was established in the authority of the church. In this way of governance, 
Foucault notes, ‘being critical was biblical’ (Djaballah 2013: 271). Second, Foucault points 
to the prominence of legal institutions in the 16th century and noted, in this context, being 
critical was constituted as ‘the counter-practice of being governed is juridical’ (Djaballah 
2013: 271). The third has to do with epistemic orientation or the rejection of ‘dogmatic 
claims to knowledge, and the certainty of claims to truth based on authority, accepting them 
only if one has grounds to do so oneself’ (Djaballah 2013: 271). 
 The concept of counter-conduct and the context within which it emerges as outlined above 
is germane to my analysis of how ‘the art of being governed’ and ‘the will not to be governed’ 
(Foucault 1997) are conceptualised within the field of power in Ethiopia. In this thesis, counter-
conduct is related to the development and anti-poverty discourses which are periodically 
mobilised by ‘the state’ to legitimise development politics and political power. These 
discourses, I argue, form the ‘critical attitude’/ ‘counter-conduct’ (Foucault 2007) against 
which people at both my fieldwork sites deploy to voice the perverse effects of governance 
practices and discrepancies between promises and practices, and to constitute themselves as 
deserving citizens and reimagine the state (see Chapter 7).  
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In addition to development discourses, I will demonstrate that, in northern Ethiopia, 
critical discourse is substantially articulated in the widespread religious metaphors and 
idioms which define the roles and obligations involved in governance. It informs the ways 
in which people understand hierarchy, insist on accountability and define governance and 
how they enunciate visions of injustice and rights talk. I will return to the question of 
hierarchy, culture and power in Chapter 4, but I would now like to end the discussion by 
reiterating that counter-conducts are not the rejection of governance itself but are an 
expression of the pursuit of a different mode of governance. As Foucault notes, it is about 
‘the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at that price’ (1997: 72). It is 
in this sense that resistance does not exist outside of power. 
Class  
I argue that power and governance dynamics are how the processes whereby control over land 
and state resources are structured and contested. They are fundamental to how class 
polarisation is established, thereby allowing the study of class relations to provide insights into 
the everyday dynamics of state formation. The kind of class polarisation I discuss in this thesis 
is the ascendency of the rich farmers and pastoralists who are dependent on the state for an 
accumulation of capital. The rise of the model farmers was aided by the means of primitive 
accumulation which involves the displacement and dissociation of farmers and pastoralists 
from the means of production (such as land and agricultural input) and the systematic transfer 
of those means of production to rich farmers. My use of the term primitive accumulation is not 
in a strict Marxist sense15 but rather has to do with the struggles and power relations that arise 
around the introduction of new techniques of governance that seek to transform rural 
livelihoods. Central to these new techniques of governance are the rational discourses on 
                                                 
15 As originally formulated by Marx, primitive accumulation is associated with the process by which workers are 
alienated from their means of production in the context of capitalist transition.  
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human development in relation to agricultural productivity, hygiene, birth and disease control 
and the importance of modern education. These new technologies of governance combined 
with the necessities of party politics provide a framework of what Jessop (2007) calls ‘strategic 
selectivity’ at the local level, i.e. they are systematically made to be open to individuals with a 
certain level of education and social capital at the same time as marginalising others. This way 
power relations lead to the constitution of class forces. 
2.2.The concept of mengist and state-party relations in Ethiopia 
So far in this chapter, I have sought to establish the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that 
will carry through this thesis. The remaining section of the chapter concerns itself specifically 
with Ethiopia. As a way to contextualise my usage of the concept of the state vis-à-vis the 
vernacular term mengist, I first examine the different conceptions of what constitutes mengist. 
Next, I provide an analysis of the relationship between the ruling party – the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – and the state. The exploration here seeks to 
answer the following questions: What constitutes the Ethiopian state as an idea and set of 
institutions separate from the ruling party? How might one distinguish the state from the party 
in an empirical sense and make it available for ethnographic analysis? In my attempt to answer 
these questions, I introduce the party’s two crucial guiding ideologies – revolutionary 
democracy and developmental state – and examine them in relation to the Ethiopian state. In 
so doing, I make an argument for the critical importance of distinguishing between the party 
and the state system, thereby opening the state to an ethnographic investigation.  
The idea of mengist  
The concept of the state in Ethiopia is commonly associated with the Amharic word mengist, 
a derivative of the term neges, which means the act of becoming a king (Toggia 2008). It 
signifies extensive notions of power, royal privilege and authority. The word mengist does not 
make a distinction between government and state (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). However, 
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often academic discussions about the state in Ethiopia start with the same conception. Recently, 
however, Mesfin Woldemariam (2013), criticising the uncritical use of the concept of mengist 
by historians, noted that state and government have historically been separate concepts in 
Ethiopia. He asserted that early royal chroniclers 16  used the term hagere-mengist, a 
combination of hager (which in common parlance means ‘country’) and mengist (government), 
to indicate the idea of a state that is made up of four key elements: population, territory, 
government and sovereignty. This understanding views mengist as an a priori or predefined 
agent composed of static elements that can readily be identified. It produces a reified 
conceptualisation of the state.  
On the other hand, the constitution of Ethiopia produces a distinction between state and 
government. The idea of the state that is enshrined in the constitution is that of an entity which 
is subject to the sovereignty of ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ (Art. 8, FDRE constitution). 
The preamble of the constitution begins: ‘We, the nations, nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia: Determined to build by the exercise of our right to self-determination, for ourselves 
and of our own free will, a single political community …’ The constitution confers rights to 
self-determination to all of the country’s recognised language groups17 (nations, nationalities 
and peoples) that include the right to preserve and develop their own languages, culture and 
history, participate equally in the federal government and ‘form their own state’ (article 47, 
FDRE constitution) or secede from the federal arrangement (article 39, FDRE constitution) ‘if 
they felt their rights had been denied or abrogated’ (Vaughan 2015: 285).  
The essence of the constitutional idea of the state is thus one formed based on cultural 
identity and the sovereignty of language groups. In other words, the constitution invokes an 
idea of a state that is formed through the coming together of distinct sovereign entities rather 
                                                 
16 Personal conversation, Addis Ababa, December, 2014. 
17 Ethiopia has more than more than 70 recognised ethnic/language groups (Vaughan 2015). 
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than an idea of state imbued with historically developed coherence, indivisibility and essential 
unity. The state, in other words, is an ‘assembled entity’ rather than an organic one. The concept 
of government, on the other hand, is linked to the principle of popular sovereignty, which holds 
that government legitimacy stems from popular sovereignty (universal suffrage and direct, free 
and fair elections held by secret ballot) (see articles 8, 38). This conceptualisation of the state 
and its distinction from government, however, is an attempt by political actors to legitimise the 
state as embodying the common will of the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’. 
In view of this thesis, neither the vernacular Amharic word mengist nor the constitutional 
conception of the state and government tells us much about the Ethiopian state itself – in terms 
of what it actually means to the people. To take such a conception as the starting point of 
analysis of the Ethiopian state, therefore, as Fuller and Harris argue, risks turning the state into 
a master concept which ‘purportedly explains more than it possibly can’ (2001: 10). In the view 
of this study, the concept of mengist cannot singularly capture and explain what all Ethiopians 
– who are positioned differently – actually think, imagine and do. Rather, this thesis argues that 
the concept of state and the way through which it comes to be understood, imagined and 
constituted has to be explained by exploring ‘what the state variously means and does’ (Fuller 
and Harris 2001: 10) for the people of Ethiopia.  
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
In this section, I highlight some of the defining characteristics of the ideologies and practices 
of the ruling party vis-à-vis the state system. My aim here is to distinguish the state from the 
party and open the first to anthropological investigation. Further, as noted in the previous 
chapter, since the local cannot be conceptualised as a closed domain but rather is a nodal point 
embedded in trans-local networks of power, studying the kebele requires attention to national 
contexts of party politics and development ideology.  
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Since the mid-1990s, Ethiopia has been governed by a coalition ethnonational party called 
the EPRDF. The four parties that make up the EPRDF are the Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front 
(SEPDF).18 These four parties govern the dominant regional states (Tigray, Amhara, Oromia 
and South Nations and Nationalities) and the municipalities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. 
Other EPRDF-allied ethnonationalist parties govern the remaining five peripheral states of 
Afar, Gambella, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz and Harari (Vaughan 2015).  
The EPRDF is guided by what it calls a revolutionary democracy (abiyotawi democracy) 
ideology which can be understood as a vernacularised and syncretic form of Marxist-Leninism 
which combines the politics of class with paternalist discourses of cultural emancipation and 
ethic nationalism. It is framed around the interpretation of Ethiopian society as a ‘pre-
capitalist’, ‘backward’, uneducated and oppressed mass (Lefort 2015) to be enlightened and 
dignified by strong visionary party leadership. A number of features characterise the EPRDF’s 
revolutionary democracy ideology. The first is the Leninist democratic centralism which 
structures the EPRDF in a very strict hierarchal organisational format. A party statute explicitly 
states: ‘All organizations that come under EPRDF umbrella are those which are led by 
democratic principles and those which respect democratic centralism’ (cited in Bach 2011: 
647). Deference to authority and party unity are maintained by regular application of one of 
the organisational principles of Bolshevism – criticism and self-criticism (which is known as 
Gimgema). Gimgema is also used as an instrument for the appointment and discharge of civil 
servants (Hagmann and Abbink 2011).  
                                                 
18 The latter three of these parties were established under the auspicious of the TPLF and have continued to be 
dominated by it ever since.  
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Secondly, the ideology of revolutionary democracy is further distinguished by its emphasis 
on ‘mass participation’ rather than ‘individually oriented pluralism’ (Vaughan 2015: 308) – a 
practice which is inspired by the ‘proletarian democracy’ of mass mobilisation in economic 
and political administration. Mass and ‘inclusive participation’ functions as a tool for 
governance and development. At the local level, participation in governance and development 
matters is ensured through state/party-organised groups called lematawi buden (development 
groups), which are made up of 20 to 30 individuals residing in a commonly defined 
neighbourhood. The role given to lematawi buden is simply to implement plans designed by 
highly placed actors within the party and state apparatus, engage in group work (school 
building), and help each other harvest crops. Membership and participation are compulsory; all 
male household heads in rural Ethiopia are members. Lematawi buden are typically led by 
cadre farmers who serve as a liaison between the group and the kebele administration, ensure 
the attendance of members and exact fines on absentees (50 birr in Degga and 30 birr in Odda).  
Thirdly, the EPRDF conceives of revolutionary democracy as a dominant ideology 
instrumental in fostering a uniform conception of the world across Ethiopian society (see 
Paulos 2001: 91). The manifest drive of the EPRDF to impose a uniform worldview is all the 
more evident in its ambition to create national consensus, as I demonstrate below, around 
developmental state ideology through the acquiescence of the mass.  
Fourth, revolutionary democracy is used as a discursive tool to create an ‘antagonistic 
political field’ (Gupta 1998) through which the EPRDF excludes those political groups, 
institutions 19  and classes over which it is unable to establish or exercise hegemony. 
Revolutionary democracy is built on the old Marxist-Leninist identification of reactionary and 
                                                 
19 An example of this is the Oakland institute which was labelled as an anti-development institution because of its 
criticism of the government’s land policies (Mousseau and Martin-Prevel 2016).  
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progressive, the mass and the ruling class, capital and labour, etc. In this regard, ethnic 
federalism, development and security are often key and stable terms of reference and ideals of 
revolutionary democracy. For example, by identifying itself as a developmental capitalist force, 
the EPRDF (as a revolutionary democratic party) explicitly condemns those individuals and 
groups it excludes (including the private economic sector) as ‘rent-seekers’, ‘anti-development 
elements’ and ‘agents of neo-liberal forces’ (de Waal 2015: 169). By claiming to be addressing 
the alleged legacy of national oppression (again, as a revolutionary democratic party), it labels 
groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front and Ogaden National Liberation Front, and the 
individuals associated with them, as ‘narrow nationalists’ and pan-Ethiopianists as 
‘chauvinists’ and anachronists (see Asnake 2013; Semahagn 2016). Revolutionary democracy 
can, in this sense, be seen as a polarising discursive tool which leaves no room for compromise, 
accommodation or a pluralistic conception of politics; it rather uses class, ethnic and political 
differences as the means with which to claim moral superiority (Vaughan 2015) for the party. 
I will demonstrate in Chapters 6 and 7 the strategic appropriation and use of ‘Manichean 
discourses’ of development and modernity (developmental vs lazy farmer; change 
receptive/modern farmer vs change-resistant/backward farmer) by local dominant classes to 
justify their monopolisation of development resources.  
Finally, the EPRDF considers revolutionary democracy to be a transitory ideology which 
functions to serve the ultimate goal of ‘developing the country’s political economy to establish 
the class basis for development and democracy’ and ‘building a capitalist society’ (de Waal 
2015: 163). In Marxist-Leninist terms, the EPRDF sees itself as a vanguard party overseeing 
capitalist transition from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist society. As a result, the EPRDF aims to 
give farmers and pastoralists (as pre-capitalist forces) a central position within its policy agenda 




Developmental state  
The main vehicle to capitalist transition for the EPRDF, since 2001, has been the ideology of 
the developmental state. The notion of a developmental state was firmly tabled by the ambitious 
late Prime Minster Meles Zenawi. He not only wrote endlessly to articulate the ideology of the 
developmental state but also managed to emulate and turn it into a dominant party policy 
agenda and instrument of legitimation. In this section, I try to very briefly sketch out Meles’s 
framework of the developmental state and its material impact and significance in everyday 
state formation.  
Two of Meles’s works, African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings (n.d.)20 and 
States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the Case for a Developmental State (2012), 
sketch out the fundamentals of his ambitious project of establishing a developmental state and 
transforming the Ethiopian economy. These works offer a trenchant critique of neo-liberal 
political economy and expound the developmental state as an alternative model to Africa. For 
Meles, the experiences of South Asia (particularly South Korea and Taiwan) appeared to have 
offered a type of political economy that could be accommodated with the ideology of 
revolutionary democracy. He maintained that structural transformation in Africa could only be 
realised through a complete rejection of the economic and political models of neo-liberalism. 
He argued that democratic politics for Africa has the risk of becoming ‘riddled with patronage 
and rent-seeking’. He described the liberal political economy in the Third World as ‘trickle-up 
democracy’ in which ‘factions contested for which one could best loot the state’ (de Waal 2015: 
166).  
Meles argued that the key to African transformation was to be found in the building of a 
growth-centred developmental state that was built around three important features: 
independence of the state from the private sector, obsession with ‘development as a matter of 
                                                 
20 This is an incomplete master’s thesis. 
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national survival’ and ‘hegemony of development discourse’ (cited in de Waal 2015: 164). 
These components are intended to prevent the monopoly of rent by the private sector and the 
emergence of a predatory state. He argued that an activist state should capture rent and 
strategically allocate it for value creation (de Waal 2015:164). A developmental state, Meles 
argued, unlike a neo-liberal state, has the motivation to avoid ‘socially wasteful rent-seeking 
activity’ because ‘its purpose is to accelerate growth and it can do so … by rewarding growth 
enhancing activities and restricting and penalizing socially wasteful activities’ (Meles 
2012:169).  
Adopting wholesale Meles’s mantle of development, as I briefly touch on in the next section, 
the EPRDF made an effort to institutionalise the ideology of the developmental state in both 
the organisation of the party and in the state system. The sustaining of this economic model, 
taken cumulatively, has resulted in economic growth 21  and also brought about dramatic 
changes in rural life and to local governance. It has massively expanded the state bureaucracy, 
created a new rural political class who bear the mantle of development (see Chapters 5 and 9), 
installed a sense of entitlement, given birth to everyday popular discourses of failed 
development and fuelled moral outrage and a backlash against what is seen as the widespread 
problem of corruption and misuse of development resources and the failure of development 
projects. These effects – having been manifest through everyday governance practices – not 
only constitute the state but also provide, in the view of this study, a terrain upon which people 
imagine the state.  
 
 
                                                 
21 Ethiopian government claims an average of 11 percent annual economic growth since 2003, but this growth 
rate has been contested by the IMF and the World Bank (IMF 2012; Lefort 2015). 
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The idea of developmentalism and revolutionary democracy  
The EPRDF’s interpretation and application of the developmental state is consistent with its 
revolutionary democracy ideology. In line with its revolutionary democracy ideology, the 
EPRDF has entered into a series of alliances with the ‘pre-capitalist’ dominant rural classes, 
and under the leadership of this alliance (all kebele positions are occupied by model farmers), 
mass support from the subordinate classes (the rural poor) is mobilised. This can be seen, as 
Sarah Vaughan (2011) puts it, as an ‘all-encompassing project’ with which the party leadership 
‘seeks to unite state, party and population to form a so-called “development army”, designed 
to mobilise communities’ (307–8). At the national level, the party, since 2005, has expanded 
its membership from 760,000 to 4 million members and the number of kebele administrative 
councils from 600,000 members to 3.5 million (de Waal 2015). This alliance is crucial because 
the national bourgeoisie is deemed to be a ‘rent-seeking’ (de Waal 2015) entity that promotes 
its own interest at the expense of the people (Lefort 2015) and is therefore unable to create the 
conditions for capitalist transition – thereby, a liberal society and state. The implementation of 
liberal democratic and civil rights enshrined in the constitution is seen as a shackle on capitalist 
transition; therefore, it is something which had to be postponed ‘until Ethiopia had achieved 
middle-income status’ (de Waal 2015). In this regard, Meles wrote: 
Developmental policy is unlikely to transform a poor country into a developed one within 
the time frame of the typical election cycle. There has to be continuity of policy if there 
is to be sustained and accelerated economic growth. In a democratic polity uncertainty 
about the continuity of policy is unavoidable. More damaging for development, 
politicians will be unable to think beyond the next election etc. It is argued therefore that 
the developmental state will have to be undemocratic in order to stay in power long 
enough to carry out successful development (n.d). 
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Legitimation of the state is therefore to be established based on securing ‘accelerated 
development’ (Meles 2012), by efficient allocation of development benefits to ‘pre-capitalist’ 
sectors and population groups and also by political indoctrination of population groups through 
mass organisations (de Waal 2015). This, I will show in the thesis, is counterproductive in that 
it contributed to the monopoly of state resources such as agricultural inputs (chemical 
fertilisers, pesticides, high-yielding variety seeds) by party-affiliated farmers, encouraging a 
form of primitive accumulation by political means and thereby creating local class polarisation 
(see Chapter 7). But, at the same time, as I will show in Chapter 7, such class polarisation helps 
to create a legitimacy for the state and national leadership by making it possible for people to 
create a distinction between the idea of a benevolent distant state that supplies development 
resources and corrupt local officials who monopolise and ‘eat’ them up.  
Clearly, the EPRDF has established itself as a dominant party; as such, Ethiopia can be said 
to have a single party-dominant system. However, there are several fundamental reasons to 
distinguish between the ‘state idea’ and ‘state system’ (Abrams 1988) on the one hand and the 
party on the other, thus making the state as an idea and institution available for ethnographic 
studies. Firstly, the EPRDF has not established ideological hegemony over several segments 
of the Ethiopian population in the way presupposed by the party elite. One is over pan-
Ethiopian nationalists – especially the predominantly Amhara and many others who owe 
primary loyalty to the idea of a biblical Ethiopia22 (Ostebo 2013; Lefort 2012). Here, rather 
than exercising a pan-Ethiopian cultural leadership, the party constructed itself as a ‘counter-
hegemonic bloc’ by employing an ethnic-nationalist discourse of self-determination that 
disparages ‘pride in Ethiopia’s heritage’ as ‘a dead end’ and ‘jingoism with an empty stomach’ 
(cited in de Waal 2013: 475). Consequently, the EPRDF, in the words of Meles Zenawi himself, 
                                                 
22 By biblical Ethiopia I mean the idea of an ‘Ethiopian state that has endured since antiquity’ (Sorenson 1993).  
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is seen by many people as ‘a sin against the idea of Ethiopia’ (cited in de Waal 2015). In short, 
the EPRDF has failed to create a common-sense legitimacy to ensure cultural and ideological 
hegemony. What this cultural struggle suggests is that, for many people, the idea of Ethiopia 
is larger and more enduring than the party.  
On the other hand, the contradictions between the EPRDF’s democratic centralism and the 
developmental state ideology on the one side and strong constitutional federalism on the other 
have contributed to the ambivalence to the party of those population groups23 that supposedly 
embrace an ethnic form of politics. In other words, the effort to represent the EPRDF as a party 
which stands for cultural autonomy and self-determination of federated regional states is often 
at the fulcrum of an authoritarian model of development (Assefa 2014). For instance, even 
though the constitution confers on regional states the right to self-autonomy in matters related 
to land administration, their self-autonomy is often violated, resulting in popular resentment 
and protests (Dessalegn 2014). In this regard, notable examples include the transfer of land to 
what is called the Federal Land Bank (of as much as 1.4 million hectares in Benishangul, 1.2 
million hectares in SNNP and 1.7 million in Oromia regional states) for the government’s land-
lease programme to foreign and domestic investors 24  and the acquisition of land for the 
construction of 12 sugar factories (seven of which are located in the Omo in SNNP regional 
state) (Dessalegn 2014). 
Secondly, the EPRDF’s ambition to create a hegemonic party-state is undermined by its 
inability to penetrate the civil service: 
                                                 
23 The EPRDF claims to guarantee the cultural and political self-determination of all ethnic groups that were 
supposedly exploited and marginalised by the Amhara (See Vaughan 2003; Young 1998). 
24 This was initiated to take advantage of the 2007/8 global food price and food supply crisis (Dessalegn 2014). 
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… the party faced problems in bending the civil service to its philosophy. Government 
institutions are hidebound and bureaucrats are skilled at subverting political decisions 
through, procrastination, sabotage or – that most effective of bureaucratic measures – 
strict working rule (de Waal 2015). 
Thirdly, as I will show in the thesis, the ‘state system’ is not an independent sphere that is 
detached from society to exercise hegemonic party politics. Instead, the state at the local level 
is deeply embedded in the wider social formation. As a result, not only state policies but also 
party discourses are reconfigured and shaped by local interests and social relations. In this 
context, at the local level, individual politicians and public authorities are more important than 
party ideology or state policies.  
Taken together, these observations suggest that the state as an idea and ensemble of 
institutions is better viewed as maintaining relative autonomy from the party. In adopting this 
view, this thesis goes beyond the party-state frame and instead empirically explores state 
formation by looking at heterogeneous sets of local governance practices and discourses.  
Having offered the theoretical frameworks and necessary contexts that will carry throughout 
this work, the remainder of the thesis elaborates on the importance of these arguments through 
ethnographic fieldwork accounts of everyday state-making. But before proceeding to present 
the fieldwork chapters, I first wish to present an account of my fieldwork choices and 
methodology. The next chapter outlines the methodology employed in this research. Secondly, 
in Chapter 4, I will position this thesis in relation to the existing literature about state formation 





Situational and Interpretive state of affairs: Field accounts, 
Methods and Techniques 
The theoretical and conceptual approaches mapped out in the preceding chapters point to 
specific methodological options. They particularly call for a qualitative research method based 
on ethnographic accounts of governance, development and bureaucratic and discursive 
practices (see Gupta 1995; Mitchell 1999). This study therefore draws on a range of 
ethnographic methods that enable an analysis of the state as a structural effect of practices and 
power relations (Mitchell 1999). First, I have applied two varieties of interpretive methodology, 
with one interpretive method applied to the study of culture (Geertz 1973) and a second to the 
study of governance and bureaucracy (Bevir and Rhodes 2010; Bevir 2013). An interpretive 
method, as developed by Geertz (Geertz 1973), is a semiotic approach to ethnographic analysis 
which views culture as a ‘text’, something to be read and interpreted. This approach is referred 
to as an interpretive approach to culture and is given a distinctive tweak to the interpretation of 
political actions, institutions and governance practices (Wagenaar 2006). Bevir and Rhodes 
(2010) propose the use of an interpretative approach for the study of governance. This approach 
is based on a de-centred understanding of governance as a contingent product of actions by 
social actors.  
 The two interpretive methods hinge on different epistemological foundations, those of 
anthropology/culture and political phenomena (Wagenaar 2006; Della Porta and Keating 2008). 
However, both methods focus on the centrality of meaning-making, ‘subjectivity, situated 
knowledge, ideas, cultural specificity’ and both advocate ‘close interpretation of governance 
practices’ and specify participant observation, discourses, narrative analysis and thick 
description as methodological tools (Turnbull 2016: 382). In relation to this study, the 
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interpretative approach to governance provides us with the opportunity to explore my themes 
of governance and bureaucratic practices by way of interpreting contingent patterns of beliefs 
and practices. It helps us to move away from an institutional and top-down understanding of 
practices and decentre governance to examine the beliefs and practices of actors and how they 
construct meanings (Bevir and Rhodes 2010). The interpretative approach to culture helps us 
understand the narratives, metaphors and symbols through which people perceive, talk about, 
represent and construct the state. Together, the two interpretive methods allow us to analyse 
both the everyday practices (governance, bureaucratic and discursive) and cultural construction 
of the state idea.  
Second, in studying the Ethiopian state through the lens of everyday practices, I was also 
inspired by the Manchester School and its situational analysis methodology (Gluckman 1958, 
1964; Mitchell 1983; Kapferer 1987). Situational analysis can be defined as ‘the intellectual 
isolation of a set of events from the wider social context in which they occur in order to 
facilitate a logically coherent analysis of these events’ (Mitchell 1987: 7). The purpose is to 
isolate a small set of social and political activities for meticulous analysis (Long 1992: 162). 
Mitchell (1987: 9) offered some epistemological distinctions that are useful for carrying out 
fieldwork from this perspective: a set of events (social encounters); the situation (the meaning 
individuals give to events and activities); and the setting (the structural and institutional 
environment within which activities take place). This thesis is therefore based upon the daily 
social situations such as meetings and informal gatherings that I participated in and observed 
as a researcher.  
In addition to situational analysis, I will make use of the work of scholars who, under the 
influence or direction of Max Gluckman, developed and extended situational analysis and 
extended case study methods. I use, as I explained in Chapter 1, Bruce Kapferer’s (1988) 
comparative approach to juxtapose my two fieldwork sites. I also employ Norman Long’s 
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(1992; 2001) ‘actor-oriented’ and ‘interface analyses’ to analyse how development practices 
contribute to state formation. I use, as I discussed in Chapter 1, Burawoy’s (2009: 45) four 
‘extensions’ to account for the heterogeneity of state’s referents across times, spaces, and 
contexts and the complexity of the everyday aspects of state formation, and to also provide the 
unity of the thesis. Apart from the methods which I have so far described, I used procedures of 
coding derived from grounded theory25 (Strauss and Corbin 1998) to analyse interviews and 
discourses generated through participant observation. 
Thus, broadly, my approach combines situational analysis and interpretative methods. The 
situational analysis helps us isolate and focus on specific events and practices (Mitchell 1987: 
7) whilst the interpretative method allows close interpretation of practices as well as the 
exploration of broader (Geertz 1973) social and political processes within which such practices 
are situated. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I first present a brief account of my entry into the fieldwork. 
Secondly, I describe the data collection processes and techniques employed. Finally, I present 
data from the analysis methods and techniques used. 
3.1.Entering the field  
I spent three months at each of the fieldwork sites, whereby I conducted interviews and 
recorded daily bureaucratic activities. In West Gojjam, the fieldwork was carried out from 1st 
September to 28th November 2014. In Borana, the fieldwork took place between 10th December 
2014 and 28th February 2015.  
In the early stage of the fieldwork, the research activities undertaken at both of my field sites 
included establishing rapport with local residents (through key informants, acquaintances and 
                                                 
25 ‘Grounded theory is a general methodology, a way of thinking about and conceptualizing data’ (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998: 163) 
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my interpreter), learning about cultural norms, ethnographic observation of spaces (kebele 
offices, local bars and public spaces) and the collection of secondary data sources. At this stage, 
my purpose was to gain the trust of local residents and to identify the local issues and actors 
involved in the local political and socio-economic issues. As part of this process, I was also 
able to identify those social situations and public spaces where I was able to position myself as 
a researcher to participate in discussions and observe daily activities. These included roadside 
and neighbourhood gatherings in Degga and a popular shop in Odda where men would gather 
to socialise. My entry into the fieldwork was not, however, a prelude to the actual work; rather, 
as I will demonstrate throughout the thesis via a series of vignettes, it was very much part of 
the fieldwork. As I began to gain access to and the acceptance of local residents, and as the 
salient issues which were particularly significant or were reflective of broader trends in social 
and economic relations (such as corruption, development and livelihood issues etc.) started to 
emerge, attention was given to them. However, the process of gaining access was not 
completed at this stage. My entrée was rather a ‘continuous process of establishing and 
developing relationships’ (Schatzman and Strauss 1982: 22) with a variety of persons including 
farmers, pastoralists, politicians and non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff.  
A typical day in the field would begin with a visit to the woreda or kebele administrative 
offices, where people would come to seek help for a variety of issues. Hours might be spent 
observing a series of meetings or encounters between kebele officials and local inhabitants. 
This would continue with house-to-house visits for interviews or with an appointment with a 
government official, NGO staff member or notable local individuals such as model 
farmers/pastoralists, customary leaders or community elders. The evening would usually be 
spent intermingling and talking with a wide range of interlocutors at shops, roadside or village 
gatherings, kebele or woreda bars.  
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Although this thesis is primarily about governance practices and the construction of the state 
idea in two particular localities, the trans-local character of the state bureaucratic system 
described earlier meant that my fieldwork was multi-sited (Marcus 1995; Gupta and Ferguson 
1997, 2002). Consequently, my approach to data collection was informed by ‘mobile 
ethnography’ (Marcus 1995: 96), whereby I moved around different kebele-, woreda-, zone- 
and regional-level offices in order to understand the various relations within the bureaucratic 
network of power and the connections of spatial hierarchies. The multi-local character of my 
fieldwork reflects multi-vocality, that is, voices are linked to spaces and local narratives about 
the state are shaped by social and physical spaces (Rodman 2003). My interlocutors at different 
spatial scales construct narratives of hierarchy and state in particular ways and from different 
points of view (see Chapters 5 and 10). The thesis engages with multiple spaces and explores 
how the state is re/produced by multiple agents in different contexts (Gupta and Ferguson 
1997). 
3.2.Data collection  
My approach to data collection included a range of different ethnographic techniques such as 
in-depth interviews/conversations, direct and participant observations and shadowing. It also 
included an examination of governmental and non-governmental texts. The particularities of 
the techniques and processes of data collection are presented below. 
Interviews  
At both of my fieldwork sites, most of my interviews involved in-depth conversations ranging 
from between 20 minutes and 1.5 hours in duration. I conducted the interviews firstly by asking 
broad, descriptive questions about farming, animal husbandry and the local development 
situation, prior to moving on to more focused questions. Almost all of the interviewees were 
asked to reflect on issues that were pertinent mostly to the state. More specifically, in order to 
bring agency into my research and explore different meaning-making, I framed questions 
67 
 
largely in the form of a life-history narrative and biographical approach. I was an active 
interviewer; I would often ask about my interviewees’ interpretations of concepts, metaphors 
and stories. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the themes under study, I opted to take notes 
rather than tape-record the conversations. I took detailed notes during the interviews and then 
reconstructed them from memory immediately afterwards. Almost all of the conversations 
were jotted down in direct speech. 
My interviewees included ‘ordinary’ farmers and pastoralists, housewives, NGO staff 
members, civil servants (development assistants, health extension workers, teachers, kebele 
managers, etc.) and politicians (kebele chairpersons, kebele council members, etc.). My 
interviewees of course had multifaceted identities, and hence their inclusion within these 
categories is only as organising heuristic. In the process of selecting the interviewees, 
convenience and purposive sampling were used. During the early weeks of the research, I 
interviewed almost anyone who was willing to talk. At later stages, I used purposive sampling 
to better reflect a balance of gender, age and class.  
However, I encountered both gender and class differences in how I was spoken to during 
the interviews. For example, in Degga, the women would in most cases tell me to speak either 
to their husbands or to their grown-up male children. On the rare occasions when I interviewed 
a husband and wife together, the women would constantly defer questions to their husbands. 
On those occasions when the women did consent to being interviewed on their own, the 
sessions turned out to be extremely difficult to run because the women would be busily engaged 
in doing household work. During the interviews they would routinely either be cleaning, 
cooking, feeding cattle or distilling liquor (to supplement the family’s income). This is 
obviously indicative of how women’s identity is built around the identity of men and associated 
with duty.  
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Similarly, in Odda, the women were more hesitant than the men with regard to being 
interviewed. The women in Odda were also busy with household responsibilities (cooking, 
child rearing, etc.) and tasks for daily survival such as selling milk and collecting and selling 
firewood. In addition to these responsibilities, the women are expected to contribute their 
labour to safety-net programmes in exchange for grain and oil. Extracting labour from poor 
women who do not have time to spare became embedded in the state development programme 
(see Chapter 9). As a result, women, when compared to men, were inaccessible for interviews. 
Some of the most revealing interviews with women emerged from serendipitous encounters in 
different contexts. One such example arose from the occasion that I met a middle-aged woman, 
whom I called Elima, at the woreda office (see Chapter 9). 
Some ‘ordinary farmers’ told me that I should speak to someone who knew how to give 
articulated speeches or to someone who worked for mengist. During the interviews, some of 
them were worried that they were talking about something that was not relevant. I had to 
repeatedly stress to them that everything was of interest to me. That said, I should mention that 
in Degga, some non-literate farmers were pleased to have someone from a very different, urban 
background taking a personal interest in them. In Odda, too, many pastoralists/farmers 
appreciated that a doctoral student from a ferenji (roughly meaning European) country was 
providing them with an opportunity to tell their stories. The interviews were carried out at 
several locations, including interviewees' private homes, local bars, and the side of the road. 
In West Gojjam, my knowledge of local customs combined with me being a native speaker 
of Amharic, the official language of Ethiopia, which is also the language of the local 
community, enabled me to find suitable informants and conduct interviews. In total, I met, 
conversed with and interviewed more than 70 local inhabitants. 
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When working in Borana, where I do not speak Afaan Oromo, the language of the Oromo 
community in Odda, I worked with a research assistant. The issue of language posed a 
challenging situation in terms of gathering data at this particular site. However, I overcame this 
difficulty by asking my research assistant to take his own notes in the field, which we then 
discussed, along with the interviews, at the end of each day, to check ambiguities and complex 
translations of idioms and to establish whether there was a need to follow up the interviewees 
for further clarification. Working through an interpreter also meant that the background and 
position of my research assistant were subject to the same level of, if not additional, scrutiny 
as my own, with the interviewees enquiring about his place of birth, means of income and 
whether he worked for the government. My research assistant was employed by a local NGO 
and found it easy to gain the trust of a cross section of the local population. My interpreter’s 
cultural awareness also meant that he assumed the role of ‘an informant in an ethnographic 
sense’ (Bragason, n.d: 7), especially with regard to introducing me to the local customs of 
greeting, starting a conversation and other points of social etiquette (see also Bujra 2006; 
Hammersley and Atkinson 2007).  
The Borana Zone, unlike West Gojjam, had a higher presence of NGOs that were involved 
in development and humanitarian activities. I formally and informally interviewed NGO 
representatives and staff. On a few occasions, I accompanied them on field visits. We 
informally discussed their work and engaged in conversations about national and global 
political developments. In total, I undertook in excess of 50 in-depth interviews with 
purposively selected local inhabitants, kebele, woreda and zone officials and NGO employees. 
I also conducted key informant interviews with Abba Gadaa (the elected leader in the Gadaa 




Participant observation  
In Gojjam I attended as many local public and official events and meetings as possible. Being 
viewed as an ‘insider’ by the local community, I was invited into both formal and informal 
spaces to which an ‘outsider’ would not readily be welcomed. I accompanied senior kebele 
officials and notable community leaders to the local bars where they met to discuss political 
and social topics. I observed a series of meetings and encounters between kebele officials and 
local inhabitants.  
 Compared to my experience in Degga, attending public and official meetings and carrying 
out direct observations of encounters between state functionaries and local people proved to be 
extremely difficult. This was largely due to the language barrier. My fieldwork activities were 
therefore restricted to interviews, focus group discussions and informal conversations with a 
wide range of actors that included farmers, pastoralists and kebele-, woreda- and zone-level 
authorities.  
Throughout the fieldwork, depending on the situation and the setting, I assumed the different 
roles as outlined by Gold (1958) and Junker (1960): the complete participant, the participant-
as-observer, the observer-as-participant and the complete observer. In formal administrative 
meetings, I acted mainly as a complete observer, listening and taking notes on the speeches, 
non-verbal behaviours and physical settings associated with the meetings, etc. On some 
occasions, I was, as a complete observer, able to ‘lurk’ in the kebele premises and undertake 
simple ‘patient, unobtrusive observation’ (Hollier 1986: 62) of bureaucratic practices and the 
ways in which the politicians and civil servants acted with both each other and their clients. 
This helped me to gain a detailed understanding of the lives of local politicians both within and 
outside their work environment. However, unless I was invited by kebele officials or cases 
were discussed with me by local people in public spaces, I have chosen to exclude stories and 
information about local people.  
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In the informal roadside or neighbourhood gatherings, where conversation topics involved 
corruption and/or development failure, I assumed the role of observer-as-participant. To avoid 
being perceived as taking sides in such highly contentious local issues, my participation was 
limited to seeking clarification or to obtaining some idea of the meanings that the participants 
attributed to their narratives. In Degga, I gained access to such public-space discussion circles 
through what is known as the snowball sampling method. This involved using a small number 
of initial contacts and acquaintances to expand my network of connections, thereby creating 
entry points into different local informal groups. To gain access to places where the local elite 
congregated, I sought the help of kebele gatekeepers such as the chairman and local elders, 
who brokered my entry into the elite spaces (Chapter 7). In Odda, my interpreter was a helpful 
source of access to state officials and NGO staff members. In public-space discussions, due to 
the language constraint, I assumed an observer-as-participant role for the majority of the time.  
While interacting with local residents at tea houses or kebele/woreda premises both in 
Gojjam and Borana, where people would meet to discuss less contentious livelihood issues or 
their business of doing in the kebele, I was able to assume a participant-as-observer role, taking 
a visible researcher position while at the same time participating in group discussions and 
activities. I should mention that in participating in both formal and informal meetings and 
gatherings, I was able to identify some of the most contentious and favourite daily topics of 
discussion and statements that invoked heated debates (see Chapters 7 and 10). 
I rarely assumed the position of complete participant; this was only on those occasions when 
I interacted with NGO staff members and when discussing issues pertaining to international 
political developments. Overall, my choices in assuming a variety of roles along the continuum 
of complete observer to complete participant were based on ethical considerations and by what 
I was allowed to do.  
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In terms of recording, while I occasionally wrote some of the key words and phrases on the 
spot, following each event I would immediately rush to make notes on everything I could 
remember about the conversations, manners of speech, physical details and moods.  
Shadowing  
In order to better understand the complex web of personalised relationships between local non-
state elites, local communities and the representatives of the various institutions that constituted 
the state at the kebele level, I obtained permission to ‘shadow’ (Czarniawska 2007; Bevir, 
Rhodes 2010) three powerful individuals in Degga and two NGO staff members in Odda. In 
Degga, I followed the chairman for two full days and one evening to observe his daily routines 
at a variety of sites (these included the office, a bar and the church). I also shadowed a 
community elder, who invited me to his house on multiple occasions (see Chapter 7). In Odda, 
I accompanied two NGO staff members on their field visits, observing their work process and 
reflecting on their experiences and views about working with state agents on the move (see 
Chapter 9). While the chairman in Odda twice agreed to have my research assistant and myself 
follow him, during the days it became clear that he was taking out-of-kebele personal business 
travel.  
Finally, my fieldwork is supported by documentary analysis of government proclamations, 
policy papers and directives, news articles and consultancy reports. Such sources, in particular 
the consultancy papers on an irrigation project in Degga (Chapter 4), may not reflect the policy 
of the Ethiopian government and are therefore used in conjunction with interviews and other 
official records.  
3.3.Positionality  
In Gojjam, my insider/outsider status served as both a benefit and a disadvantage. On the one 
hand, it meant that I was able to establish a good rapport with a broad range of people and, as 
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a result, I was able to secure access to local events, meetings and informal discussions. 
However, it also brought a challenge in the form of retaining the trust of ordinary members of 
the local population at the same time as being seen in public with unpopular kebele authorities. 
To overcome such challenges, I made several home and village visits in order to reassure 
members of the local population of my impartiality. This meant I was required to renegotiate 
my status as I interacted with variously positioned individuals and moved around the different 
public sites. Thus, my ethnographic encounters and interactions were shaped by my own 
identity and by my uneasy insider/outsider status (Riles 2006; Hammersley and Atkinson 
2007). 
Moreover, in Gojjam, my insider status was constantly brought up to cut short explanations, 
with the respondents often wondering why I was asking obvious questions, saying ‘you know 
how things are in here’, ‘why you?’. I was aware that my insider status may have impeded my 
ability to discern patterns that would be clear to an outsider. I therefore made a conscious effort 
to manage my insider status through reflexive techniques such as constant disconfirming, 
deliberately enquiring about details that I would otherwise have taken for granted, blocking 
and deconstructing my own assumptions and seeking alternative interpretations of narratives.  
In Odda my outsider status was both an advantage and a disadvantage. It was an advantage 
because people were curious and willing to speak to me. However, most of the residents were 
more careful of what they said compared to during the interviews with local residents in Degga. 
Especially at the early stage of fieldwork, my outsider status produced numerous assumptions 
and rumours about the purpose of my presence and doing in Odda. The most common 
assumption was that I was working for the government as either a surveyor or spy or as a 
livestock trader. In order to overcome this suspicion regarding my presence as well as to enable 
me to obtain an in-depth knowledge of everyday life, I undertook a tour of villages and chose 
one particular local shop to be my main locale. Here, many residents (especially men) would 
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spend a certain amount of time every day socialising. This gave me the opportunity to explain 
the purpose of my visit as a researcher and to explain that I was bound by the rules of anonymity 
and confidentiality. While interacting with local residents at this particular shop, I opted for 
active participation and obtained the confidence of the community.  
My outsider status was particularly disadvantageous in terms of capturing a detailed account 
of complex political discourses, idioms and metaphors. Clearly, while I was an outsider in 
terms of language and local customs, I was also viewed as an insider by virtue of being an 
Ethiopian. I noticed that civil servants, NGO staff members and some pastoralists were willing 
to share their opinions with me because I was Ethiopian.  
3.4.Data analysis  
In the preceding section, I outlined the field techniques employed to collect the data upon which 
this thesis is based. In this section, I describe how I analysed the vast amount of material 
generated by the field techniques. 
In analysing the data obtained through the interviews and discourses generated through 
participant observation, I made use of Strauss & Corbin’s (1998) open coding and axial coding 
techniques, which produced ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) of a variety of themes. The first 
technique (open coding) involved breaking down the data for the purpose of identifying, 
categorising and conceptualising salient social, cultural and political themes. The categories 
identified at this stage included agricultural input distribution, development failure, corruption, 
participation, water distribution complaints, subject sensibilities, territorialisation, 
sedentarisation, corruption talk, rights talk, livelihood security, and self-perception. The second 
stage (axial coding) involved bringing the different themes identified through open coding back 
together to establish connections between them. At this stage I began to identify the patterns 
and contexts under which social and political interactions occurred. This meant exploring the 
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relations between agricultural resources distribution and corruption discourses; the relationship 
between state development discourses, participation and subject sensibilities; livelihood 
conditions, class relations and corruption discourses; and the work conditions of the state vis-
à-vis NGO staff members and how this shaped their understanding of the state. 
Finally, on the basis of the themes identified, the analysis was completed and presented 
through ‘thick description’ of the processes and practices by which the state comes to be 
re/produced and imagined in the banality of everyday life.  
Discourses 
In my attempt to provide ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973), I approached the wide spectrum of 
public discourses that emanated from within the people at my two fieldwork sites through 
Thompson’s (1984: 134) ‘methodology of interpretation’. Thompson (1984) helpfully 
identified the following three ways of dealing with discourses: as narrative, as an argument, 
and as a syntactic strategy (such as the use of metaphor and metonym). In this thesis, I found 
two of the discursive features to be significant: the narrative and the metaphorical and 
metonymic statement. My purpose here was to chalk out the ways in which discourses 
illuminate my broader objective of understanding how the state idea comes to be constructed 
in everyday life.  
In my analysis of the stories generated by the local residents, I paid particular attention to 
corruption and development failure narratives. I found local narratives about corruption and 
development failure to be helpful in understanding normative moral concepts of appropriate 
behaviour relating to state officials, against which corrupt practices are evaluated, measured 
and judged. In everyday public narratives, characters such as the disinterested national leaders 
and their local representatives, the unscrupulous local functionaries, help people make sense of 
politics and imagine the state. Moreover, narratives help us to grasp the local understanding of 
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the state as a ‘feeder’ and the ways in which national discourses of development and claims to 
eradicate poverty intermesh and are reproduced, in addition to the ways in which personal 
narratives come to relate to them.  
My analysis included exploring meanings in metonymic and metaphorical statements. The 
purpose was to study cultural representations and complexities of meaning pertinent to 
everyday politics and the state. Metaphor analysis allowed me to explore how local residents 
draw on other meanings to elucidate what constitutes mengist and how they invoke meaning 
through a network of associated ‘entailments’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). I also explored 
metonymic statements, that is, the substitution of mengist for a person/national leader. In so 
doing, I showed how practices of governance are built around discourses (narratives, metaphors) 
by which the meaning of what constitutes mengist is imbued. 
Public events  
In analysing events such as meetings and other public events, the approach I take is situational 
analysis in the tradition of the Manchester School (Gluckman 1958; Van Velsen 1967). In using 
this method, I not only present the ‘abstractions and inferences from … field material but 
also … some of the material itself’ (Van Velsen 1964). In my analysis of events, I approach 
official meetings as ‘ritual moments’ in which the idea of the state as a coherent institution is 
staged; where the ideal relationship between the state and local people is articulated; where 
development-related events as ‘complex social dramas’ or ‘interface situations’ (Long 1992: 2) 
are staged; and, where social classes and underdeveloped subjects are produced. This approach 
to analysing events is congruent with a situational analysis of rituals, including of the 




 I particularly build my analysis by focusing on the presentation of sets of events, the 
meaning individuals give to events and the structural and institutional environment within 
which activities take place (Mitchell 1999). Concretely, this means presenting and interpreting 
the different aspects of rituals and performances that are embodied in events and meetings. 
These elements include the environment of meeting sites (meetings held in the kebele hall, in 
the kebele premises, alongside funerals, etc.); the seating arrangements of the participants; 
which sections of the local population (social status, gender, age, etc.) participate; the ways in 
which people participate (i.e. passive/active); who leads and controls the dialogue and the 
timing of the meetings; whose ideas are taken on board or abandoned; the displays of material 
symbols (banners, T-shirts and caps, photographs, furniture etc.); actions (physical gestures, 
facial expressions, posture etc.); and, finally, the words spoken (rumours and gossip amongst 
the participants, official speeches etc.). This sheds light on the performative and 
representational dimensions of state formation and the patterns of local relations of power.  
My analysis of development practices also involved ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) of 
everyday interactions at the interface (Long 2001; Long and Villarreal 1993) between state 
functionaries and local people as well as those of the staff of various NGOs and variously 
positioned local residents. This enabled me to analyse how the idea of the state emerges in the 
‘interface situations’ (Long 1992; 2001) where different actors, with different organisations 
and norms, interact, confront and clash. Importantly, an actor-oriented analysis of the interview 
materials helped me to unearth how development is appropriated and reproduced by those who 
are often seen as passive, targets and the end users of development. This means paying close 
attention to how development shapes the understanding and positioning of the self vis-à-vis 
governance practices. Actor-oriented and interface analysis, in short, allowed me to identify 
those individuals who defined modes and patterns of interaction at the kebele level and the way 
in which culturally specific development identities were enacted (see Chapters 6 and 9).  
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Finally, I used the interpretative method (Bevir and Rhodes 2010) to analyse mundane 
bureaucratic practices that constitute the state as an institution. I paid close attention to the 
regularised set of bureaucratic activities (such as data collection), encounters (between the 
governors and the governed), material representations (officer paraphernalia) and perpetual 
institutional rites (such as meetings). This enabled me to look into the governance stories (Bevir 
and Rhodes 2016) that constitute vertical connections and in which the idea of the state as an 
institution is embedded. I was also able to examine the complexities and levels of informality 
of norms and relationships that operate within institutions that constitute the state as well as 
the pressures and dilemmas (see Chapter 8).  
3.5.Ethical considerations  
Upon commencing the interviews, participant observation and shadowing, I made my 
objectives and intentions clear and explained the requisite ethical considerations to all of my 
participants, such as the requirement for anonymity and confidentiality. I explained to all of 
the participants that their participation in the research was entirely voluntary. I always made 
sure to obtain the participants’ informed consent. In terms of anonymity, I made sure that all 
of the participants would be referred to by their social status (age, gender and socio-economic 
status) and that details that might reveal their identity would be avoided. I always made it clear 
that all data would only be used for the purposes of this research project.  
The fieldwork presented me with a whole range of personal ethical dilemmas. For example, 
I was asked to help in resolving disputes between friends in public spaces; some local residents 
asked me if I could report corruption cases to mengist. I was also asked on numerous occasions 
by local residents to comment on individual corruption cases or to provide information about 
ways in which they could obtain foreign funding for local projects (church and cooperatives). 
Instead of allowing myself to be drawn into these situations, I would instead communicate that 
I wanted all parties to resolve their disputes amongst themselves. Instead of providing any kind 
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of information, I would candidly reiterate that I was a PhD student and made clear my purposes. 
Hence, I had to constantly maintain a balance between conducting the fieldwork, relying on 
the hospitality of the people, official permissions, the cooperation from kebele officials, and 
the different issues that my informants tried to draw me into.  
Another ethical dilemma I confronted was how to deal with people’s poverty and hardship. 
For some people, their immediate concern was for the basic amenities of life, such as food, and 
what they needed most was immediate material assistance. This afflicted me throughout my 
fieldwork in both Degga and Odda. However, I never made any contributions or paid any 
informants for their interviews or hospitality. I did sometimes pay for drinks, however, in 
accordance with local customs. On some occasions, I witnessed acts of verbal abuse by state 
officials against local people. I had to avoid involving myself in such situations in order not to 













Contested conceptualisations of Ethiopian statehood 
So far, in the previous three chapters, I have sought to establish the theoretical, methodological 
and conceptual frameworks that will be continued throughout this thesis. I have also established 
a broad context for discussion on the state in Africa, although the remainder of the thesis is 
concerned specifically with Ethiopia. In this chapter, I want to discuss in more detail why I 
chose Ethiopia as a case with which to study state formation in Africa. Moreover, in working 
towards the ethnography of the state, this chapter in particular, and the thesis in general, 
attempts to highlight and challenge several bodies of literature that, in various ways, focus on 
making sense of the nature and role of the state in Ethiopia.  
This chapter’s analysis takes its point of departure from two difficulties in the 
conceptualisation of the state in Ethiopia. First is the problem of locating the place of the 
Ethiopian state in Africa. Scholarly discussions about the state in sub-Saharan Africa have 
tended to accord only a marginal place and level of analysis to the Ethiopian state. This is 
because, for many scholars, Ethiopia is considered an anomaly in Africa. In the first part of this 
chapter, I will make the opposite point. Ethiopia represents one sociocultural and political 
formation in a diverse continent. 
Second, we face the problem of locating the historical and conceptual specificity of the 
Ethiopian state. Indeed, there is no shortage of historical literature relating to state formation 
in Ethiopia. But the very term state, for instance, is taken for granted by many as a very 
straightforward concept to the extent that it was wilfully avoided or reduced to a mere reflection 
of ethnic politics. In seeking to move beyond this impasse, in the second part of this chapter, I 
wish to address the following relevant questions: How can we locate the historical specificities 
of state formation in Ethiopia? Can we use the category of state to describe the political systems 
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over several centuries? Can we make a clean break and abandon employing the concept of state 
to explain historically specific collective politics? In addressing these questions, I highlight 
several bodies of literature across a wide range of disciplines – anthropology, history, politics, 
sociology, etc. In so doing, however, my intention is not to provide a full account of the history 
of Ethiopia or debate how the Ethiopian state has evolved over time. Rather, my overall aim is 
to examine some of the dominant perspectives on the conceptualisation of the Ethiopian state 
in light of the theoretical perspective of this thesis and establish the broad context for an 
ethnographic study of the state in Ethiopia.  
4.1.The Ethiopian state in African studies 
In the introduction to Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: monarchy, revolution and the 
legacy of Meles Zenawi, Prunier and Ficquet (2015: 1) write: 
Ethiopia is a land which, like Israel or Tibet, is often thought of first and foremost through 
myths before it is seen as a real country. Many people who would have some difficulty 
in precisely pinpointing Ethiopia on a map of the world have nevertheless heard about 
our hominid ‘grandmother’ Lucy, the Ark of the Covenant, Solomon and the Queen of 
Sheba, the medieval quest for Prester John, as well as the more recent imperial figures of 
Menelik II and Haile Selassie I, the independence of the country during European 
imperialism in Africa, and the Lion of Judah, a symbol of sovereignty that has been used 
on covers of Rastafari reggae albums. The public at large also remember the images of 
recurrent famines that often end up negatively symbolizing Africa. The Power, the Glory 
and the Tragedies. Ethiopia is oversized in the public mind and it often tends to be 
oversized in the minds of its own inhabitants, who are the first to believe in the mythical 
quality of their motherland. It is one of the few countries in the world which has an 
Encyclopaedia devoted to it …  
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The title of my thesis, ‘The Everyday State in Africa’, was intentionally chosen to draw 
attention to and challenge the long-standing assumption that Ethiopia has anomalous and 
unique social and political qualities and a state structure not seen in other parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa. The ‘mythical quality’ that Prunier and Ficquet refer to in the above extract is not only 
implanted in popular imaginations but has also long defined academic discourses surrounding 
the Ethiopian state. Many writers consider Ethiopia to be ‘the oldest African country, yet in 
many respects it is in rather than of Africa’ (Jesman 1963: 10). Ethiopia has predominantly 
been seen more as oriental than African, so much so that ‘more is written on Ethiopia in the 
Journal of Semitic Studies than in the Journal of African History’ (Teshale 1995: xvi). The 
discussions about the state in Africa, largely informed by this perspective, are reluctant to take 
Ethiopia as a fully African state. 
While political organisations in sub-Saharan Africa are predominantly conceptualised in 
relation to European colonial legacy, where the state is viewed as an imported alien supra-
institution grafted onto indigenous social and political structures, Ethiopia is said to have 
maintained a culturally rooted state for more than three thousand years (Teshale 1995; Toggia 
2008). Ethiopia, alone in the continent, successfully forestalled colonial domination and 
thereby avoided direct imposition of colonial institutions. As a result, the Ethiopian state is 
often bypassed in the mainstream accounts of African state analysis. Jean-Francois Bayart 
(2009), for instance, treated Ethiopia as an exception on account of the existence of a long and 
continuous tradition of power which, he believes, does not correspond to the rest of ‘Black 
African’ state experience.26 In his global order of cultural essentials, Samuel Huntington (1996: 
47) described Ethiopia as a ‘civilisation of its own’ in contrast to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa 
which, he argues, lacks a distinct indigenous civilisation. Even prominent Ethiopianist 
                                                 
26 Although Bayart’s famous metaphor of ‘the rhizome state’ did not include Ethiopia in its analysis, Ethiopia is 
nonetheless typical of the type of patronage politics that he describes (see de Waal 2015). 
83 
 
Christopher Clapham (1969) characterised Ethiopia as ‘an odd man out among African states’. 
Teshale Tibebu (1995: 31), an Ethiopian historian and advocate of Afrocentric analysis of 
Ethiopia’s past, wrote:  
Ethiopia is not like Chad or Burkina Faso, Central African Republic or Mali – a piece 
of territory carved out by a European power and given a name. Ethiopia is like Egypt, 
China and Iran; very old ….  
Similarly, Gebru Tareke (1996: 26) contrasts the Ethiopian state to the state in other sub-
Saharan African countries as follows: 
… the Ethiopian state is differentiated from others in the continent by its greater 
linkage to society. In the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, state apparatus was bequeathed 
by colonialism and thus lack indigenous roots. 
For a large number of scholars working on the state in sub-Saharan African, the contemporary 
modes of power in Africa are derived from colonial legacy. Institutional frameworks forged by 
colonial rule, such as the direct rule of citizens by civil law and the indirect rule of 
natives/subjects by customary law (Mamdani 1996), and the colonial mode of 
governmentality27 built on relations of subjection and violence (Mbembe 2001) are believed to 
have been the defining feature and the root cause of state crises in contemporary Africa.  
                                                 
27  Colonial governmentality represents an act of governance, Achille Mbembe (2001) argues, which was 
established on Hegelian and Bergsonian condescending imagination of Africa. On the one hand, the Hegelian 
tradition conceived Africans as a mere ‘body-things’, not even deemed subjects but animals. Hence, he argues, 
the only form of relationship possible was one of violence and domination. On the other hand, according to 
Mbembe, the Bergsonian tradition saw the natives as animals that could be domesticated. He argues a 
sympathising, familiarising and domestication of natives thus brings them into subjugation and submissiveness. 




The Ethiopian state is characterised as a ‘state’ in the true Weberian sense of the term, unlike 
the African state which is described as neither ‘African nor state’ but as ‘a dubious community 
of heterogeneous and occasionally clashing linguistic, religious and ethnic identities; their 
claim to force is rarely effective and much less monopolistic; their frequent predatory nature 
fails the test of legitimacy; and their territoriality is generally at best hesitant and contested’ 
(Englebert 1997: 767). Postcolonial African states, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) argue, do not 
have a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence in their territorial jurisdictions; therefore, 
Weber’s empirical definition of the state is insufficient to adequately explain the nature and 
survival of African states. Rather, they are juridical entities protected by international law. 
Ethiopia, on the other hand, is described as ‘the lone continental exception to juridical 
sovereignty’ (Englebert 2009: 155).  
Indeed, the Ethiopian state is relatively specific, in the sense that, unlike the rest of the sub-
Saharan African states, its historical trajectory includes no experience of colonialism. 
However, because Ethiopia remained independent throughout European colonial rule in Africa 
and developed a long-lasting and relatively well-organised political system does not necessarily 
indicate it is organised differently from the rest of Africa (Donham 1986). Most significantly, 
the appropriation of European instruments of rule, as I demonstrate below, by the ruling elites 
in Ethiopia and the rest of Africa, which resulted in the centralisation of state power in the 19th 
century, generated parallel structures and trajectories in the contemporary era.  
Recent studies have shown that colonialism did not suspend the historicity of African 
societies nor lessen their capacity to pursue strategies to produce their modernity (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999; Bayart 2009). Colonialism instead brought political, economic and military access 
to the dominant indigenous groups. African actors seized an open opportunity introduced by 
colonisers, traders and missionaries to amass wealth and gain power. Therefore, Africa was not 
just a passive victim of colonialism but was also active in the pursuit of economic gains through 
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what Bayart (2009) terms strategies of ‘extraversion’ – a process through which political actors 
are disposed to mobilise resources from their relationship with the external environment as a 
result of weak productivity and internal social struggle.  
In a comparable way, despite Ethiopia exceptionally claiming three centuries of state 
experience, it was the imported exogenous ideas such as the mechanisms of the modern 
bureaucratic machinery, the adoption of modern European law (the penal and civil code which 
was introduced in 1958) and the notion of constitutionalism that profoundly moulded its current 
shape.28 While it was colonialism that introduced new areas of domination – both ideological 
and technological – in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the indigenous elite, particularly Emperor 
Menelik and Haile Selassie I, have been credited with the introduction of modern instruments 
of rule in Ethiopia (Andreas 2003; Bahru 1991). As Addis Hiwet (1975) observed, imperialism 
offered the Ethiopian elite ‘real advantages in the modification, rationalisation and organisation 
of a modern state apparatus – ministers and bureaucracies and military power… their own 
socio-economic needs were more than sufficiently catered by the goods of the world capitalist 
system’ (78). The desire of the ruling class to ‘modernise’ itself, i.e. to imbibe the Western 
system of knowledge and lifestyle and the ambition to create a European modernity (Clapham 
2006), was important in shaping the state.  
In this sense, the centralisation of Ethiopian state power was realised in the same way as in 
other sub-Saharan African countries, where, as Bayart (2009) tells us, foreign contact and the 
appropriation of European modes of rule were a major resource for ‘the centralisation of power 
and accumulation of wealth’ (23). One can then include Ethiopia in Bayart’s claim that the 
articulation of African politics and societies, in this particular context, ‘could no longer be 
                                                 
28 For a comprehensive summary of the literature relating to how Ethiopia imported the various instruments of 




distanced from the technological civilisation of the West’ (24). The substantive difference 
rather seems to be the mode of appropriation of exogenous institutions and ideologies. While 
it was direct colonial intrusion through conquest in the rest of ‘Black Africa’, in Ethiopia the 
state elite was responsible for the appropriation of the ideologies and institutions of Europeans 
through strategies of ‘extraversion’.  
Such parallel trajectories have contributed to the emergence of comparable political 
processes and economic conditions in both the Ethiopian state and other sub-Saharan African 
states. As such, Ethiopia possesses most of the characteristic features that are currently used to 
identify Africa: ethnic and religious diversity, poverty, famine, indigenous polity, economic 
growth and so on. 
Here I do not want to imply that colonialism and the incorporation of global resources and 
technologies within a state are similar. As mentioned above, Ethiopia possesses a quite specific 
history that distinguishes it from the rest of Africa. And I acknowledge the immense importance 
of the distinctive features of the Ethiopian state (the presence of a specific tradition of power, 
the conceptualisation of politics through ‘graphic reasoning’ (Bayart 2009) and so on) in 
shaping the composition of the Ethiopian state and the popular idea of the state. Yet, to view 
Ethiopia as an exception based on such traits and counterpose it with the rest of the sub-Saharan 
African states presupposes the latter to be a singular category.  
Here it is important to note that underlying much of the discussion about postcolonial 
African states and Ethiopian exceptionalism is the assumption that colonialism had a 
homogenising effect throughout the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, however, scholars 
have raised questions about the homogenising effect of colonialism, pointing out that ‘the 
influence and effects of colonialism have been extremely varied throughout post-colonial 
Africa’ and as a result ‘pre-existing diversities – although hardly unchanging – persisted 
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throughout and beyond the colonial interlude’ (Harrison 2010:15). Ethiopian exceptionalism 
thus becomes less convincing as one downgrades the importance of the homogenising effect 
of colonialism on the composition and nature of the postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa states. If 
anything, the Ethiopian state represents one sociocultural and political formation in a diverse 
continent. Therefore, rather than see it as an anomaly, this study takes Ethiopia as a case to 
elucidate how the state in sub-Saharan Africa is constituted in the mundane materiality of 
everyday life. However, Ethiopia is not taken as a representative case, that is, this study does 
not attempt to make any empirical generalisation to either sub-Saharan African states or even 
Ethiopia. The thesis rather aims to outline those principles that underlie the modus operandi of 
the state which can be analytically and theoretically significant in understanding the state in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
4.2. The conceptualisation of the state in Ethiopia 
This section discusses the conceptualisation of the Ethiopian state. It provides important 
background information and insights into problems with the existing literature. It does this by 
bringing together an ambitious set of dispersed literature from different disciplinary fields and 
presenting them thematically. 
The Great Tradition thesis  
The predominant and classical approach, known as the ‘Greater Ethiopia’ thesis, provides an 
account of a transcendental state. This conceptualisation is anchored in a historical 
metanarrative of what Christopher Clapham (2002a) aptly termed ‘the great tradition’ – a belief 
in the continuity of ancient state tradition. The ‘great tradition’ projects an image of a long 
territorially unified state backwards into the biblical past.  
The core narrative of ‘the great tradition’ oeuvre often begins with Aksum, an ancient 
kingdom which flourished in the present-day Tigray province of Ethiopia and Eritrea between 
the first and seventh centuries, as the first recognisable Ethiopian state. Aksum is seen as a 
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‘bedrock state’, so much so that the origin of the institutions of imperial Ethiopia, such as the 
office of the Emperor and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (Clapham 1969), as well as Christian 
culture, the ox-plough agricultural system and Ethiopic script, are imputed to it. The narrative 
continues linearly and relates the history of the fall of Aksum and the rise of what is considered 
an ‘illegitimate’ non-Solomonic 29  dynasty known as the Zagwe, whose extraordinary 
achievement and enduring legacy is the construction of rock-hewn churches. By 1270 the 
‘legitimate’ Solomonic dynasty was, they say, restored and consolidated state power, expanded 
its territory and defended itself against its historic enemies – its Muslim and Pagan neighbours 
– for the ensuing six centuries until its last Emperor, Haile Selassie I, was deposed in 1974. 
After the fall of the Solomonic dynasty in 1974, history continued to serve to reify the state by 
narrating the story of the military regime until 1991 and the Federalist regime since 1991 
(Marcus 1994; Clapham 2002a; Toggia 2008).  
This narrative is corroborated by records such as ‘a list of kings, royal chronicles, 
hagiographical literature, Greek epics, Arabic and European travel history, royal epigraphic 
memorials, and such archaeological findings in coins, thrones, and palace remains’ (Toggia 
2008: 322). 
This classical approach presents historically disparate sets of activities, political discourses 
and institutions as a coherent and unified political entity contained within the concept of ‘state’. 
The account simply glosses over germane anecdotes of governance practices among non-
Christian communities and occupational groups, informal and alternative political power 
structures such as banditry,30 traditional political systems and the historically very variable 
                                                 
29 The Solomonic dynasty consists of rulers of Ethiopia who claimed to trace their roots back to Queen Sheba of 
Ethiopia and King Solomon of Israel (Marcus 1994). 
30 Historically, the practice of banditry was widely entrenched throughout northern Ethiopia. Bandits operated 
with impunity within their ‘jurisdictions’ and exercised sovereignty over a segment of the population through, at 
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territoriality of various political entities. Political writers and historians working within this 
tradition invariably use the notion of state to refer to all ‘kingdoms and empires in ancient and 
medieval periods, as well as the modern Ethiopian states’ (Toggia 2008: 331). In other words, 
the modern concept of the state is simply projected onto the historical past, and, as such, the 
Ethiopian state is represented more as an already well-formed and well-organised trans-
historical entity that evolves linearly and steers the course of social life than as a social 
formation produced at a specific and recent historical juncture and as one which is in a constant 
process of construction through social struggles and cultural idioms. This approach suffers 
from what Derek Sayer (1987) calls the ‘violence of abstraction’, that is, the disentanglement 
of concepts from historical facts.  
The Great Tradition thesis subsequently enabled Ethiopianist scholars to construct a 
civilizational hierarchy which orders cultural differences in Ethiopia into systems of centre and 
periphery: between Christian and non-Christian communities, Semites and non-Semites and 
Geeze civilisation and barbarian traditions (see, for example, Ullendorff 1973). 
This language of civilizational hierarchy was furthermore linked to racial category – in 
particular, in terms of a nested set of racial oppositions between Semitic immigrants and 
African tribes:  
… the Ethiopian Empire of the twentieth century consists of a number of previously 
autonomous and distinct ‘African’ tribes subordinated under an alien Semitic minority. 
                                                 
times, a monopoly of violence. Banditry, until the last quarter of the 19th century, was, as Crummey (1986) argues, 
‘a tool for career mobility ‘(33). For example, the first two most prominent modern Ethiopian Emperors, Tewodros 
II (r. 1855–1868) and Yohannes IV (r. 1872–1889), came to the throne through banditry. Once they assumed 
power, it was the idea of the state that gave them credibility – or, to use Abrams’ (1988) term, ‘legitimatized the 
illegitimate’ (76). According to Crummey, the use of banditry for political office competition by the Ethiopian 
ruling class proves the ‘criminal undercurrents of all forms of state power’ (1986: 133). 
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This view is a natural consequence of beginning Ethiopian history, as scholarly 
convention has had it, with the supposed Semitic immigrations of the first millennium 
B.C. (Levine 2000: 26). 
The Ethiopian state is thus understood as a bifurcated structure, as we shall see when we 
examine the centre-periphery approach, which found its expression in a sharp civilisational 
split based on tradition (great and little tradition), culture (Christian and non-Christian) and 
space (highland and lowland). The result is that, in the words of Christopher Clapham (2002a: 
40–41), the Abyssinians, ‘notably those who speak Amharic and Tigrinya’, are constructed as 
true ‘Ethiopia, whereas other peoples [are seen to be] […] part of Ethiopia’. 
The rise of the modern Ethiopian state31 
Over the years, scholars from a wide range of academic disciplines – history, political science, 
anthropology, etc. – have paid a great deal of attention to the genesis of the modern Ethiopian 
state. The emphasis of these studies has broadly been on the making of imperial Ethiopia, 
especially on the nature and consequences of Menelik’s conquest32 of the south during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. In order to capture the conquest, many scholars draw on a 
wide range of aphorisms and appellations – ‘enlargement of the state’ (Markakis 2011), 
‘imperial expansion’ (Donham 1986), colonisation (Holcomb and Ibsa 1990), ‘military feudal 
colonialism’ (Addis Hiwet 1975), restoring and uniting ‘medieval territories of Ethiopia’ 
                                                 
31 In Ethiopian historiography, the state that emerged following Menelik’s conquest (see below) is commonly 
considered to be the modern Ethiopian state (see Bahru 1991). The use of the word ‘modern’ also signifies the 
inculcation of European instruments of governance, such as constitutionalism (see Clapham 2006)  
32 Ethiopia acquired its contemporary shape between 1896 and 1906 through imperial conquest. At the turn of the 
century, Menelik II subdued several kingdoms and societies, including the emerging Oromo monarchic states 
such as Gera, Gomma, Garo, Gumma, Jimma, and Limmu-Ennarea other kingdoms like Kefa, Sidama, Kembata, 
Wolayta, and the Omotic speaking peoples (Bahru 1991; Markakis 2011). 
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(Teffera 1997: 37) – which were lost in the aftermath of Gragn and Oromo expansion33 
(Getachew 1986). These aphorisms, broadly speaking, are expressions of a wide range of 
divergent and competing views and positions about the Ethiopian state. In this and the 
following sections, I attempt to highlight some of these debates focusing on issues surrounding 
the formation and functioning of the imperial state to identify those historical processes and 
themes that have been of utmost importance in shaping the contemporary Ethiopian state.  
One debate concerns the interplay between internal and external historical forces that gave 
rise to a highly centralised Western-style state. In scrutinising the history of the Ethiopian state, 
Christopher Clapham, in his classic work Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary 
Ethiopia (1988), analysed the structural changes that recreated and modelled the Ethiopian 
state along European lines, a process which, he argues, ensured Ethiopia to be recognised as a 
‘sovereign jurisdiction existing on terms of formal equality’ (26–27) with European states. The 
first change concerns the means of access to state power from primogeniture to ‘the control of 
force’. This, according to Clapham, resulted in the rise of ‘great centralising emperors’ or state 
builders – Tewodros II (1855–68), Yohannes IV (1871–89) and Menelik II (1889–1913) – who 
restored a ‘powerful Ethiopian state’. The modern Ethiopian state, Clapham argues, was 
created by Menelik at the turn of the century through the conquest and subjugation of ‘peoples 
of the southern marches’ (Donham 1986).  
                                                 
33 In 1529 the Muslim sultanate of Adal led by Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi (nicknamed Gragn or the left handed) 
invaded the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia leading to the partial occupation of the Ethiopian highlands for a little 
more than ten years, between 1529 and 1543 (Bahru 1991; Henze 2000). The eventual defeat of Gragn was 
immediately followed by the Oromo clan’s expansion towards central, northern and western Ethiopia (see Bahru 






The second and most important change has to do with the process of centralisation 
(Clapham1988) and subjugation of ‘regional lords to a progressively increasing level of 
imperial control - a process ultimately completed only by Haile-Selassie, following the decisive 
reduction of regional autonomy during the Italian occupation’ (Donham 1986).  
Finally, the third important change is the increasing level of external diplomatic, economic, 
educational, military and administrative contact with Europeans. This resulted in two important 
developments: firstly, the creation of European-style centralised bureaucratic institutions 
(Clapham 1988). This involved the introduction of ‘a standing army, ministerial bureaucracies, 
national taxation, and a codified law to protect landed elites’ (Donham 1986: 25) and the 
transformation of what had been the traditional elite into a European-educated bureaucratic 
elite. These transformations had given rise to a state that is understood to have become a 
partially but increasingly modernising, rationalised and bureaucratised entity presided over by 
an elite detached from society (Markakis 1974; Addis Hiwet 1975). We can see here, as argued 
in the previous section, with the influence of Europe, that the Ethiopian state, instead of being 
the outcome of a unique indigenous process, is as much a product of, in Bayart’s word (2009: 
24), ‘syncretic articulation’ as other sub-Saharan African states.  
Secondly, external contacts created a foreign exchange economy ‘through which to pay for 
imported goods and provide a tax base for the imperial government’ (Clapham 1988: 29). The 
economic foundation of the state thereby shifted from a complete dependence upon the taxation 
of Abyssinian subsistence farmers to cash crops, especially the production of coffee in the 
newly incorporated territories of the south and west.  
Overall, Clapham’s historical analysis of the focuses on the contributions made by actors 
and process to the emergence of Western-style state structure in Ethiopia. As such, structural 
93 
 
transformations occurred during the 120-year period, from mid-nineteenth onwards, are viewed 
as manifestations of the Weberian process of rationalisation of state power.  
The great man approach 
Since the middle of the 20th century, the study of state and society had been ignored by 
Ethiopianist scholars in their drive to account for the personhood and power of the sovereign – 
great emperors. This tradition was set in motion, according to Markakis (2011: 20), by Thomas 
Carlyle’s (1841) ‘hero-worship’ approach which inspired numerous ‘encomiastic portraits of 
past leaders’, especially of Haile Selassie. Many scholars working in this tradition, as Bahru 
Zewde (2008) remarks, were infatuated with the person of the late Machiavellian Emperor and 
eschewed any broad social analysis. The state, rather, was predominantly discussed in relation 
to the purportedly ‘modernizing zeal’ (Perham 1969: 62) of a man who is said to have ‘shaped 
rather than waited upon events’ (Mosley 1965: 151). Even Halliday and Molyneux (1981), who 
took a structuralist political economy approach to the study of Ethiopia, remarked: ‘the history 
of modern Ethiopia has to a considerable degree been encapsulated in the biography of the man 
who, for many years, ruled it and represented it to the outside world.’ This characterisation is 
sometimes taken to the extreme, as when, for instance, Haile Selassie is described as 
‘omnipotent’ and ‘omnipresent’, ‘intervening at will in the smallest details of any aspects of 
administration’ (Clapham 1988: 23).  
Haile Selassie is simply represented as the ‘singular and transcendental’ figure of a 
Machiavellian prince (Foucault 1991: 91), who embodied not only the state but also history 
and rules to maintain personal control over his territory. While Haile Selassie’s progressive 
view (which Bahru Zewde (2008) rather scathingly characterised as ‘panegyric of money’) 
significantly contributed to the transformation of the imperial government, it is too reductionist 
to regard the monarch as a ‘quintessence of the state’ (Raphaeli 1967: 422) and make him a 
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subject of scientific inquiry as a substitute for the state and society. In these studies, analysis 
of the state is highly tethered to what Foucault (1991) conceptualised as a sovereign 
understanding of power – i.e. power is assumed to be a centralised force wielded by great 
emperors who oppress, impose laws and build institutions. 
The state and ethnicity  
One of the recurring themes found in Ethiopian studies concerns the interface between the state 
and ethnicity.34 There are several strands to this theme. One strand sees state-society relations 
in terms of the state as a unified, dominant and sovereign institution that is primarily 
constructed and controlled by a predominant ethnic group. In this respect, the Ethiopian state 
is deemed to be established by and centred on the Amhara ethnic group. Donald Levine (1965b: 
247), for instance, argues, ‘it is a conspicuous fact that the Ethiopian state has emerged through 
the ascendance of one of the people’s in the country, the Amhara, over the others’. Here, Levine 
saw that the state was not only dominated by the Amhara but also used as an instrument to 
carry out ‘cultural imperialism’, namely ‘Amharization via school system, the spread of 
Amharic custom and religion through settlers, traders, and colonial missionaries’ (247). While 
Levine emphasises the importance of the Amhara’s dominance,35 he is also committed to what 
he calls the Greater Ethiopia approach (2000). He characterises Greater Ethiopia as a 
cultural/civilizational area where the various ethnic groups that inhabit the Ethiopian state share 
a number of ‘pan-Ethiopian’ cultural traits – including similarities in family and descent 
structure and belief system. It is in this context and process of cultural contact that the Amhara, 
                                                 
34 I do not examine the literature on ethnic politics. This important issue has been addressed by others. For 
example, see Vaughan 2003; Praeg 2006; Aalen 2011; Asnake 2013.  
35 Levine’s much-used analysis of Amhara political culture and its contribution to the constitution of the state will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
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Levine argues, ascended and developed a centralised state structure by extending their culture 
across the Greater Ethiopia civilisation area.  
Similar to Levine’s analysis, Christopher Clapham (1988) argued that the Ethiopian state is 
not a neutral entity equally open to all cultures of the country. He pointed out that: 
… participation in national political life normally required assimilation to the cultural 
values of the Amharic core: the Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity, and a capacity 
to operate within the structures and assumptions of a court administration (21).  
Clapham (1988) reminded us to pay attention to the ‘plasticity’ of the term Amhara which, he 
argues, should not be associated with ‘the descent-based ethnic identities characteristic of many 
other African societies’ (24). He states: 
Being Amhara is much more a matter of how one behaves than of who one’s parents 
were; and without this capacity for assimilating other peoples into a core culture which 
can be regarded as national, and not the exclusive property of a particular group of people, 
the Ethiopian state would probably have been unable to sustain itself in the first place 
(23). 
Clapham argues that the Amhara, therefore, are ‘capable of forming the core element of a multi-
ethnic state, only because … their own ethnicity is so weakly defined’ (23). But again, Clapham 
admits that Ethiopia is commonly associated with the identity of one people that offers to others 
the chance to participate in the state system and simultaneously requires ‘the subordination of 
one’s own original affiliation’ (25). This, according to Clapham, means the Ethiopian state is 
fraught with ‘much more intense problems of national identity and integration than other 
African states’ (24) such as, for instance, the creation of a bifurcated state structure – between 
the highland core and the lowland peripheries – which is traditionally ‘expressed in terms of a 
clash between Orthodox Christianity and Islam’ (25). As such, the state institutions are seen to 
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have had no autonomy from the dominant ethnic groups and, as a consequence, the relationship 
between the state and society functions based on exclusion of ‘the mass of the population from 
the process of government, and the economic exploitation of the producers by an ethnically 
defined ruling class, into which some other elites assimilated’ (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 
82) and the cultural suppression of less dominant groups.  
Another strand of thought about the interface between state and society focuses on ethnic 
subjugation. Here, the Ethiopian state is studied in the context of Menelik’s territorial 
expansion and the subsequent consolidation of state power by Haile Selassie. Gilchrist (2004), 
for instance, contends that:  
Through the creation of the modern Ethiopian state the Abyssinians eventually 
subjugated the Oromo in a political system reminiscent of European colonialism in the 
rest of Africa.36 
Conversely, Holcomb and Ibsa (1990) describe Ethiopia as a ‘dependent colonial empire’ 
created as a result of an alliance formed between European capitalist states (Britain, France and 
Italy) and the Abyssinian kingdom in the interests of the former. They argue that the Ethiopian 
state is not an ancient indigenous entity but rather is as much a child of colonialism as any other 
African state, spared from direct subjugation for being an agent for colonial powers in the Horn 
of Africa. 
Ethiopia is the name that was eventually given to the geographic unit created when 
Abyssinia, a cluster of small kingdoms in northeast Africa, expanded in the mid-1800s 
                                                 
36 For a similar view, see Mekuria 1996; Leenco 1999.  
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by conquering independent nations in the region using firearms provided by European 
power (1).37 
Other scholars have taken a different approach, focusing on the complexity of the interface 
between state power and ethnicity. For example, with respect to the Oromo, Merara (2006: 
104) wrote: ‘the irony of Oromo history therefore is that they were among of the conquerors 
and the conquered, that they produced kings and queens while at the same time reduced to 
‘gabbar’ (serf) and tenants alienated from the land of their ancestors.’ Overall, these views 
bring to the fore the question of national and cultural oppression and other forms of inequality 
inherent in the state system which have been disguised by the grand ‘great tradition’ narrative. 
Class contradictions and the demise of the imperial state 
Some Ethiopianists who look to the past focused their studies on class relations in the late 
imperial period. The paradoxical structural transformations that the Ethiopian state system 
underwent from 1896 to 1974, namely, ‘the creation of a stronger and more centralised 
bureaucratic state and the increasing commercialisation of the economy’ (Donham 1986: 25) 
on the one side and the concomitant entrenchment of the ancient aristocratic class system on 
the other has made scholars question the liberalising and modernising capacity of the state as 
an actor. Many have concluded that the imperial state’s capacity to modernise society and 
transform the economy (especially the agricultural sector) was impaired by its ‘semi-
bureaucratised’ structure (Gebru 1996), i.e. by contradictions between ‘commercial purists and 
patron-client relationships’ (Donham 1986). This socio-political development led to further 
discussions among Ethiopianists concerning where the Ethiopian state fits in the international 
system of states. Bahru Zewde (2008), for instance, drew comparisons between imperial 
Ethiopia and Perry Anderson’s late European absolutist states during their transition from 
                                                 
37 For a similar argument, see Sorenson 1993; Asafa 1993. 
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feudalism to capitalism. Similarly, Teshale Tibebu (1995:30) sought to investigate: ‘In the 
global survey of modern state formations …. Where does the Ethiopian variety fit in?’. 
Writing about class and revolution, Markakis and Nega (1986) described the late imperial 
state as beset by a conjunction of national and class antagonisms. The first, they argue, was a 
product of the strain caused by the imperial expansion into the south and the subsequent drive 
by national leaders to centralise state power. Second, they saw class antagonism as a product 
of the introduction and expansion of western capitalism. They argued that the foreign 
domination of the economic sector prevented the formation of a national bourgeoisie and turned 
the petty bourgeoisie (the salariat in public and private sector and the self-employed in retail 
trade) into radicalisation. The petty bourgeoisie, along with the students, they argue, was able 
to make a ‘common cause with the workers and the peasants’ (53) by politicising the issues of 
land and workers’ exploitation. This prepared the ground for revolution of 1974. Similarly, 
Halliday and Molyneux (1981) saw contradictions between the advanced administrative system 
and the backward economy producing the conditions for the demise of the imperial state. 
Writing about the cause of the 1974 revolution, Halliday and Molyneux (1981) described 
imperial Ethiopia in terms of radical division between two economic sectors: the agricultural 
sector, which was attached to the pre-capitalist mode of production and administration system, 
and the industrialising sector represented by the expansion of industries in urban areas and 
large-scale commercial farms in some rural areas: 
The state apparatus became a partial promoter of capitalist development and, at the same 
time, the site of a conflict between groups associated with this capitalist development and 
those associated with the pre-capitalist order. The gulf thus created within the state was 
to be more than a reflection of the conflicts within the socio-economic formation as a 
whole; it became the politically most acute contradiction within Ethiopian society, the 
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conflict that was to determine the fall of the ancient regime and the nature of the new 
post-revolutionary system (69–70). 
Instead of immediate social conditions such as a wave of student protests and public 
demonstrations at a 50-per-cent oil price hike, corrupt officials and the infamous deadly famine 
in the north, the victims of which the emperor allegedly blamed for defaming his reputation by 
dying of famine (de Waal 1991: 57), Halliday and Molyneux (1981) argued that the insoluble 
contradictions in the state system produced a ‘revolution from above’ in 1974.  
Changes to the structure of the local state 
It is important to pause here to give a little historical context to the genesis of the kebele in this 
particular period of history. In September 1974, the Derg38 (which literary means committee) 
deposed Emperor Haile Selassie I, renamed itself ‘The Provisional Military Administrative 
Council’ and introduced a ‘declaration of socialist state’ on 20 December 1974 (Shinn & 
Ofcansky 2004). Following this, the Derg introduced a series of radical social, economic and 
political reforms including the redistribution of land to the peasants, abolishment of the 
monarchy and nationalisation of the economy. However, the most important transformation in 
the context of this study took place at the local level, where the Derg introduced rural peasant 
and urban dwellers’ associations known as kebeles. The kebele was first introduced by the 
Development Through Cooperation, Enlightenment and Work39 campaign of 1975, known in 
Amharic as Zemecha, to facilitate rural land redistribution, villagisation and other programmes. 
The kebeles were later transformed, in 1976, into permanent local state administrative units 
                                                 
38 The Derg (the Geez word for ‘committee’), first formed by a group of junior military officers to investigate 
abuses of senior officers and grievances of the army, refers to the Provisional Military Administrative Council 
(PMAC) (Poluha and Elehu 2016).  
39 In the campaign, fifty thousand students and teachers were distributed over four hundred stations of the country 




and charged with the crucial tasks of tax collection, security provision and the registration of 
houses, residents and marriages (Clapham 1988).  
The kebele functioned not only as a civil administrative unit but also as a political structure 
and ‘an effective and efficient means for the state to keep a tight control of their citizens and 
to clamp down on any opposition activities’ (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 41). Through 
kebeles ‘neighbourhood defence squads were created, numbering from 15 to 25 armed 
individuals, and they became ruthless neighbourhood arms of the regime during the Red Terror. 
They patrolled their neighbourhood day and night and sometimes operated outside the control 
of central authorities … they were responsible for a considerable amount of urban violence, 
torture, and intimidation’ (Keller 1991: 234). The kebele, which remains the basic and primary 
unit of local administration, constitutes the ethnographic site of this study.  
The Derg and the continuity of state idea  
One of the most interesting studies of the Ethiopian state focused on the continuity of the 
representation of a historical idea of the state. A number of writers have described how idea of 
an ancient Ethiopian state and its ‘message of domination’ was appropriated and portrayed by 
the Derg during the regime’s revolution period. In his book, Marxist Modern: An Ethnographic 
History of the Ethiopian Revolution, Donald Donham (1999), for example, outlines how 
spectacular ritual and pageantry formed an essential part of the state’s authority. Donham tells 
of an occasion in 1984, for example, where the Derg organised a splendid celebration for the 
tenth anniversary of the revolution at a cost of US $50 million dollars. One of the programmes 
involved a museum exhibit:  
The exhibit was placed along a wall, in front of which a red carpet led viewers from one 
installation to the next. The first stop was the bones that American palaeontologist 
Donald Johanson had found in Hadar, Ethiopia, of an individual he named Lucy (after 
the Beatles’ song), supposedly the earliest evidence of our hominid ancestors … After 
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[which] came photographs of stelae from the earliest civilisation in Ethiopia, Axum. 
After Axum came the famous rock church of Lalibela from the twelfth century. The 
exhibit continued to the battle of Adwa in 1896, in which Ethiopia defeated Italy and 
thereafter, alone in Africa, managed to remain politically independent during most of the 
twentieth century. Finally came the overthrow of Haile Sellassie in 1974 (1999: 14–15). 
Clearly, progressing through the exhibition from the beginning to the end showed Ethiopia to 
be a cradle of humanity and attempted to sustain a powerful myth of a trans-historic idea of the 
state. Moreover, the Derg appropriated the symbolism of imperial power as integral to the idea 
of the ancient Ethiopian state idea. In this regard, Clapham (1988: 79) draws a parallel between 
Mengistu Haile Mariam and Haile Selassie:  
In the time of the imperial regime, it was common to see pictures in which Father, Son 
and Holy Ghost, enthroned in the clouds, projected a beam of light onto the emperor 
(symbolically situated at mid-point between heaven and earth), who in turn diffused it 
to a waiting people. At the tenth anniversary celebrations [of the Ethiopian revolution] 
along with the official decorations provided by the North Koreans, it was also possible 
to find homemade tributes in which the gift of grace, embodied in a celestial trinity of 
Marx, Engels and Lenin, similarly descended to the graceful masses by way of Megistu 
Haile-Mariam. 
Similarly, David Korn (1986: 107), who was in charge of the American embassy in Addis 
Ababa at the time, observed:  
… in his rare public appearances in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian leader sits on a kind of 
throne, a red velvet upholstered gold-lacquered chair emplaced above and in front of the 
less ornate seats provided for the other senior figures of the regime. In these and in other 
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ways, Mengistu Haile Mariam can be looked upon as a monarch, an emperor, a successor 
to Haile Selassie and to Menelik. 
In an attempt to project himself as a champion of Ethiopian unity (guardian of the ancient 
Ethiopian state idea), Paul Henze (2000) tells us that Mengistu compared himself to the fiery 
18th-century Emperor Tewodros II, who initiated the unification of the country following its 
fragmentation by provincial warlords. I. M. Lewis (1983) also commented that Mengistu’s 
penchant for pomp and public spectacle, focused on the statue of Menelik, was ‘hardly 
accidental’ but rather a projection of equivalence with his ‘illustrious predecessor, the founder 
of the expanded Ethiopian empire’. More generally, these spectacles, through their 
performance and cultural projection of power and tradition, stress the continuity of the idea of 
the historic Ethiopian state.  
To sum up, it seems thus far that at the centre of Ethiopian studies about the state, society 
and governance lies the question of whether we have to conceptualise the state in terms of a 
broad historical continuum of some two thousand years or whether it has to be understood as 
being a ‘dependent colonial’ entity carved out to meet European imperial interest or as a set of 
institutions dominated by class and ethnic interests and yet separate from and acting upon 
society. Although extremely rich and interesting, these studies have offered only a top-down 
analysis of the state in Ethiopia. They pay little attention to local governance practices, or to 
how the people interact and negotiate with the state authority. In their attempt to historicise the 
Ethiopian state, they have become susceptible to sweeping generalisations and, as a 
consequence, conceal dispersed and localised patterns of governance practices.  
Centre-periphery approach  
A milestone in Ethiopian state studies was the frontier, centre-periphery approach. This 
approach, according to Donald Donham (1986: 4), ‘connects centre to periphery, and so 
103 
 
provides a way of linking the history and social anthropology’. Scholars working within this 
framework define the Ethiopian centre as the foci of state power which are constituted through 
the cultural idioms of Orthodox Christian followers of the Amharic- and Tigrinya -speaking 
groups of highland Ethiopia. The periphery, on the other hand, is seen to be non-Abyssinian 
groups who were identified in terms of their physical proximity to the capital, Addis Ababa, as 
a nodal point of communication, their level of incorporation to the state structure and their 
degree of self-identification with the ‘Greater Ethiopia’ myth (Clapham 2002a). This cleavage 
is understood to be the most important defining feature of the Ethiopian state and history. 
Donald Donham (1986), for instance, wrote that the centre-periphery constitutes: 
… the secret of modern Ethiopian history. It has often been mentioned that the poorest 
peasant from the north considered himself superior to any southerner. This cultural 
expression was not just the result of primordial sentiments; it was underpinned by the 
material inequalities created in the new Ethiopia (24). 
However, Donald Donham (2002) also wrote that with the secession of Eritrea and a large 
number of Ethiopians being abroad, the shape of the Ethiopian space has shifted from ‘a 
hierarchical arrangement of cores and peripheries’, a political dynamic which ‘remained stable 
for roughly three-quarters of a century’ until the 1974 revolution, into ‘a more open series of 
interactions drawing upon partially shared and intersecting ‘ethnoscapes’ of the imagination’ 
(2). He suggested James Scott’s concept of ‘mapping’ as an alternative approach to the study 
of the state.  
Christopher Clapham (2002b) made use of this concept and provided a cogent analysis on how 
Haile Selassie and the Derg and EPRDF regimes attempted to spatially reconstitute the 
Ethiopian state. He coined the concept of ‘encadrement’ or ‘incorporation into structures of 
control’ to explain how, for instance, the Derg regime controlled its territory through land 
distribution, villagisation, state farms and other projects.  
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The centre-periphery perspective, however, gained renewed interest following the 
publication of Markakis’s (2011) book Ethiopia: the last two frontiers. In this book, Markakis 
argues that instead of geography, the centre should be seen in terms of a monopoly over power 
and the state apparatus, and the periphery in terms of a relative absence of it. He identifies two 
frontiers in the periphery: the highland periphery and the lowland periphery. While the 
Ethiopian state is successful, he argues, in both politically and economically integrating the 
highland periphery, the ‘integration process has barely begun’ in the lowland periphery: 
… neither the civil code nor the penal codes of the state have much currency here, every 
man is armed, no one pays taxes and the people rely on themselves and traditional leaders 
for justice … the people subsist on the side of the state, outside the national economy, 
cut off from highland society and culture, and at the whim of a political system whose 
periodic dramatic swings they scarcely comprehend (16–17).  
Underlying this conceptualisation and characterisation seems to be an understanding of the 
state in terms of the existence of bureaucratic institutions. However, as Nielsen (2007) pointed 
out, in the case of Mozambique, local understandings of state exist even in the relative absence 
of government institutions. This approach therefore fails to recognise that the state is more than 
a physical political structure. Moreover, in most of the Ethiopian peripheries the absence of 
government institutions has historically not been constraining the government from collecting 
taxes and from making its presence felt through recurrent military incursions (Hagmann and 
Korf 2012).  
All in all, the centre-periphery approach, from the point of view of this study, is fraught with 
the problem of what Joel Migdal (2001: 199) termed the ‘beachhead imagery’, an analytical 
construct in which a ‘Great tradition’ or the centre – the beachhead of change – is assumed to 
impose its will over the periphery. People at the periphery are depicted as lacking agency and 
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only passive ‘… recipients of commands and of beliefs which they do not themselves create or 
cause to be diffused, and of those who are lower in the distribution or allocation of rewards, 
dignities, facilities, etc.’ (Shils 1982: 59). In other words, the relationship between the centre 
and the periphery is seen only in terms of a relationship of control, domination or isolation.  
The Borana in the academic literature  
Outside the rubric of the centre-periphery approach, there is a wealth of literature 
documenting the systems of livelihood and the social and political organisation of the people 
of south Ethiopia (see, among others, Asmerom 1973; Baxter and Triulzi 1996; Donham 
1999; Bassi 2005; Dereje 2011). This section focuses specifically on the literature on the 
Borana, as a contextual backdrop to the empirical chapters. I do not intend here, however, 
to offer an exhaustive account of the literature. I have chosen instead to very briefly review 
the literature that highlights the general themes of governance and livelihood in Borana. 
Further background to the context of the historical dynamics and long-term processes of 
state territorialisation efforts in the Borana is provided in Chapter 9.  
The Borana have been described variously as peripheral, marginalised and even isolated 
people (see Fecadu 1994; Markakis 2011) or as maintaining distinctive traditional ways of 
life (Asmarom1973). State discourses have portrayed their system of production as 
backward and as a factor contributing to environmental degradation (see in Crane 2013; 
Butler 2010). By contrast, with the rising importance of the international rhetoric of natural 
resource management, the Borana are viewed as stewards of the environment, as models for 
sustainable community-based natural resource management systems (see in Watson 2003; 
Bassi 2010).  
There is, however, a vast and burgeoning body of literature that explores the social, 
political and economic changes in Borana, focusing especially on the ways in which 
different political regimes have dealt with the pastoralists and their environment (see, for 
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example, Coppock 1994; Helland 1977; Hogg 1992, 1997; Boku 2008). Scholars see a 
pastoral way of life, their systems of social organisation and resource management 
increasingly undermined by state planned development policies (Hogg 1997; Galaty 1999; 
Boku 2008). For example, much has been written about how changes associated with the 
introduction of commercial ranches in the late 1960s and state ranches in the 1970s set in 
motion the processes of rangeland privatisation and changes in the customary resource 
tenure of the Borana (Hogg 1990; Oba 1998; Boku 2008). Another focus of discussion in 
the literature in Borana has centred on the realignment of administrative boundaries. Many 
scholars have detailed how the introduction of kebeles has weakened and sidelined the 
traditional resource management system of the Borana (Oba 1998). Several studies highlight 
how ethnic-based decentralisation that imposed new boundaries altered the ways in which 
resources such as grazing lands and water wells are owned and managed as common 
property (Helland 2002; Oba 1998; Boku 2008).  
These studies illuminate our understanding of how different political regimes exert 
intrusive and regulative power in borderland societies and reveal important issues 
concerning the systems of extractive power relations. The social and political dynamic 
created by development interventions and internal administrative boundaries, as I 
demonstrate in Chapter 9, has larger implications for the realignment of state-society 
relations. However, in focusing on state-level activities and how local settings have been 
altered by larger political and economic contexts and processes, these studies do not tell us 
much about the everyday governance practices that involve non-state actors and pastoralists. 
They pay little attention to the importance of the involvement of NGOs in altering the local 
social and environmental landscape, the ways in which pastoral populations interact and 
negotiate with state and non-state authorities and how this feeds into state formation. 
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 In this thesis, I will explore how the governance practices of the state are facilitated by 
NGOs, informal structures and are embedded in and shaped by local practice. In so doing, I 
underscore how change (and hence governance and power relations) in the Borana, as 
central as state interventions and its institutions are, does not always emerge from a single 
source. Here it is important to note that I do not suggest that these scholars consider the state 
and other formal decision-making structures as the main spheres through which governance 
and power are exercised in Borana. On the contrary, most of them espouse analysis based 
in terms of the complex interface of customary, state and non-state institutions and the 
changing political, economic and social alignments which shape the relations between 
pastoralists and the state. For example, Marco Bassi (1997) and Richard Hogg (1992) 
brought to our attention the significance of the conduct of international actors and NGOs on 
local relations of power and on the politics of space. Bassi (1997), for example, forcefully 
demonstrated how the United Nations High Commission for Refugees was involved in the 
‘demographic politics of space’ 40  by facilitating the resettlement of refugees into the 
Boranaland. In a recent article, Bassi (2010) highlighted attempts by international 
development initiatives to bring the state and customary structures together through rhetoric 
that promotes the need to integrate the customary institutions within modern systems of 
governance and by arranging local-scale meetings between pastoralists and state 
representatives. This thesis stresses the significance of NGOs and other non-state actors in 
reconfiguring the local pastoral physical and social landscape. It advances this insight by 
looking ethnographically at how the involvement of NGOs in development practices 
promoted sedentarisation and hence the creation of a ‘society of the state’ (Kapferer and 
Bertelsen 2009).  
                                                 
40 Bassi defined this as ‘the planned attempt to gain control over land by means of forced or voluntary migration 
or by any demographic strategy’ (2010: 241). 
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In some of the more recent literature, explicit concern has been expressed regarding the 
issue of the relationships between development agencies and customary institutions in 
Borana. One study in this regard is Elizabeth Watson’s (2003) investigation into the fragile 
partnership of pastoralists and international NGOs and development agencies. She warns 
against oversimplifying local institutions for the benefit of natural resource management, 
pointing out their deep embeddedness in other social relations.  
Other recent literature on Borana has focused on the dynamics of the nature of the 
relationship and interaction between state and customary institutions. Sarah Lister (2004) 
examined the extent to which ‘interaction between formal and traditional systems mediates 
between citizen interests and policy outcomes, and thus fulfils a “representation” function’. 
Similarly, Marco Bassi (2010: 222) discusses the ‘multifaceted attempt to co-opt customary 
institutions and community elders’ by the state. This has involved instrumental deployment 
of customary institutions for development purposes and conflict resolution.  
This thesis seeks to supplement the work carried out by these scholars, looking at the 
contingency of the formal/traditional split and the entanglement of the two through mutual 
recognition and protection. In so doing, I pay attention to the potential effects of the presence 
and conduct of state agents, NGO workers and the ways in which this contributes to state 
imagination. I demonstrate the contradictions, interstation and aspects of negotiation 
between state agents, NGO workers and customary leaders, in addition to the diversity of 
discourses employed by various actors in the everyday production of the state. 
Finally, an extensive body of research on Borana pastoralists has examined the fragility 
of pastoralism, poverty and livelihood security. In recent years a debate has emerged around 
the viability of pastoral systems in Borana as well as in the wider region of the Horn of 
Africa. Scholars widely agree that wealth and welfare among pastoralists are in decline. But 
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they differ in the nature of their concern: some advance the argument that the problem lies 
with the existence of ‘too many people, too few livestock’ (Sandford 2006). Hence, they 
seek to address the problem by looking at exit options such as expanding alternative 
livelihood-generating activities while others focus on ‘limiting the number of people who 
make a living from pastoral livestock production’ (Helland 2010) through long-term 
capacity building (Devereaux and Scoones 2006). On the other hand, authors like Catley 
(2010) focus on the underlying politics in the degradation of pastoralist systems and the 
changing forms of access to environmental resources. Others advance solutions that are 
focused on the restoration and strengthening of customary governance for the management 
of natural resources (see Homann and Rischkowsky 2008). 
These studies are extremely rich and provide clues to the changing nature and complexity 
of pastoralist systems. However, what is significant for this study is not the viability and 
future of pastoralist systems or resource governance, but rather the ways in which the 
processes of change are being affected, how practices of governance are articulated at the 
interface of multiple actors and how this feeds into the project of state formation. I highlight 
the internally diverse nature of the local population in terms of how individuals view the 
state and the multiple strategies that they devise to cope with their changing circumstances 
(Long 1990: 8) in order to secure livelihood. The thesis situates the process of 
transformation in pastoralism within the processes of state formation which, in turn, is part 
of the emergence of many of the national-level practices that have to do with expansion of 
the developmental state. 
Abyssinian culture and state formation 
Some of the most detailed studies about Ethiopia have focused on political culture, including 
the classic works of Donald Levine (1965a, 1965b, 2000) and Allan Hoben (1970). While 
scholars working within this approach, as I demonstrate below, have not explicitly theorised 
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the state, they do describe the political culture around which the Ethiopian state is organised 
and the mechanisms and system of meaning through which ordinary people make sense of 
politics, social relations and state institutions.  
In what follows I elaborate on the ideas of Donald Levine. I have chosen to focus on Levine 
because of his substantial influence on those working on Ethiopian politics, society and history. 
In his article Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism (1965b), Levine outlined the cultural 
conditions that inform political life in North Ethiopia. He begins with the argument that since 
Ethiopia had for long been ruled by the Amhara, any attempt to understand its politics should 
start with the ‘fact of Amhara dominance’ (248). He states:  
… the ideas, symbols, and values which govern Ethiopian politics are drawn from 
Amhara culture. The national politics of Ethiopia have on the whole been shaped in 
accordance to what may be called Amhara political culture … 
He points to three features that define the Amhara political culture: ‘orientation to authority, to 
human nature and to polity’ which, he believes, ‘have changed very little over the centuries41’. 
On the first component, authority, as an essential defining character of the Amhara political 
culture, Levine (1965b: 250) wrote: 
… the complex of beliefs, symbols and values regarding authority constitute a key 
component of Amhara political culture. Throughout, Amhara culture appears the motif 
that authority as such is good: indispensable for the well-being of society and worthy of 
unremitting deference, obeisance, and praise. Every aspect of Amhara social life is 
anchored in some sort of relationship to authority figures, and the absence of such a 
relationship evokes feelings of incompleteness and malaise.  
                                                 
41 It should be noted that Levine wrote this in 1965 and he would probably not make the same comment in the 
context of current circumstances.  
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He draws our attention to the pervasiveness of hierarchy in a whole range of social contexts, 
including in family relations – manners during mealtimes, obedience to parental authority, in 
children’s playing groups (dominated by the eldest), school discipline and gestures of respect 
to superiors, etc. (250–252). For Levine, the exercise of authority in social and family 
relationships in the Amhara society resembles that found in institutional contexts: ‘the 
household is less a family unit than it is a vertically ordered set of status-roles’ (2000: 123). He 
describes the nature of life in Amhara society as ‘highly political in that the wielding of 
authority is a basic and pervasive feature of their social relationships’ (1965b: 251).  
The second component has to do with the Amhara conception of human nature, which 
Levine characterised as ‘realistic humanism’. He argues that the Amhara view of human nature 
is ‘radically unegalitarian’ (257). This, Levine argues, is reinforced by the Amhara fatalistic 
conception of the universe. He argues that Edel, or fate, which has to be accepted, is tethered 
to authority (divine) and conceived of as more important than human effort. This, according to 
Levine, buttresses ‘a disposition to respect and obey figures of authority’ (261). The wider 
political implication, he emphasised, is that ‘society no more than human nature is to be made 
the object of systematic efforts to apply transcendent principles or to transform the status quo’ 
and the process of governing becomes ‘to accept such conflicts and strains as exist and to work, 
by skilful manipulation, adjudication, and occasional coercion, to maintain a minimum of order 
and retributive justice’ (261).  
Finally, Levine draws attention to national politics by referring to the Amhara culture as 
placing insignificant value on ‘the notion of civil community’ (262). Thus, social cohesion is 
maintained by a ‘sharing of common religious, territorial and linguistic identifications’ and 
‘subordination to individual authority figures’ (262). On the other hand, Levine argues, national 
sentiment is tied to the tradition of the monarch and that of the church. Levine argues that, 
taken together, the three elements, representing the Amhara political culture, ‘furthered the 
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establishment of legitimate national government’ but also obstructed its ‘rationalisation’ and 
‘affected both positively and negatively the receptivity to social change.’ (271).  
Levine has helpfully identified two aspects that characterises political culture in North 
Ethiopia: the pervasiveness of hierarchy and complex of beliefs, symbols and values regarding 
authority. However, his analysis of the belief system fails to take into account complex 
relational principles and ideas that shape power relations and hierarchical transactions.  
Since the publication of his work, echoes of Levine’s analysis of Ethiopian politics and 
society are noticeable in various early political and cultural studies. One notable example 
comes from Donald Donham (1986: 4),42  who saw the Abyssinian (Amhara and Tigray) 
sociocultural formation of the ‘… the pre-nineteenth-century period [as] the basis for the new 
Ethiopian state’. Donham (1986) sought to describe the Ethiopian state in terms of a system of 
surplus extraction that, he believes, defines the centre-periphery assemblage, building on the 
Abyssinian notions of domination, constraint and extraction. He wrote: 
The very word in Amharic for nobility, mekwannint, derives indirectly from the verb 
konene which means to discipline, to constrain, to inflict pain. The word for lord, 
melkenya, derives indirectly from the verb meleke meaning variously to vanquish, to 
govern, to expropriate. The notion of extraction in particular was evident in the phrase 
commonly used to describe the appointment of lords to fiefs: they were sent to eat their 
respective countries (6). 
Donham went on to explain what he described as the ‘unadorned system of force and 
extraction’ (6) that imbues the imperial Ethiopian state system: 
                                                 
42 Donald Donham relies prominently on the works of Donald Levine. He also cites accounts of early European 
travellers to substantiate his analysis. 
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The notion of constraint and extraction to prevent ‘satisfaction’ seems to have pervaded 
the major inequalities in Abyssinian society: the relation between God and his Orthodox 
Christian believers, that between lords and their following, and finally between husband-
father and their wives and children. With regard to the first, fasting was and is the symbol 
of adherence to Ethiopian Orthodox faith. Its centrality can be appreciated when fasting 
is seen as God’s extraction designed to constrain sinful human nature, to keep believers 
in line, and to prevent the ‘satisfaction’ that encourages people to take more than they 
have a right to. The relationship between lord and their following was seen in much the 
same light; in fact, the word for the lord’s demesne, the field worked by the corvee labour 
of his peasants, was hudad, the same word for the difficult and long Lenten fast. Finally, 
husband-fathers played the same role of disciplining their wives and children. According 
to a common saying: setinna ahiya yale dula aykenam (‘A woman and a donkey can’t be 
kept straight without the stick’) (1986: 6). 
In Donham’s analysis, the hierarchical relations that frame the Abyssinian society are ordered, 
based on principles of domination and extraction, into a whole. In this formulation, the whole 
is the phenomenological world – that is, God’s desire of extracting sinful human nature – and 
the social and political system is simply its material expression. In other words, the whole 
contains within it and serves as the basis upon which the distinction of political and social rank 
and hierarchy is constituted.  
Recently, Teferi Adem (2004) explored the gaps between the objectives of the national 
agricultural extension programmes and the reality of their implementation in Wollo through 
the lens of ‘national political culture’ (85). Teferi, building his analysis largely on Levine, 
argued that the problem of implementing extension programmes was complicated by the 
pervasiveness of cultural dispositions, such as habits of suspicion and distrust, a masculine 
and militaristic ethos and the tendency of national leaders to import foreign ideologies and 
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development programmes. Here there remained the tendency to assume the existence of 
certain cultural dispositions and national political culture, rather than testing for it, implying 
the nature of political culture is the same everywhere.  
Other contemporary scholarship has drawn attention to the complex overlap and interface 
between traditional values and formal institutions. Abbink (2006: 176), for instance, offers 
an interesting perspective on the 2005 elections and their aftermath. He particularly sought 
to illuminate ‘Ethiopian political culture in the light of neo-patrimonial theory … 
emphasizing the continued need to reconceptualise the analysis of politics in Ethiopia, away 
from the formal political science … towards a view of politics in more cultural terms, taking 
into account ethnic/kinship networks, local conceptions and psychologies of power, the role 
of ideology, and (informal) business interests’. In so doing he argued that formal institutions 
in Ethiopia are deeply embedded in informal power networks.  
The study of political culture was given a different theoretical shape by Sarah Vaughan 
and Kjetil Tronvoll (2003), who, using Barnes’ theory of power, moved beyond the ‘waxen 
form of politics in Ethiopia, to illuminate its “golden” alternate [i.e.] the relations and 
systems of power and convention which underpin and give it life and meaning’. They treat 
power as ‘both function and constitutive feature of the interaction of a social collective’ (25). 
In so doing, they demonstrated the social processes by which power relations are rooted in 
the system of social networks.  
This thesis explores this process and refines these insights by exploring the complex 
process by which hierarchy, culture and ‘counter-conduct’ (Foucault 2007) intersect. At the 
same time as I recognise the importance of the hierarchical conception of authority in North 
Ethiopia, I also suggest that our theoretical frameworks for studying power relations, 
authority and the state in Ethiopia need to take more account of resistance and the relational 
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principles which are embedded in the cultural conception of hierarchy. Ethiopian history is 
replete with resistance, including peasant revolts (Gebru 1996), banditry (Crummey 1986), 
armed resistance (Young 1997) and other everyday forms of resistance such as oral poetry 
(see Getie 1999). It seems to be necessary to ask ourselves the questions of how does one 
account for ‘the endless succession of revolts, part peasant rebellion, part feudal jacqueries, 
repressed in one place only to break out in another’ (Chojnacki 1993: 61)? How does one 
harmonise ‘unremitting deference’ (Levine 1965b: 250) to authority and the pervasiveness 
of resistance? What does the pervasive presence of resistance tell us about the nature of 
power relations and the state in northern Ethiopia? 
Messay Kebede (1999) offers us a clue to the nexus of power and resistance: i.e., how 
‘the art of being governed’ and ‘the will not to be governed’ (Foucault 2007) are 
conceptualised in traditional Ethiopia. Writing about land tenure and governance, he makes 
a distinction between peasant protest that arises due to the abuse of governors and ‘peasant 
rebellion emerging from deep discontent with the system itself’. He argues that the ‘latter 
never occurred in Ethiopia, the former was frequent’ (Messay 1999: 171). An important 
implication of this insight is that people take the land tenure and hierarchical system of 
authority for granted, whereas individual actors occupying a position of authority are 
subjected to ‘critical attitude’ (Foucault 2007) and resistance. In this regard, Messay further 
tells us that in traditional Ethiopia patrons are culturally expected to be ‘beneficent for the 
sake of justice, in the name of clientship’ and those who refuse to do so end up either 
betrayed or abandoned. However, the patron is not expected to be beneficent on the basis of 
the principle of equality because ‘the high respect for social hierarchy empties justice of the 
notion of equality’ (203). Hierarchy is thus seen to represent the natural order of things. 
However, at the same time, the bases of power and the legitimacy of leaders are not defined 
by their position within the hierarchy but rather in how people imagine good patrons and 
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good relations with them ought to be and what obligations they think these relations entail. 
Hence hierarchy, as I demonstrate in Chapter 7, is encompassed by cultural and religious 
values and the notion that the higher one (God, mengist, husband, etc.) encompasses the 
lower one (the people, family, etc.) in terms of being both more powerful and more 
responsible. The thesis further expands these insights by exploring the myriad ways in which 
mengist vis-à-vis local officials are culturally constructed in Degga in relation to discourses 
of development and corruption.  
The discussion so far allows us to see the ways in which power is entailed in culture. 
Here the distinction the Comaroffs (1991) make between hegemony and ideology is 
instructive; the former is the nonagentive and hidden face of power and the latter is the 
agentive face of power that refers to highly articulated world views and system of meanings 
within a cultural field. To ground these ideas in the case at hand, the values that encompass 
hierarchy constitute the agentive face of power in culture (i.e. ideology which is a self-
conscious systems of values and hence contestable), whereas hierarchy constitutes the non-
agentive aspects of power in culture which people take for granted as natural. Thus, the 
people and principles (ideologies, value systems) that are embedded in unequal relations of 
power are subject to resistance while hierarchy or the system that underpins it operates 
unnoticed. Hence, the concept of culture used in the thesis is tied to seeing culture in terms 
of power relations. Culture can thus be understood as ‘the space of signifying practice, the 
semantic ground on which human beings seek to construct and represent themselves and 
others - and, hence, society and history’ (Comaroffs 1991: 21). It is a field in which ‘critical 
attitude’ (Foucault 2007) is formed, and domination and resistance take place.  
In Chapter 7, I will demonstrate how critical discourse is articulated in corruption 
discourses and through the religious metaphors and idioms which define the roles and 
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obligations involved in governance. It informs the ways in which people both understand 
hierarchy and experience and image the state. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to summarise several decades of discussion about the state and 
society in Ethiopia by drawing on a wide range of academic fields. One important question that 
emerges from the literature is whether one can describe the state without being drawn into an 
analysis of a politically constructed and idealised image of the state whose origins lie in the 
state itself. In the view of this study, the literature on the Ethiopian state, especially ‘the great 
tradition’ and ethno-nationalist perspectives, are partly categories of thought produced and 
imposed by successive political regimes. Therefore, in seeking to escape such a problem, the 
thesis heeds Bourdieu’s (1999: 53) caveat and attempts to avoid ‘…the risk of taking over (or 
being taken over by) a thought of the state, that is, of applying to the state categories of thought 
produced and guaranteed by the state and hence to misrecognize its most profound truth’.  
The literature concerned with an understanding of the history of the Ethiopian state is, on 
the other hand, quiet about the nature of relations between state and society at the local level. 
This is partly because of the absence of colonial rule in Ethiopia through which anthropology 
contributed immensely to the understanding of practices of governance in the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa (James 1990). Recent anthropological writings are also comparatively biased 
towards what is described as ‘peripheral’ parts of the Ethiopian state and rarely focus on the 
broader question of local governance practices in relation to the concept of the state. By 
contrast, as I have highlighted in this chapter, the ‘core area’ is described largely in terms of 
Levine’s classic work on the Amhara political culture. This thesis, in an explicit endeavour to 
counter this impasse, attempts an ethnographic account of the Ethiopian state both in the so-
called core and periphery areas, with a special emphasis on the former.  
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Taken together, the state in Ethiopia is largely viewed in the literature as a centralised 
apparatus of power which acts upon society in the interest of one or another class, world power 
or ethnic group. Viewed from an anthropological perspective, these approaches provide us with 
a limited grasp of the nature of the state in Ethiopia. It is therefore imperative in studying the 
state in sub-Saharan Africa in general, and in Ethiopia in particular, in Foucault’s (1980: 121) 
words, ‘to cut off the King’s head’ in favour of examining the state from below. The remainder 
of this thesis attempts such an analysis in order to empirically demonstrate the nature of the 
















The production of hierarchy and state spectacle 
In undertaking fieldwork in West Gojjam, I had to go on a bureaucratic pilgrimage, which 
started within the bureaucratic labyrinth of the regional state administration, and proceeded 
through the lower level structures (woreda and kebele administrations) to request the various 
permissions required (for fieldwork, to attend meetings and obtain access to official 
documents), and to arrange interviews with officials. During my journey, I met with a number 
of people, some multiple times, at different layers of the state bureaucracy, who were either 
waiting for officials to arrive, for their papers to be signed or for their work to be completed. 
Curious about the odds of running into some of them in different offices, I would sometimes 
casually enquire about their business. Most would tell me that they were waiting for 
applications for job transfers, land realignments and title deeds, business licences, etc., being 
shunted from one official to another, one office to another, one government department to 
another. These are regular features in the day-to-day life of the state and the conditions within 
which people conduct their daily lives. From the point of view of my interlocutors, the 
bureaucratic pilgrimage signifies not only the ominous uncertainty of the outcome of their 
applications but also the authority of the officials and the power of mengist to make them wait 
and disrupt their daily lives. This was captured, in particular, by expressions such as gezeyen 
belut (they ‘eat up’ my time), gezeyen akatelut (they wasted my time), and agulalugne (they 
ruin my day). This is the contextual field within which people encounter the state, and the way 
in which power and hierarchy are generated. 
In this chapter, I study the institution of the kebele and elaborate on the performative 
dimension of power and the everyday formation of the state. Specifically, I attempt to uncover 
the manner in which state hierarchy is reproduced through mundane bureaucratic practices. In 
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so doing, I argue that the state is not an object with a natural hierarchy but rather a product of 
practices that is brought into existence through spatial and scalar representations and a 
regularised set of bureaucratic practices (such as data collection), encounters (between the 
governors and the governed) and perpetual institutional rites (such as meetings) that are 
ceaselessly performed and thereby durably institutionalised.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. First, I discuss the constitution of the kebele. 
Here, I examine the ways in which the state comes to be represented as a centre of superior 
authority by the spatial and vertical organisation of its workforce and through the standard 
bureaucratic devices of office partitioning and the presence or lack of material paraphernalia 
such as computers and stationery. I also discuss how these hierarchies become embedded in 
everyday modes of interaction among state functionaries. Next, I further explore how 
hierarchies become routinised through everyday encounters between state officials – the kebele 
chairman and kebele manager – and local people. In the final section I will show how meetings, 
which are a key feature of the corpus of everyday bureaucratic rituals, constitute state authority. 
To illustrate this, I will analyse both administrative and public meetings held in Degga during 
the course of my research.  
5.1.The constitution of the kebele 
Politicians  
The kebele is staffed by politicians and civil servants. Politicians such as the kebele chairman, 
the security issues (militia) head, committee members43 and the party leader, etc. are members 
of the kebele council44 who all are elected every five years. The kebele council, and thus key 
                                                 
43 There are numerous committees both at the kebele and sub-kebele levels. These include kebele land use and 
administration committee, sub-kebele land arbitration committee, security affairs committee and women’s affairs 
committee. 
44 The council is the legislative body of the kebele. It is composed of 200 elected members.  
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executive positions, is dominated by model farmers – a class of largely semi-educated, local 
notables who maintain relatively significant land holdings and wealth. They are chosen, 
according to the woreda administrator, for their ‘leadership qualities, progressive and 
developmental outlook’ and for their ‘self-made wealth’.45 In my interactions with the model 
farmers, they invariably described themselves as ‘hard-working’, ‘developmental’ 46  and 
‘entrepreneurial’47, attributing their political power to their success in farming and to their work 
ethic. In contrast, they described ordinary residents by pointing out their ‘lack of discipline of 
work’, ‘laziness’48, ‘lack of receptivity to change’49 and ‘anti-development mentality’.50  
Model farmers are commonly linked to privilege, power and money. They are widely 
believed to have reaped disproportionately the benefits of the expansion of the developmental 
state. They are the first to exploit state resources such as improved varieties of seeds and 
chemical fertilisers and to take advantage of modern irrigation technologies and wheat 
procurement schemes (see Chapters 6 and 7).51  This brought about increased agricultural 
yields, a higher rate of return from farming, enabling them to accumulate further wealth and 
consolidate their influence. Some of these model farmers diversified into non-agricultural 
activities, such as grinding mills, shops and timber trading.  
Model farmers are also at the forefront of campaigns for the implementation of policies, 
especially on agricultural productivity and transformation and the promotion of cooperatives. 
They are also instrumental in the promotion of ‘rational’ discourses on human development in 
                                                 
45 Interview, woreda administrator, November 2014.  
46 Interview, model farmer and senior kebele official#1, October 2014. 
47 Interview, model farmer#2, September 2014. 
48 Interview, model farmer#3, September 2014. 
49 Interview, model farmer and kebele council member#1, October 2014.  
50 Interview, model farmer and senior kebele official#4, October 2014. 
51 See also Lefort (2015) on this point. 
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relation to hygiene, birth and disease control and the importance of modern education. They 
enjoy the patronage of the party, which they assist by maintaining grassroots support from 
peasants and also by increasing the reach of the state into every aspect of the lives of the people.  
In Degga model farmers exercise power in two interlinked ways: they are embedded in the 
local tier of the state (kebele) bureaucracy and serve as the local executors of national policies, 
but are also linked through their own local networks of influence to the wider social field (see 
Chapter 8). The model farmer status therefore helps the national leadership to bind these 
politically important elites and kebele residents to the state, while also hierarchically arranging 
them into classes and political relations based on status and power. The rise of model farmers 
reveals the everyday processes of state formation, highlighting how political actors embed the 
kebele residents through local elites, while at the same time, as I demonstrate below, attempting 
to enact and legitimise the state as an autonomous actor standing above and outside local social 
and class relations of power.  
Civil servants 
On the other hand, civil servants – health extension workers, development agents (DAs), 
teachers, land administration experts and community police officers – are professionals who 
enter government service via training at different state and private colleges. While the kebele 
politicians express their function regarding ‘governance’, ‘authority’, ‘decision-making’, 
‘assessing needs’ and ‘annual planning’, civil servants describe their work in terms of 
‘development’ and ‘implementing policies’.52 
Unlike the kebele politicians, no civil servants hail from the local population. Most 
commonly, they are initially posted by the woreda administration in remote rural kebeles before 
                                                 
52  Interviews with kebele chairman, Degga, October 2014; council speaker, Degga, October 2014; security 
committee head, Degga, November 2014; two DAs (DA#5 and DA #6), Degga, October 2014; and health 
extension worker#7, Degga, October 2014.  
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making slow progress in the district spatial hierarchy. They are promoted, according to 
seniority and discipline, from kebele to kebele, as they circle closer to the woreda town, 
occupying the same post for as little as two years and sometimes for as long as eight. The most 
junior civil servants, underperformers and ‘troublemakers’ are posted to the most distant 
kebeles in the district. Only the most servile, the most senior and those with the strongest 
connections to the kebele and district officials are posted in urban centres. Few are able to rise 
up the hierarchical ladder through education and party political loyalty.  
Clearly, the bureaucratic civil service posting/transfer system is one of the key instruments 
through which the state comes to be re/produced as a ‘vertically encompassing’ (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002) singular entity. It hierarchically arranges spaces as dominant, regional and 
marginal, with Addis Ababa being dominant and Degga being marginal. Salary scales differ 
according to individuals’ positions within the spatial hierarchy of the state, with a higher 
position being paid on a higher scale than those below. Higher positions also provide civil 
servants with access to government vehicles, spacious private offices, the opportunity to 
engage in more desk-based work than fieldwork, and the power to inspect and blame failures 
on those ‘below’ them in the hierarchy.  
By contrast, positions lower down the spatial hierarchy of the state are associated with a low 
salary, poor working conditions and low self-esteem. One DA, for instance, lamented his 
posting in Degga as ‘incarceration’. He said, ‘there is no electricity for TV. The only form of 
entertainment is chatting with the local people and listening to the radio.’ Similarly, a health 
worker said her posting in Degga was ‘strenuous’ and expressed her desire to move up in the 
state hierarchy because, she said, ‘you do less work and get more money’. Such discourses 




This spatial ordering on a national scale is the foundation of the material order of the kebele 
bureaucracy. In other words, the conditions that constitute the state as a ‘vertically 
encompassing’ entity are reproduced at the scale of the kebele through the division of office 
spaces and other resources, as I demonstrate below. 
The material production of hierarchy  
Status distinction among state functionaries in Degga, as in bureaucracies all over the world, 
is demarcated through office and desk size and the presence or lack of material paraphernalia 
(e.g. stationery, computer, etc.). The superiority of the chairman in the kebele hierarchy, for 
instance, is demonstrated by him being the only person to have a separate office of his own, 
which is graced by the presence of an imposing desk and several audience chairs. During my 
visits to the chairman’s office, his desk was covered with an assortment of papers in plastic 
trays, and with pens, pencils, clips, notepads and coloured markers in plastic tubes. There were 
also a number of awards for excellence in agricultural productivity from the regional 
government, proudly displayed on the desk. On the wall, directly behind his chair, was a 
photograph of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi displayed in such a way as to powerfully 
engage visitors in creating a visual connection between the chairman and the picture. The walls 
on the right were lined with metal cabinets containing loose files stacked in cardboard sheets. 
The distinctive status of the only desktop computer in the kebele was indicated by its placement 
in the chairman’s room. The computer was treated as a prized object. Throughout the course 
of my fieldwork, it was carefully wrapped in a plastic bag to protect it from the depredations 
of dust, and strictly off limits to junior civil servants. All works were carried out on paper.  
In contrast to the chairman’s office, the kebele manager and the party chairman occupied an 
adjacent room where they sit behind less majestic-looking wooden desks. The room also 
contained few chairs for visitors, as well as cupboards for storing documents. 
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 The community police officer, land administration committee chair, and land 
administration expert all shared one room. This ‘office’ contained neither desks nor 
cabinets/cupboards. Instead, a wobbly bench stretched into the middle of the room, where a 
pile of dust-covered files and EPRDF ‘Revolutionary Democracy’ newspapers lay on the floor.  
DAs were crammed into a room which contained three desks and five chairs. Similarly, the 
health extension workers shared a single room in which most of the space was taken up by 
chairs and desks. Although the room was not large enough to accommodate more than one 
person, it was shared by four. 
The walls of the offices occupied by the DAs and health extension workers were covered 
with graphs, charts and tables giving details about the total number of households included in 
the health and agriculture extension package programmes, a list of the variety of crops that 
grow in the kebele and annual plans, etc. While this display certainly represented the data-
gathering element of civil service work, it also symbolised professional expertise and authority. 
This meant displaying knowledge, professional capability and performance that highlights their 
distinction as servants from politicians, which gives them a specific professional identity within 
the bureaucracy.  
The most visible material distinctions among employees were the toilet facilities. Senior 
kebele and visiting officials have their own separate toilet. Keys to this toilet were held only 
by the kebele manager and the kebele and party chairpersons. The other employees shared two 
common toilets which were kept in an abysmal condition and during the course of the research 
I did not witness them being cleaned.  
Overall, the rank and status of officials at each level of the hierarchy are marked by the kinds 
and types of access they have to toilet facilities. In contrast to kebele senior officials, for 
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instance, the woreda administrator has a toilet for himself, and I observed high-level regional 
officials who had access to toilets from the interior of their offices.  
From the discussion so far, we can identify two ways through which state ‘spatial and scalar 
hierarchies’ (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 119) comes to be re/produced. First, the vertical spatial 
organisation of the government workforce according to seniority and discipline is crucial to the 
production of an image of a centralised national state. This represents the state as a pyramidal 
structure with several different levels, where one level (the higher) encompasses the other (the 
lower) within an ordered hierarchy. Second, the spatial division of office spaces and the 
presence or lack of material paraphernalia such as stationery and computer constantly invokes 
the positions of junior and senior officials. The result is a reified hierarchical conception of the 
state. Consequently, as I demonstrate below, this enunciates the language and manner in which 
different modes of interactions and transactions occur among state functionaries. 
Interactions among state agents 
We have seen thus far how the constitution of the kebele is designed to institutionalise 
hierarchical political order, especially by vertically ordering spaces and maintaining divisions 
among its functionaries. In this section I will demonstrate how these material conditions allow 
for a whole range of hierarchical interactions, transactions and modes of doing business to 
occur within the kebele structure (as among its functionaries) and between the kebele and the 
woreda administrations and how this is central to the everyday performance and regularising 
of state power. 
The modes of interactions among state functionaries and government work are suspended 
between the pressures of implementing policies and the normative requirement for personal 
loyalty. In their interactions with their superiors, civil servants, for example, often find 
themselves caught between the conflicting pulls of the impersonal, technocratic style of 
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supervision of woreda sector bureaus and the personalised methods of supervision of kebele 
politicians.  
On the bureaucratic side, those above the kebele bureaucracy (i.e. at the federal, regional, 
zonal and woreda levels) set specific numerical or qualitative targets which they are expected 
and pressured to meet and report feedback through the material production of documents, 
reports and compilations of statistical figures. Health extension workers, for example, are 
required to maintain family folders, a data collection tool in which they record the health status 
of the family members of every household in the kebele (e.g. family planning, antenatal care, 
immunisation) and the status of households (e.g. access to latrines, waste disposal, hand 
washing, clean water supply). The folders are periodically (usually monthly) reviewed by 
woreda supervisors.53  
Similarly, the DAs compile monthly reports detailing the number of farmers adopting 
technology packages (especially improved seed varieties) and regular routines such as the 
degree to which they mobilise farmers for group work, the frequency with which they organise 
field demonstrations and farmer-to-farmer field visits, etc. 54  Such technocratic aspect of 
regulating kebele civil servants, conducted through devices of enumeration such as report 
writing and compiling statistics, are taken extremely seriously by woreda sector bureaus. This 
is due to the fact that the health, education and agricultural data collected by civil servants serve 
as indicators of programme success and ultimately of regional and national economic and social 
development. As such, development targets are sanctioned by packages of incentives and 
                                                 
53 Interview, health extension worker#9, October, Degga 2014; Interview, health extension worker#10, October, 
Degga 2014.  
54 Interview, DA#7 Degga, November 2014; Conversation, DA#5, Degga, November 2014. 
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disincentives which reward those who meet targets and penalise those who do not by denying 
them salary increments, scholarships, promotions and transfers.55  
On the kebele side, civil servants are placed under the political control of the kebele 
chairman. All of their local-level activities (including public meetings, giving training to 
farmers and implementing development programmes) are conducted with the cooperation and 
oversight of the chairman. Their everyday interactions are marked, however, by personal and 
at times conflictual relations that arise partly as a result of power relations structured around 
social differentials – semi-educated/educated, direct party affiliated/bureaucrat and 
rural/urbanised. Kebele officials often complain that one of the fundamental reasons for the 
failure of local social and development activities (such as children dropping out of school, poor 
performance in regional exams56 and low agricultural productivity) is related to absenteeism, 
lack of motivation and the disengagement of civil servants,57 who, according to the kebele 
chairman, are ‘interested only in finding ways out of the kebele’ and in ‘moving up’ to the 
position ‘above’ within the bureaucracy.  
For their part, with their college educations, the civil servants often resent their 
subordination to semi-educated kebele officials whom they describe as kadere (cadres), though 
most are themselves party members. But the use of the term kadere is intended to capture the 
promulgation of unqualified political allegations and sycophancy to the party, thus having a 
negative connotation in local parlance. This sentiment was summarised by one civil servant:  
                                                 
55 Interview, woreda administrator, November 2014.  
56 The chairman often complained to me about the poor performance of grade 8 students in the regional exam. In 
2013, the highest score was 74%. He said the kebele had hired a librarian for 300 birr a moth to encourage students 
to read, but they were not supported by their teachers, whom he accused of absenteeism, negligence and a lack of 
in-depth pedagogical knowledge.  
57 Conversation with model farmer and senior kebele official#1 and kebele chairman, Degga, November 2014. 
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He [the chairman] has no understanding of how things work. He thinks he knows about 
everything just because he has power. This is the fundamental problem in our country. 
Cadres want to exercise their misconceived self-perception that their political position 
makes them experts about everything.58  
However, at the same time, the chairman holds the key to their dreams of working in urban 
centres. One civil servant said: 
You have to satisfy his vanity. You have to accuse his critics of ignorance, corruption 
and incompetence. My dreams of escape from this wretched place depend on my 
relationship with him. To be honest, he doesn’t care whether you are good at your job or 
not as long as you are on good terms with him.59 
The above comment encapsulates both the civil servants’ cynicism and ambivalence towards 
the kebele chairman and the attempt to use him to their own advantage in terms of their career 
progression. Here, the threat of the political power wielded by kebele officials reaffirms the 
hierarchical nature of the relationship between the chairman and civil servants. 
The hierarchical articulation of state power is also institutionalised in class relations within 
the kebele bureaucracy. One notable example is the interaction that takes place between the 
kebele chairman and the militias which resemble those of the lord and retainers in feudal 
Ethiopia. The militias frequently provide domestic labour, such as ploughing, to the chairman. 
They are also routinely used as his personal bodyguards. It was not uncommon to see the 
chairman – in vivid and ostentatious displays of power – roaming the road or attending social 
functions such as funerals escorted by one or two militias, with Kalashnikov rifles slung across 
their shoulders. This display of statist power serves not only as a marker of the chairman’s 
                                                 
58 Conversation, civil servant#8, Degga, October 2014. 
59 Conversation, civil servant#12, Degga, October 2014. 
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superior rank and position but also symbolises the vertical authority and coercive power of the 
state. In return for their personal service to the chairman, it is well known that the militias gain 
access to agricultural resources and credit facilities. 
Taken together, the different forms of interactions among state functionaries and between 
government departments shed light on the everyday performative aspects of state formation. 
On the one hand, the technocratic aspect of supervision and bureaucratic interactions construct 
the state as a rationalised institutional structure that is fastidious in maintaining hierarchy and 
which is appropriate for the impersonal enforcement of rules and policies. The formal 
technocratic modes of operation also serve to position the kebele as an integral part of the trans-
local state system and a key nodal point in the bureaucratic power networks.  
On the other hand, the personalised aspect of the kebele-level interactions and relations of 
power vividly underscore the image of a state that is governed by compromises between vested 
interests, personal loyalties and negotiations. Very clearly, the top-down articulation of state 
power is also local in that it is applied and manipulated by kebele officials. This was clearly 
reflected in the relations between the chairman and the militias.  
At a broader analytical level my account of bureaucratic practices, material representations 
and the complex modes of interactions among the state functionaries counter with the argument 
that state institutions are absorbed by informal politics (see Chabal and Daloz 1999; Reno 
2000) and are re/constituted by social forces i.e. hierarchies spread only from the social field 
to the realms of the political. By contrast, as this section has shown, hierarchies in the social 
realm are not given, but are constantly re/produced through bureaucratic mode of governance 
practices. As we have seen above, the iterative production and enactment of hierarchy that 
brings the state into existence also serves to foster status differences and reconstitutes class 
relations. For example, their designation as local state representatives and the associated social 
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and economic status gives the model farmers the power to dominate and regulate social 
relations (see Chapter 8).  
State power therefore interweaves with and permeates class relations to shape modes of 
interactions within the kebele (among politicians and civil servants) and, as I will demonstrate 
in the next section, between the kebele and the local people. The institution of the kebele in 
this sense represents a site where not only bureaucratic rituals re/produce the state as a 
hierarchized institution but also re/produce residents along class lines. Meanwhile, as I will 
discuss in greater detail in Chapter 8, the kebele is deeply embedded in local social relations 
and are shaped by local values.  
5.2. Encountering the state: the governors and the governed 
So far, I have limited myself to the internal organisation of the kebele. In this section, I focus 
on the ways in which the performance of hierarchy, described above, is routinised in the 
everyday interactions between the kebele and the local people. I specifically focus on two 
kebele functionaries – the kebele chairman and the kebele manager – who are key figures in 
the operation of the everyday state. My aim is to get to grips with the micro-operation of state 
power by focusing on the work and identity of these officials in helping to represent and 
produce state verticality and hierarchy. In order to provide a context, I begin by introducing 
the roles of the kebele chairman and kebele manager. 
The kebele chairman and kebele manager  
The kebele opens Monday to Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. During the early hours of the 
morning, most employees can be found either at their desks or on field sites collecting data and 
conducting meetings. For the kebele chairman, however, the pattern of everyday bureaucratic 
life is rather different. Rather than spend his time at his office, he would often spend most of 
his working hours surrounded by friends in the circle of his regular haunts in the centre of the 
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rural town (see Chapter 8). When I enquired about his absence from the workplace, he 
explained that he was expected to be at his office on only two days per week as he was not in 
receipt of any remuneration for his work. Despite this, it was still rare for him to be at his office 
for two days per week.  
Over the course of my many conversations with him, the chairman consistently told me that 
he was a ‘successful farmer and businessman’ and ‘known for good work’.60 He thus asserted 
that his role in the kebele administration was not linked to ‘conducting paperwork’ but rather 
to being ‘a role model [i.e.] governing by example’ and providing ‘a positive image and being 
an inspiration’ to the local population. In choosing to represent himself as a self-supporting 
person, the chairman was keen to give me the impression that he, in Weber’s (1948) terms, 
‘lives for politics’ as a ‘part-time politician’ rather than ‘live off politics’ as a ‘professional’ 
politician, i.e. as a person who has made politics his vocation. In other words, the chairman did 
not work in politics for money but rather for the moral cause of serving the local population as 
a part-time politician.  
For the day-to-day running of the kebele, the chairman is heavily dependent upon the kebele 
manager,61 whom I shall refer to as Alemaz. Well-versed with government matters, Alemaz 
represents the kebele to the woreda bureaucracy and, as such, deals with time-consuming 
paperwork and everyday administrative matters. She also performs the functions of cashier, 
accountant and finance officer. As a person who keeps the wheels of the everyday kebele 
business turning, she occupies a key intermediary position between the chairman and the local 
population. Alemaz’s key position in the kebele hierarchy defies the local normative gender 
                                                 
60 Conversation, kebele chairman, Degga, October 2014. 
61 The kebele manager, or yesera halafi in Amharic, is a civil servant who is appointed by and is accountable to 
the woreda. They attend both kebele council and cabinet meetings and supervise all development activities carried 
out by the kebele (see Emmenegger, Keno and Hagmann 2011). 
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hierarchy whereby women have negligible visibility in both public institutions and the local 
social and political life. However, she is noted locally for her callous treatment of ordinary 
people, usually with indifference and arrogance. Ordinary farmers who request an audience 
with or signature from the chairman find themselves constrained by her dismissive responses 
and unhelpful attitude. In the opinions of many men, the kebele manager and the community 
police officer, who also is a woman, constitute admonitions on the danger of women occupying 
public office. One man, for instance, described her as a ‘haughty woman’ with ‘little regard for 
farmers’ and ‘not fit to be called a manager’.62 His description underscores the fact that, unlike 
male politicians and bureaucrats who treat farmers in a similarly callous manner, female office 
holders’ actions and behaviours carry additional weight because of their distinctiveness (which 
entails otherness), thereby amplifying matters.  
However, on the other hand, the active participation of women in the repression of another 
subordinate section of the local population – the poor – and thereby the maintenance of the 
existing hierarchical state system while also contributing to its change complicates the 
essentialised view of hierarchy. The state, in this sense, figures as a hierarchical and dominant 
entity, but the hierarchical values embedded in its system (patriarchy in our case) are open to 
contention and change. The question, then, is how the behaviour and practices of these local 
officials help to constitute the state and its relations with the local people? I turn to this next. 
Waiting for the chairman  
The Kebele office for the local population is generally impenetrable and access to the often 
absent chairman, even outside the kebele office premises, is unlikely to occur without the 
approval of the manager or the help of other important connections. For many poor people, 
who are without cultural capital, literally weeks may pass before the chairman will sign letters, 
                                                 
62 Interview, model farmer#3, Degga, October 2014. 
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ID cards or grant them an audience. Consider, for example, the case of a middle-aged farmer I 
shall call Abebe, who went to the kebele to request a replacement for his lost ID card. Abebe 
wanted the replacement ID because he was asked to produce it when applying to join a 
microfinance cooperative. Abebe told me that to maintain his family he depended on a small 
income that he derived from farming a small plot of land. His family comprised his dependent 
parents, wife and two young children. Despite working hard as a smallholding farmer to 
extricate himself and his family from poverty, he doubted that he would be successful. His only 
hope, he explained, was to join the cooperative, borrow money and invest in a chicken farm in 
his own backyard.  
A preliminary requirement for joining the cooperative and making himself eligible for a 
loan was the production of some ID, which he described as ‘unnecessary’ because ‘all the 
cooperative people know me personally very well’. He said, ‘there was a time when we trusted 
one another. Now, there is no work without paperwork’. Significantly, Abebe’s comment may 
have been intended to highlight the breakdown of village social bonds, but it is also shaped by 
a recognition of the changes in social relations wrought by the expansion of state services and 
the bureaucratisation of social life.  
Nevertheless, as Abebe noted, ‘it is only the bit [ID] of paper that would allow me to join 
the cooperative’. When he first went to apply, he went to the manager’s office:  
On the first day, she was not even willing to talk to me. She only told me to wait outside 
and then a few moments later she left her office and never returned. I came back the next 
day, and she said my ID could not be processed because she was busy with paperwork. 
She said to ‘return tomorrow morning’. The next day, I came early in the morning and 
waited all day long … finally, by 4 a.m. she told me that I should bring evidence from 
the police which says my ID is lost. The next day I went to request a letter of evidence 
from the police officer. The police officer told me she would tell the manager orally that 
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I had lost my ID. I took her word and returned the next day to the manager. The manager 
was angry, scolded me and I went back to the police officer to get the paper. I took the 
paper and returned the next day back [to the manager]. She said to return tomorrow 
because she was about to leave. When I returned the next day, she accepted my picture 
and issued the ID and told me to return another day for the chairman’s signature.  
When I met him, Abebe had already visited the kebele office several times over a period of a 
week and a half and was told that ‘the chairman is not available’. He therefore had to squat, 
along with others who were also waiting for the chairman, at the kebele open ground, gazing 
hopefully at the entrance. When I enquired as to why he would not want to approach the 
chairman outside of the kebele, he replied, ‘he wouldn’t even reply or even maybe look at me 
[unless] I would go to him with the recommendation of important people or the manager 
herself’. He further added, ‘I can’t do anything about it’ and he blamed the situation on his own 
lack of connections and influence. Abebe’s response tells us that when local people meet state 
officials, especially in non-state spaces, they do so with reference to important connections. 
Hence, Abebe had the option of either waiting or actively pursuing the strategy of soliciting 
the help of intermediaries in order to obtain the service of the state. But given his lack of 
connections, trips to the kebele premises and waiting would likely become a regular feature of 
his daily life over the coming days or weeks. In the meantime, the lack of ID, which he 
described as a ‘bit of paper’, continued to be an obstacle in his day-to-day life.  
Abebe’s was not an isolated case. The kebele premises were always full of local people 
waiting for the chairman’s arrival or queuing up to be seen by the manager. I will return to 
examine how the local people encountered the chairman later in this section, but my purpose 
here is to highlight how, in its everyday mode of conducting official business, the state neglects 
the poor and thereby exhibits and normalises its power.  
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A number of important themes emerge from Abebe’s experience. On the one hand, the 
actions of the chairman and the manager indicate the extent to which state work is beset by 
rigmarole and is predicated on arbitrariness. However, such arbitrariness should not be seen as 
an indicator of state dysfunction but rather as part of the process of the performance of power 
and hierarchy in that it defines the poor people’s role as waiting and being accommodating to 
the demands, whims and caprices of state functionaries. The rigmarole serves to outline the 
type of relationship that should exist between the state and the people by positioning them 
hierarchically.  
On the other hand, while, as mentioned above, the chairman indicated that he does not 
receive remuneration for his political services and that as a consequence he treats his position 
as a semi-official one, his regular absence from his workplace nevertheless points to something 
at the centre of state bureaucracy, namely that availability, accessibility and hierarchy go hand 
in hand. The more important an official, the less he/she is available for the ordinary public. For 
example, very much like the kebele chairman, the woreda administrator is often absent from 
his workplace. When I first went to the district office to request an appointment for an 
interview, the administrator’s secretary told me the administrator was not available and that I 
should return in a few days. According to the secretary, much of the administrator’s work was 
conducted beyond the woreda level. She described him as ‘a very important’ figure who 
consults, negotiates and regularly ‘meets with high-level officials’ at zone and regional levels 
for the benefit of the woreda.63 Other members of the woreda administration office told me the 
administrator is ‘a man of the people’ who moves between inaugurations, kebele-level field 
visits and other public events where he represents the state and inspects local development 
                                                 
63 Conversation, the woreda administrator’s secretary, woreda town, September 2014. 
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efforts.64 However, his daily schedule, exact whereabouts or the precise nature of the public 
events and meetings he is purported to attend, despite my persistent requests, were not for 
disclosure.  
Curiously, not many ordinary people I talked to at the woreda and kebele premises ever saw 
him conducting any field visits or attending public events. Yet he is reported by his colleagues 
to be a hard worker. When I asked for an appointment, the secretary told me she could not 
schedule one because she didn’t know when he would be ‘sitting in his office’. In the meantime, 
I continued with my visits to the woreda office several times a week for the next month until I 
finally met him (through a common acquaintance) and he agreed to set time aside for an 
interview.  
This enactment of seclusion by the kebele chairman and woreda administrator highlights the 
everyday display and constitution of state authority and hierarchy. Seclusion clearly constitutes 
the prerogative aspect of state power that helps officials not only flaunt statish authority but 
also project an image of hard-working and busy administrators. The enactment of seclusion 
also demonstrates the everyday aspect of drawing a boundary between the state and the local 
population. It plays a critical role in shaping the understanding of the local population that state 
officials/authority are separate from them/society.  
Meeting the chairman  
Returning to the kebele chairman, during high-profile visits or when an inspection by woreda 
representatives was scheduled, the chairman would be seen running frantically between offices 
and meetings. There would be a high level of activity but once the big event had passed, the 
chairman would barely be seen on the premises. Employees would either wander in, vanish to 
                                                 
64 Interview with a woreda office administrator, woreda town, September 2014; conversations with two woreda 
administration bureau staff members.  
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tea houses in the town centre or simply leave early. The pace of activity would become slower. 
On the rare occasions when the chairman did show up, in the case of pressure to meet deadlines, 
for example, one could not fail to notice the stream of people forming a queue outside his door.  
Once in his office, dealing with various clients, the mode of doing official business was 
based on the differential status and hierarchies of the clients. He, for instance, admits his clients 
in accordance with their status rather than based on the order of their arrival. His personal 
friends, guests and senior visiting officials are treated with great respect and admitted 
immediately. The amount of time taken by the chairman to deal with visitors is also conditional 
on the status of the visitor. Allies and important visitors would receive as much quality time as 
was necessary to discuss their issues or just chat with the chairman and pass the time of day. 
In the meantime, those without influence or who lacked connections experience maddening 
waits gathered on the open patch of ground, where the bustle would only increase over time. 
It is important to note here that the familiarity with and greater access of influential 
individuals to the chairman did not necessarily stand them in better favour. In circumstances 
wherein the chairman is not able to dispense favour to his allies, he resorts to invoking the 
influence of yebelay akalat (authorities from above) over the decisions and activities of the 
kebele. Consider, for example, the following case. In 2012, the kebele commissioned a local 
contractor to build a bridge over a river between one of the three sub-kebeles and the main 
highway, for donkey-pulled carts to cross. However, the contractor had fallen two years behind 
schedule as of November 2014. In the meantime, the existing dilapidated wooden bridge was 
washed away by flooding, with a temporary bridge built by community labour in use ever since. 
However, the new replacement bridge was wobbly and could not bear the donkey-pulled carts 
that transport agricultural produces, commercial timber and quarry. The situation created such 
a political stir and disgruntlement among the rich that it prompted the kebele chairman to send 
a notice to the builder to resume and speed up the construction work, starting within a few 
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weeks’ time. Failure to do this would result in his contract being annulled, and the kebele would 
issue a public tender to recruit another qualified contractor. 
 One day, while I was sitting in the office, the builder came to the chairman’s office to 
convince him that he needed a time extension before he was able to resume the work. The 
contractor explained that he was caught in a protracted and costly lawsuit with a certain 
individual over unpaid construction fees, as a result of which he was unable to pay labourers 
to resume work on the bridge. The chairman listened sympathetically but explained that a 
further extension was impossible because the case had already been taken over by yebelay 
akalat. The kebele manager later disclosed to me that there was no yebelay akakalat 
interference in the case. The chairman apparently wanted to respond to public complaints at 
the same time as maintaining good relations with the contractor. To this end, by claiming to be 
acting according to the orders of yebelay akalat, rather than assert his own authority, the 
chairman deflected the social responsibility of dispensing favour.  
Such a technique is commonly practised by officials when they find themselves caught 
between the social obligation of dispensing favour and the necessities of their work. The 
chairman’s invocation of the influence of yebelay akakalat is thus indicative of the widely held 
assumption that power is held at the top and that important decisions are made by yebelay 
akalat. Claims of subordination to orders from above also serve to obscure the vast 
discretionary power of kebele officials over local issues. More fundamentally, this creates the 
appearance that the kebele, as part of the state system, is merely a token of the centre and that 
‘the state’ speaks with one voice. In other words, the practice of invoking yebelay akalat 
implicitly represents the state not only as hierarchical but also as a unified and cohesive actor.  
Back in his office, in stark contrast to the respect with which he treats important clients, the 
chairman admits any number of farmers at once and gives an audience to all of them 
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simultaneously. All of the ordinary farmers’ matters are discussed in the presence of other 
clients in addition to, on several occasions, both myself and friends of the chairman who just 
happened to be on the kebele premises. In such a setting, discussions are always dominated by 
the chairman. From time to time he would switch his attention between his clients and myself, 
sometimes without allowing them to finish explaining their matters. Very often, he allowed 
everyone present to join in discussions about other clients’ matters. But while the chairman is 
speaking, everyone tries to be careful, and acquiescent to what he says, to the point of fawning 
over him. If a particularly sensitive matter were to come up, the chairman would request that 
the client returns the next day or else retreat to one of his regular haunts (see Chapter 8). Most 
matters, however, were referred to his juniors to deal. The overwhelming majority of cases 
consist of people making a request for references and assistance in filing lawsuits for minor 
assaults and alcohol-induced brawls and feuds, complaints about fines and the encroachment 
of predatory farmers on neighbours’ land, etc.  
The chairman, with a sigh of resignation, would instruct some to select elders of their own 
choice and resolve their feuds in the customary way, sign others off to the manager or the police 
officer and dismiss others after two or three rounds of exchanges, asking them not to bother 
him with their trivialities. Most clients, often looking visibly dejected, would leave the room 
and mumble something about the futility of the kebele. Gradually, the kebele’s open patch of 
ground would be cleared. As they lack any other form of recourse, kebele clients subject the 
chairman to criticisms, rumours of corruption and disparagement in their village public 
domains and in everyday private conversations (see Chapter 7).  
The preceding discussion of the mode of conducting governmental work in Degga sheds 
some light on how hierarchy is embedded in the routinised practices of the kebele bureaucracy 
and how it legitimises various hierarchical modes of interaction between state functionaries 
and local people. In what follows, I turn to present and analyse two kebele-level meetings in 
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order to further unravel specific ways through which bureaucratic practices re/produce, display 
and regularise state power. 
5.3. Kebele meetings: staging hierarchy  
Meetings are regular features of local state work, and they are also interwoven with the rhythm 
of the everyday lives of ordinary people in Degga. As I undertook my fieldwork, I observed 
and attended numerous meetings. In fact, it seemed that it was a rare day when I didn’t hear 
about, observe or attend some kind of meeting that was taking place. Meetings are not, 
however, simply ‘rational-legal’ (instrumental) administrative tools; rather, I argue they 
constitute a key means by which the verticality of the state, as an authoritative symbol of 
society, is produced. In this section, I examine two types of meetings. The first is administrative 
and involves people in positions of formal authority (such as kebele politicians and civil 
servants). The second type is public meetings involving members of the local population.  
Administrative meetings  
Here, for the sake of analytical clarity, I distinguish between two types of administrative 
meetings – semi-formal and formal meetings. Semi-formal meetings include sub-kebele-level 
and committee-level administrative meetings. These meetings are unscheduled. A sub-kebele-
level land administration committee chairman, for instance, could convene a meeting on the 
sideline of a church gathering or a funeral. Typically, such meetings are long, lack focus and 
proceed at a very slow pace. People engage in casual conversations and the meetings are 
frequently interrupted by uninvited passers-by who engage in conversations or exchange 
greetings with the assembled committee members. Discussions often drift away from the main 
topic. At one sub-kebele meeting, for instance, a farmer interrupted the meeting to enquire 
about my study and note-taking skills. Another man asked me why Ethiopians living in the US 
are not helping with the rebuilding of their local church, leading to a long conversation about 
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the importance of repairing old churches. Half an hour passed before those assembled were 
able to refocus on the case at hand.  
On another occasion, at a meeting called to discuss a dispute over grazing land, I observed 
the assembly debating whether or not a certain ‘fortune teller and sorcerer’ in the neighbouring 
kebele was a fraud. In such meetings, in the end, decisions are usually passed by mutual 
consensus, even if it doesn’t exist, or else the meeting would be adjourned with the issue carried 
over to another session.  
 By contrast, formal administrative meetings are where different layers of the kebele 
bureaucracy convene to discuss the routine management and administration of the kebele 
population. The participants usually comprise elected political representatives, kebele-level 
DAs, members of the kebele militia and sometimes visiting woreda representatives. Their 
regular occurrences are strictly ruled by hierarchy and bureaucratic procedures such as the 
detailing of proceedings and outcomes in official minutes and the subsequent archiving and 
sending of these to the woreda administration. They are almost always scheduled and meeting 
agendas are strictly followed.  
This type of meeting usually takes place in the dedicated kebele conference hall which can 
accommodate between 50 and 70 people. The hall has a dais with a desk and three chairs at 
one end, at which only the most important people would sit. Facing the dais, the first row is an 
area usually reserved for civil servants, important kebele officials and visiting guests. Behind 
the first row, benches are arranged in a classroom style with the audience facing the dais. While 
a wide space onto the dais would separate and distinguish the high-level officials from other 
participants, the different types of chairs and a step onto the first row marks off the most 
important participants as separate from the ordinary ones.  
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In what follows, I provide an example of a formal administrative meeting. This particular 
meeting was called by the kebele chairman to examine the kebele’s poor tax collection 
performance.  
To provide some context, one of the principal responsibilities of kebeles in Ethiopia is the 
collection of taxes levied by the regional state governments on rural land and agricultural 
incomes. However, kebeles have no specialist team or separate department focusing on tax 
collection. In Degga, the kebele assigns the task of tax collection to semi-literate militia 
members and sub-kebele representatives. The kebele manager controls the activities of the 
militia, undertakes technical and accounts procedures and the chairman then submits the 
revenue collected to the woreda finance bureau. Below, I present my personal observation of 
the meeting as it was originally jotted down at the time of the fieldwork.  
Tax collection performance evaluation  
The meeting was scheduled to begin at 09:00, but at that time the conference hall was empty. 
I was the only one to turn up on time. After about 10 minutes, participants began to arrive in 
dribs and drabs. The DAs, sub-kebele representatives and security committee chairman 
eventually came to be seated on the chairs contained in the first row. The kebele manager and 
land administration chairperson sat at the head of the table, leaving the middle chair vacant. 
Members of the militia slowly filled the remaining seats behind the first row. This seating 
arrangement visually mirrors the territorial-administrative hierarchy of the kebele in that from 
the dais one can look down on the kebele territorial hierarchy, level by level, i.e. the civil 
servants and sub-kebele representatives, the sub-kebele land administration heads and the 
militia.  
The participants continued waiting and conversing. Some people wandered in and out of the 
hall while others congregated to discuss their livelihoods and social issues. Sitting among the 
militia, I could overhear fragments of their conversations: ‘When is the meeting going to begin? 
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Is he [the chairman] coming?’ and so on. Fifteen minutes passed before the chairman walked 
in and sat down on the chair left vacant for him in the middle, reflecting his central position as 
a very important figure in the kebele hierarchy. Before the meeting started the kebele manager 
introduced me as a researcher working on the issue of government.  
The kebele manager then called the meeting to order and introduced the business of the day. 
‘We have called you today to discuss the poor tax collection performance of our kebele,’ she 
announced.  
The chairman then took over and made a particularly long speech, lasting close to half an 
hour, which encompassed the importance of tax to national economic development and ‘the 
lack of self-motivation of tax collectors’. He denounced the fact that it took ‘19 days [for the 
militia] to fully collect our tax … 4 days past the woreda deadline’. He then called upon the 
sub-kebele representatives and militia to account for their poor performance.  
 A moment of silence followed, after which the chairman went on to say, ‘I was summoned 
by the woreda administrator and the finance bureau and asked to explain why our kebele was 
performing poorly in submitting tax revenue on time … Our failure to submit on time caused 
the woreda delay in transferring the tax money to the zone finance bureau … our failure is 
causing failure to the woreda … [by contract] our neighbours kudmi are the fastest kebele … 
collecting and submitting their taxes in just 10 days … [as a result] they are honoured as a 
model kebele in tax collection’. The chairman then emphasised that because ‘the reputation of 
the kebele was at stake’, the problem should be pinpointed.  
Again there was no response from the participants. After a few seconds spent glancing at 
the assembled participants, the chairman began naming sub-kebele representatives and the 
militia and asking them why they had failed to meet their deadlines. As their names were called 
out, the concerned representatives rose to their feet and explained their reasons.  
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The first speaker said, ‘It’s extremely difficult to get people pay taxes at this time of the 
year. Children are starting school; parents have to buy notebooks, clothes and pencils. It was 
holiday season [new year and the Cross]; Most people had no money left to pay the tax.’  
 The chairman interrupted him, ‘what do you mean people have no money? I don’t believe 
this. This year we had good rain; we had a good harvest.’  
The next speaker, a militia, got up and said ‘no one has refused to pay’. The chairman 
interrupted him before he was allowed to finish speaking: ‘why did you not then finish 
collecting on time?’ The militia replied, ‘some of the people had no cash to pay. I even went 
from house to house to collect tax …’ The chairman interrupted him again, ‘we are paying 40 
birr (£1.50) for a hectare of land. This government is farmers’ government. We pay very little 
amount of tax. Do you have any idea how much the merchants pay? … Our entire kebele pays 
less than the amount of tax one merchant pays.’  
At this point, the manager said, ‘You [the militia] should give me a list of people who have 
not paid their taxes on time.’ She labelled farmers who were said to have failed to pay on time 
as ‘anti-development elements’. She threatened ‘measures’ against them.  
The next speaker had difficulty maintaining the requirements of the meeting speech. He 
began a rambling, off-topic monologue about the problem of the delay to construction of the 
local bridge project. The kebele manager interrupted to remind him to stay on topic. However, 
he went on to contextualise the subject in terms of the local history of tax collection by 
mentioning how it had worked during the Derg era. Time and again his failure invoked rounds 
of muted and at times raucous laughter among the participants.  
The chairman reprimanded the participants and ordered them to keep their voices low, a 
practice which is part of the everyday performance of power. This rebuke underscored the 
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chairman’s self-positioning and projection of power as a tough and strong statesman capable 
of governing, who was in complete control of the assembly.  
Three more men made similar speeches, all citing the inability of inhabitants to pay on time. 
These time and again prompted the chairman to interrupt them with the seemingly 
unanswerable question of ‘why have you failed?’  
The meeting went on in a dramatic way, with the chairman and sometimes the manager 
almost always expressing their dissatisfaction at virtually every reason put forward by the 
participants. What was evident here is that the chairman was anxious about the reactions from 
the woreda officials who had made it clear to him they were aware of the kebele’s inefficiency. 
Yet, at the same time, while emphasising the intolerance of the state to the inefficiency, the 
chairman implicitly communicated to his audience that the kebele was under the watch of the 
ranks of hierarchies – the regional state, zone and woreda; hence, he projected the coherence, 
chain of command and vertical authority of the state system. Here, we also see the verticality 
of the state represented in the cascading manner in which the regional government imposes 
levies and sets deadlines for zonal and woreda administrators, who in turn put pressure on the 
kebele to meet their deadlines. The pressure moves downwards to the tax collectors and then 
to the people in subsistence farming who are struggling to survive. On a personal level, the 
failure to collect taxes on time could be said to present a test of the chairman’s capacity to 
govern.  
Finally, an important aspect of the meeting was the performance of certain kinds of conduct 
– how to speak, where to sit, when to stand up and how to behave like political actors. The 
participants were reprimanded for undermining the official performance of meetings by talking 
off topic or laughing. The rituals associated with such meetings together with bureaucratic 
practices constitute part of the ‘state effect’ (Mitchell 1999) that gives the state idea substance 
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and meaning in the eyes of its employees. The state agents subsequently learn to adapt his/her 
behaviour in accordance with these performative rituals that constitute the state. Overall, the 
meeting embodied an everyday way of ordering the local people, regularising authority and 
hierarchy and performing state power. 
Public meetings  
In contrast to administrative meetings, public meetings in Degga are numerous and varied. 
They include weekly cell and development group meetings, women’s meeting, sub-kebele and 
kebele-wide meetings and annual party and development conferences. In what follows, I 
provide an analysis of a public meeting.  
Anti-corruption discourses: attending state spectacle  
In November 2014, I attended a two-day kebele-wide public conference that had been 
organised by the state and EPRDF officials. The conference, in terms of its content, was 
essentially just a bigger version of the many smaller kebele-level meetings in which I took part. 
But, as an annual conference, it was exceptionally different in its scale, splendour and 
organisation. Unlike other weekly and monthly political meetings and events, local kebele 
officials barely played any significant role in its running. In the usual fashion of strict 
hierarchical state control, it was organised and led, in minute detail, by visiting officials from 
district and zone administrations. There were instructions on the selection of open space as a 
conference site in the kebele premises, the imposition of a quota on each household for the 
amount of food to prepare, orders to put up banners and instructions for the door-to-door 
mobilisation of farmers for the days of the conference.  
Hierarchy was also physically and visibly embodied in the seating arrangements on the 
opening day of the conference. The importance of the zone and woreda representatives was 
displayed through the comfortable chairs, a table with tablecloth and peaked tent shade held 
above their heads to protect them from the scorching rays of the sun. Next, seated in chairs 
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without a table, were the kebele officials. Priests and community elders were seated on wooden 
benches at the far end of the open space. The remainder of the ‘ordinary’ participants sat on 
the ground in the inner circle under the withering sun, thereby marking their inferiority. The 
chair size of the zone representative accentuates his superiority over the district and kebele 
officials. This is particularly significant in a place like Degga, where the vast majority of 
ordinary peasants have no chairs in their homes and where it thus metaphorically, as 
everywhere else, signifies authority.  
The dominant themes of the conference were unmistakable. The temporary conference site 
was decorated with vivid banners containing slogans denouncing corruption and promoting 
‘Ethiopian Renaissance’, a major theme in the state development discourse. One of the bold 
slogans read: ‘End corruption for a bright tomorrow’. T-shirts and caps featuring a photograph 
of the late Prime Minster Meles Zenawi and a caption reading ‘visionary leader’ were 
distributed to all participants. Clearly, Meles Zenawi was portrayed as the people’s hero who 
bravely fought poverty and corruption. The background of one of the banners portrayed a 
panorama of the design of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Clearly, these material 
representations reconstitute the hierarchy, authority and splendour of the state in rural 
communities, which are remote from the administrative capital as the centre of actual state 
spectacle.  
These representative dimensions were further accentuated by the speeches given by state 
officials. With everyone taking their seats, the conference was opened with the district 
representative making a welcome speech and reading the official programme. This was 
followed by a speech by the zone representative about the development performance of Amhara 
regional state and a brief discussion on issues of productivity. After this, one of the officials, 
punctuated by frequent applause, began to read aloud a document that it was claimed had been 
sent from yebelay akalat (authorities from above) strongly condemning what he regarded as 
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‘entrenchment of the culture of corruption’ among government officials. ‘Corruption is an 
endemic disease; corruption is the bane of bad governance; corruption is rent-seeking 
behaviour,’ the visiting official continued, ‘the people need to expose those who demand bribes 
and syphon off yemengist ena yehezeb habt [government and public resources] and those who 
damage state infrastructures …We have clear choices. Either we swim together against the tide 
of corruption and poverty or we will drown together.’ The document clearly pointed to attempts 
by the state to present corruption, in an obviously hyperbolic way, as an existential threat to 
both society and the government. The struggle against corruption was depicted as a struggle 
against poverty.  
The official reading the document was emphatic in saying that ‘unless we are resolute we 
will spiral back again to disaster’. But, then, in an interesting twist, the officer proclaimed: ‘We 
can reach an extraordinary and new level of greatness, by rooting out corruption.’ The 
implication of this statement was that national development can be achieved by rooting out 
corruption, through the cooperation of the people.  
The document further outlined how the current government and national leadership 
demonstrated their ‘partnership to the public’ by deposing the dictatorship of the Derg regime 
and how it, in the same spirit, was resolute against the scourges of poverty and corruption. This 
was punctuated by references to the constitution and an elaborate tribute to the life and 
leadership of talaku meri (great leader), Meles Zenawi.  
At the end, the participants were invited for discussion on the content of the document. After 
quite a number of notable individuals and ordinary farmers had given speeches, invariably 
praising mengist’s commitment to fighting poverty and corruption, the organisers blatantly 
urged the residents to be direct, face their officials and expose cases of corruption. But, 
notwithstanding the celebratory, warm and enthusiastic applause for the reading aloud of the 
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document, no participant was willing to expose and criticise any local official or talk about any 
case of corruption. Despite the incessant appeal and urging by conference organisers, the 
participants remained mute. I will return to the case of corruption in Chapter 7, but it is worth 
noting here that the participants were obviously reluctant to speak so openly of corruption out 
of fear of retribution. At the time of the fieldwork, corruption was the most talked about theme 
in the kebele public domains which, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 7, function as an important 
means by which people construct a particular image of the state.  
In his closing words, the zone official reprimanded participants over their lack of courage 
to collaborate with mengist in fighting corruption. In doing this, he drew on a kinship-based 
analogy between the state and the people: ‘Would you be content if your children concealed 
anything which could potentially destroy your home?’ The official continued, ‘you certainly 
wouldn’t. Mengist is like a father to his people. You should be willing to collaborate in rooting 
out corruption.’ Such use of a father image as a metaphorical expression not only infantilises 
the local population but also naturalises state authority. Notably, the remark was a good 
illustration of how meetings are used as a discursive space whereby the ideal relationship 
between the state and the local population is outlined and dictated by officials. Finally, the 
official adjourned the conference by shouting a series of slogans: ‘We will overcome poverty’, 
‘We will root out corruption’, ‘Ethiopian renaissance will be realised’. 
To sum up, on the one hand, throughout the conference, the state was clearly presented and 
mediated through discursive (developmental) and material representations (banners, slogans 
and so on). On the other hand, the document constantly referred to mengist as a ‘public partner’ 
in contrast to the kebele officials who are implicated in corruption. What even more tellingly 
accentuated the discursive distinction between local officials and the state was that local 
officials remained peripheral throughout the conference. They only provided information and 
facilitated the provision of mineral water for their superiors. Overall, the removal of kebele 
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officials from the performative process of installing an anti-corruption and developmental state 
idea is a means by which a ‘sublime state’ (Hansen 2001) is communicated to the public (see 
Chapter 7). Finally, the conference could be read as a theatrical enactment of state hierarchy 
and superiority – as distinct from the people and residing above local officials – and yet 
claiming to represent and work for the people.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, my purpose was to demonstrate the modalities by which the state is brought 
into existence. Rather than taking the state as an object with a self-evident authority and 
hierarchy, I demonstrated how it is constructed as a vertically encompassing and authoritative 
entity through bureaucratic practices and spatial and scalar self-representations. The vertical 
organisation of the government workforce and the differential partitioning and distribution of 
material paraphernalia such as computers and stationery shows how the state is constructed as 
an organisation with many different levels. I have demonstrated that this spatial and material 
production of hierarchies became routinised and embedded in the everyday modes of 
interaction among state functionaries both within the kebele (among politicians and civil 
servants) and between the kebele and the woreda administrations through a technocratic style 
of supervision and personal ties. Similarly, meetings constitute another regular practice or ritual 
in which there is a vivid display of the hierarchies of authority and which act to demarcate the 
boundaries between the state and the people and regulate the behaviours of officials and local 
people in the form of proper conduct (where to sit, how to speak, stand and so on).  
The performance of power and hierarchy is a crucial thread in the everyday interactions 
between state functionaries and the local people. State functionaries, such as the kebele 
chairman and kebele manager, re/produce the appearance of hierarchy and difference (between 
state and society) and thereby spread and regularise state power throughout society, both by 
making people wait as well as through a ritual of self-seclusion.  
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Overall, in this chapter, we have seen how the kebele forms a nodal point in trans-local 
power relations and also a site where administrative processes, interactions and spatial 
arrangements produce the state as a hierarchical institution. But it does so by interweaving 
rational practices of policy implementation and personal relationships into a single institution, 
a process which has proved to be a central feature of state formation. On the one hand, the local 
officials’ informal and arbitrary style of conducting the business of government implies a 
socially embedded process through which the state is constituted. On the other hand, the 
performance of the state hierarchy and authority implies that state functionaries engage in 
everyday routinised bureaucratic efforts to produce an idea of a unitary state in local 
imaginations (Abrams 1988; Gupta 1995). At an analytical level this reminds us that, in 
examining the state in Africa, while we can learn much by seeing state formation as shaped by 
social practices, it is also important to recognise that bureaucracy plays a major role in 
re/producing a unitary and hierarchical state idea. We need, therefore, to pay attention to the 
oscillation and mutual constitution between state institutions and social networks. In the next 
chapter, I further demonstrate how the process that sustains the image of the state as a discrete 









Boundary-making: the construction of state-society distinction 
The previous chapter discussed the manner in which state power and authority circulate and 
how state coherence and hierarchy are reproduced through the regularising of specific sets of 
activities and bureaucratic rituals. This chapter explores how the state is constructed as a 
discrete and separate entity through an active state boundary-making practice. I use the concept 
of boundary-making to refer to ‘the delineation of the official edges of the government – and, 
consequently, the delineation of state from society’ (Mayrl and Quinn 2016: 1). I illustrate state 
boundary work through the case of an important state development project: the Koga Irrigation 
and Watershed Management (KIWM) scheme. This scheme is an interesting case study 
because there were clear sequential phases to its development (design, training, construction, 
implementation, etc.), where one is able to see, as I demonstrate below, local and high-level 
state functionaries engaged in activities that differentiate state from society in terms of 
articulating what community is and does, where state ends (for instance, in terms of 
responsibilities) as opposed to other forms of authority such as community associations, and 
where community begins. 
 However, I should point out that this chapter does not intend to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the history of the construction of the KIWM system nor offer a critique of the 
normative participation theories, as this would be beyond the scope of the chapter. Rather, the 
goal of this chapter is to highlight some of the most important aspects of the scheme’s 
construction and implementation processes in order to chalk out the modalities by which state 
autonomy is produced. It shows the ‘instrument-effects’ (Ferguson 1994: 256) of the irrigation 
project in producing and maintaining the distinction between state and society (i.e. 
community). The central argument of this chapter is that the appearance of the state as a discrete 
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entity separate from society is not an outcome of the imitation or imposition of the Western 
form of state. Instead, the distinction between state and society arises from complex, locally 
grounded governance and bureaucratic practices of boundary-making and the production of 
difference.  
I begin this chapter by offering a brief description of the Koga irrigation scheme and closely 
examining how the underlying assumptions that underpin the design of the community 
participation component of the scheme were premised upon a normative distinction between 
state and community. I then demonstrate how the institutional setting of the scheme, at the 
construction stage, rather than adopting a participatory and bottom-up structure, simply 
reflected the pre-existing top-down hierarchical state bureaucratic set-up, thereby effectively 
excluding the local population from all decision-making bodies. This will be followed by an 
analysis of how state training programmes devised by different state departments are anchored 
in a problematic divide between tradition (presumed to be the realm of the local population) 
and modernity (presumed to be the realm of the state). I will also highlight how the state-society 
boundary is institutionalised with the formation of a water user association (WUA) as a means 
through which the local population is induced to participate in and accept the management of 
the irrigation system.  
In the second section I build upon the analysis presented in the preceding section to examine 
how state training programmes induce farmers to identify themselves as ‘underdeveloped 
subjects’ (Gupta 1998). 65 My purpose here is to demonstrate the contradictory effects of state 
                                                 
65 Akhil Gupta (1998: 39-40) argues that ‘underdevelopment is not merely a structural location in the global 
community of nations’ but ‘a form of identity, something that informs people’s sense of self. Who people think 
they are, how they got that way, and what they can do to alter their lives have been profoundly shaped by the 





practices, particularly by examining how training programmes and development discourses 
intended to encourage participation informed the inferior position of the poor vis-à-vis (semi-
)educated members of the local population.  
In the third section, I draw on farmers’ usage patterns of the irrigation system to demonstrate 
the consequences of state boundary-making practices on their material conditions. I will 
highlight how the separation of responsibilities and control of decisions and resources between 
state and community produce definite consequences in terms of farmers’ access to water and 
land resources and technical assistance.  
6.1.The KIWM scheme: the logic of the project  
The KIWM scheme is a central agricultural development project which aims to ‘contribute 
towards poverty reduction among smallholders through improvement in food security in the 
Region [Amhara regional state] in particular and the country as a whole … [and] to improve 
agricultural production in the catchment and command areas of the Koga River valley in a 
sustainable manner’ (AfDB 2001: i). Construction of the irrigation system began in 2001 and 
was completed in 2011 following four years of delay (Marx 2011). The scheme draws water 
from the Koga river – one of the 50 tributaries of the upper Blue Nile (locally known as Abay) 
– and irrigates a total land area of 7000 ha across nine kebeles, covering 12 blocks and 11 
reservoirs. It enables farmers who are limited to rain-fed cropping to produce crops and 
vegetables during the dry season. The number of beneficiaries at the time of my fieldwork in 
Degga stood at 942 households.66  
The scheme was designed and implemented under the aegis of the Ministry of Water 
Resources (MoWR) and was funded by the African Development Bank (AfDB). The most 
important feature of the scheme has been the emphasis placed on the participation of farmers, 
                                                 
66 Interview, PMU officer#13, woreda town, October 2014.  
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entailing their active involvement at all stages of project implementation, planning, design and 
construction. The logic behind this emphasis on participation as a favoured strategy is 
threefold. Firstly, participation was seen by both the Ethiopian government and the donor 
agency as a mechanism through which to overcome the legacy of public mistrust bequeathed 
by previous authoritarian projects (e.g. collective farming and villagisation). In emphasising 
the importance of community participation, an AfDB (2011: 4-5) document summarised the 
problem with similar schemes in the past as follows:  
Until recently, projects have been implemented through a top-down approach. Irrigation 
was generally associated with the compulsory formation of producer cooperatives in 
which farmers were reluctant to join. 
The shift away from an old, authoritarian paradigm was explained by a senior project officer 
as follows:  
So far, the farmers have been written out of the process of project design and 
implementation. They were simply seen as beneficiaries rather than participants of 
development processes … their inputs and influence had been absent. In the new 
approach, we sought to build community trust and consensus between the government 
and the people through the process of participation. 67 
The new paradigm therefore represents a new form of governance which calls for the active 
involvement of the local population, with a view to promoting partnership between the local 
population and the state in order to realise the ultimate objectives of agricultural transformation 
and poverty reduction. In short, the fecundity of linking state and society is reflected in the 
                                                 
67 Interview, senior PMU officer#14, woreda town, October 2014.  
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shift in emphasis from a top-down approach to a ‘decentralised and participatory-based project 
implementation’ and ‘bottom-up mechanism of accountability’.68 
Secondly, the concern and objective of participation is driven, largely as part of donor 
conditionality, by the desire to build local capacity, ‘a sense of ownership’ and ‘community 
self-management capacity’ (MMD 2005a: 4), which ultimately leads to a ceding of state 
management and control so that the project may be sustained solely by community effort. This 
is supposed to be accomplished by transforming the local population (community), which is 
presumed to be characterised by horizontal social networks as opposed to the verticality that 
the state represents, into a WUA that acts to manage its own development and address 
collective problems. In short, the motivation for community participation is to promote 
community self-management and create agency possibilities for farmers:  
The farmers must be the group that moves forward with the foundation, the mobilisation 
of the farmers’ interest in WUA / I&D [irrigation and dam] management organisations, 
and the ‘movers and shakers’ of the democratic process of establishment, legal formation 
and then the continued development of the organisation. It is no other person’s or 
department’s or organisation’s responsibility; it is only the farmers, the water users, who 
will become the members (MMD 2005a: 27). 
The project thus has a ‘transformative’ (Hickey and Mohan 2005) agenda, wherein the local 
population is expected to enact roles that make them active agents in influencing and, 
eventually, taking control of their own development. As a result, the scheme in official circles 
is considered a ‘landmark’69 , ‘the first of its kind in Ethiopia’ and ‘unique’70 , in that it 
                                                 
68 Interview, senior Amhara bureau of water resources official#15, Bahir Dar, October 2014. 
69 Interview, senior PMU officer#14, woreda town, October 2014. 
70 Interview, senior Amhara bureau of water resources official#15, Bahir Dar, November 2014. 
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underscores the dialectical relationship between farmers’ empowerment and poverty reduction: 
empowerment through participation was seen as a means for poverty reduction, and poverty 
reduction, in turn, was conceived to be a necessary tool with which to encourage participation 
and collective responsibility for community self-development.71  
Finally, the usage of the concept of participation cannot simply be seen as an isolated and 
exceptionally unique experiment associated with the scheme or as part of donor conditionality. 
In Degga, as elsewhere in Ethiopia, one cannot speak of participation without taking into 
account the EPRDF’s revolutionary democracy ideology. Community participation is a 
mechanism of governance and dominant party ideal of all small- and large-scale state projects 
undertaken in Ethiopia. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the EPRDF uses participation as a means 
to mobilise community resources (financial, human and material) and also to implement plans 
designed by highly placed actors within the party and state apparatus. Community participation 
at the kebele level takes place through lematawi buden (development groups), which are 
typically made up of between 20 and 30 individuals residing in administratively defined 
villages. Participation in development groups (i.e. in public works and meetings) is 
compulsory. In all, their involuntary participation is expected to contribute labour and material 
resources and provide trust, solidarity, legitimacy and habits of cooperation (social capital) for 
the success of local projects. The question, then, is how the project engages the EPRDF’s idea 
of participation? First, by inducing participation, the scheme aims to harness local resources 
such as money and land and mobilise free labour. Second, by emphasising community and 
participation, the scheme is presented as public as opposed to state driven, and hence legitimate.  
What does the scheme’s logic of participation reveal about the phenomenon of boundary-
making between state and society? First, in framing the participatory agenda of the project, the 




MoWR sought to establish a strong relationship of partnership between the state and society. 
However, the very idea of establishing a relationship of partnership presupposes that the state 
and the local population are mutually exclusive objects. Although the ministry’s aim was to 
break down the seeming boundary between state and society, it has actually re/produced the 
boundary and reified the two as independently existing entities. 
Secondly, the whole idea of community participation and community-based organisation is 
premised on the assumption of the existence of ‘community-as-social organisation’ (Agrawal 
1999), that is, separate from the state. The concept of community (mahbereseb) is abstract, 
ambiguous and, more to the point, was never before part of the everyday vernacular in Degga. 
Indeed, it was previously used to constitute the ideological basis of the Derg, i.e. communism, 
and was employed at the local level as a label for state-orchestrated meetings and work groups. 
With the deposition of the Derg, the concept once again resurfaced but this time in the context 
of a participatory development approach. In Degga, it has been widely put to use throughout 
the state-orchestrated awareness campaigns, capacity building programmes and in the process 
of the formation of the WUA and cooperative groups. Conversely, in everyday life, people use 
different terms to refer to a wide range of social relationships. For example, the concept of got 
(parish) or debere (population settled around one church) has been used to refer to socio-spatial 
units, and the terms mahber (religious feasts), idir (burial societies), iqub (informal saving 
schemes) and wonfel (neighbourhood labour self-help groups) have been used to describe 
social organisations, whereas the concept of hezeb (population or people) or hezebe-christian 
(Christian people or community) have been employed as abstract categories to describe the 
whole local population.72 The concept of population or Christian community is used to describe 
                                                 
72 Field notes, September – December 2014. 
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an abstract entity of social relations with common values, but it does not necessarily describe 
territorial space.  
The key point here is that ideas of belonging to a secular and geographically localised 
empirical group called community, in which all members act harmoniously and collectively, 
represented by common public authority and enjoying the benefits of community-wide 
relationships of solidarity or of a representative promoting collective goals to the state, do not 
exist. Community, in other words, is not an organising social unit. Rather, local social life, as 
seen above, is dominated by wide and dispersed networks of associational relationships. The 
point here is not that local residents lack a sense of shared identity. On the contrary. People 
identify themselves as Amhara, which colloquially means Orthodox Christian. The point here 
is rather that community is not an ‘already existing’ empirical group that exists separate from 
society. Community is a product of an exclusionary (boundary-making) logic of state practices. 
This is clearly reflected in my informants’ responses to my question asking what community 
is: ‘ye kebele tesatfo’73 (participating in kebele activities), ‘does it mean people?’74, ‘It means 
people’75, ‘I think it is when we gathered together for kebele meetings’76, ‘… when we come 
to work together in the kebele or irrigation’.77 Particularly interesting regarding these answers 
is that the concept of ‘community’ was understood in relation to activities in and around kebele 
meetings or as existing only in opposition to the state.  
The above discussion illustrates how the various state actors responsible for steering the 
scheme has reproduced and objectified an abstract idea of community which is disembodied 
                                                 
73 Interview, middle-aged farmer#16, October 2014. 
74 Interview, middle-aged woman#17, October 2014. 
75 Interview, middle-aged trader-cum-farmer#18, October 2014. 
76 Interview, young farmer#19, November 2014. 
77 Interview, middle-aged farmer#20, November 2014.  
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from local empirical contexts. In other words, state functionaries (in the MoWR) took a highly 
fluid and abstract concept of community and gave it the appearance of a static and essentially 
harmonious practical group. The notion of community is reproduced simply to conform to the 
national policy agenda of participation and self-management. More specifically, it is 
juxtaposed in relation to the state, as a counter to ‘past experience [of] … large-scale rural 
development projects in Ethiopia [which] have tended to be driven by government and [whose] 
acceptance has been low’ (AfDB 2001:8).  
The institutional setting  
Following in the wake of the project design, an important development in the process to begin 
construction of the scheme was the setting up of an institutional structure that would allow the 
participation of the local population. Here, the overall bottom-up approach of project 
construction and implementation, as noted above, meant that the local population should be 
included in institutional decision-making bodies and participate at every stage of the project 
construction and, in the process, hold government officials accountable. However, to do so, 
they needed to be sufficiently trained and empowered; hence, as I demonstrate below, the top-
down panoply of professional and bureaucratic expertise, acting upon a series of hierarchically 
structured committees, all concerned with downward supervision to the point where it reaches 
the kebele and then the local population. Within this structure, the agency of the local 
population and their role as partners of the state simply disappear. Rather, their role as end-
users – exteriors of the state – is highlighted. This is demonstrated in the account below, which 
describes the organisational structure of those institutions that make up the state apparatus and 
were involved in the planning and implementation of the scheme.  
At the federal level, the controlling agency of the scheme is the Ministry of Water Resources 
(MoWR), located in Addis Ababa. The MoWR oversees all project activities, devises 
guidelines, manages project funds, communicates with the donor organisation, the construction 
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contractor and other federal government departments and ensures the project runs 
conterminous with the larger state policy frameworks. Below the federal level, the scheme was 
supervised by a regional Project Steering Committee (PSC) located in the regional capital city, 
Bahir Dar. The PSC members were drawn from the Amhara Bureau of Water Resources, the 
Amhara Bureau of Agricultural and Rural Development, the Amhara Region Environmental 
Protection, Land Use and Administration Authority (for the relocation and compensation 
processes of resettled households), and the Regional Women’s Office and the Amhara Region 
Cooperatives Promotion Bureau. The steering committee prepares and provides training for the 
local population on a range of issues such as gender equality, agricultural productivity and 
ethics of work (Gebre, Getachew and McCartney 2008). 
At the local level, the scheme was coordinated by a project management unit (PMU) 
committee, whose members include a project manager, who is a politician from the woreda 
administration, an agriculturalist, gender issues coordinator, a representative from the woreda 
Agriculture Bureau, representatives from kebele administrations, a procurement officer, an 
accountant and a monitoring and evaluation officer. The project unit members help to mobilise 
the local population for labour, facilitate and arrange meetings and training sessions and 
provide day-to-day construction supervision. They also arrange compensation payment for loss 
of livelihood at the project site.  
Farmers, on the other hand, are placed within the lower ranks of the development ladder and 
outside the state hierarchical bounds. The formal decision-making structure does not involve 
either the democratic representation of farmers or any broad-based community participation 
forum. Instead, the kebele chairman was appointed to represent the local population and ensure 
that community priorities were included in important decisions. This means that, in contrast to 
the large number of hierarchically placed professional and bureaucratic state functionaries, the 
local population approached the scheme with the service of kebele officials. When asked to 
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comment on the lack of representation of the local population in local decision-making 
structures, a senior member of the PMU said:  
At the project construction stage, the people were represented on the PMU committee by 
their kebele leaders. The kebele leaders communicated all the decisions made by the 
committee to the community. We organised regular meeting so that there would be 
opportunities for feedback.78 
Another committee member explained: 
The community participated in various training programmes and in different project 
implementation activities such as in contributing labour for constructing canals. Many of 
the farmers also contributed voluntarily by ceding 20% of their land for the construction 
of the canals.79 
The above comments suggest that participation, at this stage of the project, was used more as 
a means to harness resources than as a tool of empowerment and, it results in strengthening of 
the instrumentalist view of participation which the new approach is supposed to have moved 
beyond. In other words, the scheme, at this stage, was driven more by the officials’ ideological 
adherence to the EPRDF’s doctrine of mass participation as a means of governance and 
resource mobilisation rather than by the new ideals of democratic participation, empowerment 
and bottom-up accountability.  
Some woreda- and kebele-level officials who were part of various committees throughout 
the implementation process were ambivalent and sceptical about the very idea of ‘active 
participation’ and the importance of the involvement of the local population in decision-making 
                                                 
78 Interview, senior PMU committee member#21, woreda town, November 2014. 
79 Interview, PMU officer#13, woreda town, November 2014. 
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structures and processes. One senior civil servant, who was in charge of coordination during 
the initial years of the project, said that ‘involving uneducated farmers in decision-making 
processes could be detrimental to the effective and timely implementation of the programme’.80 
Because, he argued, ‘to go and sit with the community to discuss only serves to slow down the 
construction process’. Another woreda-level politician told me that involving farmers in the 
planning and implementation process would be a ‘waste of time’ because farmers ‘knew 
nothing about complex and contentious bureaucratic, administrative and technical issues’.81 
Here, the explicit scepticism expressed by my informants is not only a reaffirmation of the 
EPRDF’s view of participation in development processes but also an important indication of 
how state functionaries help to re/produce and solidify the normative distinction between state 
and society.  
To sum up, the foregoing discussion reveals that the progressive participatory approach that 
appears and aims, at least in theory, to create a real possibility of active participation turns out 
to reify the old top-down paternalist approach which counter-poses state and society as distinct 
categories, by hierarchically ordering them. One thus notes a ‘path-dependent effect’ (Mayrl 
and Quinn 2016), a condition where the organisation of the everyday operation of the scheme 
simply reflects the pre-existing bureaucratic hierarchical set-up. In other words, although the 
project was supposed to operate in a bottom-up participatory-based fashion through active 
farmer participation, the sheer scale and hierarchical nature of the state system82 oblige the 
government to rely on a top-down bureaucratic approach. Ultimately, the state has figured as a 
bureaucratically authoritative, pyramidally structured organisation and as an entity that 
                                                 
80 Interview, woreda senior civil servant#22, October 2014. 
81 Interview, woreda politician#23, October 2014. 
82 Here I wish to make clear that I don’t intend to imply a reified conception of hierarchy as a self-evident element 
of the state system. Following on from what I argued in the previous chapter, state hierarchy should be viewed as 
re/produced and installed through a regularised set of bureaucratic practices. 
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classifies the local population as exterior ‘outsiders’ who have to be mobilised, informed and 
represented by kebele leaders.  
The logic of capacity building: the modern state and traditional society  
The benefits of the Koga irrigation scheme were articulated not solely in economic terms but 
also in terms of social and cultural transformations that it was envisaged would eliminate the 
underlying social evils of poverty, such as a lack of work discipline. The social transformation 
agenda was facilitated by the launching of numerous training programmes which saw the 
participation of various sections of the local population – women, the poor and model farmers 
– between 2002 and 2011.83 I will return later to the question of how different segments of the 
local population were targeted differently for training, but for now I would like to demonstrate 
how the training programmes were crafted on the basis of an assumption that the state is 
separate from the local population/society.  
Close analysis of various project documents, as I demonstrate below, confirms that the 
training programme was rooted in a paternalistic paradigm of modernisation that sought to 
expose the local population to progressive ideas and new information that would change local 
values and attitudes, and thereby, ultimately, transform their farming practices. The project 
planners believed that the local cultural and religious belief system posed an obstacle to the 
proper implementation of the irrigation scheme and prevent the local population from 
improving their livelihoods. Most government publications challenge people’s religious 
beliefs, lack of discipline and anti-social and anti-progressive attitudes that are described as 
regressive attributes that undermine development efforts. A training manual entitled ‘Koga 
irrigation: development and social constraints’ described the local ‘work culture’ as a 
‘lamentable obstacle to the economic and social progress of farmers’. It further holds that ‘it is 
an exercise in futility to hope for national progress with the current mind-set’ (MoWR 2005). 
                                                 
83 Interview, senior PMU officer#14, October 2014. 
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In much the same fashion, the donor agency, the (AfDB 2001: 9), noted the following in its 
appraisal report:  
Religious and cultural holidays may take up to 150 days in a year. Efficient use of the 
irrigation component will require dispensation to allow irrigation to take place 
throughout the season. The project will work with local religious leaders and elders on 
this issue as this approach has worked elsewhere in Ethiopia.  
It was claimed that ‘proper implementation of community self-management requires 
fundamental shifts in the norms and attitude of the farmers. The goal is to build social capability 
for using and sustaining the irrigation on a long-term basis.’ The project therefore aims to 
‘transform … beliefs and practices which are inimical to economic development and 
modernity’ (MoWR 2005), to eliminate what the state characterises as ‘non-productive socially 
unaccepted activities’ and ‘the extravagant number of Saint’s Days’ (Acres 1995).  
What does this pedagogical modernisation model of development tell us about the state 
discourse of boundary work? In designing the training, different government departments 
positioned the state as a site of rationality and science and the local population as traditional, 
stagnant and work-shy, and, in doing so, they helped to re/produce a line of difference between 
state and society. In other words, on one level, characterisations such as ‘traditional’ assert both 
the superiority and autonomy of the state; on another level, they construct the local population 
not only as a separate non-state domain but also as temporally belonging to habits of the past. 
The result is that poverty and underdevelopment are ascribed more to tradition than to the 
current structure of inequality (especially in terms of access to resources) that led to growing 
wealth for the few (see Chapter 5). Significantly, this threatens the visibility of local class 
relations and the marginalisation of the poor by projecting them as victims of tradition.  
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Additionally, the content of the training programmes was framed around the idea that state 
and society are inhabited by two fundamentally different kinds of people. On the one hand 
were the small group of people who were considered to be committed to the ideals of progress, 
rationality, science and technology. On the other hand were the majority of the population who 
were regarded as irrational, superstitious and traditional. In practice, however, state 
functionaries can hardly be characterised as ‘modern’ and ‘rational’, and they cannot be neatly 
juxtaposed against the local population. Instead, the identity and interaction between state 
functionaries and the local population are inextricably shaped and marked by common 
normative religious and social values. In other words, traditional social and cultural values 
animate as much the lifeworld of state functionaries as they influence the everyday lives of the 
local population. For example, during the course of my fieldwork, some civil servants at both 
the kebele and woreda levels had a high rate of absenteeism on unofficial religious holidays. 
Others, in honour of personal patron saints, were in the habit of suspending field-level activities 
(such as agricultural demonstrations) each month and celebrating their saint’s day with 
traditional coffee ceremonies.  
On the other hand, most of the farmers were enthusiastic about and keen to take advantage 
of new agricultural technologies such as chemical fertilisers and hybrid varieties of seeds. The 
crux of the matter is that shared normative cultural practices interpellate both state functionaries 
and the local population in their daily lives and hence produce subjects who perform roles that 
cannot be neatly categorised as either modern or traditional. Therefore, tradition as a distinct 
domain that belongs to society is a context created by political actors and technocrats which 





Classification of the local population for training  
In making efforts to investigate different government documents, training guidelines and 
manuals, one thing tended to appear to be most significant: the state development imaginary 
embedded in the training programmes reinforces normative social hierarchies. The different 
state departments (e.g. Agriculture, Land Use, Women’s, etc.) that were involved in the training 
process designed different training programmes and targeted them at people who were 
positioned differently in terms of their education, power and gender. The local population were 
roughly classified into three categories of trainee: trainee trainers (semi-educated local elites 
who would in turn train larger number of trainees), trainees (the ordinary population) and 
women84. For instance, a government appraisal report identifies ‘lead’ and ‘respected’ farmers:  
… to implement a capacity building programme to farmers, in particular the lead farmers 
and respected community leaders (who are farmers), whereby irrigation construction 
engineers and/or technicians, masonry tradesmen, and/or irrigation workers from small-
scale irrigation schemes teach the leading farmers the practical skills of constructing 
canals, drains, banks and structures (MMD 2005a: 45). 
As such, power relations make a glaring appearance. The ‘trainee trainers’ were positioned as 
knowledgeable citizens capable of both learning and teaching other members of the 
community. Following on the classification of the local population, as a strategy to transform 
local values, prominent local priests, notable individuals and kebele representatives were given 
intensive training about the benefits of hard work and ‘progressive social values’ (MoWR 
2005) and were invited to visit irrigation schemes in other parts of the country. A senior project 
unit coordinator explained: ‘leaders that were drawn from religious and opinion leaders are 
made to travel to Tigray and Oromia regions and share experiences and observed practices of 
                                                 
84 Interview, senior Amhara bureau of water resources official#15, Bahir Dar, November 2014. 
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irrigation users in action.’85 Meanwhile, the poor and women were positioned as vulnerable 
and extreme victims of tradition who were unable to understand and communicate with the 
experts. As such, they needed their own leaders as intermediaries to help them become aware 
and express to them the benefits of hard work in the simple language they understood.  
Yet women were also singled out for special capacity building activity. One training manual, 
for instance, emphasises that training for women should be ‘tailored to their need … since they 
have multiple household responsibilities, training programmes need to be flexible in schedule 
and reach them [as they are not allowed by their husbands to travel] in villages’ (MoWR 2005). 
What becomes more notable upon close reading of the training manuals is that the state’s 
development programme was highly gendered in that it inadvertently included masculine and 
feminine training programmes. Masculine training included mainly agricultural (such as crop 
production, agronomy, animal husbandry), infrastructural (canal management, water and soil 
conservation) and input (fertiliser, chemicals) utilisation programmes, whereas feminine 
training programmes included programmes on social and household issues (gender 
empowerment and household management, waterborne diseases).  
Institutionalisation of the state-society boundary: the WUA  
In addition to providing capacity building training, the MoWR and the donor agency (AfDB) 
determined that the legitimacy and sustainability of the project required the formation of a 
farmer-driven participatory institution that would articulate ‘community interests’86 and serve 
as an intermediary between the local people and the local institutions that constitute the state:  
Another important step we took was to help the local community organise themselves 
into water user cooperatives. The role of the cooperatives is to represent the whole water 
                                                 
85 Interview, senior PMU officer#14, November 2014. 
86 Interview, head of the WUA#24, Degga, November 2014. 
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users and the interests of the local community in the implementation and management of 
the project.87  
To this effect, in 2011, water cooperatives (WUAs) were established across the 12 kebeles 
served by the irrigation system and federated to form one Koga Irrigation Cooperative.88 Here, 
the practice of producing and institutionalising the distinction between state and society finds 
its expression in a WUA by-law, which was prepared by the Amhara Regional Bureau of 
Cooperatives Promotion. The first element that the by-law established was distinctive state and 
non-state realms of authority. This involves division of responsibilities between the local 
institutions that make up the state apparatus and the local community/WUA. The by-law, for 
instance, states that a Project Operation Unit (POU), as a branch of government bureaucracy, 
operates ‘the dam and reservoir, main and secondary canals and drains and the associated road 
network’, whereas the WUA is responsible for the ‘O&M [Operations and Maintenance] of the 
tertiary and quaternary canals and drains and associated access roads and on-farm structures’ 
(MMD 2005b: 2). Furthermore, the WUA is charged with the optimal allocation and utilisation 
of the water resource, generating local resources in cash or labour for maintenance and 
operations, preventing erosion, ensuring the interests of the owners and users of the land plots 
and sanctioning violations of the rules (MMD 2005b). Thus, the local population were 
designated as exteriors to the state and treated as discrete development actors. The WUA, in 
this sense, represents the institutionalisation of the two schemas, the state and the local 
                                                 
87 Interview, senior PMU officer#14, November 2014. 
88 It should be pointed out that there was nothing new or unique about this form of arrangement. On the contrary, 
it is a typical way of arranging an irrigation management system and is used all over the world. But the formation 
of the WUA, in the context of this thesis, is significant insofar as it offers insight into how the boundary between 
state and society is produced and reaffirmed. 
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community, governed by a by-law which dictates specific rules, regulations and parameters on 
how the two are supposed to relate to one another.  
The second element introduced with the by-law was that the WUA, as a self-managed 
development actor, was to be run by a committee of seven community representatives who 
were to be elected as its members. The by-law, however, recommends that the leadership 
committee is composed of respected village elders, preferably those who can read and write 
(MMD 2005b: 2). The problem here was that the requirement for literacy and social status 
helped erstwhile dominant semi-educated social and political elites (model farmers) to continue 
their domination. At the time of my fieldwork, the leaders of the WUA in Degga were the same 
few elites who occupied multiple positions at various levels of the kebele administration. The 
chairman of the association was, for instance, the ANDM/EPRDF head. It is clear then that the 
formation of the WUA – as a discrete community body separate from the kebele institution – 
has not affected local power relations. Rather, by distinguishing the elite from ordinary 
inhabitants, it reproduces and reinforces local stratifications, hierarchies and thereby 
perpetuates erstwhile power relations. As such, the boundary between the state and the local 
population, as we shall see later in the chapter, simply serves as a resource of power and 
personal enrichment for those local elites on both sides of the dichotomy.  
6.2. Participation and subject sensibilities  
So far, I have attempted to demonstrate the different mechanisms and processes through which 
state-society boundary is produced. In this section, I wish to briefly draw attention to examine 
how state training programmes induce farmers to identify themselves as ‘underdeveloped 
subjects’ (Gupta 1998). My purpose here is to demonstrate the contradictory effects of 
development and boundary-making practices, particularly by examining how training 
programmes and development discourses intended to encourage participation informed the 
inferior position of the poor vis-à-vis (semi-)educated members of the local population.  
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Before detailing the complexities of how subject positions were produced, it may be worth 
considering the grassroots’ vernacular understanding of the concept of participation. The verb 
‘to participate’ in common local parlance, i.e. mesatef, means to attend events, meetings or 
public works, etc. Participation, to the local population, therefore simply implies attending 
meetings to receive information and listen to the eloquent and witty speeches and technical and 
forceful words given by state functionaries and public leaders. Many of my informants were 
surprised when I informed them that participation entails the idea that participants are in charge 
of discourses, that they have the right to vote and be elected and that all local inhabitants should 
have an equal voice in decision-making processes. They would then be confounded by any 
difference this might make. ‘Regardless, it is not our place. A farmer toils with dirt and dust. 
We are not people of paper and pen,’89 said a middle-aged farmer. Similarly, another middle-
aged farmer expressed: ‘We [ordinary farmers] must accept whatever comes. A donkey and a 
farmer should consent to take orders.’90 Another elderly man said, ‘Who would listen to a 
farmer? We are looked down upon by everyone.’91 It is tempting to interpret these responses 
as a reflection of the dynamics of the Amhara authoritarian political tradition and the culture 
of obeisance to authority. Such an approach, however, fails to account for the ongoing complex 
contemporary practices that re/produce structural positions and the norms governing the 
participation of the local people in decision making processes.  
Despite the scheme was initiated with the aim of transforming local inhabitants into 
empowered subjects, I argue that a constantly re/produced set of discourses and governance 
practices that constitute social classes and underdeveloped subjects continue to animate the 
norms governing the participation of the local people. In particular, as will be discussed in 
                                                 
89 Interview, middle-aged farmer#25, Degga, October 2014. 
90 Interview, middle-aged farmer#16, Degga, October 2014. 
91 Interview, elderly man#26, Degga, October 2014.  
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greater detail below, development and participation discourses were used by local inhabitants 
as points of reference against which they constituted not only ideas of state but also 
‘underdeveloped’ subjectivities. That is to say, state capacity building programmes, as seen in 
the first section, set the terms by which – and are key mediums through which – subject 
positions are managed. Many of the people I interacted with expressed that it is impossible to 
be active participants because, as one middle-aged farmer expressed, ‘participation requires the 
ability to read and write’ and he is an ‘uneducated peasant’.92 Here, an awareness of his 
illiteracy not only tells my informant that he cannot actively participate but also informs his 
sense of self as an ‘uneducated peasant’ and certainly positions him as such in the context of 
wider power relations. When asked to account for their lack of active participation, the majority 
of my informants drew on state discourses and described themselves using disparaging terms. 
One man remarked, ‘I cannot meaningfully participate because I am illiterate. We were told 
that working in the association [WUA] requires the ability to read and write. I have nothing 
useful to contribute to the WUA.’93 Many of the ordinary farmers were conscious of and 
sensitive to the structural and social contexts within which participation is required. One 
middle-aged farmer told me, ‘It was made clear to us during the training programmes the WUA 
needs educated people as leaders’. He further added, ‘I am not useful for them. My role is to 
learn what mengist teaches me … I have no one to blame but myself.’94 Similarly, another 
middle-aged man said, ‘participation is best achieved only when educated people take the 
responsibility of leadership … As to the illiterate farmers … what we learn at meetings [training 
                                                 
92 Interview, middle-aged farmer#27, Degga, October 2014.  
93 Interview, middle-aged farmer#28, Degga, October 2014.  
94 Interview, middle-aged farmer#25, Degga, October 2014. 
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programmes] is sometimes difficult to comprehend. Only those who read and write can 
communicate better with mengist … poor people attend just to make up the quorum.’95 
The above comments illustrate that in the context of active participation, the training 
programmes and subsequent elections of WUA leaders privileged literacy and devalued the 
agency of those who did not read and write. This sentiment, I should point out, was also quite 
common among state functionaries. For instance, when asked to comment on the extent of 
ordinary peasants’ participation in the leadership roles, the PMU coordinator at the time of 
project construction, remarked:  
It is important that capable people fill the positions. Most people cannot even write their 
own names. The farmers themselves are ill at ease to sit side by side and discuss matters 
that require broad understanding with the better educated and socially respected elders. 
Leadership in such important matters of development requires a basic level of 
qualification.96  
The other issue that anchored the lack of active participation and self-perception of farmers 
was an awareness that a knowledge of state bureaucracy was required for the poor to be active 
participants. A middle-aged man explained:  
We are ignorant regarding government procedures. When matters related to government 
work come up, one has to know the right procedures. Education and experience are 
critical to participating in government-related work.97  
Another man spoke in similar terms:  
                                                 
95 Interview, middle-aged farmer#29, Degga, October 2014. 
96 Interview, PMU coordinator#14, woreda town, November 2014. 
97 Interview, elderly man#26, Degga, October 2014. 
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Those of us who are not educated are in a difficult position; we don’t know the simple 
things as identifying and distinguishing government offices. When we go the woreda 
offices, we are unable to read office numbers or government notices … To participate, 
one has to read and write and should know how to work with government officials.98 
The view that representation and participation are derived from literacy and knowledge and 
familiarity with state bureaucracy is related to the common culture of defining development 
initiatives and political office in administrative terms (bureaucratic procedures, letter and report 
writing, etc.). This view belies the fact that an illiterate person can be as good a representative 
of community interests as prejudiced literate individuals.  
Despite the purpose behind the training programmes being to empower farmers, they were, 
as the comments above demonstrate, unwittingly grounded in radical self-consciousness-
raising projects, i.e. telling peasants what they are and do not have instead of how they can be. 
What farmers see is that they lack access, power and education and thereby any meaningful 
position in the participatory community management programme. By inculcating and pointing 
out the state-specified terms within which participation takes place, my informants constructed 
subordinated subjectivities.  
With respect to the local leadership, many of my informants compared their lives with those 
who were educated, powerful and wealthy, often belittling themselves in the process. They 
considered themselves as ‘lacking in education’99 and ‘knowledge of mengist’100 that defined 
local elites. In most cases, people’s endorsement of WUA representatives relates to the state’s 
emphasis on education and denigration of their agency which informs their sense of self, rather 
                                                 
98 Interview, young man#19, Degga, October 2014.  
99 Interview, elderly man#30, Degga, October 2014. 




than local leaders’ ability to deliver economic and social benefits. In other words, individuals’ 
self-awareness of their situated constraints allows them to visualise and imagine how 
community participation is expected to work and who is well positioned to fit the expectations. 
Yet this does not mean that peasants accept any abuse of power and resources. They in fact, as 
we will see in the next chapter, discursively contest the abuse of power by semi-literate 
community representatives and state functionaries through narratives of corruption.  
Indeed, in the view of my informants, the notion of participation, in the context of attending 
meetings, is significant. Most of my informants spoke positively about the information and 
knowledge they derived from the training programmes. They also embrace the ‘modernist’ 
hope generated by state discourses. Almost all the illiterate people I spoke to were keen to send 
their children to school and prevent them from meeting the same fate. But they were also aware 
that they cannot do anything about their illiteracy and material constraints. ‘I have received so 
many great ideas from the project people about how to use irrigation water and start an animal 
fattening business. But I am poor. I have no resources to put the information I gathered into 
practice,’ explained a middle-aged farmer.101 Similarly, another middle-aged man said, ‘I have 
learned so many things ... what and when to plan, soil erosion, water and fertiliser use, etc. But, 
I don’t have what the rich people have … land, fertiliser and money. Learning is good for 
nothing: I still struggle to feed my family.’102 Another man stated: ‘They teach us zemen 
ametash [modern] methods … but I have not seen training resulting in any benefit for the poor. 
They are good for the rich.’103 In short, knowledge of farming technology and methods which 
underpin capacity building discourses only served to create ‘underdeveloped as a subject and 
underdevelopment as a form of identity’ (Gupta 1998: 11).  
                                                 
101 Interview, middle-aged farmer#29, Degga, October 2014.  
102 Interview, middle-aged farmer#25, Degga, October 2014. 
103 Interview, elderly farmer#30, Degga, October 2014. 
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Thus far, the discussions in this chapter have revealed how the various state actors 
responsible for steering the scheme helped to produce a boundary of difference between state 
and society based on the presumed existence of ‘community-as-social organisation’ (Agrawal 
1999) that can articulate common interests, participate in project implementation processes, act 
to address collective problems, be represented, take responsibility for its own development, 
and legitimise the project. Although a harmonious and empirical community envisaged by the 
planners was absent in Degga, it emerged as a political/technocratic construct of what should 
be there in order to legitimise the scheme, a practice that made it possible to identify the 
difference of state from the society within a single field. This in effect solidified hierarchical 
relationships between the rural poor, women and the local elites. The following questions thus 
remain to be answered: Are the state boundary-making practices effectual? Does the distinction 
between state and society create concrete consequences? If so, what material implications does 
this have for the poor and local power relations? I turn to this now.  
6.3. Utilisation and management of the irrigation facility  
By 2011, construction activities had been completed and the farmers began to utilise the system 
for production in the dry season. In the meantime, management of the canal system was handed 
over to the WUA. The division between management responsibilities between the local 
institutions that make up the state apparatus and the local community/WUA brings into sharp 
focus the distinction between state and society by defining who and what constitute such 
domains and by making legible the agencies and individuals who perform roles that are 
recognised as either state or community. This process has helped to make a boundary between 
state and society appear as an empirical reality in the eyes of both the state functionaries and 
the local population. As I will demonstrate below, this ‘state effect’ (Mitchell 1999) has been 
practically consequential in that it established an institutionalised relationship between the local 
institutions that make up the state apparatus and the local population based on the principles of 
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community self-management and limited state involvement, thereby exposing the poor and 
women to asymmetrical class and gender-based community relations that undermined their 
access to water and other resources. In this section I therefore seek to show how the effort to 
build community self-empowerment by treating the local population as discrete development 
actors separate from the state has the contradictory effect of perpetuating class divisions. 
 Before detailing the material consequences of the state-community division, I would like 
to discuss briefly the local patterns of irrigation water and land use and market constraints that 
have been in place ever since farmers began to utilise the irrigation system. In Degga, the 
lowest, most fertile and best-irrigated parts on the banks of the canals are cultivated by the rich 
and powerful. If the wealthy did not already own the land near the canals before they were 
built, they soon acquired it through long-term rent contracts or exchanges of land. The regional 
law permits land rent-outs by smallholders for up to 25 years.104 Particularly, during the first 
few years in which farmers began irrigating their land, market constraints allowed local elites 
and wealthy urban opportunists to rent land from poor, cash-strapped farmers. In 2011, for 
instance, with almost all of the farmers producing similar vegetables and crops such as 
tomatoes and onions and marketing during the same period of time, there was excess supply in 
the market. This resulted in a sharp fall in price. The tomato surplus especially could not be 
stored because of a lack of cold storage rooms. Urban-based traders made matters worse by 
quoting lower prices on tomatoes, forcing farmers to sell at a price as low as 10 ETB (£0.33) 
per quintal. Widowed women and poor farmers ended up renting out their plots to wealthy 
farmers and outsiders and becoming sex workers, household and commercial farm labourers.105  
                                                 
104 The Revised Amhara National Regional State. Rural Land Administration and Use. No. 133/2006. 




Over the following years, cognisant of market constraints, the government established the 
Amhara Seed Enterprise to contract farmers to grow commercial quantities of onion and wheat 
seeds at government procurement prices, way above the market value.106 At the local level, the 
contracting process was primarily managed through the WUA and development agents (DAs), 
who are under the influence of local kebele cadres that straddle the line between the state and 
community. The result was that the work was almost entirely contracted out to wealthier 
farmers.107 Poor farmers are thus forced to rely on fast-yielding vegetables and tomatoes, 
thereby sharply reducing the demand for chemical fertiliser. However, the vegetable and 
tomato markets are too variable to secure an income.  
This situation is exacerbated by institutional restrictions in that now the community, i.e. the 
WUA, is separate from public institutions, state actors are not able to interfere in the day-to-
day monitoring of water distribution and management of disputes. At the same time, local elites 
(model farmers) dominate the leadership positions in the WUA. These wealthy and powerful 
farmers, in order to keep their vast areas of land under cultivation, use a great deal of water, in 
the process reducing and sometimes denying the amount that is allocated to the poor. 
Community rights to water access are simply overridden by the growing quantity of crops 
produced commercially for the government by model farmers. As a result, during the course 
of my research, I was met with persistent and extensive local complaints about exclusion from 
water distribution and the absence of any state help. One farmer explained his experience with 
his wealthier neighbour:  
He blocks the water to my field and diverts it to his own fields. I needed water desperately 
because tomato and vegetables [that he cultivated] need regular watering. He says that I 
                                                 
106 Interview, DA#7, Degga, November 2014. 
107 Ibid.  
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only need little water because I have small plot … and sometimes he denies my turn … 
It is WUA’s responsibility. Mengist cannot help me.108  
Some have even given up farming during the dry season. One middle-aged farmer, for instance, 
reflected on his experience as follows: 
I have completely quit farming in dry seasons. It is costly … it needs land preparation, 
pesticide and regular watering … You have to fight with the rich to secure your right to 
access water …. It is an association’s [WUA] thing, mengist can’t help you … ultimately, 
either your crops perish for lack of water or the market plummets and you end up selling 
them at a cheaper price that does not even cover your inputs and labour costs.109 
Because of the multiple constraints, many household heads, especially women, entered into 
sharecropping arrangements with wealthier farmers:  
It is easier for [widowed] women to enter into sharecropping. Farming is a man’s job. I 
am not capable of negotiation like a man to acquire fertiliser: I am weak to participate in 
maintenance work, and my children are very young. Added to that, there is no support 
[for widows] from the government with respect to water use or fertiliser. Everything is 
decided by the rich people in the cooperative [WUA]; there is not government 
involvement at all.110  
Experiences of abuse also surfaced in local complaints. A middle-aged farmer pointed out his 
own experience as a case in point:  
                                                 
108 Interview, middle-aged farmer#33, Degga, November 2014.  
109 Interview, middle-aged farmer#29, November 2014. 
110 Interview, widowed woman#34, November 2014. 
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I have suffered the worst abuse … I had a problem with a rich man who has a big farm 
at the head. He used to block water and refuse to give me my turn. I reported it to the 
association [WUA], but they have done nothing. Then I reported it to a government 
person at the project office, and he told me it is ‘the association’s issue; they will deal 
with it’. Left with no other option, I decided to confront him. He sent his labourers to 
beat me. I reported it to the militia and the social court and they have done nothing. I then 
took the case to an elder, and the elder reprimanded his brutality towards me. I don’t 
know if it lasts but, for now, he respects my turn.111  
Notable from this case is how, in the struggle over access to water, the realms of state and 
society have been restricted by the parameters of institutions and the law and negotiating points 
have been narrowed down to internal village social relations, with no oversight or 
intermediation from external state functionaries. The most well-connected individuals rely on 
power derived from kinship networks in their clash over access to water. Others were 
ghettoised into a system where no immediate legal or administrative action may be brought 
against the powerful.  
Returning to local complaints, many people expressed their frustrations related to canal 
maintenance. Although it is the responsibility of the WUA to mobilise labour, it is usually 
individual peasants who clear debris from canals. My informants cited that wealthier farmers 
receive special attention from the WUA while their own demands go unanswered. For instance, 
a middle-aged farmer said: 
When damage occurs in areas which affect the rich, we all participate in the repair 
process. The association pays special attention to the demands of the rich. Sometimes 
they call government people [engineers] to clear the canals using graders. But when I and 
                                                 
111 Interview, middle-aged farmer#35, November 2014. 
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many other [whose land is located on heads of the watercourse] need help to carry water 
uphill, no one responds.112 
Similarly, another young peasant complained:  
When we need [technical] help from the government, we should submit an application in 
writing on a piece of paper to the association. The association treats an application from 
a rich man and myself differently. They make sure the rich get help from the government. 
We [whose land is uphill] are still pleading with the WUA for canal clearance.113  
Here, my informants are referring to the established institutional procedure of requesting 
technical help from the government where technical assistance can only be requested through 
the WUA (which is assumed to represent the interests of the local community). However, in 
practice, as my informants indicated, such requests from poor members are often ignored, 
leaving them to their own devices. 
In almost every case from the informants above and in my interviews with many other 
farmers, those who expressed their complaints and frustrations found that they were unfairly 
treated by local elites, not by mengist114. As one elderly man said: ‘it is our own children [local 
elites] who make us suffer.’ What these comments from different informants’ reveal is that the 
boundary-making practice has locked the poor and women into a mode of livelihood that is not 
empowering. Ironically, far from benefitting from the irrigation scheme, the peasants might, in 
fact, become worse off by ceding 20 per cent of their landholding for canal construction. Most 
farmers cultivate smaller plots (DHWSES 2008). 
                                                 
112 Interview, middle-aged farmer#20, November 2014. 
113 Interview, young farmer#19, November 2014. 
114 I analyse the reasons for people absolving mengist of blame in Chapter 7.  
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To summarise, the participatory aspect of the scheme that was aimed at community self-
management and self-empowerment had the contradictory effect of sustaining class differences 
partly because of the unrealistic assumption of the existence of community as a harmonious 
whole that is separate from the state. The idea that the project can be equitably managed 
through the WUA has ‘depoliticised’ local practices of abuse and corruption, not because, as 
Ferguson (1994) argued in the case of Lesotho, of the technical aspects of the project but rather 
because it has become ghettoised and incarcerated as a community issue. Ultimately, as we 
have seen, the fruits of the project have failed to reach the poor. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter my purpose was to chalk out governance and discursive practices in the KIWM 
scheme that afford the state the appearance of being a separate structure. I did this by closely 
examining the scheme’s construction and implementation processes and its aim of empowering 
and transforming the local population. I have demonstrated that the urge to empower the local 
population stems from concerns over the state’s past authoritarian approach to managing 
development projects. As such, the state was premised by the scheme’s planners (MoWR and 
AfDB) as a discrete entity that assumed complete control over development processes and as 
a result beset by top-down attempts at development intervention, with very little success. By 
contrast, local communities are perceived to be as a harmonious whole and potential 
development partner. Success was therefore conceived to be contingent upon the inclusivity of 
the scheme –specifically, in its ability to bring the two together as partners. I have argued that 
the premise that state and society constitute two discrete entities that could enter into a 
relationship of partnership with one another reproduces and reaffirms the line between state 
and society. 
 Furthermore, the organisation of the project into federal, regional, woreda and kebele levels 
reflects the pre-existing scalar structure of the state bureaucratic set-up. Hence, participation 
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was interpreted and implemented in terms of the pre-existing classifications and schema (state 
and non-state domains) rather than in light of the radical new idea of empowerment and bottom-
up accountability. Similarly, the introduction of the WUA, with its aim of empowering the 
local population, had the effect of reproducing an image of an autonomous state that is separate 
from the local population.  
The participatory approach of the scheme was also spurred by the impulse to reach out and 
empower marginalised sections of local communities which should be allowed to have an equal 
say regarding their own development. However, the strategy of achieving this through training 
had the paradoxical effect of informing the peasants what they are (illiterate) and what they 
lack (knowledge of state bureaucracy, literacy and numeracy) for them to meaningfully 
participate. In short, instead of empowering the rural poor, the scheme had outcomes of 
constituting ‘underdeveloped subject’ positions and identities, generating and consolidating 
discourses that reify the state as a distant entity and excluding the poor from access to water 
and other resources. In short, rather than empowering the local population by creating a 
relationship of partnership, the scheme reproduced the image of the state as an autonomous and 
hierarchical entity that is elevated beyond the reach of the local population. This process speaks 
to issues I discuss in the next chapter, of how the state is popularly imagined as an idea lying 






Corruption talk, livelihood security and state imagination 
So far, this thesis has addressed the processes by which state verticality and discreteness are 
produced through the governance and development practices of kebele-level bureaucracy. 
Together, the previous two chapters presented the ways in which the state operates as a 
cohesive and authoritative apparatus that stands as ‘a part of society and apart from society’ 
(Migdal 2001: 263). The modalities by which the state emerges as a symbolic centre of society, 
however, are manifested in more than state-related political practices. The state is also 
discursively constructed and imagined as an authoritative centre of power in public culture 
(Gupta 1995). Thus, this chapter turns to an analysis of the manner in which the state comes to 
be constituted in people’s imaginations in the context of everyday social life. This means 
analysing the language of the kebele public domain. By the kebele public domain, I mean the 
habitual social spaces such as tea and coffee houses, tella bet (literally meaning beer house, see 
Chapter 8) and the informal roadside gatherings where local inhabitants engage with a variety 
of issues that shape the idea of state and moral rights and wrongs. In such spaces, the local 
population, as social actors, disparage and gossip about state functionaries, tell each other 
stories of corruption and the success and failure of local development projects and also 
exchange information about the distribution of agricultural inputs, weddings, funerals and other 
local social events.  
In participating in such local public domains, I found corruption to be a favourite topic of 
everyday conversation. Men would meet in one of the local public domains – usually during 
the evening, when the day’s work was done, and during religious off-work days – to tell stories 
of corruption. They talked about the embezzlement of development resources, about the 
amount of money the kebele officials had so far diverted from development programmes or 
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were expected to divert, and about the cost of getting things done (guday masfetsemya). They 
also shared ideas, experiences and obtained new information about, for instance, how much 
civil servants would likely demand and so on. Within such talk and discourses, the actions of 
local leaders were argued over and eventually evaluated against local moral norms. Politicians 
were often described as corrupt, self-serving and unscrupulous. An often-used phrase was 
‘eating up’ of state resources. Another term that was often employed to describe the perceived 
widespread nature of corruption was ‘stealing’. This chapter focuses on examining how such 
corruption idioms and discourses help people make sense of politics, imagine the state and how 
it confers on them specific claims of important agricultural resources that are perceived to be 
controlled and managed by powerful state functionaries.  
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is not to explain the existence of the phenomenon of 
corruption in terms of whether, why and how it occurs and why people talk about it but rather 
to examine the implications of corruption talk in the construction of images of and the 
legitimacy of the state idea. Moreover, like all public discourses, corruption talk is partisan and 
is prone to exaggeration, but instead of investigating the veracity of such talk, this chapter 
focuses on the kind of local politics and imagination of the state that it produces. What truly 
makes the phenomenon of corruption an interesting object of study is ‘not so much the “reality” 
of its existence as the fact that it is widely believed to exist, the complex narratives that enfold 
it, and the new relationships and objects of study that those narratives create’ (Haller and Shore 
2005: 6).  
I begin this chapter by providing a short background introduction to the mechanisms of 
agricultural resources management and distribution in Ethiopia. While the main objective is to 
illuminate the modalities by which the state comes to be constituted as a superior centre of 
authority and power, a foray into the intricacies of local class relations is almost unavoidable 
when discussing this process. The section that follows therefore demonstrate how the 
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monopoly and misuse of development resources by state functionaries has contributed to class 
polarisation insofar as it has altered the traditional local relations of production from those 
based on subsistence farming to relations in which the poor are dependent on the rich through 
arrangements of sharecropping and land lease. In doing so, I will highlight how local class 
relations are intimately tied to the immediate survival needs of the poor and demonstrate their 
bearing on the way people talk about corruption and imagine the state. Next, I lay out discourses 
of corruption in a series of ethnographic vignettes to demonstrate the different meaning and 
function it has not only to the production of state idea but also in the lives of the rural poor.  
The chapter ends by noting that corruption talk is not the only dominant arena through which 
the state comes to be constructed and imagined. I will highlight that people in Degga also 
imagine the state through their use of language replete with religious metaphors and 
symbolism. In so doing, I will furthermore argue that the employment of religious imagery and 
language by Amhara farmers – based on which a large proportion of the scholarship on 
Ethiopian politics explains state-society dynamics as relations of dominance and subordination 
– is very much about imagining and elucidating the state’s responsibilities and obligations to 
the people. 
7.1.The mechanisms of agricultural resources distribution in Ethiopia 
In this section I provide a very brief description of the manner in which agricultural resources 
such as chemical fertilisers, credits services and improved seeds have been managed and 
distributed in Ethiopia since 1991 (the year in which the EPRDF took power) as a way to better 
contextualise the chapter. In 1993, under a foreign aid conditionality agreement, the Ethiopian 
government opened the fertiliser market, which had formerly been monopolised by a 
government agency called Agricultural Inputs Supplies Enterprise (AISE), to the private sector 
(Jayne et al. 2003). This had the effect of liberalising wholesale and retail prices and gave 
peasants the ability to purchase from a range of suppliers. However, by 1999, the ruling front 
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(EPRDF)-owned companies, which had been given preferential access to foreign exchange, 
government warehouses, vehicles and subsidies, had completely driven private suppliers and 
retailers out of the agricultural market (Jayne et al. 2003). Since then, the fertiliser market has 
been monopolised by the AISE and party-affiliated companies.  
More recently, however, the share of party-affiliated companies has significantly declined 
and the market is being dominated by state-organised cooperative unions (Spielman 2008). 
These cooperative unions import agricultural inputs, mainly fertilisers, pesticides and different 
kinds of seeds, through the AISE and distribute them to smallholder farmers via local primary 
cooperatives that are explicitly controlled by kebele politicians. The state-owned Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia provides credit to the cooperative unions under a complete credit guarantee 
via the regional Bureaus of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARDs). The regional 
governments (BoARDs) then set fertiliser prices that include margins for the unions and 
primary cooperatives. The primary cooperatives sell fertiliser to farmers on cash, credit or 
combined cash-credit bases. In Degga, as also applies to other relatively food-sufficient parts 
of the country, fertiliser and seeds are provided on a cash basis, with kebele officials playing a 
leading role in the distribution process. It is within this general context that state-society 
encounters take place at the local level and corruption circulates as a dominant theme in public 
discourses in Degga. 
Corruption, class and the marginalisation of the poor 
Before proceeding to present the ways in which people imagine the state, it may be worth 
considering the intimate link between class relations and corruption discourses as a way to 
delimit the specific conjunctures that have shaped state imaginations in Degga. State-controlled 
development resources such as chemical fertiliser, credit, pesticides and land are the only 
important forms of capital and assets in Degga and thus represent a critical means to provide 
for the survival needs of the poor and enhance their life chances. Fertiliser is seen as the most 
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valuable of all resources because, as one farmer ruefully said, ‘The soil does not yield crops 
without application of fertiliser. It does not even accept the [organic] manure. It has become 
useless; it is simply a wasteland without fertiliser.’115 Similarly, another farmer told me that 
‘fertilisers are essential. If we stop applying fertilisers, the crops will fail.’116 Another farmer 
said, ‘access to fertiliser has become equally as important as having access to land’.117 In 
today’s changing economic circumstances, where cash has become an important means with 
which to obtain access to the basic necessities of life, the poor depend on access to such 
agricultural inputs to earn profit from the cultivation of cereal crops 118 so that they can buy 
basic goods (cooking oil, salt, cloth, etc.), pay their taxes and debts (personal or to cooperatives) 
and send their children to school. Overall, the implication is that access to land, fertiliser and 
cash has become crucial to meeting the survival needs of the poor, in contrast to former times 
when access to land (subsistence production) was the only factor determining the livelihood 
security of the poor.  
Yet most of the poor people lack the social contacts or skills required to strategically 
negotiate with key local actors and secure sufficient amounts of fertiliser. Without fertiliser, 
the poor, instead of leaving their land fallow, engage in sharecropping arrangements whereby 
they rent out their land to wealthy farmers for the duration of one or more agricultural cycles. 
Under this kind of arrangement, the wealthy farmer, as a tenant, provides all the necessary 
agricultural inputs such as high-yielding seed, chemical fertiliser and pesticides, with the 
landowner bearing the responsibility for ploughing, sowing, weeding and protecting the crop 
from birds and encroachment by cattle. The resulting output is then divided equally between 
                                                 
115 Interview, elderly farmer#30, Degga, October 2014. 
116 Interview, middle-aged farmer#16, Degga, October 2014. 
117 Interview, middle-aged farmer#36, Degga, October 2014. 
118The major cereal crops in Degga include grains such as teff (used for the making of injera), wheat, barley, corn, 
sorghum and millet.  
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them. The second option for farmers with no access to inputs is simply to lease out their land 
for cash. Most poor men supplement their income by working for wages in the fields of wealthy 
farmers, in traditional local timber mills, where they process timber extracted from local forests 
into planks for commercial purposes, as daily labourers in urban centres and by engaging in 
the brewing and selling of alcohol.  
As I will elaborate below, the changing means of production (the fact that agricultural inputs 
have become as essential as land) introduced a shift in the traditional system of production 
from subsistence farming to the types of relations of production that are established between 
model farmers and the poor. In other words, the development of a system of production based 
upon capitalised means of production and the concomitant differential access to agricultural 
resources subordinated the poor to the powerful farmers (through sharecropping arrangements, 
land rent and lease), as the former are dependent on the latter for the inputs (fertilisers, 
pesticides, irrigation water credits and sometimes oxen for ploughing) necessary for their land 
to be productive.  
Many of my informants told me that when they rented or leased out their land, it was mainly 
rented by the model farmers who control all local state and non-state institutions, including the 
kebele, cooperatives and the water user association (WUA). They depicted this trend as 
corruption, manipulation, a violation of their state-conferred rights to the basic resources 
needed for a livelihood and as greed and an unfair accumulation of wealth at the expense of 
the poor. One middle-aged individual, for example, described a wealthy local businessman-
cum-politician who rented his land for the duration of an agricultural cycle as a ‘selfish, corrupt 
man [who] takes advantage of the small people like me’.119 Similarly, another farmer viewed 
the general trend towards resource accumulation via tenancy as the ‘corruption and greed of 
                                                 
119 Interview, middle-aged farmer#29, Degga, September 2014. 
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officials’.120 To a majority of my informants, ‘greed’121, ‘selfishness’122 and corruption (‘eating 
up’)123 were characterisations commonly associated with and which explain their struggle 
against everyday poverty and the violation of their state-conferred rights. In this sense, the 
well-off farmers’ accumulation of wealth was seen as being at the expense of the poor and in 
violation of their perceived state-secured rights to access development resources and thereby 
survive.  
Thus, for those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, corruption discourses serve to 
articulate the circumstances of class (model farmers’) domination and provide an explanation 
for their being deprived of the resources critical for survival. It is in this context of class 
relations that the discourse of corruption has become pervasive in public spaces.  
7.2. Everyday popular conception of the state 
Corruption talk and state imagination  
Many of the people with whom I spoke in Degga drew attention to the difficulties of securing 
a livelihood in times when corruption is perceived to be a pervasive and widespread practice. 
Most people complained about model farmers diverting development resources such as 
chemical fertilisers and improved varieties of seeds and about the unfair access of the rich to 
irrigation water, credit services and state procurement prices for wheat.124 However, many 
absolved mengist of blame and instead blamed local politicians for abusing and diverting 
development resources from the poor for private use.  
                                                 
120 Interview, elderly farmer#26, Degga, September 2014. 
121 Conversation, middle-aged farmer#37, Degga, September 2014. 
122 Conversation, middle-aged farmer#38, Degga, September 2014. 
123 Conversation, young man#39, Degga, September 2014. 
124 Roadside conversation with three middle-aged farmers (#16, #18, #17), and young labourer #40, Degga, 
September 2014; tella bet conversation with a four middle-aged men (# 18, #28, #29, #33), Degga, October 2014. 
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One day, for instance, during a fairly ordinary conversation with a group of kebele residents 
at a local coffee house, the topic abruptly turned to agricultural resources distribution. As usual, 
there was speculation as to whether the government would provide adequate fertiliser in time 
for the spring growing period. ‘The government is not at fault. It is the people [cooperatives] 
who distribute inputs who are to blame. They divert fertilisers to merchants and deliberately 
hold back distribution from us. I know this because there are always fertilisers on the black 
market,’ said one middle-aged farmer, distinguishing between the distant state and its local 
representatives. Everybody agreed. The general feeling among my interlocutors was that it was 
locally powerful individuals who were to blame for them being left bereft of state-sanctioned 
agricultural resources. When I asked them to describe the processes by which agricultural 
resources were distributed in the kebele, another middle-aged man replied, ‘Agricultural inputs 
are never distributed equitably in our kebele. We are normally supposed to share them equally 
according to our needs. But the poor never get adequate amounts of what the government sends 
us ... the kebele officials and cooperative managers eat up the development resources.’ 
Similarly, the third interlocutor commented, ‘there is no equal sharing of resources … woreda 
and kebele officials eat up all the resources’. When I enquired as to why he thought the local 
officials ‘eat up’ agricultural resources, he replied sounding surprised, possibly by the naiveté 
of my question, ‘If you come back early in January, you can see a pile of fertiliser bags stacked 
at the front veranda of the chairman’s house’. In support of his friend and as evidence of 
rampant local-level state corruption, the first speaker gave the following anecdote from his own 
experience: ‘last summer I stood in line for three days to get one bag of fertiliser from the 
cooperative … when I received it, it looked to me as if the bag had been opened and repackaged. 
I then went straight to the mill house to find a scale … I discovered that it was 3 kg 
underweight.’ ‘So why are you not bothered about going to the woreda administrator and 
complaining?’ I asked. He replied that it would be of no use. ‘I know it is our right. The 
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government gave us the right … they are bound by the government to respect our right. But 
there is no point in complaining to the woreda administration. They are all in this together – 
even the woreda administrator is part of this. He would not do anything.’ These comments 
highlight the widespread belief that state functionaries indulge in corruption and, hence, they 
subvert the purported impartiality and benevolence of the state.  
I followed my interlocutors’ lead and began asking other people how they felt about the 
distribution of agricultural resources. Time and again I heard similar stories and complaints 
about the corruption of government officials. On another occasion, for instance, I was sitting 
chatting with four local farmers when one, whom I shall call Kebede, recounted the hardships 
he faced after half of his crop was destroyed by insects and pests. He said he struggled to 
support his family by working as a daily-wage labourer. He also noted that one of his four 
children dropped out of school to work for wealthy farmers by tending their cattle and 
supporting his parents. In the meantime, Kebede said a deputy of the local primary cooperative 
offered to help him obtain pesticides for the coming harvesting season, which he accepted. 
However, as he was about to receive the pesticides from the cooperative, the deputy began 
hounding him. ‘He wanted to keep some bottles of the pesticides for himself,’ explained 
Kebede. But instead of conceding, Kebede confronted the cooperative deputy, which angered 
him more and led to him threatening to take away all the pesticides. He reprimanded Kebede 
for being unwilling to reciprocate in the expected manner – that is, by showing due respect and 
ceding half of the pesticides. Kebede explained, ‘I thought he was sincere and wanted to help 
me. But, I was naive … that was not his motive … he wanted me to feel grateful and concede 
half of the pesticides as a dollop of gratitude to his favour. He had not given me anything from 
his own pocket. This was mine in the first place … this came from the government.’ Kebede 
felt that he should not give any material gift or pay a debt of gratitude through sentimental 
expression, that is, through submission or cowering, because he considered the pesticides to be 
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from mengist and originally intended to reach him. In the end, however, Kebede conceded to 
the deputy’s demand because, he said, his family relied heavily on access to such inputs for 
their survival.  
The three other men present endorsed Kebede’s view in saying that the government ‘sends 
resources to the kebele population’125 and that it is ‘our right to get access to pesticides’.126 
Clearly, my interlocutors viewed themselves as agents who were rightfully able to lay claim to 
the development resources provided by the state. But they also expressed that mere awareness 
did not amount to much; hence, they criticised Kebede for failing to strategically negotiate with 
the cooperative head at an early stage. One of them commented, ‘they do not act out of altruism; 
they are interested only in their own benefits … you should have known that he wanted to help 
you to steal more resources for himself … you could have negotiated to concede only a quarter 
of the bottles’. From their experiences, my interlocutors were aware that access to development 
resources and a successful livelihood were arrived at not by laying claim to resources but by 
mastering the technique of negotiating with corrupt officials. Clearly, their social position and 
poverty prevented them from fully asserting claims to resources they considered to be passed 
down to them by a benevolent state.  
On another day, my acquaintance, whom I shall call Ayele, in emphasising the importance 
of negotiating with locally powerful people, provided me with evidence of his successful 
negotiation with a cooperative manager. In 2006, he was invited to join a new micro-credit 
cooperative that was in the process of being established. Ayele, however, rejected multiple 
invitations because he considered the cooperative to offer no benefit. Once the lending 
programme began, however, he saw members of the cooperative benefitting from it and wanted 
                                                 
125 Conversation, the first interlocutor, November 2014. 
126 Conversation, the second interlocutor, November 2014. 
195 
 
to join. At that point, however, the cooperative had many members and Ayele’s application 
was rejected on the grounds that he was ‘poor and incapable of paying back loans’. Ayele 
confided to me that he was aware that joining the cooperative at any time was his state-
conferred right as a poor farmer. However, he opted to seek the assistance of a local elder, 
arguing that laying claim to his state-given right ‘would only be seen as confrontational’ and 
that ‘it would antagonise’ the head of the cooperative. The mediation was successful and Ayele, 
after months of waiting, was admitted to the cooperative.  
Within seven months of his admission, he received loans from the cooperative and was 
involved in the breeding of cattle. Since that time, he has successfully increased the number of 
his cattle from one to three. Yet Ayele refused to view his success as an outcome of the 
benevolence of the local elder and the head of the cooperative. ‘Mengist is like a father to us 
the poor people. We have its support in all things … but the greedy people always create 
obstacles. They want to eat up everything alone,’ he concluded. 
Here, we can see that Ayele positioned himself as a knowledgeable and right-bearing 
individual. His passive supplication to the locally powerful actors only highlights his strategy 
for securing a livelihood. This reality contrasts sharply with the views of model farmers, who, 
as I demonstrate later in the chapter, caricature the poor as ignorant and lazy farmers. My 
informant, on the other hand, formed an image of a right-giver and resource provider idea of 
state. Clearly, Ayele’s attempt to differentiate between a benevolent state idea and corrupt local 
officials and his use of this distinction to construct himself as right-bearing individual echoes 
the similar accounts provided by his friends and many of my other informants.  
I should however point out that in discourses of corruption, local inhabitants make clear 
distinctions between different types of corruption. Different corruption practices are subject to 
different moral evaluations. Bribes, for instance, which are usually explicitly requested by local 
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politicians and civil servants or paid via intermediaries, commonly to ‘get things done’ or 
circumvent rules and regulations, are widely seen as unproblematic, with the amounts paid 
believed to be necessary to cover the costs associated with running the client’s case. Most 
commonly, the ability to extract bribes signifies a prerogative and possession of state power. 
The general perception is that corruption is part and parcel of local politics and the state 
structure; politicians are inherently corrupt and state authority serves as a tool for personal 
aggrandisement. This sentiment is popularly expressed in the saying ‘seshom yalbela seshar 
yekochewal’ (‘One who does not eat up to the full his position when he is promoted will lament 
when he no longer has the opportunity’). Corruption seems to become problematic when it 
challenges the right of the poor to their survival and livelihood, which my interlocutors, as 
indicated earlier, link with the benevolence of an impartial state.  
Metonymic conception of the state  
In extending the discussion about state imagination, I now want to draw attention to another 
aspect of state imagination, that of a metonymic conception of the state. By metonymic 
conception of the state, I mean the process by which the state is imagined and named by a 
national leader through relations of contiguity. In other words, the state is seen to be actualised 
in the personality, role and style of operation of a national leader. My intention here is to bring 
to the fore one of the broad range of ways through which the state comes to be constituted by 
people who are positioned differently.  
One day, while discussing local politicians during one of many conversations with a group 
of middle-aged men at village tella bet, a villager narrated an infamous incident: a truck full of 
pesticide, which villagers believed was sent by mengist to them, got lost on the way. The 
villager declared that the pesticide had been stolen by one senior woreda official and a local 
cooperative manager. He explained how they spent the money: ‘He [the woreda official] 
bought a piece of land in Bahir Dar [the regional capital city] and is building a luxurious house. 
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He is currently taking stones from the kebele fields for construction … the cooperative manager 
[who had since left his job] has bought a brand new commercial mini-bus.’ He proceeded to 
juxtapose the ostensibly upright and ‘simple’ lifestyle of late Prime Minster Meles Zenawi with 
the woreda official’s avaricious appetite for wealth and luxury. ‘Meles was mengist and he did 
not have a house of his own. But the woreda official already has two houses and he is building 
his third one. He sells our pesticides to build his houses. He uses our [kebele] building material, 
stones and timber.’  
In my interlocutor’s narrative, Meles Zenawi, even three years after his death, continued to 
be seen as a powerful idealisation of the state. Such stories about the corruption of local leaders 
and their alleged comfortable lifestyle vis-à-vis the perceived simple lifestyle of Meles Zenawi 
was extensive. In discussing with me their feelings about local corruption, people invoked 
Meles Zenawi as mengist to criticise the local leaders that interacted with them on a daily basis. 
For example, a middle-aged man told me, ‘Leaders should not be selfish. They should govern 
and behave like mengist.’127 When I asked him what he meant by mengist, he replied, ‘Mengist 
is Meles Zenawi’. Similarly, a young farmer told me: ‘I would like kebele leaders who act like 
mengist to everyone. When Meles was alive, he helped the people. They should do the same.’128 
He then accused kebele officials of quite the opposite: ‘They don’t pay attention to the 
problems of the people; they are interested only in collecting wealth for themselves.’ Another 
person added that ‘Meles Zenawi was mengist. He was as a parent to everyone. He showed no 
bias. He put the people first. But kebele leaders only try to benefit themselves. They have no 
zeal to develop the kebele.’129 Here, my informants explicitly referenced Meles as a mengist 
who embodied their highest ideals such as benevolence, hard work, impartiality and authority. 
                                                 
127 Interview, middle-aged farmer#41, Degga, September 2014. 
128 Interview, young farmer#42, Degga, September 2014. 
129 Interview, middle-aged farmer#43, Degga, September 2014. 
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In so doing, they also positioned the kebele administrators as unscrupulous leaders who failed 
to follow the example of the national leader.  
During my fieldwork, Meles was omnipresent in everyday conversations within the public 
domain. The work he was considered to have carried out, although he was seen as distant and 
obscured from public view, was, for most of my interlocutors, evident in the increasing amount 
of agricultural resources he was said to have sent to the people. The water pumps installed in 
several villages, the Koga irrigation dam and the upgraded local school (from elementary to 
junior level) acted as befitting symbols of the benevolence of the hardworking national leader 
and mengist. In everyday discourses, all the main kebele development programmes were 
ascribed to the ‘good will’ and ra’ey (vision) of Meles Zenawi. He was furthermore seen as an 
astute and farsighted mengist for carefully selecting and cultivating his successor –  
Hailemariam Dessalegne – to ensure the continuation of development works. Meanwhile, his 
death – purportedly without any personal wealth – elevated him to the status of a stable 
patriarchal figure who sacrificed his life for the cause of fighting poverty. The key attributes of 
‘stateness’ – the quality of being a state – such as benevolence, providence and protection of 
the poor which the poor expect from their leaders were metonymically imputed to the work 
and person of Meles Zenawi. And these attributes functioned as the basis through which people 
conceived of the ways in which local politicians ought to relate to them.  
The populist image of Meles Zenawi as an ideal leader who fought on behalf of the poor 
was juxtaposed against the failure of equitable distribution of development resources, attributed 
to the corrupt practices of the district- and kebele-level officials. In other words, while local 
development-related works were taken to be signs of the hard work being done by national 
leaders for the economic benefit of the rural people, all of the problems troubling them – 
corruption and the unequal distribution of agricultural resources – were seen to be as a result 
of the greed and corruption of the kebele and woreda officials. Such a metonymic imagination 
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of the state, which absolves the national leadership from responsibility by elevating them to 
the status of a state that lies beyond local venality, greed and vested interests, is certainly an 
important source of legitimacy for state authority. This is in stark contrast to the reality on the 
ground wherein the state maintains political hegemony through the creation of a strong alliance 
with model farmers. 
To sum up, from the discussion of corruption talk and livelihood issues pursued so far in 
this chapter, two important things stand out. Firstly, as the vignettes outlined above underscore, 
the discourse of corruption has helped to create a clear division between an idea of a distant 
and transcendental state which is imagined as a moral repertoire of social justice and a neutral 
dispenser of the development resources vital to the livelihood needs and survival of the poor 
and those local institutions that are dominated by corrupt individuals. In abstract terms, 
following Hansen (2001: 226), state imagination in Degga can be understood as consisting of 
‘sublime’ (abstract) and ‘profane’ dimensions. The sublime dimension refers to the qualities of 
providence, benevolence and impartiality that people see as imbuing the trans-local state. Here, 
the state figures as a site of power far removed from kebele life and suspended above local 
partial and vested class interests. Such a conception of the state has a great deal to do with anti-
corruption rhetoric and discourses of development that, as indicated in Chapter 5, are 
periodically mobilised by the state for political purposes and the legitimisation of development 
projects. The ‘profane’ dimension, on the other hand, encompasses the bureaucracy and local 
politicians with whom the people interact on a daily basis. The everyday administration, as we 
have seen, is perceived to be imbued with corruption, partiality and abuses of power. In short, 
the ‘sublime’ dimension is constructed and imagined as the antithesis of the ‘profane’ aspect 
of everyday administrative problems and venality of the bureaucracy.  
The discrepancy between the discourses of development and the realities of corruption 
bolster the legitimacy of the state and the party. Discourses of corruption enables my 
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interlocutors to engage in ‘counter conduct’ (Foucault 2007), they enact the right to question 
how they are governed; especially in relation to the mechanisms of the distribution of 
agricultural resources. They therefore help to construct what O’Brien and Li (2006) call 
‘boundary-spanning claims’ – claims that do not challenge the state system but rather stress 
loyalty and submission to the state and the party.  
Secondly, they construct themselves as right-bearing and deserving individuals who are 
exploited by locally powerful people. However, the image that they conjure of themselves as 
right-bearing individuals is not one based on the liberal language of legality and citizenship as 
found among individuals in capitalist societies (Mouffe 2005; Isin and Turner 2002) nor is it 
one of empowered subjects (Rose 1999) but rather is an image of poor individuals struggling 
against everyday poverty and seeking to secure a livelihood and the basic necessities of survival 
such as food and a basic income. In other words, the basis for laying claim to resources as a 
right is not legalistic but moral. Popular claims to livelihood are also linked to the long-standing 
commitment, at least rhetorically, of the EPRDF to guarantee and improve the livelihoods of 
the rural population.  
Responses of local officials  
In contrast to the local inhabitants’ narratives about corruption stand the state functionaries, 
who rely on strategic discourses of development to defend their positions. In response to my 
enquiries as to why there were numerous complaints about the ways in which agricultural and 
irrigation water resources were distributed, community leaders, kebele and woreda officials 
and development practitioners all alike had ready answers. In every instance, they referred to 
the concepts of productivity, developmentalism, modernity and progress, useful for the state’s 
promotion of national development and the creation of an antagonistic political field (see 
Chapter 2), in justifying the monopoly of agricultural inputs, land and water resources.  
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When I asked the woreda administrator to respond to the widespread perception among the 
local population that agricultural resources were misappropriated, he said, ‘I interact with the 
farmers quite a lot, many of them are diligent … but there are also lazy, anti-development 
farmers who spread such false rumours and allegations of corruption. We hear people gossiping 
that we have fertilisers and pesticides piled up in warehouses.’ He continued, ‘it is impossible 
to convince most people that we distribute resources equitably because they don’t understand 
the mechanisms involved in the import and distribution of agricultural resources’.130 These 
types of attitudes of the state functionaries about themselves and the farmers were both 
extensive and pervasive. The woreda Agriculture Bureau head, for instance, explained how the 
entire woreda administration could not afford to ignore the issue of agricultural resource 
distribution because it was central to achieving the government’s rural development and 
agricultural productivity agenda:  
We provide agricultural resources, credit services and irrigation facilities with the aim of 
increasing agricultural productivity. It is crucial for the government that farmers become 
successful. It is also in the interests of woreda and kebele leaders to demonstrate that 
government investments increase smallholders’ productivity.131  
He went on to attribute allegations of corruption to false rumours concocted by ‘work-shy and 
anti-developmental farmers’: 
There are farmers who are work-shy and anti-developmental. They spread false rumours 
of corruption to confuse people and create tension between the people and the 
                                                 
130 Interview, woreda administrator, woreda town, November 2014.  
131 Interview, woreda Agriculture Bureau head, woreda town, November 2014. 
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government. What they ask is only this or that resources … when we ask them to 
meetings and field demonstrations, they grumble and fail to show up.132  
Similarly, when I asked a notable model farmer whether some poor people are systematically 
made to enter into sharecropping arrangements with wealthy farmers, he responded by saying 
that ‘there is no such manipulation’. He then added, ‘it is better for lazy farmers to enter into 
sharecropping than lay their land in fallow or plant [unprofitable] vegetables’.133 This comment 
reveals the discourses used by the wealthy farmers to explain local relations of exploitation.  
The Degga WUA head, on the other hand, drew on national discourses of modernity that 
validate ‘hard work’ and ‘technology adaptation’, which he believed allows some farmers to 
become more successful and wealthy than others. In so doing, he took aim at the poor: 
Most people speaking badly about the successful individuals [the rich] are lazy and 
recalcitrant farmers. They blame teramaj [the progressive] model farmers for their own 
problems. They are not trying to do their own things. When we ask them to use modern 
technologies and seeds, they refuse. Yet, by the end of the day, while the progressive 
becomes successful, they complain about land, water shortage, the kebele.134  
In the above quote, the WUA head positions the rich as productive, innovative and 
knowledgeable and the poor as unproductive and dependants. In taking stock of the 
circumstances of the poor, the officials I spoke with rarely considered the asymmetrical nature 
of local power distribution and other explanations for the marginalisation of the poor. Instead, 
they ascribed the problem of the poor to their particular ignorance and illiteracy. The woreda 
administrator, for instance, said: 
                                                 
132 Ibid. 
133 Interview, model farmer#3, Degga, November 2014. 
134 Interview, Degga WUA head-cum-party chairman, Degga, November 2014.  
203 
 
People in Degga need to be taught about and exposed more to their rights. They have a 
long way to go in order to secure their rights. We acknowledge that more capacity 
building work is needed to mitigate people’s lack of knowledge.135  
The kebele chairman remarked in similar terms: ‘We have not overcome the problem of the 
dependency mentality. These are the people who still look for the government to do everything 
for them.’ Here, the chairman, in stark contrast to the popular imagination of the state as a 
provider and caregiver, saw the responsibility of the state in terms of ‘facilitating the 
development of the kebele and the people’. He claims the government was working towards 
‘enabling every household to be self-sufficient, developmental and productive’; hence, ‘we 
need determined and hardworking farmers who fight poverty with vigour’.136 
Taken together, this ‘elitist’ view of the local people’s problems might be best captured by a 
local development agent’s comment:  
Let me tell you. Our people are very backwards. Mind you, they well know that the 
project belongs to them and their children and yet they steal metal from distribution 
canals: we caught local women washing clothes in the canal water … they lack 
commitment; they don’t come to meetings unless mobilised: if they come, they arrive 
late. They are unwilling to work in conservation works. They want everything provided 
for them. … I am not saying they are not being unfairly treated by community and kebele 
leaders. They are. But, they have to fulfil their duties and change their mindset before 
they ask for their rights to be respected.137  
                                                 
135 Interview, woreda administrator, woreda town, November 2014. 
136 Interview, kebele chairman, Degga, November 2014. 
137 Interview, DA#8, Degga, November 2014. 
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Overall, these comments from different officials reveal an underlying belief that the state is a 
catalyst for development, not a feeder. The last quote speaks to this and the construction of the 
state as a facilitator of development is at odds with the notion of a benevolent state that is 
constructed by the people. Whereas most people I interacted with used corruption discourses 
to lay claim to development resources as a right conferred by a benevolent state, state officials 
referred to the difference in mindset, knowledge and attitude between themselves and the 
people and used this to explain corruption as a product of false rumour, illiteracy and 
dependency syndrome, thereby positioning themselves as knowledgeable individuals and 
representatives of the state.  
The comments of my interlocutors further highlight how the poor are discursively produced 
in everyday life such that their poverty, lack of development mentality and understanding and 
sophistication defines their life chances and their entire range of possibilities. The discussion 
also demonstrates how the identification of a segment of the local population as anti-
developmental by local leaders neatly converges with the wider EPRDF’s antagonistic political 
discourse (see Chapter 2) of developmental forces against anti-development elements. It is 
important to note, however, that this concurrence does not reflect the entrenchment of party 
hegemony at the kebele level; rather, it shows how local officials forcefully employ Manichean 
discourses (developmental vs anti-developmental) to justify the monopolisation of resources, 
negate corruption complaints and consolidate local class domination.  
7.3. Righteous dominance: religious symbolism and metaphors  
In addition to corruption discourses, my ethnography in Degga revealed that religious 
metaphors and symbolism are central to the meaning and construction of state idea. In my 
conversations with a broad cross-section of individuals in Degga wherein state was referred to, 
my informants invariably used religious metaphors and idioms that evoked a pathos of divinely 
oriented relations of power and obligation. The local people live under the sway of Orthodox 
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Christianity which provides them with the conceptual tropes, idioms and metaphors through 
which they imagine the state. For example, when I asked a middle-aged acquaintance about the 
role of the state in the management of development resources, he explained that the government 
was responsible only for obtaining and sending agricultural inputs to the people. He used the 
following analogy to illustrate his point: ‘God sends rain on all the people to enable us to 
provide food to our families. He does not make it fall only on the fields of some people. Instead, 
He makes it fall equally on all our fields. The good farmer would make use of the rain and feed 
his family. But, who do the family of a lazy farmer have to blame for their lack of access to 
food? Is it God who sends the rain or their head of household that failed to make optimal use 
of the rain?’ 138  In this analogy, my informant distinguished between mengist and the 
bureaucracy and considered the mengist’s responsibility – like that of God – to be the provision 
of the resources needed for a livelihood, with the bureaucracy’s responsibility – like that of the 
household head – to make efficient use of those resources, i.e. distributing them to the people. 
In my informant’s account, agricultural resources are always provided by the state but they 
remain inaccessible to the poor because of the corruption of local politicians. Here, the state is 
idealised as a paternalist provider and benefactor and the lower-level state functionaries are 
pathologised. The local people then establish their claim of entitlement to agricultural resources 
by invoking the notion of a benevolent, impartial and disinterested state that always fulfils its 
responsibility of providence to the people.  
 In the analogy, the state, like God, as noted above, is represented as a provider and 
benefactor, but it is important to point out that this does not mean my informant held the view 
that the state and God are the same or should be afforded the same weight. Rather, my 
informant was obviously drawing, to use Levi-Strauss’s (1966) concept, ‘homologous 
                                                 
138 Conversation, middle-aged farmer#41, Degga, October 2014.  
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opposition’ between the state and the people on one side and God and the people on the other. 
That is, the relationship between the state and society metaphorically resembles the relationship 
between God and the people. In other words, the metaphor should be interpreted as a way of 
establishing ideal relationships within the temporal world (between state and society) by way 
of analogy with perceived relationships in the spiritual world (between God and the Christian 
population).  
The fact that the above metaphorical analogy is not an idiosyncratic view of my 
interlocutor’s view is evident from the comments made to me by other local inhabitants. A 
middle-aged farmer, in the context of discussing the state’s providence in relation to 
agricultural resources, said: ‘God is the one who can give us rain. This is the same with the 
government.’139 In my informant’s comment, the quality of being a state involves providence 
to the people. This means the invocation of religious analogy functions to constitute the 
relationship between state and society which is embedded in the local moral imaginary that 
entails specific rights and responsibilities on both sides.  
Compare this metaphor with the regular account of Amhara farmers conceiving of state 
power as absolute. For example, Lefort (2007: 258) quotes Shoa peasants as saying, ‘God and 
the mengist are the same’. In Lefort’s account, the mandate of the Derg and EPRDF is 
‘perceived as coming from heaven’, and therefore, ‘to submit to the absolutism of the mengist 
is simply to respect divine will’. When Degga farmers, in contrast, use religious symbolism 
and metaphors, they do not describe relations of hierarchy but also refer to their expectations 
of how the state should act. Instead of submitting themselves to the ‘absolutism of state power’, 
they imagine a God–state–people relationship as a model of stateness and method for good 
governance.  
                                                 
139 Conversation, middle-aged farmer#37, Degga, November 2014. 
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The majority of my informants drew a homologous analogy between the state and society 
and expressed an understanding that the state, like God, is expected to show benevolence and 
providence towards the people and should generally act as a proxy God. In doing so, they 
clearly distinguish between good mengist and bad mengist. A good mengist would ‘like God 
… look after the well-being of the poor’ and ‘as God … support and protect the poor’.140 Most 
commonly, the Derg regime constituted the central point of reference of bad and illegitimate 
mengist. One senior man, for instance, remarked:  
… the Derg redistributed land at first but later it confiscated more than half of it [and 
also] it took away our oxen to use for producers’ cooperative. [In doing so] it prevented 
us from working our land and forced us to join the producers’ cooperatives. The Derg 
did not work for the poor people; it had no helping nature … a government should [rather] 
be like God in protecting and providing to the people and to the poor who have no allies 
… [but]the Derg acted like a father who doesn’t look after his children but punishes 
them.141  
Others questioned the legitimacy of the authority of the Derg as not emanating from God 
because it did not act as a proper mengist. My acquaintance Ayele, for instance, said: 
The Derg was not from God. It never looked after the people. Instead, it took away our 
oxen and made us work from sunrise to sunset in the producers’ cooperative. In return, 
they would give us 1 quintal of teff, 5 quintals of corn and 2 quintals of sorghum. It never 
sent us development … it conscripted children into the army.142  
                                                 
140 Conversations with two middle-aged farmers (#27 and #33), Degga, November 2014. 
141 Interview, elderly farmer#30, Degga, October 2014. 
142 Conversations with my acquaintance Ayele, Degga, November 2014. 
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Unlike Ayele, an elderly man saw the Derg as ‘the worst mengist’. He said, ‘It was against us. 
It never took responsibility for the needs of the people’, because ‘it was imposed upon us by 
God as a result of our sin’.143 It is clear that while my two informants provided two different 
explanations as to what gave rise to the Derg government, they nevertheless held a strong 
patrimonial view of the state and expected it to be acting much as God would treat the people, 
as a father to His children. Both characterised the Derg by its lacks of paternal care which was 
revealed by its cruel policies of collective farms, lack of development and military conscription.  
In addition, some of the local inhabitants described former president Mengistu Hailemariam 
as mengist and criticised him for failing to demonstrate care to the local people. One man 
explained: ‘Mengistu Hailemariam was a bad mengist. He had no religion; no moral character; 
he did not bring us development … but misery; he has besmirched the holy country.’144 
Another said, ‘we don’t regard Mengistu as worthy of being mengist’.145 The conception that 
Mengistu was ‘cruel’ and ‘uncaring’ was often expressed, and, to some of my informants, his 
lack of benevolence was seen as the main cause of his downfall. The common sentiment among 
my informants was that Mengistu lacked the legitimacy to rule because he did not embrace the 
locally cherished Christian values of offering help, protection and support to the downtrodden 
in a way similar to God. Mengistu rather demanded a commitment to his programmes without 
showing munificence to the poor. In this sense, the attribute of stateness, for my informants, 
entailed the moral duty to fulfil the needs and ensure the safety of the people. 
Conversely, when I asked my interlocutors to elaborate on the current government, most of 
them praised it for having brought development and peace. One said, ‘the old mengist was not 
the people’s mengist ... the present mengist is a good mengist. It sends us development. We 
                                                 
143 Interview, elderly farmer#44, Degga, November 2014. 
144 Interview, middle-aged farmer#45, Degga, November 2014. 
145 Interview, elderly farmer#46, Degga, November 2014. 
209 
 
have the chance to send our children to school. We have a health post on our doorstep [kebele]. 
It allowed us to work on our land. There is no military conscription; there is no producers’ 
cooperative. We can sell our grains … it is peaceful.’146 Similarly, another man said, ‘This 
government is working for the poor …. it worries about everything. In the past women died 
while giving birth. Now, they are taken to hospital in ambulances. It worries about the school 
of our children; even about our habits of toilet use, stove use. It looks after us well and we see 
that it is sent to us from God’147  
While my informants conceived of the state as fulfilling its obligations of care and sending 
development to the local population, they also alleged, as described in previous sections, that 
they were not benefitting from state resources because of the corruption of the local state 
functionaries. The following comment by a middle-aged man is fairly representative of this 
sentiment, ‘Mengist is taking responsibility so that our kebele develops and every one of us 
can have everything we want. But, when resources are sent from mengist, they are eaten up by 
the woreda and kebele officials along the way before they reach us. [As a result,] we continue 
to live in poverty.’148  
To sum up, the preceding discussion provides a valuable corrective to the problematic nature 
of the assumptions scholars make about the farmers’ relationship with the state and their 
attitude towards authority and hierarchy. To be sure, my informants’ accounts underscore the 
hierarchical logic of everyday state formation that permeates Amhara society, whereby the 
divine authority is imagined to encompass the temporal one and then the temporal (state) in 
turn comprises the various layers of state authority (bureaucracy) and society. But the use of 
religious metaphor also indicates the view that power and hierarchy are oriented and 
                                                 
146 Interview, elderly farmer#44, Degga, November 2014. 
147 Interview, middle-aged farmer#41, Degga, November 2014. 
148 Interview, middle-aged farmer#28, Degga, November 2014. 
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encompassed by fundamental religious values such as providence, protection, reciprocity and 
benevolence. In this sense, when the farmers relate governance practices and hierarchies to the 
realm of the divine, they not only construct relations of authority but also implicitly invoke 
notions of paternal and divine care to emphasise the state’s responsibilities and obligations.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have illustrated how the state is popularly imagined as an idea and a person 
lying beyond the venality of local politics. Rather than simply providing an explanation for the 
perceived existence of corruption, I have sought to examine the implications of corruption 
stories for the everyday construction of state idea. Hence, I have argued that corruption talk is 
one of the ways in which local people construct an idea of a good state and also make claims 
for the appropriate distribution of state resources. As we have seen, corruption discourses are 
more fundamentally associated with the problem of local class relations. For many people, the 
degradation of soil fertility means that agricultural inputs (especially fertiliser) have become as 
crucial a means of production as access to land. When the local people are unable to hold on to 
fertilisers, instead of leaving their land fallow, they lease it out to wealthy farmers or engage 
in sharecropping arrangements. This has created a dependence of the poor on the wealthy and 
powerful. Corruption (i.e. the violation and deliberate denial of state-conferred rights to 
resources) is seen by the poor as a major factor behind their increasing dependence on the rich 
and powerful for survival. This is in contrast to the progressive vision of poverty reduction and 
development mobilised by the central government. Within this context, the state is imagined 
as a dual structure: sublime (as a provider, benevolent and caretaker) and profane (as corrupt, 
venal and filled with self-serving people). The paradox produced by these sublime and profane 
images of state play the crucial function of creating legitimacy for the national leadership. 
Corruption discourses also demonstrate the ways in which the poor construct and position 
themselves as right-bearing individuals. They evoke the idea of a benevolent state and use their 
211 
 
experience of subordination to (rhetorically) lay claim to and argue for appropriate distribution 
of resources. But, in practice, in their everyday interactions with state functionaries, they have 
to consider their livelihood needs, the actual local power relations and master the technique of 
negotiating with officials.  
Even though corruption discourses appeared to be central to the construction of the state 
idea in Degga, religious metaphors and symbolism are as important. My interlocutors spoke of 
the state using symbolism filled with moral imagery from the spiritual world, such as 
providence and care. By drawing relational analogies that explicitly entail rights and 
obligations between God and His people on one side and the state and its people on the other, 
they evoke a paternalistic image of the state.  
Finally, it is important to note that the state is not homogeneously imagined. This chapter 
has shown that imagination of state is determined by one’s social position, experiences of 
encounters with state officials and also one’s rank in the government bureaucracy. In the next 









Demystifying the state: boundary crossing 
Up to now, we have seen how the imagined unity and coherence of the state as a structure 
standing apart from and above society is created through everyday governance practices and 
also how it is shaped by public discourses of corruption. However, in this chapter, I argue that 
this boundary is unclear and porous in reality. This point, of course, is made at various points 
in the proceeding chapters. Nevertheless, the idea of such a blurred boundary deserves a more 
detailed empirical analysis since failing to do so would obscure the mundane subtleties, 
complex patterns of interactions and aspects of mutual constitution between the state and 
society. It also encourages a reified understanding of the normative distinctions between state 
and society that this thesis is supposed to move beyond. Reification refers here to the assertion 
of an oppositional construction, one in which the state (for instance, the local state institution, 
i.e. the kebele and its functionaries in Degga) and society (local communities) are viewed as 
two distinct and identifiable structures.  
This chapter aims to illustrate the blurring149 and permeability of the state-society boundary 
by distinguishing the ‘image’, or what Mitchell calls the state effect, from the ‘everyday 
operation of power’. Concretely, this means ‘demystifying the state’ (Abrams 1988) to show 
how it is locally embedded and socially enmeshed as a set of disaggregated practices, 
institutions and hierarchies inhabited by people with multiple positions (official and non-
official) and social relations. To address this also means moving beyond the fields of everyday 
formal bureaucratic practices of governance to explore the interactions between the state, non-
state actors and the local population in multiple settings. It thus examines ‘interface situations 
                                                 
149 These ideas of the blurring of state-society boundary build on the works of Gupta (1995), Lund (2006) and 
Hansen and Stepputat (2001). 
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where different life-worlds interact and interpenetrate’ (Long 1992: 2). Much of this chapter is 
therefore concerned with investigating the workings of the state within and beyond its 
bureaucratic structures. Concisely put, this chapter explores the processes, governance 
practices and actors on both sides of the state-society boundary to demonstrate how state and 
society are in fact part of the same sociocultural and political complex.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, after briefly introducing and 
laying out the nature of two important kebele public domains in Degga, I present a case in 
which an informal coalition of social and political actors (with vested interests) discuss a 
government directive on cooperatives and youth unemployment. In doing so, I demonstrate 
how these actors manipulate a formal state policy regulation and blur the distinction between 
de facto public and state authorities. This is followed by an analysis of the implications of the 
regulation as it was reinterpreted and seized as an opportunity by local inhabitants to obtain 
access to land.  
In the second section, I examine specific cases of boundary crossing by focusing on the 
positions and roles of three local actors. Here, I treat boundary crossing as encompassing two 
important elements: vertical and horizontal crossings. The first concerns a case of patronage in 
which a local elder traversing multiple layers of state structure to help a member of local youth 
obtain state employment as a primary school teacher. The second case involves two prominent 
local individuals who occupy multiple positions of authority (with extensive horizontal social 
networks), namely those of traditional leader, religious figure, business guru and state 
representative. The focus on these two cases clarifies the fluidity of the state-society boundary 





8.1.Multiple patterns of interactions  
Intermediary spaces of governance  
Arriving at the small, dusty rural town of Degga, one is immediately confronted with the sight 
of rows of houses (20 or so) facing each other across the main national highway. These houses 
form the centre of the rural town. Most are shabby and in poor repair. Each house has a roofed 
veranda over its front door with benches where men drink tea during the daytime and sit to 
talk. At night, the houses sell traditional homebrewed beer called tella – hence their popular 
name of tella bet, which literally means ‘beer houses’ – and areki (home-distilled liquor) to 
ordinary residents. Single and widowed women – most of whom engage in commercial sex 
work to supplement their income – live in and run the tella bet. By contrast, two houses on the 
northern edge of the rural town are considerably larger than the rest and are painted in bright 
blue and green colours. These houses are frequented by local elites150 such as priests, wealthy 
individuals, influential elders, local politicians and civil servants. Drinking in such places is a 
sign of status. Contrary to tella bet, which are frequented by ‘ordinary’ residents, there are no 
brawls, fights or loud music. They are also the only places where factory-made beer is sold in 
Degga.  
It is worth mentioning here that neither the ordinary tella bet nor the elite houses are always 
exclusive. It was not uncommon, for example, to witness local elders and politicians in tella 
bet chatting with ordinary inhabitants. The presence of elders or officials in tella bet is a big 
driver of customers for the women who run the houses. Common people usually follow elders 
into tella bet just to listen to stories and gather important information about a range of issues 
including the distribution and prices of agricultural inputs, issues related to land administration 
                                                 
150 By local elites I mean the loose collection of state officials (kebele politicians such as the chairman and speaker 
of the kebele council), local party head, wealthy traders and farmers, a few elite priests and well-connected 




(such as land use taxes and grazing arrangements) and the use of irrigation water. On the other 
hand, although the elite spaces maintain a reputation as places for the privileged, ordinary 
inhabitants occasionally drop into these spaces, most often during the daytime, for less 
expensive soft drinks.  
Nevertheless, these two spaces constitute the geography of local power distribution by 
demarcating elite and peasant domains. The elite spaces in particular constitute specific 
‘intermediary spaces of governance’ – linking state, non-state actors and local communities 
and thereby blurring boundaries – where micro-practices of kebele governance take place. I 
use the term ‘intermediary spaces of governance’ to describe the ‘beer houses’ which feature a 
wide range of local actors including state and party officials, civil servants, customary leaders, 
businessmen and traders. What especially constitutes intermediary spaces of governance is the 
multiple and overlapping engagements among variously positioned state and non-state actors. 
They represent a ‘twilight zone’ (Lund 2006) or a permeable space between the state and 
society that signals a blurring of the ostensibly fixed boundaries between the state and society 
on the one hand, and the state and public authorities on the other. Used in this way, the 
‘intermediary spaces of governance’ in Degga are particularly significant in two senses: firstly, 
they serve as an arena in which illicit practices are negotiated151 within a context that involves 
a complex web of personalised relationships between local non-state elites 152 , local 
                                                 
151 Some of this is illicit because, while petty corruption is socially tolerated, abuse of state resources, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, is widely condemned. For this reason, elders do not openly mediate between local 
inhabitants and various officials in distributing public resources such as agricultural inputs, loans and land. Often, 
local inhabitants visit these elders at their homes with their cases, which the elders and politicians will then discuss 
over beer.  
152 On visits to these spaces, I consistently came across community elders who mediated between individuals, the 
local community and various state officials. They would also discuss and participate in local political decision-
making processes with state actors, but they did not hold any official position of their own. This was intriguing 
because in Degga, as in most other parts of Ethiopia, there is no formal state-sanctioned traditional authority. 
Within this context, community elders in Degga draw the legitimacy for their ‘de facto public authority’ (Lund 
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communities and representatives of various institutions that constitute the state at the kebele 
level. Moreover, they constitute spaces in which local political alliances are forged and 
patronage networks are crafted through both relations of friendship and marriage.153  
Secondly, theses spaces serve as local sites where state policies are negotiated, reproduced, 
reinterpreted, contested and manipulated. Often, the everyday business of governance is 
discussed and decisions are passed in such spaces and then merely rubber-stamped during 
official kebele meetings. The following account demonstrates how this takes place.  
Merger of actors and transgressions  
One evening, I accompanied a prominent local elder and the kebele chairman to one of the 
relatively cosy local beer (elite) houses. When we walked in, we found two other local elders, 
a prominent local businessman, two traders, the kebele land use and administration head and 
the chairman of the local ANDM/EPRDF party. We were soon joined by the speaker of the 
kebele council. It seemed odd as there were no other ‘ordinary’ people present in the beer 
house. As we entered the building and greeted these powerful local elites, I caught their 
questioning glances which clearly indicated their bafflement and curiosity regarding my 
presence at the late hour in their elite, male-dominated ‘clubhouse’. With nearly everyone’s 
eyes fixed upon me, they began asking lots of questions about my education and family 
background. Having satisfied their curiosity and perhaps dispelled their suspicion regarding 
my background and what I was doing, they seemed to become comfortable with my presence.  
                                                 
2006) primarily from their relationships and networks with powerful and wealthy individuals, their own economic 
wealth or the traditionally and religiously rooted custom of respect for elders. Their power, however, as I will 
show in the ensuing sections, is primarily underwritten by kinship connections. 
153 According to my local informants, the families of six elders and state officials are closely related through the 
marriages of their own children and other kin members.  
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As the conversation eventually veered away from me, I realised that we (the new arrivals) 
had entered into an ongoing conversation about youth unemployment which seemed at first 
glance to be casual in nature. However, I gradually came to understand that it was a rather 
serious and much more complex conversation. The main reason for the discussion was a 
directive sent down from the federal and regional governments regarding youth unemployment. 
The purpose of the directive154 was to tackle the problem of rising rural youth unemployment 
through the active promotion of cooperative groups. However, the directive, like many other 
government regulations, was unclear as placed much greater emphasis on the rationale for the 
local landless youth to be organised into cooperative groups than it did on any relevant 
procedural aspect. Although it outlined economic activities such as bee keeping, trading, 
farming and animal fattening, it listed neither any priority areas of engagement nor any rules 
and recommendations for specific local situations. This is because, the woreda cooperatives 
coordination head later told me, the regulation was crafted with the aim of encouraging the use 
of locally available resources to solve the problem of rural youth unemployment. 155 
Nonetheless, the lack of clarity presented a particular problem for the kebele in Degga due to 
both the lack of local resources such as land156 and, as we will see, conflicting elite interests. 
The directive was ultimately up to the kebele’s own interpretation. Concretely, this meant that 
local state officials had to find viable ways of curbing rising unemployment and supporting 
their youth.  
                                                 
154 Directive from the Federal Cooperative Agency that was held by the Degga kebele administrative office. 
155 Interview, woreda cooperatives coordination head, woreda town, November 2014. 
156 There is an extreme scarcity and fragmentation of agricultural land in the highlands of Ethiopia due partly to 
population pressure and the ambilineal descent system which confers equal property rights to all of the children 
in a family (McCann 1995). In the Degga area, for instance, the average household land size has fallen from 3.3 
ha in the 1990s to 2.1 ha in 2007 (Marx 2011). 
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The main focus of discussion among the local elites in the beer house was therefore around 
finding ways to organise the youth into cooperative groups without harming their particularistic 
economic interests. This involved the identification and evaluation of different options. The 
first theme during the discussion concerned timber forests. Kassa (fictionalised name),157 one 
of the richest men in Degga, who is reputed to have accumulated his wealth through extracting 
timber concessions from the kebele and smallholders, was one of the first speakers to raise 
concerns about the possibility of the kebele’s timber forests being set aside for the purpose of 
a cooperative. He asked, ‘What is this that I hear about the cooperatives office [a district-level 
government agency responsible for the organisation and oversight of cooperatives] giving away 
kebele forests?’ One trader and a community elder also expressed their bewilderment about the 
cooperatives office approach. In response, the kebele chairman said, ‘… the forests will 
continue to be managed by the kebele to secure environmental protection through regular re-
plantation and patrolling. They [the youth] wouldn’t care for reforestation, and they may even 
eventually convert them into farms … we are working with the agriculture bureau’s 
environment protection office on this matter.’ The chairman’s comment underscores the 
contradictions in the goals of the two different state agencies, a situation which he was able to 
translate into an opportunity to exploit. When talking about the kebele forest, he frequently 
positioned the environmental bureau as being in opposition to the cooperatives coordinating 
bureau and accused the latter of promoting business at the expense of the environment. The 
chairman’s invocation of the lack of coordination between different state institutions around a 
similar goal highlights the multi-faceted, fragmented and disaggregated picture of the state. 
Kassa was obviously actively managing and selling timber from these forests, and the 
impetus of his anxiety became clearer when he expressed concern about the possibility that 
                                                 
157 I am using a personal (fictionalised) name here because this particular individual is one of two persons also 
introduced in a case study later in this chapter. 
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timber concessions would be given to the cooperatives. He said, ‘having built a road [he had 
built a rudimentary gravel road providing access to the kebele’s timber forests] and invested a 
large amount of money, our [his] concessions shouldn’t be revoked’. The speaker of the kebele 
council added, ‘We cannot establish cooperatives in a way that harms investors … it is 
improper that while encouraging investment, to discourage investors’. The speaker’s comment 
indicated the use of abstract language by local officials to obscure particular interests.  
The kebele chairman, however, attempted to dispel the anxiety by expressing that ‘not 
everyone [the youth] would be interested in engaging in timber trading’. His statement was 
especially true of the majority of the local unemployed youth who, due to their lack of essential 
skills such as literacy and numeracy, had been reluctant to engage in alternative economic 
activities. According to figures I obtained from the kebele, at the time of my fieldwork, there 
were 57 landless and unemployed youth in Degga, of which only 12 could read and write. For 
that reason, the majority of those whom I interviewed 158  expressed a lack of interest in 
engaging in occupations beyond farming. The chairman was therefore clearly tapping into the 
youth’s lack of interest in trade to clear up concerns about what would happen to the forests.  
After a few minutes of joke telling, the conversation reverted to more serious discussion 
about the case of cooperatives. The party chairman expressed how he perceived little benefit 
in maintaining an area of land which was set aside by the woreda investment desk for urban-
based construction companies who wanted to invest in the extraction of stone for building. 
However, the idea of giving away building stone sites was also dropped when one of the elders, 
sitting leisurely in the corner of the room, suggested that the woreda administrator was already 
                                                 
158 One young man#40, for instance, expressed that he had no desire to do anything other than farming because 
he was ‘uneducated’. Others expressed a fear of being dominated and manipulated by a few educated young men. 
For instance, one of them said, ‘… I can’t read or write. If I join a trading cooperative, my role will be to work as 
a labourer being controlled by others [educated members]. They will control the money and management.’  
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in touch with a construction company in Bahir Dar with a view to leasing part of the land. It 
was obvious that local state representatives were in receipt of briefings on official business 
from a customary leader. Surprisingly, without any further comments or questions being raised 
on the issue, the topic of conversation changed. It appeared to have been the case that the elder 
had a good network of contacts with highly placed individuals in the woreda.  
The party chairman’s comment, however, raises an important question about the meaning 
of investment. It is unclear whether the exploitation of a natural resource such as stone would 
be considered investment in Degga, or even investment as such. Woreda officials I spoke to 
alleged that the benefit of any ‘investment’ in the extraction of stone for building purposes 
would lie in its potential contributions to the local economy and especially in providing local 
people with jobs. 159  The local people, on the other hand, contended that the benefits of 
‘investments’ in the extraction of stone didn’t reach them.160 For example, with the exception 
of two people employed as security guards, no local person was employed by a Chinese road 
construction firm that extracted stone from the fields of Degga. Similarly, another Chinese firm 
which contracted the Koga irrigation and watershed management project (see Chapter 5) and 
extracted stone from the same fields also failed to generate many local jobs. Furthermore, taxes 
and licence fees associated with the stone extraction were paid to either the regional or federal 
governments rather than to the local community/kebele.  
The third area concerns the distribution of communal grazing lands. One of the traders 
opened the discussion with a proposal that they give up part of the kebele’s communal reserve 
grazing land for the purpose of organising youth into cooperative group farms. While sipping 
                                                 
159 Interview, woreda investment promotion desk official, woreda town, November 2014. 
160 Interviews with local trader, Degga, October, 2014; two unemployed young men (#47 and #48), Degga, 
October 2014; middle-aged farmer#20, Degga, November 2014. 
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their beer, kes (Priest) Hailu (fictionalised),161 the kebele land use and administration unit head, 
gave an account of recommendations made by the kebele land use and administration expert, 
who is a civil servant directly accountable to the district administration. He said that the expert 
expressed her concern over the diminishing availability of communal grazing lands. He 
continued by asserting that the advice of the expert was the kebele should abide by the law. It 
is noteworthy that the regional land proclamation permits land redistribution only if there is 
agreement from 80 per cent of the local population.162  Kes Hailu, citing the land expert, 
concluded that it would be hege-wet (illegal) to redistribute communal land. There then ensued 
a lot of confusion regarding the legal aspect of distributing communal land to the jobless youth. 
From the point of view of the local elites, the term hege-wet (illegal) presented a problem 
of meaning. It in fact sparked furious reactions from many of the elite, which led to confusion 
in the hitherto calm discussion. One of the elders, who had been lingering over a single bottle 
of beer, eventually regained control by speaking loudly to bring everyone to attention, saying: 
‘It is our own land. Why should this be illegal? This should not be a problem. If needs be, we 
will explain our decision to the woreda [authorities].’ The party chairman added, ‘I see no 
illegality in this’. Another elder questioned the purpose of the law, ‘for whom is the law? Isn’t 
it for us all? … We should stop wasting our time bickering over the question of legality. … If 
we can reach a consensus which benefits everyone, nothing is illegal.’ Almost everyone nodded 
in agreement and two elders made concurring speeches. After this the speaker of the local 
council suggested that as crop cultivation may no longer be an option for those with a formal 
                                                 
161 I am using a personal (fictionalised) name here because this particular individual is one of two persons 
introduced in a case study later in this chapter.  





education (but are lacking the level and quality of education needed for urban labour), cattle 
fattening farms should also be considered.  
Finally, the chairman, summarising and incorporating aspects of what other participants had 
said, urged everyone to reach a consensus on the distribution of communal land for crop and 
cattle fattening farms, and all then agreed on the proposal in response.  
The discussion at the beer house provides an example of the permeability and blurring of 
the state-society boundary. State agents working at the kebele levels are enmeshed in the ‘larger 
social matrix’; their interest and stakes seem to be different from national politicians. As local 
agents responsible for implementing national policies and programmes, they do not simply 
translate policy agendas but reinterpret, manipulate and transform them by venturing into 
relationships with non-state forms of authorities. In so doing, they follow local demands and 
interests even if these are at odds with national policies and interests. In this context, one can 
regard the local as a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ (Moore 1978) which generates its own 
localised rules. However, as we will see below, this do not necessarily imply that the state 
becomes completely absorbed by informal politics. 
Bureaucratic rationality vs local practices 
While the informal agreement at the beer house was crucial, it should however be noted that 
different procedures are involved in attaining formal approval for the agreement. The 
implementation of the locally agreed plan would have to be approved and facilitated by the 
woreda cooperatives coordination desk with the help of its technical expertise. This involves 
obtaining agreement from 80 per cent of the local population to distribute communal land. 
However, the local elites were engaged in attempts to comply with the formal procedural 
requirements, but not with its spirit. They employed a number of tactics to this end, including 
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convincing the local population that the only viable way in which to organise the local youth 
into cooperatives is through a redistribution of some of the communal grazing lands. 
When the woreda cooperatives coordination desk convened a community meeting just two 
weeks after my encounter with the local elites at the beer house, for example, these same local 
elites and their protégés were the first to speak and they suggested the distribution of communal 
land. This was clearly a strategic move aimed at galvanising participants around particular 
ideas. Nearly every subsequent speaker repeated ad nauseam those ideas expressed by the 
initial few speakers.  
The dominant view, to which all of the speakers subscribed, is best captured by the following 
statement made by one of the community elders who had led the beer house discussion two 
weeks earlier:  
Most of these young men have no skills and education to engage in commerce or other 
economic activities. This is a fact which the young men themselves expressed to you 
[cooperatives office]. What options are we then left with? People here believe that land 
is the only resource we have. People are willing and ready to give up their right of grazing 
on communal land in order to support their children. People do not want to see their 
children turn into burglars or urban pickpockets or die as [migrant] labourers in malaria-
infested desert farms in Humera [a district in Southern Tigray dominated by large-scale 
commercial farms]. We give up our lands. We suggest some of them to be organised into 
farming [crop cultivation] groups and others [with literacy skills] into animal fattening 
groups. 
After about two hours of discussion, with multiple perspectives expressed but no potential 
alternative options forthcoming, the elites’ plan was unanimously approved by consensus. The 
organisers concluded the meeting by declaring that they would report the agreement back to 
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high-level woreda officials. Thus, the meeting took place in an elite dominated context, where 
decision making was done using the elites’ code of deliberation that prevented the ordinary 
people from expressing their ideas and opinions. It is almost impossible for the local people to 
question the modes of deliberation employed by the local elites to circumvent formal 
procedural requirements. As indicated in the previous chapters, the local elites could make life 
unpleasant for any kebele resident by denying them access to state resources over which they 
have control and discretion.  
Indeed, not only the mode of deliberation but the entire process of the meeting was at odds 
with the procedural requirements of the rational law. The meeting organisers, for example, 
rarely followed the terms of prescribed legal and official procedures. Most notable was the 
incongruity exhibited by the meeting organisers in applying the strict regional proclamation 
that required the approval of 80 per cent of the local landholding inhabitants. The meeting was 
attended by only somewhere between 150 and 200 people. When compared to the total size of 
the local population (9,688) and the total number of households (1,320), these figures 
correspond to only between 1.5 and 2 per cent and 11 and 15 per cent, respectively, thus falling 
far short of the approval of 80 per cent of the local landholding (households) population. 
Moreover, with no single woman participant, an important section of society was left out 
altogether, raising questions about the role of the state in excluding women from critical 
decision-making processes and thereby perpetuating gender inequality. However, none of these 
issues was noticed or raised by the meeting organisers. It was difficult to establish whether this 
was due to the officials’ lack of knowledge or their habitual disregard for the law.  
What transpires from this example is that the everyday practices of state agents run counter 
to, and also undermine, the ideas of the rule of law and bureaucratic and administrative 
rationality that the institutions that constitute the state system claim to stand for. This process 
through which state functionaries operate with habitual disregard for the law, or even in 
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ignorance of it, fuses with forms of governance that are defined as informal and which shape 
and is an integral part of the state system. 
Nonetheless, in the weeks that followed, the decision eventually led to disputation between 
district state departments when the cooperatives coordination office announced that the 
organising of cooperatives should be carried out in accordance with the law, citing a regional 
order which indefinitely barred any form of redistribution of land. In response to the 
announcement, a local elder told me that they had the support of the district administrator and 
that their idea would eventually be accepted.163 It is interesting to note here that the executive 
order by the regional administration barring the redistribution of communal land was in 
violation of the regional land administration and use proclamation (passed by the regional 
council/parliament) that permitted land redistribution. Yet, at the local level, no one appeared 
to challenge the order on the basis that it contradicted the proclamation. While the district 
cooperative’s office took the order as a law in and of itself, the kebele officials, rather than 
making their case on the basis that the law was violated, challenged this position by soliciting 
the patronage and paternalism of the district administrator. However, by the time I left Degga, 
having completed my fieldwork, the issue had yet to be resolved. Yet the endless dispute could 
be seen as having been productive since the forests – which were the main concern of most of 
the participants – had been left alone.  
The discussion so far reveals that the modes of operation of politics in Degga do not fit 
neatly into the dichotomised categories of formal and informal or state and society. It is rather 
characterised by a constant mutation of actors and an oscillation between the informal, 
conducting state business in the intermediary spaces of governance, and the formal, acting with 
                                                 
163 Conversation, local elder#49, Degga, November 2014. 
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reference to the procedural requirements of the rational bureaucracy, as well as between kebele 
and woreda hierarchies.  
Finally, subsequent to these events, further reinterpretations occurred when the decisions 
entered into discursive social fields already perfused with the material (land) demands, social, 
religious and legal norms and relations of patronage. It is to this area that I now turn in the 
following section.  
The embedded state: petty corruption and the sociocultural character of the state  
With the result of the meeting circulated in social spaces and informal networks such as tella 
bet and monthly religious festivals (in honour of personal patron saints), it came to be 
reinterpreted and understood to mean different things to different people. Reinterpretations 
were subjective and anchored in personal needs and experiences. For example, among the rural 
poor who sought land redistribution, a rumour went round that the decision was the first step 
towards the introduction of a large-scale national redistribution of land. For some opportunist 
local inhabitants, the communal decision was just an opportunity to reinforce, reclaim or 
legitimise encroachments on communal land. Significantly, this precipitated practices of petty 
corruption. One day, for example, I was sitting, as I often did, with a group of young peasants 
at a roadside tella bet, participating in a conversation about land problems, when one of the 
group told us how he had managed to obtain some community land. He began his account by 
referring to the recent decision to redistribute communal land for cooperative groups, 
something which he had initially understood to include all young inhabitants. He said: 
… I was disappointed when I later learned that it excludes people like me who had only 
fractions of lands … I contacted an important distant kin of mine to help me convince 
the official [in charge] that I should be part of the cooperatives [yet to be established]. 
This did not work. He [his kin] told me the woreda would ultimately disqualify me [on 
227 
 
the basis that he owns farmland albeit a small plot] ... I thought there was no better 
opportunity than this to lay claim to the small grazing land adjustment to my farm. ... I 
described to my kin that with the small fraction land I have, I manage to eke out only a 
few quintals of maize which is barely enough even to feed my family … then after a few 
days, he advised me to go to the official’s house early the next morning with 200 birr 
[£6] in an envelope and repeat my story to him. I went to the official’s house at dawn the 
following morning, explained my ordeal to him and handed over the envelope as eji 
mensha [gratitude]. The official sympathised with my suffering and promised to do his 
bit to help me – especially for the sake of my young children. On the same day, he visited 
the field and gave me a verbal confirmation that he would put my name in the land 
register. 
What impresses one, in this case is how the process through which the regulation designed to 
establish cooperative groups exclusively for the landless was first subjected to elite 
re/interpretations and manipulation before then used by my informant as an opportunity to 
exploit.  
Having demonstrated how the state regulation was ultimately adopted by local inhabitants 
and then mediated through practices and discourses of corruption, I now extend the discussion 
on this case by focusing on the ways in which the morality of the story told by my informant 
was evaluated by residents in Degga. My intention here is to demonstrate how popular 
conceptions of petty corruption blur the boundaries between state and society. Some 
commentators may find as corrupt the extra length to which the narrator went to access a scarce 
‘state resource’. However, the morality of the story was judged by his friends and later by 
villagers based on the wider context of social values. Even though his friends were aware that 
the transaction involved illegal activity, i.e. the taking of money by the official, the material 
transaction was held as secondary in their reactions. As the young man ended his story, for 
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instance, his friends lauded him a ‘hero’ for his audacity and management of the whole process 
and his ability to putatively sell his story to the official.  
Interestingly, no one either assumed/expressed that the transaction circumvented official 
ways of doing business or accused the official of being corrupt. When I asked the young men 
if they considered the official to be corrupt, one of them said, ‘helping the poor is not 
corruption’ 164 . Another young man, describing the transaction as a favour, distinguished 
between musena (corruption) and eji mensha (gratitude money/gift): ‘It is not corruption. It is 
customary to give eji mensha [gratitude money] for such favours.’165 Similarly, several weeks 
later, when I asked a middle-aged farmer, who had heard about the story, whether he regarded 
the transaction as corrupt, he said the following: ‘It is admirable to help the poor and landless 
youth amongst us. If you don’t give them this land, they would be a burden on mengist and 
hezeb … they will become robbers and burglars.’166 Another young farmer said, ‘I don’t see 
any wrong in it. The official should do more to help other landless young people.’167 Bribery 
in this context didn’t violate the villagers’ view that local state functionaries should be 
impartial, rule-bound and ‘uncorrupt’. While it is widely accepted, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, that state functionaries ought to act impartially, it is also accepted that the institutions 
that constitute the state (the kebele administration, cooperatives etc.) are, after all, made up of 
real people who have not only legal but also social and ‘familial’ responsibilities. My 
informants rather saw the official not only as a state representative but also as a social actor i.e. 
an individual with social relationships and obligations of mutual help. 
                                                 
164 Conversation, young resident#51, Degga, October 2014. 
165 Conversation, young resident#52, Degga, October 2014. 
166 Interview, middle-aged farmer#45, Degga, November 2014. 
167 Interview, young farmer#19, Degga, November 2014. 
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What all of the comments from different interlocutors make clear is that while practices 
which involve appropriation of state resources by private interests were widely condemned as 
illegal, the abuse of state resources (such as land) for the benefit of the poor was not condemned 
by the inhabitants for its illegality. In fact, localised moral discourses about communal 
responsibility to the poor legitimised both the illegal allocation of communal land and the 
bribery involved. This complex pattern of ‘reasoning’ about corrupt practices and moral values 
clearly dissipates the ostensible distinction between the state and society that is produced by 
political imaginations (see Chapter 6).  
The reactions of the young men listening to the story further indicate that bribery is not just 
a mere economic exchange, as in dealing with state bureaucracy, but requires local people to 
develop certain manners, contacts, tact and etiquette for initiating and undertaking transactions 
and negotiations with the local authorities. There are ‘unwritten’ rules which govern the 
interaction of citizens with state representatives. The narrator, for example, advised his friends 
by saying, ‘You should create rapport with one of his [official’s] close friends or ask 
community elders who would talk to him first for you and arrange the amount of money and 
manner of approaching him’. The conversation provided the young and inexperienced men 
with the kind of information they needed to deal with the local state functionaries. The whole 
process involving acts of petty corruption, like other forms of legitimate state service 
transaction, can thus be viewed as one of ‘the first acts of citizenship; the tie that binds political 
subjects to the state whilst making the state visible to its citizens’ (Haller and Shore 2005: 7).  
Finally, by way of conclusion, I suggest that petty corruption in this context should not be 
taken as a symptom of weakness of the state, as if it were unable to establish a firm grip in 
Degga kebele, or as a symptom of patronage politics, but rather as an integral part of a complex 
socio-political system. To comprehend this (social character of the state), it is essential to relate 
petty corruption back to the issue of governance. Governance, as I alluded to earlier, is not an 
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exclusive category which can be readily associated with state power. Rather, it is a social 
process produced and practised by a broad coalition of state and non-state actors who meet in 
intermediary spaces of governance and whose identities and interests are shaped by social 
relations, norms and discourses. Patterns of norms that inform governance practices thus arise 
at ‘interface situations’ (Long 1992) and as ‘contingent products of diverse actions and political 
struggles informed by the varied beliefs of situated agents’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2010: 16). 
Within this context, what is socially accepted as governance involves petty corruption. This is 
captured by statements such as: ‘they [officials] should help friends and family’, ‘it is normal 
to ask favour’, ‘whether legal or illegal, there is no harm in helping the poor’ or ‘it is a tradition 
to give or receive gratitude gifts’.168 These comments point to an understanding of governance 
where officials are not expected to separate their personal agency from the state. From the point 
of view of my informants, what was legal or official was not necessarily the only legitimate 
form of governance. These statements, I would argue, can therefore be seen as a recognition 
and bolstering of the de facto patterns of governance in the local power structure. More 
precisely, petty corruption in this sense is a constitutive element of the local governance system 
which falls neither under the purview of state authority nor the realm of the traditional/social. 
Instead, blurring the line of distinction, it gives the state and society the quality of being part 
and parcel of a single socio-political complex. In other words, petty corruption, as one 
constitutive element in the local governance system, serves as an integral part of the functioning 
of the local state.  
                                                 
168 Interviews with middle-aged farmer#33, Degga, November 2014; middle-aged farmer#45, Degga, November 
2014; young woman#50, Degga, November 2014; and elderly resident#44, Degga, November 2014. It is important 
to note here that this was a widely shared sentiment among almost all of my informants. The exceptions were a 
few petty traders and elementary school teachers. One school teacher, for instance, condemned petty corruption 
as illegal and described local inhabitants as ‘backward’.  
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8.2. Patterns of boundary crossing  
This section deals at some length with specific cases of three individuals marked by multiple 
identities in order to further reveal the ways in which the state-society boundary is crossed. 
Firstly, I look into the particular case of a prominent local elder communicating with 
individuals occupying a higher echelon of the state hierarchy. Although this type of case may 
be ‘uncommon’ because only a handful people can traverse multiple layers of hierarchies, it 
does shed light on the multiple aspects of state construction and boundary crossing that are at 
work more generally. Secondly, I present two individuals who, with their multiple positions 
and vast horizontal networks, efface the state-society boundary.  
Crossing of multiple hierarchical layers of authority  
In September 2014, I visited one of the most influential and well-known local elders at his 
home. On the third day of my visit, when I arrived at his house, I found him on his veranda 
surrounded by fawning individuals. Within a few minutes of my arrival, the elder received an 
old man who was accompanied by his son. After the extended exchange of greeting that is 
common when individuals meet in Degga, the old man began to explain that despite having 
graduated from a private college about a year ago, his son had found it extremely difficult to 
obtain a job as a primary school teacher. The young man, in an effort to bolster his father’s 
account, interjected to explain that this year, as in the previous year, the number of teaching 
applicants at the district education bureau far exceeded the number of available positions. He 
put the number of applicants at 132 and the number of vacant positions at 20. Regardless of the 
large number of applicants and the inevitable cut-throat competition, what was frustrating to 
the old man and his son was rather their lack of important social contacts at urban centres. The 
old man repeatedly said a very popular phrase in Degga, ‘hulum neger bezemed new’ (which 
can be literally translated as ‘everything works through kin relations’), in order to stress that 
one needs networks to obtain state employment in urban centres.  
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As they finished explaining their case, the elder, instead of answering them directly, turned 
to myself and dramatically declared: ‘You see, I am helping this kind of helpless and poor 
people.’ He then promised the old man that he would try and talk to his ‘people’ at the zone 
education bureau. The old man then pulled the elder over to one side and tried to 
inconspicuously hand him a wad of cash. The elder was clearly embarrassed by the incident 
and reacted furiously: ‘these peasants are manner-less and uneducated. I am trying to help him, 
and you see what he does?’ Clearly, it was my presence which influenced the transaction. The 
elder told the old man off for trying to bribe him but nonetheless promised to help the young 
man in getting the job.  
Later, in October, when I met the young man in the district town, he gleefully told me that 
he had already been given the job. The process did not, however, run smoothly. He said: ‘After 
that encounter, the elder was so offended by my father’s attempt to bribe him in front of you 
that he refused to help me get the job.’ The young man added that the elder even refused to talk 
to his father, so they had to send an apology through one of his friends [another elder] who 
several days later came back with the recommendation of offering a rather steep sum of 
‘gratitude money’ (1000 ETB or £30), the reason being that the elder had to make several calls. 
When he explained why he and his father had solicited the help of the elder, the young man 
mentioned a well-known fact that the elder had a brother who was exceedingly well placed in 
the Ethiopian national defence force. He said: ‘He is a well-connected individual. He can even 
get you a job in Addis Ababa, let alone in here [district level].’ This exemplifies how a 
particular local case can traverse multiple layers of state hierarchy as well as go between 
different types of authorities, thus blurring the line between public and state officials.  
The most interesting aspect of this case was not only the capacity of a local elder to thwart 
the bureaucratic mechanisms of public service employment but also his ability to reach to a 
higher zonal official, bypassing the kebele and district hierarchies. What constituted the core 
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of the relationship between the local elder and his trans-local state patron was not the potential 
mutual economic benefits that may have been derived from it but rather kinship obligations. 
However, at the local level, the elder accrued financial benefit and also the reputation of being 
a community patron for ‘helping’ the son of a poor and powerless farmer. Such strong 
connections between local elites and trans-local state agents are commonly highly valued in 
Degga. Most commonly the effective exercise of power and influence by local elders requires 
the constant reassertion and demonstration of links to, and successful engagement with, the 
outside world (important people at multiple layers of the state).  
Finally, I should point out that a change in authority at one or many levels of the state 
hierarchy, whether induced by corruption allegations or a demotion, transfer or retirement, is 
always a potential threat to those community elders who have established their legitimacy 
based on vertical relations of patronage. When personal power bases shift at the district and 
sometimes regional and national levels, so the influence of non-state actors waxes and wanes. 
For example, during many of my conversations, local informants frequently referred to an 
elderly man, now an ordinary peasant, who used to be one of the local patrons and enjoyed a 
great deal of influence because he had kinship ties with a former senior woreda official, to 
indicate shifting local power relations. When the senior woreda official was replaced by 
another person, the elderly man completely lost his political influence in Degga. For such 
reasons, patronage in Degga is to a significant extent a politics of shifting alliances and 
changing constellations of power relations. This ever-shifting engagement – in such vertical 
informal symbiosis – between state and non-state authorities contributes to the continuous 
making and remaking of the state. This also denoted that local non-state elites are neither 
indicators of state dysfunction nor antitheses to state formation but are instead an integral part 




Crossing of horizontal boundaries: multiple positions and horizontal transgressions  
In the following, I introduce two prominent local elites who hold multiple positions as religious 
and traditional leaders and state representatives, thereby blurring state/society and public/state 
authority distinctions. 
Kes (priest) Hailu 
Kes Hailu is a middle-aged man in his late fifties. He is an interesting local figure due to the 
multiple positions of authority he occupies as the kebele land use and administration unit head, 
as a high priest of one of the five parish churches and as a customary leader. As head of the 
kebele land use and administration unit, his responsibilities include encouraging and mediating 
with people to resolve their land disputes, demarcating boundaries in line with agreements 
reached through arbitration processes and authorising land rent contracts, etc. His clout as the 
land use and administration head is significant because decisions taken at his office/local unit 
cannot be appealed in court. As a priest, he functions as yenfes abat (literally meaning ‘father 
of the soul’) for a large number of households. His responsibilities as yenfes abat include 
periodically visiting and blessing each family, mediating in marital conflicts, hearing 
confessions, providing spiritual and moral support during times of stress and grief and giving 
absolution to the dying. More importantly, he has the power to excommunicate members of the 
community who choose to disobey him. In short, he enters the hearth and home of households. 
As one astute farmer exaggeratedly said about the power the priest wields, ‘He knows every 
secret of each household he visits’.169 He is also rumoured to have knowledge of traditional 
herbal medicine, an allegation which he discounts for fear of being labelled as debtera (debtera 
are priests who lose their ordination for practising medicine, fortune-telling and astrology). 
However, on one occasion, I myself overheard him recommending a local herb to one of his 
clients. Nevertheless, aside from any medical skills, kes Hailu claims to draw his authority as 
                                                 
169 Conversation, middle-aged farmer#20, Degga, November 2014. 
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a priest, customary leader and land administrator from God, the people and the state. During 
one of my many long conversations with him, he said: ‘I consider myself lucky and blessed to 
be entrusted with responsibilities by mengist, the Almighty and the people. Everyone treats me 
with respect.’  
 Kes Hailu always arrived at the kebele premises wearing his distinctive turban and white 
cloak and carrying a fly-whisk and a wooden cross and small books from the Gospels held in 
a piece of cloth. He was available in the kebele only twice per week, on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays, but this did not include days when he came to attend official meetings. When 
residents, who had come to the kebele for various reasons, saw him arrive, they would approach 
him in a certain order and one by one bend from the knee and lower their waist to kiss his hand-
held wooden cross and his knee and receive blessings.170 This would continue as he sat in his 
office with the land administration expert to review land-related petitions. Barely half an hour 
would pass without yet another group of farmers coming to receive blessings. Clearly, when 
people come forward to receive blessings in state spaces, they are blurring the line between 
religious and impersonal state norms. This doesn’t, however, mean that people misunderstand 
the workings and administrative procedures of modern bureaucracy. As illustrated in the 
previous chapters, local inhabitants are aware that the bureaucracy ought to be run according 
to formal rules and regulations. This blurring of religious and impersonal state norms is rather 
indicative of the fact that the everyday state is embedded in social contexts. 
The ambiguous status of kes Hailu and the fluidity of the state-society boundary are even 
more apparent in the different types and purpose of his visitors and the ways in which he relates 
to them at his office. People would sometimes come to his office seeking his advice and counsel 
on a range of personal matters such as marital spats, spiritual problems and quarrels with 
                                                 




neighbours. Instead of focusing on official business, he would instead spend hours chatting 
with his visitors, sometimes with gusto, about all sorts of spiritual and personal issues. The best 
illustration came from a chat I witnessed between kes Hailu and one of his friends. One day, as 
I sat with kes Hailu and the land use administration expert (the civil servant in charge of the 
office), his friend strode past visitors and pushed his way into the office. After warm greetings, 
the friend began telling a story about a certain monk in the neighbouring kebele who claimed 
to cast out evil spirits and cure illness through holy water. The story led to a warm conversation 
about pilgrimage between kes Hailu, his friend and, surprisingly, the land use administration 
expert, which went on for some 40 minutes. In the meantime, visitors were told by the land use 
administration expert to wait their turn outside. Similarly, on a separate occasion, I witnessed 
another friend of kes Hailu dropping in to chat during working hours owing to the fact that they 
had not seen each other for a long time. At kes Hailu’s office, the distinction between a client 
and a friend and official and social life was unclear. On another occasion, I witnessed a young 
boy, who had been sent by his parents, delivering an invitation to the priest to bless the 
celebration of Gabriel mahber (Mahber is a traditional association where families, usually 12, 
who have the same patron saint or angel, honour and feast on a day assigned to their particular 
saint or angel in the liturgical calendar). What is clear from these anecdotes is that kes Hailu’s 
role as a priest and yenefs abat was not secondary to or distinguishable from his role as a state 
representative in a ‘state space’. Kes Hailu effectively collapses the distinction between public 
(religious) and state authority not only through his priestly attire but also in his style of 
operation and communication with his clients in a state space by acting as a traditional authority 
and religious figure as opposed to as a public servant. 
Furthermore, kes Hailu occupies an ambivalent position not only between the state and 
society and traditional and modern authority but also in people’s imaginations. On the one 
hand, he enjoys respect as a high priest and as an elder who can solve local disputes; on the 
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other hand, his position as the kebele land use administrator renders him a suspect. Many of 
my informants accused him of taking material advantage of his position as a state 
representative. By local standards, he does well financially and has managed to invest in a 
property in an urban centre and send his young children to a private school in the regional town. 
Such corruption allegations by local state functionaries, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, enable local people to construct an impartial idea of the state. Nevertheless, the 
multiple positions of kes Hailu and his style of conducting official business reveal the social 
embeddedness of the state. 
Kassa 
Kassa is another prominent local leader who occupies multiple positions as a customary local 
elder, successful businessman and state representative. Unlike the majority of local inhabitants, 
he completed elementary education. Kassa runs a successful timber trading business. He owns 
a truck, the only two shops in Degga and two grinding mills. According to local informants, 
his business success is largely based on logging concessions he has recurrently obtained from 
smallholder producers since the mid-1990s, from which he supplies timber to richer urban-
based traders with whom he has established close associations through his kinship networks. 
Kassa is also a member of the EPRDF/ANDM party and deputy speaker of the kebele council. 
Kassa is reputed and is very proud to be the only person whose home was visited by UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2009 as part of showcasing the success of state health 
extension programmes.  
Unlike most local politicians, he is a popular figure among the majority of local inhabitants. 
His popularity is due to his ability to provide jobs to the local poor in his timber business and 
his generosity in donating money to local projects. For instance, at the time of my fieldwork, 
he contributed 100,000 ETB (£ 3, 370) for the renovation of St. Giogris (St. George) Church, 
with the amount presented by the kebele chairman. Kassa has also constructed a rudimentary 
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gravel road which connects timber-producing villages to the main asphalt national road. While 
locals are aware that the road along the logging tracks was constructed to facilitate access to 
the outside market, they still hold him in respect for the benefit they receive from it, namely 
the ease with which they can transport their produce. Most often, local inhabitants describe him 
as a pious patron with business acumen who is willing to share his hard-earned money with 
noble communal causes.  
Kassa, as both a local politician and community elder, is horizontally connected to and 
supported by local authorities and inhabitants. Thus, his multiple positions, popularity and 
extensive networks enable him to enjoy power and influence within the kebele power structure. 
One example that confirms his influence involved an incident that took place when a few 
wealthy Muslim traders agreed to buy two houses from local farmers in order to open shops in 
Degga. Kassa, as the owner of the only two existing shops, was outraged by the news. In his 
position as deputy speaker and community elder, Kassa used his connections within the kebele 
and local churches to organise a community-wide meeting where all adult male community 
members swore an oath of allegiance to their Christian faith and to defend their community 
against infiltration by Muslim traders. During the meeting, it was alleged that the traders 
practised witchcraft to attract business and accumulate wealth. According to local informants, 
the local priests threatened to excommunicate individuals who granted business concessions or 
sold properties to the Muslims. This was supported by a passionate speech given by the kebele 
chairman. The incident, being cast in religious terms, stirred strong local emotions against the 
Muslim traders, even at the time of my fieldwork. When I talked to him, Kassa acknowledged 
his leadership in orchestrating the meeting but denied that the motivation behind it was to 
secure his own local business interest. He said: ‘Yes, I have brought together the kebele, church 
and the people in defence of the only true faith. We have always been a 100 per cent Christian 
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kebele. We oppose infiltrators … but I didn’t say they [Muslim traders] practise witchcraft … 
and it has nothing to do with business.’ 
Being accepted as a benign community patron, he dominates the economic and political life 
of Degga by monopolising its ‘territory’, resources and businesses. It is no exaggeration to state 
that he acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ who controls access to Degga. However, Kassa is cognisant of 
the fact that he operates in the twilight of legality and illegality, something which makes his 
local business interest vulnerable to state anti-corruption measures. During one of my 
interviews with him, he made allusion to the fact that his ability to operate freely was protected 
by higher-level authorities. He said: ‘I stand by my willingness to defend my faith. I have been 
told by people from both woreda and zone administrations that I am doing the right thing. I 
work with full support from everyone.’ Operating under such conditions requires one to rely 
on ‘vertical’ networks of patronage. Of course, Kassa would never have been able to exercise 
such tremendous influence without the backing and protection of trans-local elites.  
What the cases involving these two seemingly different individuals show is not so much 
how local actors capture the local state per se as how the state and society constitute one 
another. By collapsing the distinction between their official role as public servants and as 
religious/public figures, these actors render the state-society dichotomy ambiguous in nature. 
They represent the case that the state is profoundly shaped by powerful local actors who 
straddle the fluid line between state and society.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, my purpose has been to tease out the ways in which the state is locally 
embedded and socially enmeshed through an analysis of the interactions between the state, 
non-state actors and the local population in multiple settings. Having first explored patterns of 
local elite interaction in intermediary spaces of governance, I proceeded to demonstrate the 
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relational ambiguity between public and state authorities. Intermediary spaces of governance 
as permeable spaces bring together the agents of two supposedly distinct entities, the state and 
society, including politicians and party officials, civil servants, customary leaders, businessmen 
and traders. They serve as local sites in which state policies are negotiated and the everyday 
business of governance and political decisions are exercised. This reveals how outcomes of 
state regulatory practices depend very much on the manner in which they are accepted, 
reinterpreted, negotiated and implemented by local elites.  
We have also seen the social character of state-making by focusing on important dimensions 
of state-society boundary crossings: vertical and horizontal. There was firstly a case of 
patronage in which a local elder traversed multiple layers of state structure (bypassing kebele 
and district hierarchies) and different types of authority (public and state authorities). The 
appearance of a clear-cut state-society boundary was also collapsed, as we saw, by two 
individuals occupying multiple positions of authority, namely those of traditional leader, 
religious figure, business guru and state representative, within both state and non-state domains. 
This shows us that even within the kebele bureaucracy, state work is conducted by people who 
occupy multiple positions and operate in the twilight between state and society. In other words, 
the social character of governance in Degga conditions the working of the state.  
In sum, this chapter has shown how patterns of local governance are locally enmeshed with 
social relations and how state autonomy can be compromised by individuals who occupy 
multiple positions of authority in both state and non-state domains. While governance is often 
thought of as a category which falls under the state administrative domain, in practice, as we 
have seen, it involves a large number of social processes. Local governance practices are 
anchored in the everyday reality of social and economic life, social norms, familial obligations 
and power interests. An understanding of the state based on constitutive oppositions between 
formal and informal, modern and traditional, state and society categories does not therefore 
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capture the intricacy of the everyday process of state formation. In the chapter that follows, I 
further unravel the complexities of state-making by focusing on the intersection of national 


















State formation in Borana: 
Sedentarisation, territorialisation and the making of subjects 
The Borana Zone was nearly always described to me as a ‘remote’ and ‘state-less’ area. Given 
its distance from the country’s capital, Addis Ababa, and its location on the border with Kenya, 
its poor transportation infrastructure and marginality in both national politics and economy, I 
did not find the characterisation of ‘remote’ and ‘marginal’ altogether surprising. However, 
when I first arrived in Odda, I began to question the discourse of ‘state scarcity’. On my first 
day, I went with my research assistant to the kebele office to request permission to undertake 
my fieldwork. The administration office is located in what appeared to be the centre of the 
kebele. Like many other kebeles in highland Ethiopia, the rural centre is a cluttered and 
lacklustre place. There were gangs of youth roaming the dirt road, children running to and fro, 
three-wheel vehicles setting down passengers and several groups of men standing together, 
talking. The dilapidated kebele administration office, which was first installed by the Derg in 
1974, is pretty much at the centre of the kebele and is surrounded by an assortment of 
government buildings. Directly in front of the kebele office are the development agent (DA)’s 
office, a soap production cooperative’s office and a grain store. To the far left are a teacher’s 
residence and a hostel for female students. To the right is a health post. At the southern edge 
of the kebele office building, a large wooden fence surrounds the kebele’s elementary school 
compound.  
As we entered the compound, we noticed two Land Rovers bearing NGO licence plates and 
the EU (European Union) and USAID (United States Agency for International Development) 
logos, which were parked adjacent to the wood-and-mud kebele office building. The inside of 
the compound was full of people. We walked over to a group of men sitting under the shade of 
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a tree to ask them where we could find the kebele manager. They informed us that he was in a 
meeting and respectfully motioned for us to sit down with them and wait – out of the scorching 
sun – whilst he was busy. As we sat down, one middle-aged man from the group, who perceived 
us to be government representatives, asked us why there had been a delay in safety-net food 
stamps and complained about the lack of medicine at the local health post. By mistakenly 
associating us with the state, the man rhetorically yet effectively held us responsible for the 
local problems. We nevertheless explained to him that we were not from the government, at 
which they all laughed.  
We now turned to the others and enquired as to the nature of the business that had brought 
them to the kebele. One said he was there to appeal against fines levied upon him by his village 
head for grazing cattle in an area of land prohibited for conservation. He said, ‘there is no place 
for the cattle to graze. The grazing pastures that we have used in the past are being settled by 
people and reserved by NGOs and the government for conservation. There is nowhere to go.’ 
Everyone commented on the growing grievance concerning the shortage of grazing land and 
the growth in population. The conversation continued for a few more minutes, after which one 
of the group spotted the kebele manager and his guests emerging from the meeting, at which 
point the gathering broke up. 
After seeing his guests off, the kebele manager greeted us in impeccable Amharic and 
ushered us into his office, offering us a share of a bench with two other clients. His office walls 
– just like the offices in Degga– were decorated with graphs detailing successful past 
government projects, tables of statistics and charts. Two old metal cabinets were positioned 
against the left-hand wall, but much of the space in the office space, however, was dominated 
by one wooden bench and a medium-size wooden laminate desk piled with files, notebooks 
and papers. As we sat down, I introduced myself, my assistant, my research project and 
produced an official letter of introduction issued by the woreda. He glanced through the content 
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of the letter and said, ‘We will provide you with any assistance you need’. He then spoke 
passionately about the overall status of the development and changes underway in his kebele: 
‘This area has really been developing fast. We are witnessing improved life conditions and 
many people are flocking in for habitation.’ He then put on his glasses and looked at me with 
a smile, saying: ‘I am happy you chose to do your fieldwork here. There is so much going on. 
We need someone to write about the development in Borana.’ Overall, his speech was one-
sided and appeared to betray a touch of government propaganda. Following this encounter and 
throughout my subsequent stay in Odda, my interactions with him continued to be marked by 
his expectation of me to write about the success of government projects and the improvements 
made to the living conditions of the local inhabitants.  
My first-day conversations with the manager and local inhabitants, in addition to my 
personal observations, encapsulate the themes I explore in this and the following chapters. I 
came away from these encounters and observations with the distinct impression that changes 
of some sort were underway in Odda. It was also blatantly clear to me that the interpretation of 
these changes was a matter of contention between my two interlocutors – the kebele manager 
and his clients. But they do, after all, share the common theme of change. In this and the 
following chapters, I therefore ask what these stories of change are, how they came about and, 
more importantly, what they tell us about the everyday aspect of state formation.  
In my attempt to answer these questions and as a way of studying the processes of state 
formation, I take the concepts of sedentarisation and territorialisation as my analytical points 
of entry. Territorialisation, in this context, implies the process through which ‘all modern states 
divide their territories into complex and overlapping political and economic zones, rearrange 
people and resources within these units, and create regulations delineating how and by whom 
these areas can be used’ (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 387). By focusing on sedentarisation 
and territorialisation processes, this chapter explores the ways in which state formation takes 
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place through the intersection of national policies and local processes. As such, the core 
argument of this chapter is that the local everyday forms of state-making (Chapters 5–8) are 
not necessarily opposed to central state policies but occur at the intersection of interests 
between national policies, state and non-state forms of authority (community leaders), NGO 
activities and the local population. The chapter therefore aims to widen our understanding of 
state formation by demonstrating how it takes place through triadic interactions and 
negotiations between the state (central state policies), NGOs and local population groups 
(ordinary people and local elites). I shall reserve for Chapter 10 the implications of these 
processes in terms of promoting a variegated public understanding of the state.  
I begin this chapter by examining the historical dynamics and long-term processes of state 
territorialisation efforts in Borana in order to better contextualise our discussion of state 
formation. I then consider the factors that impelled pastoralists into sedentarisation. This is 
followed by a discussion of the state’s strategies for extending its power through various 
territoriality tactics and their consequences. Lastly, I examine individual personal experiences 
and representations to explore how state programmes and governance practices re/produce 
‘subject positions’171 and shed light on the making and workings of the state.  
9.1.Understanding the context: the state in Borana 
Before entering into a detailed analysis of the everyday aspects of state-making, I wish to 
provide a very brief background of the historical processes of territorialisation in Borana as a 
                                                 
171 According to theorists Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffé, a subject position refers to ‘the ensemble of beliefs 
through which an individual interprets and responds to her structural positions within a social formation … an 
individual becomes a social agent insofar as she lives her structural positions through an ensemble of subject 




way of better contextualising the contemporary attempts to extend spatial and administrative 
powers.  
State territorialisation in Borana can be said to have begun with its incorporation into the 
Ethiopian state in 1897 (Markakis 2011; Helland 1999). The initial attempt at territorialisation 
was prompted by a need to establish territorial sovereignty and a desire to extract revenue. At 
the turn of the century, a series of border agreements and demarcations between British East 
Africa and Imperial Ethiopia divided Borana society into two parts (Oba 2013; Bahru 1991), 
thereby making the two groups Ethiopian and British subjects. The border demarcation, along 
with the creation of Ketemas (garrison towns), had the function of instituting a predatory 
regime of revenue extraction in the zone. That is, while the external border defined citizenship 
for the purposes of taxation, the garrison towns served as important launching pads for periodic 
raids to collect taxes from the pastoralists (Oba 2013).  
However, contrary to the imposition of so-called gabbar-malkagna (an institution of land 
tenure and taxation system)172, as was the case in the ‘highland peripheries’ (Markakis 2011; 
Bahru 1991; Donham 1986),173 the imperial government did not make any attempt to control 
the relationship between pastoralists, their land and other natural resources. Broadly speaking, 
there was no territorially organised state system in the Borana Zone. But this does not mean 
that Borana was an ungoverned periphery, or that its people, as Markakis (2011: 134) argues, 
were ‘left to their own devices’. On the contrary, the Borana have always been interconnected 
with the centre/Addis Ababa through the enmeshment of hierarchical and personalised power 
                                                 
172 For an excellent account of the Ethiopian land tenure system, see Crummey (2000).  
173 Markakis (2011) distinguishes between highland and lowland peripheries based on ‘the material foundation 
that determines the ways humankind makes a living’ (15). 
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relations and practices of tax extraction.174 At first, settler administrators and soldiers, aided by 
local protégés, controlled the area and thereby stood at the interface between the Borana and 
the Imperial state. But over time, the Qallus (ritual leaders) of the two Borana moieties – the 
Saabbo and the Gonna – were awarded the Abyssinian military title of Fetawrari (commanders 
of the vanguard), and, assisted by soldier-settlers and qoros (local protégés) (Oba 2013; 
Halland 1999), helped to connect the Borana to the centre and extend the reach of the state in 
its effort to extract taxes.  
The territorially organised system of rule, an attempt to control both land and population (Li 
1999), began under the Derg regime. The Derg territorialisation initiative was a product of 
centralised socialist planning that sought to organise pastoralists (and peasants) into 
territorially bounded units, that is, kebeles, for effective development interventions (Clapham 
1988). The Derg promoted settlements and crop cultivation in Borana. However, settlement 
was generally cursory and farmland was randomly spread across kebeles.175 As a result, the 
newly created territorial form of administration had not effectively bounded people to kebele 
settlements.  
Beginning in the 2000s, territorialisation arose as a consequence of transformations in the 
political economy at the national level and with the self-reinvigoration of the legitimacy and 
identity of the state in relation to its ability to deliver development services. In this respect, the 
overarching tool of pastoralist government development policy was sedentarisation. 
Government rural development strategies such as the Agricultural Development-Led 
                                                 
174 The taxation of the Borana was extensive and severe, and was equated to robbery by British officials in North 
Kenya at the time (Oba 2013). But given the history of border disputes and rivalry between the two forces, their 
comments should be taken with a pinch of salt.  




Industrialisation (ADLI) strategy and the current strategy of ‘commercial agricultural 
investment’ (Lavers 2012) encourage settled agriculture (MoFED 2003). Pastoralism is seen 
as unsustainable,176 and settlement as a key development tool is concurrently implemented with 
other government programmes. This is revealed quite clearly in the influential national Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTPI) which stipulates that ‘household asset building, safety net, 
and settlement programs, as well as off-farm income generating activities’ in pastoralist areas 
are to be ‘jointly implemented’ (MoFED 2010). Sedentarisation, and then territorialisation, as 
I demonstrate below, are thus effected along with a systematic convergence and 
implementation of various other development programmes.177 
9.2.The allure of NGOs: Sedentarisation  
The Borana Zone is densely populated with both domestic and transnational NGOs. Borana 
has 44 registered NGOs (26 international and 18 domestic) with 65 different project titles.178 
Unlike the severe famine periods of 1973–74 and 1984–85, the years in which they started to 
                                                 
176 Aberra Deresa, State Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development, told the BBC, ‘We are not really 
appreciating pastoralists remaining as they are. We have to improve their livelihood by creating job opportunities. 
Pastoralism, as it is, is not sustainable. We want to change the environment’ (Butler 2010). 
177 Here, it is instructive to point out the regional variations by which the practice of state territorialisation takes 
effect. In some parts of lowland Ethiopia, in the Gambella region, for instance, state territorialisation was 
prompted by the federal government’s desire to release significant amounts of land for commercial agricultural 
purposes. As a consequence, the state’s territorial tactics included officially designating millions of hectares of 
land as wasteland and subsequently transferring it to direct central state control (Kelly and Peluso 2015), in 
addition to the settlement of scattered villages into properly administered clustered units. Through this process, 
sedentarisation and the provision of development services almost always followed territorialisation and were 
undertaken through coercive mechanisms. As a result, state power is bitterly contested by the displaced population 
(see Rawlence 2016). In Borana, however, as I demonstrate in greater detail below, sedentarisation preceded 
territorialisation and is being undertaken systematically and relatively peacefully with the willing participation of 
pastoralists and the very active involvement of NGOs. In this regard, one interesting aspect of everyday state-
making in Borana is that the sedentarisation and territorialisation projects are, perhaps unwittingly, aided by the 
NGO programmes. 
178 Borana Zone NGO profile, the Borana Zone finance bureau, 2014.  
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function in the area, their goals are now not simply relief and humanitarian intervention but 
development and empowerment. Out of the 65 project titles, 60 focus on livelihood 
diversification, infrastructure development, health, women’s empowerment and school 
promotion activities. Only about five projects funded by USAID, CARE UK and the Office of 
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), although large in scale, focus on food aid, nutrition 
and emergency relief.179 One NGO director explained:  
The old relief-based model is proven unsustainable. The best strategy is to enable 
communities to engage in development activities and to encourage them to take 
responsibility for their own development.180  
The fact that NGOs largely operate community-based development projects with an emphasis 
on participation and sustainability means that only settled populations are classified and 
targeted for welfare and livelihood diversification programmes. In other words, as I 
demonstrate below, the ability of drought-prone pastoralists to extract basic amenities and other 
benefits from NGOs crucially lies in their willingness to associate themselves with 
participatory-based income-generating cooperatives and lematawi buden and cell groups that 
are recognised, facilitated and controlled by state authorities. The head of one international 
NGO summarised how income-generating cooperatives are organised: 
When we work community projects, there are several stages we go through. First, we 
enter into a partnership agreement with the woreda cooperatives office. Pastoralists are 
required to be registered as a cooperative under the woreda. We are not allowed to initiate 
the formation of any type of association. This is because the government wants to control 
everything and keep track of people and associations. But because the government lacks 
                                                 
179 Ibid. 
180 Interview, director of an international NGO#7, woreda town, January 2015. 
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the capacity to do everything and it is disorganised and out of touch, when we see needs 
for alternative means of income among people, we give them the nudges that bring them 
to the attention of the woreda officials. Once they are organised, we give them training 
and provide them with seed money.181 
The process of organising most cooperatives begins with the settlement of pastoralists and their 
registration with the local authorities. The kebele must first validate the residence status of 
individuals who wish to join a cooperative. Newly established cooperatives are then granted 
access to NGO seed funds (usually 25,000 ETB or about £800) and training schemes. 182 This 
process underscores how development practices extend the reach of the state and augment its 
grip on non-state spheres. Through the registration and organisation of cooperatives, the 
woreda and zone administrations affirm and reproduce their authority over local residents and 
also regulates the penetration of NGOs. 
It is important to point out that NGO activities and support are not limited solely to settled 
communities. They also provide extensive support to pastoralists that includes cattle restocking 
and destocking, animal health, water development, saving and credit cooperatives and famine 
relief, etc. But these services and projects, as we shall see below, are perceived by pastoralists 
as sporadic, and in any case are typically wiped out by fluctuating weather conditions. On the 
other hand, pastoralists who wish to secure a relatively sustainable source of income from one 
of the many cooperatives are required to settle as cultivators. The establishment of a permanent 
settlement as a precondition of joining one of the many cooperatives is justified on the basis 
that membership requires regular and ‘active participation … which is unbefitting to a pastoral 
way of life’.183 Sedentarisation can therefore be seen as a condition enjoined upon those who 
                                                 
181 Interview, head of international NGO#8, woreda town, January 2015. 
182 Interview, senior woreda official#9, woreda town, January 2015. 
183 Interview, senior woreda official#10, woreda town, January 2015. 
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depend upon a fragile mode of subsistence to secure the basic amenities of life. One middle-
aged man’s expectations, for instance, contributed to his settlement decision:  
I had large livestock until the 2005 drought, due to which I lost all but a few. With the 
support of NGOs, I began recuperating … they [NGOs under drought-recovery 
programme] gave me a mix of 25 goats and sheep. But before establishing myself, I lost 
half of the cattle to disease. After that, I came to learn that NGOs provide continuous 
help only for those who are settled. In 2008, I left pastoralism altogether and came to 
settle in Odda. Since then I have started farming and also I keep some cattle, goats and 
sheep … the income I get from the saving and credit cooperative [which he is a member], 
is, however, very small … it is not as I expected it first.184  
Others were exhorted to associate themselves with a cooperative in order to secure access to 
credit, markets, seed money and education and health services. One elderly man shared his 
experience:  
I was a member of a pastoralists’ microcredit cooperative. It was just useless. They 
wouldn’t even give us small loans because they feared we could lose our cattle to drought 
and fail to pay them back. The NGOs and the government really look after settlers well. 
Whenever we asked the NGO people for the same provisions, they would tell us that 
there was not much they could do for people who moved every six months or so … it 
became clearer to us that we had no other better option than settlement ... some of us 
came to Odda in 2009, and have associated ourselves into a saving and credit cooperative, 
after which we received 25,000 birr [about £800] from SOS. We now buy cattle from the 
residents and sell them in big markets.185  
                                                 
184 Interview, middle-aged man#11, Odda, December 2014. 
185 Interview, elderly man#12, Odda, December 2014. 
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Similarly, another middle-aged herder, who did not want to abandon the profession of his 
ancestors, said the following: 
Settlers can get loans very easily; they get free money up to 100 birr [about £ 4] for just 
attending a meeting. Some of them even get free grain from the government. However, 
a herder must sell animals to buy food. A herder must pay for everything. When we ask 
for the same kind of treatment, we get told we must regularly participate in meetings ... I 
then brought my wife from another woreda to live in Odda while I keep on the herding 
profession. She is a member of the soap production cooperative. She was once given 180 
birr just for participating in an NGO training and 100 birr twice as dividends. But they 
nag her day in and day out to send our child – who helps me in herding – to school. … I 
thought about settling to become a farmer and send him to school, but I just don’t want 
to leave the profession of my father.186  
Complementing the initial assistance provided by the NGOs, newly settled pastoralists helped 
to encourage their kin’s entry into agriculture and permanent settlement. This was the 
experience of a middle-aged resident:  
When I was moving [in search of pasture and water] my cattle started to die. My relative 
who recently started farming in Odda told me about the benefits of settlement. He said I 
could start an easy life by being a member of one of the NGO’s associations. He said ‘if 
you lose your cattle, and the crops fail, you wouldn’t lose your income from the 
cooperatives’. I was persuaded and sold the little that remained and came here to start a 
new life.187  
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In direct contrast, a number of others who had already been settled for a while began to 
contemplate abandoning agriculture and moving back to pastoralism. Many explained to me 
how once settled they realised the income-generating cooperatives had nothing substantial to 
offer in terms of material gain. One middle-aged man, for instance, who was a member of the 
local cattle fattening cooperative, said:  
In the beginning, we thought that we would make a lot of money. The training by AFD 
[Action for Development] was good. They gave us allowances. But over time, AFD 
withdrew and the management began to ask more money from us, let alone distribute to 
us ... Farming is also bad; rain rarely comes. I then thought about going back to herding 
but I had no capital to buy cattle, and my children were at school. The longer you put off 
herding, the harder it becomes to revert.188  
By using the criteria of permanent residence and a compulsory commitment to regular 
participation in the cooperative as conditions of membership, there is immediately a drawing 
of individuals into a permanent settlement without any deployment of coercion. In Odda, the 
result was that between 2009 and 2014, with its growing number of settlers, 14 new income-
generating cooperatives were formed in the areas of aloe soap making, saving and credit 
services, gum and incense extraction, animal fattening and the extraction of stone for 
construction.189 Some of these were federated into zone-level unions with similar cooperatives 
in other kebeles and woredas.  
What emerges from the expansion of cooperatives, then, is a much wider engagement of 
state institutions with local inhabitants. All of the cooperatives were set up using donor finances 
and are officially reported as being member-managed, but in practice, it was alluded to me by 
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multiple cooperative leaders and members that they are in fact governed by the woreda 
cooperatives promotion office. They serve as sources of mobilisation and finance to support 
public infrastructure projects such as road construction. 190  Members of the various 
cooperatives – the biggest being a saving and credit cooperative with 250 members – regularly 
receive visits from state representatives and are expected to participate in weekly or monthly 
meetings to discuss applications for loans, their general performance and sometimes even 
village and personal issues such as alcoholism. Moreover, all of the cooperatives maintain 
contact with state institutions such as the woreda finance bureau through modern bureaucratic 
procedures such as paperwork and auditing.191  
 But I should point out here that, at the time of my fieldwork, several of the cooperatives, 
such as the animal fattening cooperative, existed in little more than name. Many of my 
informants, having being required to pay membership fees and without receiving dividends, 
described the cooperative as a steady drain on their purse. There is a high drop-out rate from 
such cooperatives. In this respect, the expansion of cooperatives might be viewed cynically as 
a tactic of the state’s strategy to settle people and assert control over them.  
To sum up, NGOs have accelerated the process of sedentarisation by way of engaging 
people in community-based income-generating activities that have eventually turned Odda into 
a site of governance. The fact that cooperatives are established by and for people in a 
geographically and administratively bounded territory has been instrumental in bringing about 
the preconditions for territorialisation, as I demonstrate in the next section.  
                                                 
190 Many members of different cooperatives told me that they are often asked to contribute a small portion of their 
dividends for roads and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. 
191 Interviews with middle-aged cooperative head#16, Odda, December 2014; middle-aged cooperative head#17, 
Odda, January 2015; young cooperative head#18, Odda, January 2015. 
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9.3. Territorialisation and state-making 
This section explores the ways in which the state, in many cases with and through customary 
local institutions and customary leaders, has reworked the local spatial configuration and, as a 
result, extended its control over local social and property relations. My intention here is to 
explain how state formation is accomplished through localised state practices, non-state actors’ 
development interventions and through the willing cooperation of local actors and the 
population. In the following, I discuss two main components of state territorialisation in Odda: 
the individualisation of grazing lands and the recognition of the customary and their 
consequences on state–society relations.  
Individualisation of grazing lands  
The individualisation of common land has its origins in the 1975 land proclamation which 
conferred common land user rights to pastoral lands to the individual residents of newly created 
kebeles, such as Odda. At the time, however, agricultural holdings were small and unregulated. 
A person who first cleared a non-grazing land could simply claim usufructuary rights to the 
land.192 But as people gradually settled into cooperatives, as shown in the previous section, the 
woreda administration began to turn itself to the task of extensive territorialisation through the 
mundane practice of the registration of land to private titles. In 2009, the government 
established a new woreda-level land department called Land Use Administration and 
Environment Protection (LUAEP), which was mandated, among other things, to delineate, 
register and administer agricultural land. The department began the practice of the 
systematisation and formalisation of land use through cadastral surveying and registration on 
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the grounds of avoiding land-related disputes and overlapping claims. As a senior woreda land 
administration expert explained:  
A growing number of pastoralists are shifting towards crop cultivation. As a 
consequence, land-related disputes and overlapping claims are arising. There are also 
cases of feuds because of the alleged destruction of crops by animals. What we do is 
introduce an organised system of management to help the people manage their own 
resources.193 
There are two levels at which individualisation of land is carried out. First, it is worked out in 
a long-drawn-out process of registration, allocation and plot demarcation. This principally 
involved the participation of traditional leaders extant at the juncture between woreda agents 
and the local population. The particular impetus to involve customary leaders in local-level 
land management processes came from the Ministry of Agriculture’s desire to counter the 
erstwhile top-down approach to natural resource management and address local discontent 
towards state policies. The broader parameters that call for negotiations with the local 
population and the collaboration of customary leaders are laid down in the national Land Use 
Planning Guideline (LUPG) and Local Level Participatory Land Use Planning Manual 
(LLPLUP). These guidelines and manuals define the limits of engagement and provide 
frameworks through which territorialisation initiatives can be mediated by the customary 
structure. The LUPG, for instance, outlines a nine-step approach to establishing ‘participatory 
and negotiated’ land tenure arrangements at the local level, including how to use legitimate 
pre-existing customary channels rather than ad-hoc committees (MoARD n.d).  
Consistent with these broad national frameworks, land registration and individualisation in 
Odda is carried out as follows. With the help of customary local leaders, the woreda LUAEP 
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bureau carries out regular and sometimes spontaneous cadastral surveys in and around Odda. 
The first-time registration of pre-existing land users takes place as part of this process, and 
spontaneous settlers are persuaded to relocate to agricultural zones. The main idioms used to 
secure residents’ compliance are ‘participation’, ‘consultation’ and ‘engagement’.194  Since 
2009, new applications have been submitted directly to the woreda administration, but 
permission is only granted in consultation with the Abba Reera (sub-kebele leader), Abba Olla 
(village leader) and the council of elders in cases where there is any dispute among the 
villagers. In other words, for new settlers to be able to acquire agricultural land, the woreda 
land administration, in conjunction with the kebele and the Abba Olla, have to first ensure there 
is land available in the village agricultural zones. The applicant should then obtain the 
permission of other customary leaders.195  
Second, within each territorialised village agricultural zone, instead of there being direct 
kebele oversight, everyday regulation196 is handed over to and carried out through traditional 
authorities. The Abba Olla and village council of elders are charged with arbitrating in land-
related conflicts within the limits of the national legal set of rules. That is to say, they cannot 
approve illegal land transactions and should refer serious cases of land disputes to the local 
                                                 
194 Interviews with kebele chairman, Odda, January 2015; Abba Reera#1, Odda, December 2014; senior woreda 
official#10, woreda town, January 2015.  
195 Interviews with Abba Reera#2, Odda, December 2014; Abba Olla#3, Odda, December 2014; Abba Olla#5, 
Odda, January 2015.  
196 The origin of this is to be found in the Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation (FDRE, 2005) 
which states: ‘Where dispute arises over rural landholding right, effort shall be made to resolve the dispute through 
discussion and agreement of the concerned parties. Where the dispute cannot be resolved through agreement, it 
shall be decided by an arbitral body to be elected by the parties or be decided in accordance with the rural land 




authorities or formal channels of conflict resolution.197 In some villages, the Abba Olla can 
levy fines of as much as five head of cattle on spontaneous settlers and cultivators. Customary 
leaders therefore function as partners, agents and local edifices in state-facilitated agricultural 
management and control.  
In sum, since 2009, all of the agricultural land owned by the 1142 households in Odda is 
registered, with records stored in the woreda and kebele archives.198 Today, the holders of 
individual titles, recognised and sanctioned by the regional and national laws, can pass down 
or lease their land. This has resulted in the stricter collection of tax revenue. One woreda official 
noted that prior to the system of registration, only about 40 per cent of the residents paid 
agricultural land tax.199 By virtue of land registration, all land owners are now required to pay 
land-use taxes and agricultural income tax. This also implies that the permanent inheritable 
usufructuary rights of individuals are valid for as long as they pay their taxes, thereby 
establishing a subject-and-sovereign relationship between households and the state. 
Recognition of customary rights  
In the meantime, in Odda, the woreda administration has not harboured the idea of 
incorporating all of the common land under its direct control. In fact, it rather conceded the 
idea of extensive control by recognising ‘what already exists’200 – customary use rights – and 
carved out autonomous niches as common grazing land. This common grazing land is divided 
into three zones: warra (areas set off for lactating and weak animals), forra (areas designated 
for non-lactating animals and bulls) and kalo (calf enclosures). All three categories are 
                                                 
197 Interviews with senior woreda land administration expert#19, woreda town, January 2015; Abba Olla#3, Odda, 
December 2014; Abba Reera#1, Odda, December 2014. 
198 Interviews with kebele manager, Odda, December 2014; woreda finance bureau official, woreda town, January 
2015. 
199 Interview, senior woreda official, woreda town, January 2015. 
200 Interview, senior woreda official#19, woreda town, January 2015.  
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regulated by the village council of elders with no interference from the kebele. One senior 
woreda official explained:  
The people have a strong tradition and rich experience of collective management of 
natural resources. All the knowledge for managing grazing land is within the 
communities … resources are properly tapped, utilised and conserved by the community 
members themselves. We don’t interfere in their jurisdiction.201  
The state’s recognition of the customary jurisdiction has the effect of enabling the customary 
recognition of state jurisdictions and authority. In my conversations with many local 
inhabitants and local leaders, all of them invariably referred to agricultural (individual) land 
and conservation areas as ‘government land’ and the common areas as common land governed 
by Aaadda-Seera Borana (Borana custom). This implies the mutual constitution of the state 
and customary authorities on the one hand and the state and society on the other. But the flip 
side of this is that the recognition of customary land renders customary rights to be contingent 
upon state sanctions, that the very idea of ‘recognition’ enables the woreda administration to 
monopolise the authority to determine who controls which plot of land. More broadly, while 
local people are able to secure customary rights to resources, although in a much diminished 
and spatially restricted way, there is ultimately a continuation of the wider trend towards an 
extension of the power and reach of the state.  
The end result is that every plot of land becomes an object of state regulation – surveyed, 
classified, parcelled up and with ownership ‘rights’ attached to it. Significantly, the kebele have 
now been classified into Olla (village) or settlement areas, farmland, community, government 
and cooperative enclosures. Even very limited unoccupied parcels and abandoned farmland are 
designated as areas for future agriculture and placed under the control of the woreda 




administration. The overall impact of this territorialisation, as I demonstrate below, is far-
reaching.  
9.4. Emerging structures 
In what follows, I attempt to present the composite effects of the territorialisation process in 
turning the pastoralists into a ‘territorial community’, their settlements into stable sites of state 
intervention and in the reconfiguring of their property and social relations. My overall is aim 
is to show how localised development practices contributed to the re/constitution of the state 
in terms of creating institutions of governance and modes of governing and organising social 
relations of the local population.  
The territorialisation process discussed above lead to the growth and expansion of the state 
apparatus and transformed Odda in three important ways. Firstly, as a result of clearly defined 
boundaries and the classification of areas into discrete zones of enclosures, the customary rights 
of individuals, namely that of free access to natural resources anywhere in the Borana Zone, 
have become drastically restricted and increasingly tied to status as a permanent resident. One 
sub-kebele representative/customary leader explained:  
We don’t wish to prevent flocks of other kebeles or woredas from coming into our areas. 
But our forra land has considerably reduced … we don’t even have enough land for our 
own cattle. As a result, we are forced to prohibit entry of non-residents’ flocks. If anyone 
wishes to graze over here, they should be permanent residents or hold a special permit 
from their own kebele.202 
This means that the Borana can only legitimately graze their flocks in fixed areas with a state 
permit. Concurrently, the category of ‘agro-pastoral’ was formed as a unit of self-identification 
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and communal identity. The majority of my informants, who were almost entirely dissociated 
from pastoralism, described themselves to me as agro-pastoralists and farmers.  
Secondly, the transformation of a significant portion of community land into personal 
property has led to significant changes in social relations. Social relations have now been 
reconfigured and reconstituted around personal property rights. Land has become a central 
economic resource, along which sharecropping arrangements, in which the owner demands a 
portion of the crop in return for use of his land, and land-lease arrangements emerged.203 One 
local elder spoke about the changes in meaning and perceptions ascribed to land:  
We believed we would always continue to be herders. We were never bothered about 
land. We didn’t see land as an asset. What we saw was what it provided to us – the water 
and the pasture. Now, all of a sudden, it has become very important, and everyone is 
fighting to get access to a plot.204  
This comment sums up the views expressed by every other community leader and local resident 
I talked to at the time of my fieldwork. Nearly all of my informants pointed out that land had 
become the central focus of family and community disputes, with individuals vying for 
inheritance and access to a plot of common land. Significantly, this has to do with the fact that 
the new individual usufructuary rights and the accompanying property-based social relations 
are not guaranteed or regulated by custom and tradition. When I talked to the customary leaders 
they explained that, under Aaadda-Seera Borana (Borana custom), ‘land cannot be claimed, 
owned’ or ‘left as an inheritance’ by an individual and, therefore, there are ‘no established 
                                                 
203 Interviews Abba Reera#1, Odda, December, 2014; Abba Reera#2, Odda, December 2014; Abba Olla#1, Odda, 
December, 2014; Abba Gadaa of Borana, woreda town, January 2015. 
204 Interview, Abba Olla#4, Odda, December 2014. 
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customary rules available’ to regulate individuals competing over access to land.205 As a result, 
state legal norms – usufruct, inheritance, succession and contract – are increasingly taking 
precedence over custom and traditions in governing social relations. The woreda court is 
usually the body whose arbitration is solicited in land related disputes. One woreda court 
official, speaking in the context of the increasing problem of court overcrowding, noted: 
There is a dramatic surge in the number of divorces and land-related cases. It is very 
worrying that the traditional system is falling apart. We try and encourage people to 
resolve their differences at the local level in traditional ways.206  
As a way of discouraging people, the overcrowded woreda court has also posted a sign at its 
gate advising people to use the traditional conflict resolution system. Notwithstanding the 
worries of court officials, what we see is an interlocking of property, proprietor and the state – 
the latter assuming the role of a guarantor of the former’s usufructuary rights.  
Thirdly, as alluded to above, the permanent settlement of pastoralists into villages 
familiarised local residents with the idea of ‘legality’ and the ways of bureaucratic procedures. 
For example, Huka, a middle-aged resident whom I met at the kebele premises and who, as a 
pastoralist, never comes into direct contact with state bureaucracy, recounted his first 
experience. He told me that the issue that brought him to the woreda was the shortage of land. 
‘I have too little land to cover my household needs,’ explained Huka.207  In the hope of 
appropriating more land, Huka approached the Abba Olla (village head), who had initially 
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206 Interview, woreda court official, Odda, December 2014. 
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263 
 
granted him half a hectare of land in 2006, to explain his case. The Abba Olla, however, 
informed him that new applications should be submitted to the woreda in writing:  
I submitted my application to the woreda, and they referred it to the kebele. The kebele 
with the Abba Olla and Abba Reera heard my case and asked me to identify any of my 
neighbours who had more land than me. I could not instantly identify anyone. Then they 
told me all people have the same problem of land shortage and that I should learn to live 
with it. The next day, I appealed to the woreda office … after they read the appeal, they 
expressed their sympathy, but they said they didn’t want to reverse the decision made by 
the community elders and the kebele. The whole process took two months and cost me a 
lot of money. I had to pay for transportation, and twice for scribes to compose my letters.  
Huka’s experience highlights how the outcome of the territorialisation process enabled an 
institutionalised and formalised relationship between the local people and the state. Huka’s 
case can also be read as an affirmation that the state208 did not merely extend its presence 
territorially but also through multiple institutional points of contact and engagements.  
Finally, the settled landscape of the Borana required more than a mere redefining of the 
pastoralists in territorial terms in order for it to be effectively governed. New roles like those 
of model farmers/pastoralists were introduced into the socio-political landscape, bringing with 
them significant changes to the configuration of the local authority and people’s relationship 
with it. Local notable individuals, as model farmers, now constitute a coterie of influential men 
and occupy non-bureaucratic positions such as the kebele leadership, local party leadership 
role, seats on the land administration committee, in the social court and so on. This has created 
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a particular opportunity for the local elite to exert an influence both formally and informally. 
It was often pointed out to me by several people, for example, that the local model 
pastoralists/farmers, as facilitators of the land allocation processes, used their connections, 
new-found political positions and insider knowledge to acquire large parcels of land. Several 
influential local politicians and customary leaders are said to have acquired large areas of land 
for hay production in the name of crop production. Their land is usually fertile and lies near 
water sources and major roads, ensuring accessibility to markets. Moreover, some notable 
individuals have fenced off agricultural land for private ranches. One prominent politician, for 
instance, has not only established a private ranch on common land but is also rumoured to have 
diverted two special breed bulls allocated by a government research centre to the cattle 
fattening cooperative to his own ranch. Local people are afraid to complain as some depend on 
the model pastoralists/farmers for work and loans, while others are dependent on food aid, over 
which the model pastoralists/farmers also have control. Being members of the Oromo People 
Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Oromo wing of the EPRDF, the local rich are politically 
protected by the woreda officials. I will introduce two of these individuals in the next section.  
By contrast, the ordinary people – including non-resident pastoralist Boranas who used to 
rely on the common land – lost their customary rights to freely graze their cattle as the lands 
became territorialised, enclosed, fragmented and individualised. They depend on the 
fragmented land to feed themselves and their family. At the time of my fieldwork, some of the 
settled inhabitants, in an effort to supplement their income and overcome the effects of 
fluctuating rainfall, were engaged in selling firewood, wage labour and were also hired as 
herdsmen by wealthy cattle owners/model pastoralists. The more numerate, socially active, 
young and streetwise would engage in shop businesses and trade in contraband goods across 
the Ethiopia-Kenya border. Those at the very bottom of the social hierarchy, as I will discuss 
in greater detail in the next section, are variously ranked on the basis of their level of poverty, 
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labour capacity, gender, etc. and become subjected to various state and NGO provisions such 
as the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and nutrition programmes. 
The discussion up to now has underscored how state formation is an outcome of an ongoing 
and interconnected set of practices, mutual adjustments and negotiations between national 
policies and local interests. It involves a wide range of social and non-state actors and is 
mediated through multiple day-to-day practices – participation, negotiation, consultation and 
discussions – by multiple agencies – NGOs, individuals, customary institutions – and multiple 
micro-instruments of power – registration, recognition and certification.  
9.5. Getting closer to the state: developed and underdeveloped subjects  
In this section, I examine the many ways through which the state comes into being in everyday 
life and how the local people make use of selective categories of identities and development 
discourses in order to increase benefit opportunities. I will also examine the context of the 
transformation of the Borana’s subjectivity that is derived from and is related to their 
relationship with the state. In so doing, I demonstrate how state development discourses and 
empowerment programmes not only target different classes of individuals but also produce 
them.  
In order to provide a detailed analysis, I present the experiences of two members of the local 
elite, both of whom hold important political positions, and three ordinary citizens who look 
upon the state to meet their daily basic survival needs. My overall purpose is to demonstrate 
how the process of sedentarisation and expansion of state territorial control re/produces 
different ‘subject positions’. The experiences presented below must therefore be viewed as 
structural products of the sedentarisation and territorialisation process and as ‘negotiated 




The developed subjects 
In December 2014, I was introduced to a wealthy man and elected member of the kebele 
council, whom I shall call Jarsso, and I had the opportunity to converse with him on several 
occasions during the course of my fieldwork. Jarsso owns a small restaurant in a nearby market 
town. I went to his restaurant one Saturday afternoon and found him sitting on the veranda and 
talking with two other men. As we sat together, I began the interview by asking Jarsso about 
the changing situation of pastoralism. Jarsso replied, ‘Why should our life be backwards? Who 
says the Borana should be herders in the traditional way? The government and NGOs are 
providing us with credits, modern animal and human medications. We have schools for our 
children. We can be settled ranchers with the benefit of the ease brought to us by our 
government. We can eliminate the hardships of our transhumance lives. That is what I see as 
the future of the Borana.’  
When I asked him what this vision meant for the poor, Jarsso used the following example 
to illustrate his point. ‘Take milk production, for example. If you go and visit the market, you 
will find many women sitting for hours trying to sell milk. Their problem is that firstly they are 
trying to sell milk to the Borana [i.e. a place where most people produce their own milk]. 
Secondly, there are too many [of them]. If one woman starts selling milk from a certain village, 
all start doing it and the market becomes oversaturated. The solutions for this will be to expand 
milk cooperatives so that they can sell to Addis Ababa. You can benefit the poor this way.’ 
From this, he moved on to draw a parallel between the Borana’s traditional values and modern 
cooperatives: ‘I talked to many woreda- and even zone-level politicians ... this is the plan of 
the government. It is a wonderful plan because the idea of cooperatives resembles our 
traditional ways of working together and helping one another.’ On the other hand, being one 
of the very few Borana to own a business such as a restaurant in a market town, he believes 
that it is important that ‘the government should encourage and reward entrepreneurs’ like 
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himself. Jarsso’s vision, in short, involves the collectivisation of the poor into cooperatives and 
the freeing up of economic space and support for the better off.  
Jarsso was not alone in harbouring such a vision of development. The kebele chairman also 
spoke in similar terms. The chairman, a bespectacled man, first introduced himself to me as a 
model pastoralist and model merchant. He loved to talk about himself and his achievements. 
He spoke of the pride he felt at being awarded certificates of recognition and medals, once by 
the Oromia regional state government and twice by the federal government, for being an 
entrepreneurial model pastoralist and merchant. ‘I have more than eight hectares of land and a 
sizeable flock,’ he explained. I asked him if he could tell me the number of his cattle, which he 
declined to do. I asked him why and he said it was not because he did not know the exact 
number but rather that ‘we don’t traditionally tell the number of our livestock’. I then asked 
him about his land. He replied that he had acquired three hectares from his father but did not 
explain about the remainder of the ‘more than’ five hectares. He then added, for clarification: 
‘Being a model pastoralist and a model merchant are not, however, all about being wealthy. 
You have to be exemplary in every other respect. For instance, twelve of my fifteen children 
are at school. I have a house in town, and at all of my houses I have built toilets, and we dispose 
of household waste properly.’ The chairman lives in his townhouse in the woreda town and 
travels to Odda to check on his cattle, farm and to fulfil his political responsibility as a kebele 
chairman.  
The chairman told me that he wishes to shift his concern and concentrate fully on his 
business. ‘I have been kebele chairman for the last ten years. Now, my business is expanding 
and has already reached a point where I cannot run it alongside my kebele responsibility. I have 
therefore submitted my resignation to the woreda and they are looking for another model 
pastoralist to replace me.’ ‘Why should another model wealthy farmer/pastoralist replace you?’ 
I asked. He said, ‘a leader should have a developmental mindset and should be a model and 
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inspiration to others’. When I asked him about his business plan, he said, ‘I want to invest in 
dairy and meat production. But the people are inimical of the idea that land has to be provided 
for investors. For now, I don’t want to be antagonistic with the people. I will wait … the future 
generation is not interested in pastoralism because it is not what they see as modern. They want 
to be as NGO and government workers that they see every day at villages and in school. In the 
future, the land will be free. It will be available to large-scale ranches.’  
Taken together, it is obvious that these two men were not simply pandering to government 
propaganda. Rather, they were part of the national political class in that such utopian views 
were as much in their own interest as they were relevant to those of national-level politicians. 
They invoke the modernist role that the national leadership has adopted for itself and abide by 
it in order to assert their business interests. They see pastoralism becoming more and more 
obsolete in its older forms. Their self-identify comes less from their association with 
pastoralism than from their adoption of the language of development. They take pride in 
identifying themselves as ‘model pastoralists’, ‘model farmers’ and ‘model traders’. They 
define themselves by their capacity to utilise the instrumental rationality of modern knowledge 
– education, modern health and investment. Moreover, in the realm of everyday social and 
political life, they live in towns and ride their motorcycles between their homes, the kebele 
office, the cattle market and their ranches. They spend more time with woreda politicians than 
with the local people. These changes constitute their class and subject positions.  
The underdeveloped subjects  
In the meantime, Jarsso’s and the chairman’s utopian vision of pastoralism sits in stark contrast 
to the experiences of the poor who are structurally forced to invoke and adopt ‘underdeveloped 
subjectivities’ (Gupta 1998) in order to extract material benefit from the state and NGOs. In 
discussing this issue with a cross-section of household heads, they usually began by talking 
about the strategies and subject positions they adopt to negotiate with politicians for the basic 
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amenities of everyday life. Elima, a middle-aged widow whom I met at the woreda office, 
recounted her story to me. She struggled to support herself and her two children by selling 
stacks of firewood.  
One day, in 2009, the woreda and kebele representatives came to her village to recruit poor 
people for a public works programme – which was part of the PSNP – and she made an 
application. During the selection process, however, she was rejected. ‘They said I am not 
eligible because I had four goats and land. They did not take into account that my land is too 
small and I do not have the labour or ox to plough it. I rented it out only for 300 birr [about £ 
10] a year for a wealthy man,’ explained Elima. ‘The following year I sold three of the goats 
and made myself poorer.’ She was eventually accepted onto the programme. Once she began 
participating, she learnt about another scheme called direct support. Under this scheme, eligible 
candidates, usually those who cannot supply labour, receive direct cash/food aid. She needed 
the kebele’s approval in order to transfer to the direct support scheme. Kebele officials, 
however, determined her fit to work. In her narrative she spoke of her pain at the kebele’s 
refusal to classify her as a person eligible for direct support:  
The kebele is against me. I am not poor, weak or old enough for them. We sometimes 
are required to clear bushes and plant trees the whole day. It is heavy for men, let alone 
a weak woman like myself … One of the kebele people said to me ‘you walk long 
distance to collect firewood and carry them to the market and you dare to tell me you are 
weak to clear few bushes’ … Now, I am telling ‘I have stopped collecting firewood 
because of a backache’ … the backache is not a real … but I still collect firewood. How 
else would I feed my children?  
She further told me about the breaking down of the traditional clan-based system of mutual 
help called Bussa Gonoffa. ‘Earlier the clan would take care of widows. Now, no one is 
cooperating,’ she explained. With the disintegration of Bussa Gonoffa, people like Elima look 
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to the state to provide the basic amenities of life. This points to one of two dimensions of state 
formation processes, which involves the state working by dissolving old social networks and 
replacing them with its own programmes. The other dimension involves the state seeking, 
through formalisation, to turn these old networks to its own ends, as we have seen in the case 
of the recognition of common land.  
Warrio, a greying man in his fifties with six children, used similar tactics. He said he started 
farming after receiving one hectare of land from the village council of elders in 1998. During 
the 2005 drought, however, he lost ten cattle, and the dry spells that followed the drought 
affected his crop production. Following this loss, he was given one cow and six goats by CARE 
International as part of the livestock recovery programme. However, despite his best efforts to 
fully recover from the devastation, he struggled to feed his family. He informed me that he had 
sought the kebele’s help in getting food aid. The kebele, however, refused to class his family 
as eligible, stating that he already possessed sufficient assets in the form of his one cow, six 
goats and two sheep. He emphasised how badly he had been treated by officials. He was, for 
example, perceived as and called ‘lazy’ and ‘greedy’ for seeking to be registered on the public 
works programme. He wished that officials would not be so fastidious with regard to food aid. 
‘No self-respecting Borana would declare himself as needy if it was not real. It is tough to be 
a farmer here. Rain is erratic and there is no water for irrigation. And even when we get enough 
rain, our crops get ravaged by pests and eaten up by insects,’ Warrio explained. He then went 
on to talk about the constraints that prevented him from pursuing alternative livelihood 
strategies: 
If I had business skills and the capital, I would have become a cattle merchant. It is a 
profitable business for those who know how to do it … or if I had several wives, I could 
still manage to be self-sufficient. If I had three wives, one would sell milk, another would 
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join women’s cooperatives and another would take care of the fields and I would take 
care of the cattle.  
Warrio saw himself as being caught in a vicious circle in which he is unable to improve his 
livelihood because he is not polygamous, yet he cannot be polygamous because he is too poor 
to have more wives. Warrio, with a palpable sense of despair, told me how, as the plight of his 
family worsened, he had sold three goats to buy food and sent a further two to his cousin in 
another woreda. ‘I then declared to the kebele and the woreda that I had sold eight goats to buy 
food for my family … I was included.’ He now receives 65 kg of wheat, 8kg of pulses and 1 
litre of cooking oil and farming tools. ‘When I joined we used to receive the food aid every 
two months but now they made it every six months. It lasts for just a month,’ Warrio 
complained.  
These stories from Elima and Warrio illustrate how the disfranchised come to form a direct 
relation with the institutions that constitute the state. Unlike Jarsso and the chairman, who 
willingly assume and strategically deploy state discourses of development to advance their 
interests, Elima and Warrio have to perform and improvise as vulnerable and destitute subjects 
in order to make themselves ‘visible’ to the state officials and thereby meet their basic survival 
needs.  
Itana, on the other hand, a middle-aged man working as a daily labourer, had to both act as 
a subject of five years’ empowerment and at the same time demonstrate his neediness in order 
to make continued claims as part of the safety net programme: 
I have been a safety net programme beneficiary for the last six years … by the end of the 
fifth year, one DA and some people [woreda officials] came and chided me for lack of 
visible improvements in my life. They said they would exclude me altogether from their 
list because there are other needy people who [with the same opportunity provided to me] 
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could make improvements in their lives and buy sheep and goats. Then, the next year I 
have bought one goat. This way I avoided being deleted from the list on the grounds of 
laziness. At the same time, [the fact that] I only own a total of three goats keeps me from 
being excluded [on the basis of self-sufficiency].  
In his struggle to secure the basic amenities of life, Itana must avoid being categorised by the 
woreda as an undignified recipient of state handouts and equally as a completely transformed 
and self-sufficient man. He therefore slips away from the destitute category as the moment 
requires and assumes the identity of an individual undergoing a transformation. In my many 
interactions with a cross-section of food aid recipients, I noticed a majority of them struggled 
to define themselves according to variable state standards which do not flow smoothly one into 
another. It is important to note here that this fluctuating subject self-positioning is generated 
by the problematic and contradictory logic of the programme which, on the one hand, is a kind 
of welfare programme that provides food aid for the destitute, while on the other is a kind of 
empowerment programme which requires the beneficiary households – ironically through 
welfare – to become food secure over time and hence transform and graduate from the 
programme. Moreover, it is also, at least theoretically, an entitlement programme which 
guarantees five days’ paid work per month. 
In conclusion, the state prominently figured as a relevant entity in the shaping of livelihood 
possibilities and thereby subject positions. In other words, through its various development 
discourses and empowerment projects, the state has provided local people with vectors for self-
representation. On the one hand, local elites position themselves through national discourses 
of development and articulate such discourses to assert their interests and identities. On the 
other hand, however, the poor have to subscribe to a set of scripted development roles that have 
already been outlined to them by state actors, self-positioning themselves as the moment 
demands. By shifting the ways in which they identify themselves from ‘poor’ to ‘destitute’ and 
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from ‘destitute’ to ‘transforming subjects’, they establish a working, albeit difficult, 
relationship with the state.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, my purpose was to demonstrate how the process of state formation takes place 
through the intersection of a wide range of political, social and development actors. I have done 
this by focusing on the changes that have transpired over roughly the past two decades as a 
result of sedentarisation and territorialisation activities aimed at controlling the movement and 
livelihood of the Borana. I demonstrated that the government’s attempts to order spaces and 
control the local people have been aided locally by NGOs. The NGOs’ engagement of local 
people, in particular through community-based income-generating activities, has been 
instrumental in bringing about the precondition (settlement) of territorialisation and in 
eventually transforming Odda into a site of governance. 
I have also demonstrated how the state reworked the local spatial configuration, 
predominantly with and through customary local institutions and local elites, and as a result 
extended its control over local social and property relations. This dynamics of territorialisation 
involved the individualisation of grazing land and the recognition of elements of customary 
use rights by carving out autonomous niches as community grazing land. This process has 
brought about vast changes to the social, political and economic landscape which have included 
crystallising the agro-pastoral category as a form of communal identity, reconfiguring social 
relations around personal property rights and a reworking of local class relations. 
 I have furthermore argued that the increasing engagement of the state in the Borana – 
particularly through sedentarisation and territorialisation activities – has created opportunities 
for the local elite to exercise their authority, accumulate wealth and influence local decisions 
on both a formal and informal basis. The new roles of notable local individuals as model 
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farmers and politicians in the institution of the kebele complicate the distinction between the 
state and society through the entry of government institutions. This in effect constitutes the 
kebele as a site where national policies and local interests converge. In other words, the local 
(kebele) serves not only as an implementing agency of government policies (sedentarisation 
and territorialisation) and as a target of development interventions but also as a site where local 
interests are articulated and top-down national regulations are reshaped. This underscores the 
multifaced nature of state formation.  
I have also demonstrated how state activities and programmes reconfigure identities and 
contribute to the production of subject sensibilities by introducing different modes of 
identification. On the one hand, we have seen the rise of property-owning local elites who take 
pride in identifying themselves as ‘model’ farmers/pastoralists, while on the other hand we see 
the ‘docile bodies’ that are subject to humanitarian intervention and look to the state for their 
basic survival needs and who identify themselves by shifting categories of underdeveloped 
identities.  
Overall, the discussion in this chapter demonstrates that state formation is an ongoing 
process that involves a wide range of non-state actors – NGOs, customary institutions and 
individuals – and the use of micro-instruments of power and administrative strategies such as 
the registration and formalisation of land holdings and the recognition of customary rights. The 
discussions reveal the problematic nature of the distinction Ethiopianist scholars make between 
the central (core) and the local (periphery) and the emphasis they place on the ‘top-down’ 
approach to state formation. We have seen that, rather than operating through a matrix of 
centre-periphery, state formation appears to function along a complex and shifting axis of 
power relations among state actors/policies, non-state actors (NGOs) and diverse local 
population groups (wealthy politicians, ordinary people and welfare dependents). Rather than 
viewing it as a homogenous whole, the local, and especially the periphery, should therefore be 
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understood as being marked by differences in power, class, gender, etc. In the next chapter, I 
investigate how the changing conditions we have seen in this chapter promote a new and 



















Development talks, practices and state imagination 
In the previous chapter, we saw how the state, through its territorialisation process, brought 
pastoralists into a new spatial and bureaucratic order while at the same time increasingly 
dissociating them from a pastoral livelihood, the erstwhile clan-based social order and 
traditional territorial references. We also saw cases of individuals’ efforts to enmesh 
themselves with the state system and abide by national discourses of development in order to 
claim their place as model citizens and clients of the state programmes. In this chapter, I turn 
to explore how the creation of new social categories, territorial spaces and actors promotes a 
new and variegated understanding of the state. I do this by drawing on the experiences of 
differently positioned individuals that include not only the local population (state development 
clients) but also state employees and NGO workers. This more specifically entails exploring 
the dynamics of ‘interfaces’ (Long 2001) between state employees and NGO workers, the local 
population and state employees and the local population and NGO workers. My intention in 
this juxtaposing of differently located individuals is to sketch a spectrum of discourses and a 
broader range of ways through which the state comes to be imagined in Odda.  
In this chapter, I argue that the state is imagined and makes its appearance in people’s lives 
in multiple and divergent ways as a dysfunctional and failed institution, authoritative and 
bureaucratic organisation, etc. depending on how individuals are situated and placed within a 
complex social setting. More specifically, I argue that one cannot experience the state as a 
unified whole. Rather, individuals engage with it fragmentarily in different domains of 
everyday life, and, as a result, differently positioned people develop different understandings 
of a unitary state idea.209 The chapter therefore demonstrates how these constructions of the 
                                                 
209 This line of argument builds on the work of Gupta (2012). 
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state in Odda follow the practices and talk of development promoted by NGOs and the state. 
The overall aim of the chapter is to show how localised and fragmented development practices 
create a unified state idea at ‘the periphery’, and also how ‘the periphery’ is hierarchically 
interconnected, rather than geographically disconnected, to the centre.  
I begin the chapter by demonstrating how the daily work and lives of NGO staff shape their 
understandings of the state. Here, I explore the ways in which NGO staff juxtapose themselves 
with the state, presupposing and positing the state as a dysfunctional organisation. I then show 
how the state workforce at the lowest rungs of the bureaucracy perceive the state development 
programmes they are part of, and thereby how they imagine the state. Finally, I turn to the 
various ways through which popular state imaginations are formed.  
10.1. NGO staff: pathological state 
NGOs in the Borana are largely staffed by natives who hold at least an undergraduate degree. 
After work and at weekends, they gather to socialise, often with members of international 
visiting donor institutions, in high-quality restaurants and bars. The sight of a fleet of NGO 
licence-plated Jeeps and Land Rovers lined up on the front lawns of such places usually signals 
an after-work gathering. Such gathering and mingling of junior and senior staff forms the basis 
of the symbolic assertion of the social and professional position of non-state development 
workers and provides a stark contrast to the hierarchy of interaction among state employees 
which persists in the realm of social relations. Many of the NGO workers, as I demonstrate 
below, are self-consciously modern in terms of their belief in meritocracy and, hence, they take 
special pride in distinguishing themselves from state employees. For example, during one of 
my many conversations, a young domestic member of NGO staff commented, ‘Government 
attracts incompetent people. The majority of people work for the government because they 
have no other options. With their poor skills and education, they have no chance to be 
considered for NGO work. The salaries they earn are barely enough for survival [therefore] 
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they lack motivation.’210 Similarly, another, middle-aged, member of NGO staff described 
government workers as self-interested apparatchiks who were ‘only loyal to the party and their 
superiors’.211 Many of my informants also expressed their contempt for state officials who are, 
with their limited educational background, able to move at ease in the upper echelons of state 
power to become their bosses. ‘It is an open secret that officials get promoted to higher 
positions more for their party loyalty than based on merit. Most of them are undereducated, 
suspicious and closed-minded. We face great difficulties trying to convince them of our 
projects,’ explained one senior member of NGO staff.212 In such discourses, my informants 
produced an image of a state that is filled with incompetent and inept people, who see their job 
only as a means of survival. 
Another member of NGO staff considered state employees to be time-wasters who spend 
the entire day in meaningless meetings, thereby distracting themselves from important 
development works. ‘If you go to the woreda or zone office, you will be told officials are in 
meetings. They waste so much time in meetings. If they did their jobs properly, we would no 
longer be necessary. We are doing what the government should be doing.’213 My informant 
perceived the rationale for the NGOs’ operations to be the weakness and failure of the state in 
undertaking development works. Similarly, another member of NGO staff scoffed, ‘they spend 
their office and field visit time sipping coffee, playing cards or sitting idle and yawning at their 
desk’.214 In contrast, the same person made the following comment about NGOs: ‘We spend 
our time in the field with the local people. We work hard and interact with the local people.’215 
                                                 
210 Interview, young domestic NGO worker#21, woreda town, December 2014. 
211 Interview, middle-aged domestic NGO worker#22, woreda town, December 2014. 
212 Interview, senior member of NGO staff#23, woreda town, December 2014. 
213 Interview, middle-aged international NGO worker#24, woreda town, December, 2014. 




These responses were typical of many of my informants who wanted to draw attention to the 
inefficiency of the state vis-à-vis the efficiency of the NGOs. In doing so, they represent the 
state as a vacuous and patrimonial institution shot through with fatigue, lethargy and party 
politics. At the same time, they construct the non-state sphere as being filled with enthusiasm, 
efficiency and hard work. Most of my informants saw themselves as the real development 
agents. In so doing, they locate themselves outside of the state, standing instead with the people 
and providing them with the basic everyday requirements of survival. 
 Others demonstrated a pragmatic understanding of the state as a failed development actor. 
A field visit to a children’s nutrition centre, on which I tagged along with a junior member of 
NGO staff whom I shall call Gutema, provides a case in point. On the way, Gutema told me 
that his NGO established the children’s nutrition centre but that the woreda health office runs 
it. The inspection is ‘part of a comprehensive assessment of the performance of the nutrition 
programme .. which is to be included in donor reports’. When we arrived, there was no one 
there. The nutrition centre – a small mud-and-wood-built house – was locked. In front of the 
centre, we could only see a large hoarding announcing the project and outlining the main points 
of the programme, the name and logo of its donors and the implementing local NGO. With a 
sigh of resignation, Gutema moved in the direction of the nearby village and asked the residents 
whether the nutrition centre was operating. The villagers we met were not sure whether or not 
the centre was still operational. ‘There was a health visitor who used to come once a week. I 
haven’t seen her for a long time,’ one old man explained. Gutema turned towards me and said, 
‘this is typical of what we face every day. This place is becoming derelict. The government 
does not follow up and monitor whether our projects are running well. We are caught in a 
vicious circle in every direction. Years of hard work gets wiped out by a spell of drought and 
government neglect. There is not much progress in this area. I don’t remember a time where 
there was no emergency in the last 10 years. It is impossible to bring about change while 
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working with the government.’ Gutema conjectured that the inefficiency and negligence of the 
government had caused their projects to fail. From his comments, it was clear that he was keen 
to stress and draw on his understanding of the state as a dysfunctional institution to criticise the 
absence of the health worker at the time of our visit. In reality, however, the closure of the 
centre was related to the low priority accorded by the woreda health bureau to services initiated 
by NGOs. The cost of running the centre was simply putting a strain on an already resource-
constrained and understaffed local health department.216 It was therefore more the presupposed 
identification of the state as a dysfunctional entity that enabled Gutema to describe the project 
as a failure than the actual incapacity of the woreda health bureau. This is not to say that the 
state institutions do not lack capacity; instead, it is possible, in this particular case, to see that 
the closure involved a clear and conscious decision by the woreda health office.  
Returning to the visit, Gutema then asked the villagers, largely for my benefit, about the 
general development-related situation of the village. In response, the villagers complained 
about the lack of drinking water and a shortage of grazing space in their village, that their 
current grazing space was too small to accommodate their animals. Gutema advised the 
villagers to persist in their demands to the kebele for development services.  
Overall, my field visit with Gutema provided an example of the self-representation of NGO 
workers as true development agents who listen to the woes of the poor, in contrast to the state 
                                                 
216 Interviews with kebele health extension worker#26, Odda, December 2014; woreda health bureau official, 
woreda town, December, 2014. According to the health extension worker, ‘we are understaffed, we have to run 
our own government programmes such as the health extension programme. If the NGOs want us to work on joint 
programmes, they can help the government in hiring staff … that would be a greater help to us than complaining.’ 
Similarly, woreda health affairs expert said, ‘they [NGOs] have established and still want to establish many 
services and hand over the responsibility of running them to us. We do not have the budget to run their services 
… what they seem to be intent on doing is producing good stories to their donors at our expense.’  
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which leaves its people high and dry. Gutema’s comments furthermore illustrated an 
understanding of the state as a failed and inefficient entity. 
Gallo, another junior member of NGO staff, expressed a similar understanding of the state 
as an inefficient and failed development actor. He said, ‘people say the problem with the state 
development programmes is how they are handled at the local level. In my view, the problem 
is at all levels, both at the higher and lower echelons.’ He evidenced his assertion by narrating 
the following case.  
Last year, the kebele and our NGO divided a community land to undertake bush clearing 
through community participation. We then completed the clearing of our ground within 
a month. On the kebele side of the ground, work had barely started, but the DA in charge 
reported to the woreda that he had already cleared the ground. The zone administration 
then immediately arranged an experience-sharing field visit for Somali region pastoralist 
bureau land administration experts to the kebele ground. Shaken by the urgency of the 
visit by senior officials, the kebele decided to showcase a field cleared by our NGO and 
put up a sign announcing that the ground had been cleared under the government 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). We came to know about this only after the 
visit had been completed. We were outraged by this and reported it to the very senior 
zone officials … they promised they would pursue the case and discipline the kebele and 
the DA in charge. But so far, no measure has been taken against them. The system simply 
doesn’t work.  
It is such experiences and encounters that play a critical role in shaping NGO staff members’ 
ideas about a dysfunctional state. When narrating his experience, Gallo is implicitly alluding 
to the notion that an ideal state should discipline its employees. However, in reality, for Gallo, 
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the state is fraught with slow decision-making and a lack of proper inspection and supervision. 
Gallo, therefore, like other NGO staff, represents the state as dysfunctional.  
To sum up, from the discussion so far, we can identify two ways through which the state 
comes to be constituted. The first is that it is juxtaposed with NGOs in that state development 
activities and the quality of its employees are measured against the streamlined NGOs and their 
development activities. As such, NGOs are constructed as possessing the essential qualities of 
development such as a self-motivated and qualified workforce, whereas the state is represented 
as lacking the qualities essential for development and as being imbued with lethargic and low-
skilled workers. The second is that, as a corollary from the juxtaposition, the state is 
presupposed (Koddenbrock 2013) as dysfunctional, and the anecdotal everyday bureaucratic 
or development hurdles, for many of my informants, automatically prove its dysfunctionality. 
For instance, the absence of state functionaries at fieldwork sites, and their presence in their 
offices during field visit hours (contrary to the implicit understanding that they should be at 
field sites), proves for my informants the state’s presupposed pathological and dysfunctional 
characteristics. State work is largely taken at face value, that is, as we have seen in the case of 
the closure of the nutrition centre, there is little link between NGO staff members’ assertions 
of state failure and what actually happens in the messiness of the everyday routines of 
implementing development projects. Nevertheless, the constitution of the state as dysfunctional 
legitimises the NGOs’ interventions and helps them make sense of their own work, thereby 
serving to uphold their self-importance.  
The state as an all-powerful and patrimonial organisation  
Contrary to the idea of a dysfunctional state that my informants invoked in the previous section, 
a cross-section of the NGO staff to whom I talked, including the individuals mentioned above, 
represented the state as omnipotent and its authority as inescapable. Many of my informants 
expressed frustration with the zone’s efforts to brand them as supporters of opposition parties 
283 
 
and with its attempts to hamper field operations, threaten their existence through national 
legislation217 and invasive surveillance and with its attempts to deny them services. The field 
coordinator of one domestic NGO said: ‘we are seen as a threatening presence … always met 
with suspicion and unjustifiably accused of being agents of OLF [the Oromo Liberation Front] 
and other opposition political organisations. During election seasons, we get instructions to 
suspend our field operations … even at one occasion our NGO was forced by the party 
[OPDM/EPRDF] to fire a member of our staff who was perceived to be critical of the 
government.’218 Another senior member of NGO staff said, ‘They accuse us in meetings and 
vilify us in the open in media as ‘rent-seekers’, ‘opportunists’, ‘squanderers’ that waste 
resources that come in the name of the poor people’. Similarly, a prominent domestic NGO 
field coordinator commented:  
There is an all-out attack on the NGO community in Ethiopia. It is not a one-off thing. 
Whenever we have meetings, officials would not fail to brand us as ‘resource wasters’, 
‘irresponsible’, ‘jungles of opposition parties’ and ‘anti-development elements’. They 
even call us ‘neo-liberal Trojan horses’ …I don’t think they even know what neo-liberal 
means. To be honest with you, neither do I know exactly what it means …whenever they 
[party leaders and officials] go to Addis Ababa for training or meetings, we wait and 
wonder ourselves what other new phrases they would pick up from their bosses.219  
Certainly, such rhetorical performances of power are displayed on a regular basis and constitute 
a key aspect in projecting and maintaining the image of a strong and all-powerful state. It is 
                                                 
217 One of the major topics which frequently cropped up in my discussions with NGO staff was the impact of the 
Charities and Societies Proclamation (2011), which places restrictions on their funding and areas of operation. 
The proclamation prohibits foreign-funded NGOs from working on gender, conflict resolution, human rights, 
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30:70 percentage ratio.  
218 Interview, field coordinator of domestic NGO#29, woreda town, December 2014.  
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how the state projects its cohesiveness and sovereignty, attempting to intimidate, coerce and 
persuade people who consider themselves to belong to the ‘non-state sphere’. On the other 
hand, such a rhetorical tactic underscores attempts by political actors to assert that the state is 
the only legitimate driver of development, unwilling to roll back from or relinquish its image 
and function as an entity which brings development to the rural population. The rhetoric 
promotes the centrality of that state in the development of its citizens. It can therefore be seen 
as a reaction to the increasing challenge NGOs present to the legitimacy of the state.  
 Some NGO staff – particularly junior members – expressed the idea of an all-pervasive 
state. ‘The government is everywhere. All NGOs are infiltrated by party members. … They 
report everything that is going on inside NGOs, all the petty talks, rumours and discussions 
both at the workplace and outside to the party. We are afraid to talk about anything related to 
the government even in our friendship circles,’ explained a young domestic NGO staff 
member.220 Another NGO staff member commented that government is trying to bring NGOs 
into its fold: ‘The government wants to control NGOs. There is a widely known case in one 
domestic NGO where the party fired the director of a local NGO and replaced him with a 
hardliner EPRDF member.’221 It is obvious here that my informants not only treat and speak 
of the state as a concrete entity, but that they have also developed what appears to be a fetishised 
relationship with it, perceiving it be found everywhere. In other words, the state, as a concept, 
looms in every aspect of their social relations, friendship circles and personal lives, shaping 
their everyday interactions in terms of whom they talk to, where they meet and what they talk 
about.  
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Professional NGOs vs a patrimonial state  
While adherence to formal regulatory procedures and political necessities is a critically 
important prerequisite for operating as an institution, personal connections are also of 
paramount significance to the day-to-day operation of NGOs at the local level. The head of one 
international NGO explained that they needed to accommodate the personal interests of 
government officials: ‘We have to cater to the personal interest of officials. They have bad 
habits in their house [state], and they want to drag us into that. For example, if we fail to invite 
an official to a training programme as a speaker, guest of honour or participant, he would punish 
us by refusing approval to programmes or creating delays by keeping files circulating between 
offices and up and down the bureaucracy.’222 Another NGO director said, ‘personal connection 
is very important to the success of many NGOs. That is how the state works.’223 While my 
informant drew attention to the importance of personal and political connections to the success 
of other NGOs, he denied having such connections because, he said, his ‘organisation believes 
in integrity’, and his programmes should only be ‘sanctioned and run on the basis of the law 
and their potential benefits to the people’. Others also expressed that a speeding-up of approval 
for their programmes and bypassing unnecessary bureaucratic and personal hurdles required 
them to call upon national NGO directors to contact ‘high-up’ party and government officials 
to call on zone officials to instruct them to provide the NGOs with the assistance they required. 
These remarks and practices highlight attempts by the leaders of NGOs to claim the moral high 
ground and thus draw a line of distinction between the NGOs and the state. In so doing, my 
informants construct and juxtapose an image of professional NGOs and a patrimonial state.  
Taken together, many of my informants represented the state as an authoritative and 
patrimonial organisation, but they also ordered state and non-state spheres hierarchically. More 
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specifically, they described the state in terms of its authoritarian, restrictive and larger scale of 
authority and NGOs by their position of subjugation. In doing so, they invoked the state’s 
greater dominance over the non-state sphere or, in other words, reiterated the verticality of the 
state (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). But, it is important to note here that the environment and the 
manner in which NGOs operate in Borana call into question the characterisation of NGOs as 
agents to a ‘new modality of government’ in Africa which Ferguson and Gupta (2002) refer to 
as ‘transnational governmentality’. NGOs, they argue, with their transnational links, challenge 
state authority by shaping the local and creating global and local partnerships. NGOs, as we 
will see later, do indeed have special appeal among the local people, but their activities are 
both spatially and temporally limited (i.e. they lack permanence and systematic and universal 
reach) in terms of their ability to influence the everyday behaviour and thus the subjectivity of 
citizens; in other words, to regulate or direct their ‘conduct’ (Foucault 1991). There is no 
evidence to argue that NGOs create, alter, fashion or regulate subjects in a way that is 
comparable to the state. Even if we assume that their activities exert a real impact on the 
conduct of the local people, there are reasons to challenge the assertion that NGOs represent a 
transnational neo-liberal ideology and, as a result, create self-interested, entrepreneurial and 
market friendly personhoods. For one thing, NGOs are largely engaged in works that support 
state local development programmes and function conterminous with the national state 
development agenda (as in the case of sedentarisation outlined in the previous chapter) and 
does not implement independent global programmes. For another, as we have seen above, the 
scope and activities of NGOs at both the local and national levels are controlled by state legal 
and administrative frameworks, insofar as their staff are handpicked by the party224 and all their 
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programmes are liable to be revoked by shifting political necessities. This suggests that NGOs 
simply function within an authoritarian political hegemony of the state. 
10.2. State employees  
In Odda, the government controls the population through cadres of development workers 
trained in local government and private educational institutions. These include three health 
extension workers, three nurses, four DAs, a veterinary practitioner and fourteen teachers. They 
organise local inhabitants to development works, and, as such, mediate between the 
government and local inhabitants and represent the scale and reach of the state everywhere and 
in every aspect of citizens’ lives. They, in short, are important instruments that the state uses 
to claim ties to the grass roots. The positions they occupy (and their work) at state institutions, 
as I demonstrate below, determine how they give meaning to their subjectivities but also their 
understanding of the state. In what follows, I present their ‘worm’s-eye view’ of the state and 
how it operates. 
Nearly all of the local-level civil servants with whom I interacted described their role in the 
state system as agents of development. But they also insinuated that they were not as proud and 
satisfied with their work as the NGO staff. Most saw themselves as working more and earning 
less in comparison to NGO staff, whom they describe as working less and earning more. On 
the other hand, many of my informants described NGO work as ‘dependency-inducing’ for the 
people and counterproductive. A young DA said the following: ‘NGOs spoiled the people. 
They pay them for everything ... meetings, bush clearing, water well maintenance, etc. What 
people ask is that ‘what do you have to give to us?’ If you don’t have any tangible thing to give, 
you are not important to them. Your programme is not taken seriously … we have to use local 
militia or exact fines on people who fail to turn up for community work.’225 Similarly, another 
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DA commented, ‘they [NGOs] see money as a solution to everything … you cannot pay 
somebody to participate in his own empowerment programme. The moment you start to pay 
local people, you start to kill your programme.’226 He contended that sustainable livelihoods 
cannot be derived through cash handouts. For my informants, the NGOs, as the first informant 
mentioned, are seen as ‘cash dispensers’227, while the state is represented as the exact opposite.  
However, almost all of the state employees with whom I spoke were critical of how the 
government ran its development programmes. They described state works as goal-oriented and 
target-driven as opposed to process-oriented, and they complained that development goals were 
used as instruments of career performance management. A young DA, for instance, told me, 
‘our job is to hit targets set by the high-ups [high officials] ... the main problem with the 
government is that it is rigid. If it says that all of the PSNP beneficiaries should be graduated 
in five years, we should enable them to graduate in the time frame no matter what the 
circumstances are … If the government says Productive Safety Net Programme [PSNP] 
beneficiaries should demonstrate improvements in their lives in a year, then we should push 
beneficiaries to save and buy animals and report that farmer X bought a goat or chickens.’228 
The key impetus behind the PSNP, to which my informant referred, is for beneficiary 
households to become food secure in time and hence graduate. The highest priority for the DAs 
in this regard is therefore to hit targets and increase the number of graduating households. All 
of the DAs said that they were always under pressure from their bosses and were therefore 
always concerned about the consequences of having only a low number of graduates. In a 
moment of apparent frankness, the above-mentioned DA remarked: 
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To be honest, to have a poor person who is unlikely to be graduated is to run a career risk. 
We are evaluated on the basis of the number of people who are graduated under each of 
us. We are competing with one another. The one who has the highest number of graduates 
[among other criteria] is the most likely to have promotions and transfer to the woreda 
bureau.229 
In addition to the goal-oriented nature of the state’s work, my informants pointed out the 
authoritarian nature of the state as both a fundamental problem and its defining feature. One 
DA commented that ‘the one thing the government [woreda and zone administrations] doesn’t 
want is someone at the bottom to question the attainability of development targets. It would 
easily be taken as a sign of weakness or insubordination.’230 Similarly, another said, ‘there is 
no room to question or try to explain failures or problems in government programmes. They 
want success stories, and we report to them success stories.’231 According to my informants, 
the most important thing while dealing with the state is not to meet targets but rather to learn 
how to subvert the bureaucracy. In this regard, the informants were quite honest about ‘fudging 
numbers’ and ‘exaggerating reports’. The second informant mentioned above said, ‘it is not 
our fault. This is how the system works.’232 The state, from the everyday point of view of my 
informants, is therefore an organisation that is both separated from the dynamics of the 
everyday grassroots reality and authoritarian. As a result, its authority has to be subverted and 
avoided.  
The kebele health extension workers also expressed a similar perspective regarding the state. 
The extension workers are state employees devoted to implementing the national health 
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extension programme which aims at improving primary health services through a community-
based approach, with an emphasis on healthy living, preventive and basic-cure care. The head 
of the extension programme described their work to me as follows:  
We [health extension workers] are three. Each one of us is assigned to the three different 
sub-kebeles … one health worker serves a total of 333 households. Each of us makes 
between six and eight household visits every day except on Fridays [during which they 
complete paperwork and write reports]. Our goal is to train all households [in a package 
of] 16 preventive and basic curative services in a few years. So far, 120 households have 
graduated and received a certificate as model families [in recognition of successful 
implementation of the health package].233 
The extension workers saw the programme not only as a development project but also as part 
of a system that the state uses to evaluate their performance and determine their place in the 
state bureaucratic hierarchy. One extension worker commented:  
Our career fate depends on the success of the programme. Therefore, we work very hard. 
We walk an average of 5 km every day ... There is a strict supervision … the woreda 
health bureau undertakes reconnaissance inspections every time, moving from house to 
house. They check the number of households with new toilets and villages with waste 
disposal areas …. If we perform well, we can get promotions and education 
opportunities. … It puts stress on us.234  
In addition to the performance-related issue, the extension workers, in my discussion with them, 
expressed an understanding of a state that is vertically authoritative and which operates in a 
top-down manner. One extension worker said, ‘We get the blame for everything that goes 
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wrong in the programme. They simply photocopy and pass on instructions from above with an 
asterisk ‘for appropriate action’ or ‘for investigation’.’235 She wished that there was some 
structure below them to which they could pass down the barrage of instructions and letters. 
Another extension worker, using the following infamous mosquito net case, told me how orders 
‘from the state pit us against the local population’. She said, ‘once, the woreda administration 
called the residents to a malaria eradication campaign meeting and announced that they would 
distribute free mosquito nets to each and every household. After a month, they had sent out 
only 800 nets to distribute to 1142 households. We refused to distribute the nets and requested 
to have 342 more nets or for the officials themselves to come and explain to the people. In their 
response, they threatened us with disciplinary action and forced to distribute the 800 nets to 
poorer households. This created discontent and was rumoured to be corrupt, biased and 
impartial. Some even refused to welcome us in their houses.’236 This case involving mosquito 
nets was mentioned to me by a number of local inhabitants as a case through which to illustrate 
the problems of partiality and corruption within the state. Overall, the case exemplifies how 
unexplained state practices contribute to the making of the state as a corrupt institution and 
constitute state authority in negative terms which, in turn, shapes the administration of 
development programmes.  
Taken together, local state employees see themselves as instruments of development 
intervention rather than as agents participating in how development should be administered. In 
other words, they see themselves as the subjects of a hierarchical bureaucratic dominance and 
as tokens of, as opposed to part of, the state. Moreover, almost all of the kebele development 
workers expressed frustration at the government for being out of touch and detached from 
grass-roots realities. In doing so, they attempt to distance themselves from the state while also, 
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ironically, occupying positions in the state hierarchy and being perceived by the local 
population as state functionaries and administrators of state programmes. For their part, almost 
all of the state employees with whom I talked referred to their marginality in the state system 
to dissociate themselves from the state. Overall, my informants saw the state more as a top-
down, rule-bound, rigid and internally heterogeneous entity than as a coherent organisation.  
10.3.Popular imaginations 
State vs NGOs: the failed development 
A cross-section of the individuals I met during the course of my fieldwork in Odda talked about 
the state and development failure in the same breath. Many people saw development in terms 
of the provision of basic services such as drinking water, electricity, medicine in the local health 
centre, paved roads and agricultural inputs such as fertiliser and pesticides. Very often, many 
of these government-initiated and financed projects are either incomplete, never get off the 
ground or are dysfunctional. As a result, people expressed their frustration largely about their 
health post being without basic drugs, water pumps falling apart, a school with no books and 
not enough classrooms and promises of electrification and road clearance that were never 
fulfilled. To emphasise their point, many people compared the government’s failed projects to 
successful NGO projects. ‘The government has installed a faulty water pump in our village,’ 
explained one middle-aged man. He continued, ‘It took them two years to complete it, and yet 
it has broken down within a week of its installation. In a neighbouring village, their water pump 
was built by an NGO three years ago, and it is still functional.’237 Another person complained, 
‘the government people always come here to ask about our needs; they promise to bring us 
development and then nothing happens. The NGOs don’t talk, they come and build water walls 
and clear bushes. The government doesn’t give us anything for our participation in 
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development activities, but NGOs pay us not only when we clear bushes but also when we 
participate in meetings.’238 Others compared the extractive nature of the state to the charity of 
NGOs. ‘The NGOs give, but the government takes from us much more than it gives [in the 
form of development]. We pay tax, contribute to road construction, for the dam [the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam],’ said a middle-aged man.239 Similarly, another man said, ‘the 
government gave us the right to express our needs in meetings, and when we do express our 
needs, they tell us they would resolve all of our problems. When we then ask about the 
promised water pumps or electric supply, they get angry. They are only good at collecting our 
money.’240 For many of my informants, the state gives rights, but paradoxically it does not 
allow people to push their demands to it. The state talks and promises, but it does not deliver 
or give anything substantial. And worse, unlike NGOs, it requires material contributions from 
the people. For many, it is simply an extractive institution.  
To give one more example, one day, as I always did, I was sitting at my acquaintance 
Halake’s shop participating in a conversation – through my research assistant – that included 
Halake and three other local men. When I asked them about the development situation in Odda, 
all of them unanimously said, ‘there is no development by the government’. Halake then 
pointed to the cluster of government buildings, just about twenty-five feet from his shop. ‘Even 
those government houses were built by NGOs,’ he declared wryly. Gallo, one of Halake’s three 
friends, chimed in: ‘DAs office, the veterinary clinic, the teachers’ residence, cooperatives, all 
were built by AFD, and the health centre by SOS.’ At this point, Warrio, the other participant, 
interrupted Gallo to say ‘the health centre was also built by AFD’. As usual, the conversation 
turned into a heated debate about which NGO built which government office. Everyone was 
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speaking at once and there was no unanimous agreement in sight. The impasse, however, was 
broken when Halake mocked a regular visit of an OPDO/ERDF senior official to Borana as 
something motivated by his putatively ‘insatiable appetite and craving for the freshly grilled 
Borana breed of goat meat’.  
Usually, the main topics of conversation at Halake’s shop revolved more around discourses 
of state neglect than remoteness. The usual participants in conversations were aware not only 
of hierarchies but also, as their favourite conversation pastime, would mock and satirise the 
authorities who filled the state hierarchies. In such practices and talks, they demonstrated 
awareness of the kebele’s hierarchical connection to the trans-local through a chain of 
command, but this relationship of power did not bring them any of the benefits of development 
and modernity. On the other hand, while there was a clear understanding among my informants 
that development constitutes the function of the state, there was, at the same time, an articulate 
realisation and construction of the state as a resource-constrained entity dependent on foreign 
aid, and that they therefore expect development to come from NGOs.  
Taken together, the public imagination of the state portrays it as possessing a set of 
characteristics counterposed to those of NGOs. Whereas the state is represented as inefficient, 
resource-constrained, coercive and untrustworthy, NGOs are described as resourceful, 
democratic, charitable and trustworthy. In this sense, the state is constructed by way of 
comparison to the development practices of NGOs. 
The state as aid collector  
On the other hand, many other people considered the state’s main goal to be the canvassing of 
aid and the granting of permission for NGOs to undertake development work and distribute 
food so that the Borana do not suffer a famine. One farmer said, ‘The job of Meles was to ask 
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for money from the ferenji.241 We were very concerned when he died … we thought NGOs 
would be closed and we would no longer get any development.’ 242  Similarly, a PSNP 
beneficiary said, ‘before the death of Meles we used to get food aid every two months but 
shortly after his death we get it only once in six months. I think the new state is not asking for 
donations from the ferenji.’243 Another middle-aged inhabitant commented: ‘In the Derg period 
there was no development because the government didn’t allow NGOs. Only it is this 
government that allows NGOs to operate in Borana and bring us development and aid.’244 For 
my informants, it was only due to the state’s higher-level connection with the ferenji that the 
people at the local level received development benefits and food aid through NGOs. The NGOs’ 
involvement was thus a privilege bestowed by the state. However, while many people saw 
NGOs as repositories and dispensers of development, they also looked upon the state for critical 
functions such as obtaining land, processing paperwork and permission to join cooperatives.  
The state, participation and rumours  
One of the development-related concerns during the course of my fieldwork in Odda was a 
shortage of school classrooms. The members of the parent-teacher committee245 and Odda 
elementary school governing body whom I interviewed told me that the school classrooms 
were full beyond capacity because of sedentarisation. ‘More and more people are coming to 
Odda and are willing to send their children to school. As a result, the school is overcrowded, 
children sitting on the floor,’ explained the committee chairperson.246 By the end of the 2013 
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academic year, the parent-teacher committee included the issue of the lack of classrooms in 
their annual plan submitted to the woreda finance bureau and the woreda Council. Their plan 
involved a proposal to construct four new classrooms, two new toilets (for girls and boys) and 
maintenance work to the school fence. However, the plan was rejected by the finance bureau 
and council. One woreda finance bureau official explained: 
We have no money to approve their plan. The block grant247 that we get from the regional 
government is small [therefore, it is used] largely as a recurrent expenditure to meet 
administrative costs such as teachers’ salary and textbooks. Capital fund [from the block 
grant] constitutes less than 10 per cent … There is a high level of demand for public 
services. Discretionary capital expenditures are [therefore] carefully used towards the 
development of underprivileged kebeles. There are worse places than Odda.248 
The parent-teacher committee chair rejected this explanation claiming that the woreda, as per 
the rule, promised to cover 50 per cent of the construction costs of the new classrooms. He said, 
‘after they had promised to cover half of the cost in this year, we raised the annual community 
contributions from 10 [about £0.40] birr to 30 [about £0.60] birr per pupil, and so far have 
collected 38,000 birr [about £1,200]. Our aim is to collect 45,000 birr [about £1,450] [from 
parents’ contributions and the sale of school grass/fodder]. The parents also promised to 
contribute wood and in labour. But, they [the woreda administration] broke their promise.’249 
I should point out here that the involvement of the parents in the planning process was an 
instance of a bottom-up participatory development administration, which is a crucial part of 
the Ethiopian state’s decentralisation agenda (see Taye and Tegegne 2007). However, the 
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committee members expressed their frustration over their lack of power to implement new 
school development activities. The parent-teacher committee chair, for instance, complained: 
‘What is the point of submitting an annual school plan? The woreda almost always rejects our 
plan ….’250 The committee chair refers here to the usual practice whereby the woreda Council 
and finance bureau send back local plans for revision on the basis of allocated funds. From my 
informant’s point of view, the state’s action of encouraging the school committee to engage in 
annual school planning without any actual transfer of decision-making power is a waste of time. 
Even though the committee had the stated function of planning and administrating the school, 
their actual dependence on money earmarked by the central government belied their power, 
influence and the idea of community empowerment.  
Nevertheless, the committee members continued to look for other means of financing their 
project and, by the beginning of the academic year, the committee had, for example, sought 
help from NGOs but received none. After exhausting other options, the parent-teacher 
committee then decided to use half of their annual school grant to finance the construction of 
the additional classrooms. A school grant is a lump sum which can only be spent on expenses 
related to enhancing the quality of education. School grants, unlike block grants, reach the 
school directly in the form of cash and are managed by the parent-teacher committee. The 
school is not, however, allowed to spend the money on the construction of new classrooms or 
buildings. The woreda explained to the committee that the school grant comes as a ‘tied fund’ 
or an ‘earmarked fund’ that cannot be redirected to other purposes. If the school does not fully 
exhaust the grant during the current fiscal year, it then has to be returned to the woreda finance 
bureau.251 This, according to my informants, raised widespread discontent among the parents. 
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The woreda education and finance bureaus, as a response to the growing discontent, called a 
general meeting of all the parents and explained the rules and difficulties involved in 
redirecting earmarked funds. According to my informants who were present at the meeting,252 
the parents were not convinced and insisted that the woreda and the Borana Zone administrators 
reverse the rule. The representatives explained to the parents that the state rule establishes that 
the earmarked funds cannot be used for any purposes other than those for which they are 
earmarked and that the woreda and zone administrators and the regional president have no 
discretionary power to repeal or bend the rule or make an exception for Odda. 
For many of my informants, the official response that government rules and regulations limit 
the woreda and zone administrators and the regional president – and that the state restricts them 
– was not convincing. The most popular and widespread explanation was rather corruption. 
During my fieldwork, many rumours circulated in Odda that the woreda officials had 
embezzled the school money. ‘Why would the government send money to our school and make 
the woreda command us not to spend it on building classrooms? It does not make sense at all. 
In my opinion, they [woreda officials] want to eat the money,’ explained one middle-aged 
man.253 Similarly, Halake, the shopkeeper, commented, ‘the woreda is part of the mengist, but 
they say the state restricts them. This makes no sense. The government cannot be against itself. 
They are trying to fool us. I heard from one source it is what they [woreda officials] say when 
they want to eat the government money.’254 Another middle-aged man commented: ‘It is the 
money sent to our school from the government. But the woreda is putting obstacles. They don’t 
want our kebele to develop. They only want to enrich themselves.’255 The fact that the state 
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restricted the woreda was illogical for my informants. One middle-aged man drew the 
following analogy to explain his point: ‘Any person who put aside 100 birr to buy a chicken 
and made a rule to himself not to use the money for other purposes would never be bound by 
[the self-imposed] rule if he ran out of food or became ill. If what they say is true, the state can 
change its own rule. But the rumour is that they ate the money.’256 Clearly, for my informants, 
the state cannot bring limits on itself and its own authority. The local residents therefore 
demonstrated an understanding of a state that is not only a caring provider but also a seamless, 
non-contradictory unitary entity and not bound by its own rules.  
Some of the local residents, however, as part of the school parent-teacher committee, were 
given access to information about the government and enhanced their knowledge and 
experience of the state bureaucracy. In many of my interactions with the committee members, 
they demonstrated awareness of state hierarchies and criticised the messiness and 
contradictions of bureaucratic rationality. This gave them a unique position from which to 
imagine the state as a contradictory and rule-bound organisation.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, my purpose was to explore how localised and dispersed development practices 
promote an image of a unified state idea and also to demonstrate the ways in which the local is 
hierarchically interconnected to the centre. To this end, I have sketched a broad range of 
perspectives and discourses about government and NGO works that help different local actors 
to constitute different ideas of a unified state. On the one hand, NGO employees distinguish 
themselves from state functionaries, whom they describe as inept and undereducated, thus 
constructing an idea of a state rife with inefficiency and development failure. In the eyes of 
NGO workers, the work of state employees is driven by political and personal interests, 
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whereas NGOs are seen as self-motivated and genuine development actors. NGO workers’ 
imagination of the state is also shaped by government discourses of suspicion regarding the 
role of NGOs in what is considered to be an area that promotes the legitimacy of the state, 
namely that of development. On the other hand, state employees, by drawing attention to the 
target-driven and top-down approach to development work, reiterate the rule-bound, 
authoritative and hierarchical dimensions of the state. Furthermore, the views expressed by 
both state and NGO functionaries underscore how the local is imagined to be administratively 
linked to the centre. 
By contrast, in popular imaginations the state was portrayed as possessing a set of 
characteristics that are counterposed to those of NGOs. My informants described the state as 
an inefficient, coercive and untrustworthy institution and NGOs as resourceful, charitable and 
trustworthy.  
Overall, the discussion in this chapter demonstrates that differently positioned people 
develop different understandings of a unitary state idea. This tells us that the state manifests 
itself differently to differently positioned individuals in different contexts. As a result, people 
experience the state fragmentarily based on how they are placed in the government bureaucracy, 
the development sector (such as working in NGOs) and the wider social setting. And yet, 
paradoxically, it is through such experiences that perceptions of the coherence of state power 






This thesis has concerned itself with the construction of the state as an idea and everyday 
governance practices in Africa through the case of Ethiopia. It has done so based on an 
understanding of the state that differs from the view that is widely found in the study of the 
state in Africa. As outlined in the introduction of this thesis, in most of the literature on the 
state in Africa there has been a profound tendency to focus on precolonial traditions, colonial 
legacies and postcolonial forms of global domination while omitting the working of the state 
as it is practised and experienced at the local level. The result, on the one hand, is that the state 
is represented as a discrete political actor, both separate from and elevated above the population 
it governs. On the other hand, it is traduced for being shaped by a pathological ‘political culture’. 
In combination, these views have led to the reification of both the state in Africa and African 
political culture as homogenous, timeless and fixed entities. In departing from the existing 
studies, this thesis has avoided conceptualising the state in Africa as a fixed entity and instead 
sought to explore the mechanisms and processes by which it – through the case of Ethiopia – 
comes to be constructed by the people who inhabit it.  
At the centre of this study has been the reorientation of the source of legitimacy of the 
Ethiopian state by the EPRDF into a national project of state-directed development. As 
described in Chapter 2, the Ethiopian state has unusually intervened in people’s livelihood 
strategies through a national economic transformation agenda which includes the promotion of 
basic services such as the provision of universal primary health care, access to education and a 
focus on the agricultural productivity of smallholders. This is unusual since claims to political 
legitimacy were never traditionally established based on the rhetoric of economic 
transformation and development. As described in Chapter 4, the state has rather been built and 
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maintained in the name of religion, a monarchy and so on. For imperial Ethiopia, for instance, 
‘so essential was the defence of Ethiopian Christianity that the state had no secular goal of its 
own’ (Mesay 2008: 11). Similarly, during the Derg regime, the main raison d’être of the state 
was territorial integrity and national unity. By contrast, I have argued that the contemporary 
development-driven politics and the resultant enormous expansion in the development role and 
function of the state, especially at the kebele level, have helped to represent the state to its rural 
population and provided multiple sites and possibilities of state-society encounter. Hence, the 
thesis has argued that the kebele offers an especially good site from which to examine the 
everyday forms of state formation.  
Changes in the orientation of state legitimacy to economic transformation provided the 
thesis with a broader context and background while simultaneously focusing on the 
implications of such national development and political projects which are translated and 
interpreted variously through local governance practices, development activities and discourses, 
bureaucratic representations and the cultural values of local people. The thesis conceived of 
the state in Africa as an effect of ongoing practices and processes rather than as a given object. 
It thus interrogated the expression of the state through governance, development, bureaucratic 
and discursive practices in multiple local settings. It has also looked into what the state means 
as experienced and imagined by differently positioned actors (local people, state functionaries 
and NGO workers). 
Throughout, the thesis has attempted to offer accounts of different contexts of state-society 
interfaces. The early parts of my study extensively explored the local practices of governance 
at both the institutional and individual levels by delving into the lives of local people. The later 
parts focused more on the intersection between the micro and macro, formal and informal, etc. 
processes. In studying these processes, the thesis predominantly employed interpretive and 
situational analysis methods. While situational analysis provided the thesis with the tools to 
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analyse specific social and political events and practices, interpretative analysis (especially of 
discourses) helped me to place locally situated practices within their broader social and political 
context. 
Throughout the thesis, by exploring these processes and practices, I have at one and the 
same time demonstrated a disaggregated picture of governance practices and power relations 
and how this feeds into construction of the ‘state-idea’ (Abrams 1988). In so doing, the thesis 
argued that state formation is an ongoing process that consists of heterogeneous practices of 
governance and power relations that produce it as a seemingly coherent entity but which also 
embed it socially. 
In this final chapter I want to bring the main arguments of the thesis together by first 
presenting the decentred and labyrinthine nature of governance practices and state power and 
then by showing the processes through which the state as a seemingly unitary actor is imagined. 
Finally, I conclude by addressing the implications of the study for our understanding of the 
concept of mengist, the centre-periphery divide and the state in Africa. 
11.1. De-centring the state 
Throughout the thesis four sets of practices (governance, bureaucratic, development and 
discursive practices) allowed me to present the working and re/production of the state in 
Ethiopia in a relatively straightforward manner. However, as I described in Chapter 2, the 
distinction that I made between these different sets of practices was only heuristic in order to 
capture and analyse in depth the different processes through which the state comes to be 
constructed. With the task now complete, as I conclude this thesis, I would like to dispense 
with this distinction. Instead, I suggest that the bureaucratic, development and discursive 
practices are all encompassed by and contribute to governance and are overlaid with complex 
power relations. My purpose here is to demonstrate how governance practices embed the state 
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socially in everyday realities, specific constellations of power relations and social contexts. 
From this vantage point, in what follows I reflect on how the ideal of a unitary state is in 
practice marked by fractures in governance and power relations.  
The insights to be drawn from the thesis suggest that governance is not merely a function of 
policy and technological possibilities or ideological imperatives. It is also a social process 
which at the same time enables, constrains and eludes those institutions that constitute the state. 
As I have noted in a number of places in this thesis, central government regulations do not 
always underpin governance practices at the local level. In addition, rules are not always 
externally imposed but are also produced, negotiated and reshaped in the intersection between 
actors in multiple local settings. This takes place by actors operating within ‘a semi-
autonomous social field’ (Moore 1978) which is permeable and flexible, where alliances 
between actors are knotted together and shift and where political and material imperatives and 
ambitions alter. Here, local norms and state regulations are constantly questioned, manipulated, 
reshaped and rearticulated in new ways, producing new consequences. While certain aspects 
of legislation (central state interventions) are referred to in certain situations to legitimise a 
certain action, the very same legislation, in a different context, may also be used to refer to 
other ideas (see Chapter 8).  
Contingency in cases of decision-making fosters a multiplicity of norms (Blundo and Le 
Meur 2009; Olivier de Sardan 2013; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014) which in turn 
implies that negotiations between actors are not only about the pursuit of particularistic 
interests and economic or political gains but also about ways to interpret legislation, modes of 
deliberation and norms governing particular conduct (see Chapter 8).  
These processes, which are constitutive of the everyday operation of the state, are mediated 
by different arms of local state institutions. However, state institutions (such as the kebele, 
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cooperatives, etc.) are not available to all to the same degree; they privilege those actors who 
are in control of various forms of capital, including cultural, political, economic, etc. We have 
seen that some forms of capital are inherited or transmuted from the religious and customary 
spheres; others are associated with the process of the expansion of the developmental state. 
Some of the local elites, for example, draw their authority and status from (as we saw in Chapter 
8) complex networks of informal alliances with both local power structures within each kebele 
and outside of the kebeles, with woreda/zone officials. Others draw from their knowledge of 
the state bureaucracy (writing, reading) and from their ability to imbue national development 
discourses (see Chapters 5 and 9). By drawing on these forms of capital, local actors have been 
able to establish dominant positions at the kebele level and are thus able to determine the object 
and basic rules of the game. Class relations are contingent upon such specific configurations 
of local actors, their access to different forms of capital and their interactions with the local 
institutions that constitute the state.  
Indeed, as we have seen throughout the thesis, whatever power relations emerge, these are 
always overlaid with local moral ideals (moral economy expectations) that govern social 
conduct. Shared cultural practices and values connect the people with state agents and allow 
local people to negotiate with the authorities to secure access to the basic resources of survival 
(agricultural resources, land, etc.). This was clearly seen in Chapter 8, in the case of acts of 
petty corruption which, as it is understood locally, are socially acceptable in so far as they 
adhere to local notions of care, mutual help and reciprocity. Yet, at the same time, as we have 
also seen throughout the thesis, the complex enmeshment of local values and 
governance/development discourses now and then opens up the space for local residents who 
are disadvantaged by power relationships to contest the specific acts of state actors. As the 
study demonstrates, local people appropriate development discourses and employ them to 
criticise the conduct of local officials and the prevailing material conditions and aspects of local 
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relations of domination. In this way, we can conclude that resistance/ ‘counter-conduct’ takes 
place from within the existing field of power relations and hegemony (Foucault 2007: 194–5). 
Therefore, although governance practices are articulated and mobilised around state 
institutions, they are also socially and contextually constructed and they do not always emerge 
from a particular centre. Hence, in so far as governance practices do not stem from a stable 
centre, they are shaped more by their own contradictions and simmering tensions than by 
formal government principles. Each chapter in this thesis has in different ways highlighted 
aspects of this contradiction. To recapitulate, we saw first that the co-option of locally 
influential men through their being conferred preferential access to state-sanctioned 
agricultural resources sat uneasily beside the working of the state to legitimise itself by seeking 
to represent the interests of all sections of the rural population. This was illustrated in Chapters 
5 and 9 through the case of a class of model farmers and pastoralists. Common to this group of 
wealthy farmers and pastoralists is that they simultaneously occupy multiple positions as state 
officials, traditional leaders and business people. They have established a complex network of 
informal alliances with both local power structures within each kebele and outside the kebeles, 
with woreda/zone officials. These processes, as we have seen throughout the thesis, at the same 
time limit or exclude large sections of the population from direct access (without patronage) to 
the basic resources of livelihood. There is then an apparent contradiction between the state’s 
attempt to entrench authority both through claims to provide for the needs of the poor and 
through governing via the co-option of networks of patronage. 
Second, we saw in Chapter 6 that the central government institutions’ drive to control local 
activities and the imperatives of hierarchy run counter to the self-imposed principles of 
governance through a decentralised and bottom-up mechanism of accountability and active 
community participation. Moreover, we saw that the introduction of the WUA, with its aim of 
empowering the local population, had the effect of reproducing an image of an autonomous 
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state that is separate from the local population and of ghettoizing practices of abuse and 
corruption as community issues. The WUA was appropriated by local actors and thus was not 
available to all to the same degree (class, gender, etc.). The project was intended to undo local 
inequalities yet it also sustained those inequalities.  
Third, in Chapter 10, in Odda, tension between state functionaries and NGO workers over 
definitions of development and about the implementation of development programmes and 
who is best placed (equipped and work) to reach and benefit the local population profoundly 
shaped the nature of governance and the administration of development.  
Fourth, the stories of the marginalised subjects of Ethiopia – widows, women, landless youth, 
poor farmers and pastoralists, and informal sector workers – that I have recounted throughout 
this thesis show how they are re/constituted as underdeveloped subjects by the very same 
strategies of development discourses and practices that attempt to extricate them from poverty. 
We saw, for example, in Chapter 9 that at the same time as the Productive Safety Net provides 
food aid for the destitute, it also requires beneficiary households to become food secure and 
transform economically over time. Consequently, the poor have to perform and improvise as 
vulnerable and destitute (marginal) subjects in order to make themselves visible to the state 
authorities and thereby lay claim to state benefits, at the same time as they enact the identity of 
individuals undergoing transformation.  
Finally, the ethnographic material presented throughout the thesis has shown that the 
bureaucracy is not a monolithic organisation that works coherently to implement policy. On 
the contrary, the bureaucracy is made up of different arms and layers of institutions and 
processes which in turn are composed of different actors such as politicians and civil servants 
(DAs, health extension workers, teachers, veterinary practitioners, etc.) that have different 
agendas and interests. These different actors do not function as unified collectives. For example, 
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for civil servants at the lower level, the primary concern is not programme success and thus 
legitimacy, as it is for those at the upper level, but rather the production of reports and thus 
career development. The politicians at the lower level, on the other hand, are concerned with 
administrative issues, particularly with accommodating (by way of implementing, bending, 
manipulating, co-opting, etc.) new regulations. The dynamics involved in the intricate 
relationship between civil servants and politicians also demonstrates the tension between 
technocratic and personalised modes of governance. Further, as we saw in Chapter 5, 
governance practices in the bureaucracy are inflicted through social inequalities, tensions and 
exclusions based on class, gender, kinship and so on. 
We can therefore deduce that in light of such simmering tensions and conflicts, practices of 
governance are contingent upon ‘interface situations’ (Long and Villarreal 1993; Long 1992: 
2) and the specific ways in which power relations articulate in a particular context. In these 
processes, local institutions that constitute the state, local people, state functionaries and NGO 
staff members and non-state authorities are key mediating factors. As such, governance takes 
place through instances of competition a) between various levels and arms of the state system 
(kebele, woreda, etc., b) between different government workforces (civil servants, politicians, 
etc.) and c) between government departments and NGOs, as well as through contingent 
negotiations over norms, resources and methods that ensure compromise within and between 
competing actors as opposed to through concern with the formal law, policies or common 
agendas (development/welfare of the people).  
However, the contradictory conjunction of practices and power relations shapes the working 
and the outcome of development programmes in a manner that produces a coherence of effects. 
In Chapter 6, for example, we saw the ‘instrument-effect’ (Ferguson 1994: 265) of the 
implementation processes of the Koga irrigation scheme in fostering state-society distinction. 
Similarly, Chapter 9, through its analysis of sedentarisation and territorialisation cases, 
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demonstrated how governance practices brought about massive changes to the social landscape 
or created what Kapferer and Bertelsen (2009) call a ‘society of the state’. This process gave 
rise to a permanent kebele population and, as a corollary to this, the entrenchment of the 
‘modern’ legal framework which legitimates state authority.  
11.2. The state idea 
From the discussion above, a complex picture emerges in which the state in Ethiopia is without 
a priori coherence of action. It does not, as a monolithic actor, coherently shape practices on 
the ground, but its powers are inconsistent, dispersed, contradictory and concealed within 
multiple levels of social relations. Individual local actors bend and manipulate its rules and 
regulations; its policies are inconsistent and contradictory and they are not straightforwardly 
implemented. 
However, that said, as has been demonstrated throughout the thesis, the view of the state as 
a fully formed concrete entity is strongly entrenched within the popular imagination. In both 
Degga and Odda, one commonly hears local people invoke that ‘the state’ sends resources. 
Furthermore, state functionaries deploy the rhetoric of the state instrumentally in legitimising 
various practices of governance but also as a way of deflecting responsibility. 
 My study has shown that the appearance of the state as a coherent entity is politically and 
socially constructed through practices associated with governance, bureaucracy and 
development conducted by various actors. First, I have demonstrated that the state imaginary 
is reproduced at the local level through the many ‘micro-markers’ (Gupta 2012: 59) of state 
power such as meetings, representations (displays of material paraphernalia), devices of 
enumeration (report writing), supervision visits from higher-level officials and discourses of 
development and corruption. Institutional rites (such as meetings) are perpetually performed 
by state functionaries as a matter of routine and are thereby durably institutionalised, becoming 
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a habitus (Bourdieu 1997) as local people participate in these practices. These contribute to the 
re/production of state ideas in the context of local social life and also to the bolstering and 
sustaining of a reified image of the state as a distinctive, vertical and detached (from society) 
actor.  
Second, I have shown that the state idea is also constituted through local discourses about 
‘the art of being governed’ (Foucault 2007). We have seen that in Degga the state is very much 
associated with paternalistic care and expectations of providence, munificence and reciprocity. 
The state idea is also infused with powerful hopes of livelihood security and transformation. 
However, these hopes and expectations are usually frustrated by the perceived venality, 
corruption and partiality of local politics. As we have seen throughout the thesis, complaints in 
both Degga and Odda about the failure of development programmes/projects vis-à-vis the 
conduct of local officials are extensive and persistent. At the same time, however, local people 
continue to maintain an idea of the transcendent state, one which sends them the resources 
necessary for survival and around which their hopes and expectations for a better livelihood 
congeal. The promise of development has served as a dominant trope through which the state 
comes to be imagined, and this serves to neutralise the critical attitude/popular cynicism 
towards state power that is implicitly and explicitly expressed against local state functionaries. 
State ideas, then, are perpetually reproduced through hope and the expectation of a better 
livelihood, as the conduct of local state functionaries is simultaneously contested through 
counter-discourses. 
This generally contributes to the re/production of an understanding that the state appears to 
be both above and separate from local politics and society. This popular understanding of the 
state cannot be dismissed lightly as a mere illusion because it is continually reproduced and 
consolidated by practices which create the ‘effect of agency’ (Mitchell 1999: 84) and which 
have real consequences. We saw this very clearly in the case of the Koga irrigation and 
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watershed management project. That scheme was designed with the aim of bringing together 
two supposedly distinct entities: the state and the local community. Paradoxically, however, 
the project has reified the state as a self-contained actor with a mandate to mobilise the local 
population for development work by defining what community is and delineating those 
activities which ‘the local community’, as opposed to the state, will fulfil. Thus, the distinction 
was perceived as a real boundary and has been acted upon. Therefore, it should be taken 
seriously as it is useful for understanding the ways in which, as we saw in Chapter 6, 
development practitioners and bureaucrats involved with the implementation of development 
projects conceptualise the state and construct an objectified and abstract notion of community 
which is disembodied from empirical realities. 
11.3. Whither mengist?  
What, then, do we make of the concept of mengist? This study has shown that in public 
cultural discourses in Ethiopia mengist is described as a subject – named by a national leader. 
Here the concept of mengist has, at times, been attached to the person of a national leader 
as an individual and, at other times, to his role as a leader. We have also seen that mengist 
is imagined without reference to an incumbent and hence it was often attributed with abstract 
qualities. In such contexts, mengist was described through idioms of familial relations, 
projected onto the ‘family writ large’ or religious moral relations expanded into society, 
whose principal attributes include munificence, providence, impartiality and protection.  
Local values, expressed through metaphors and idioms, served to orient asymmetrical 
power relations between mengist and local people into a relationship (and mutual 
recognition) of responsibility and obligation. The ideal nature of this relationship meant that 
mengist was locally identified a priori. For example, people did not need to know or interact 
directly with any specific national leader in order to claim that mengist was responsible for 
obtaining and sending agricultural inputs and aid to the people (see Chapters 7 and 10). This 
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reified understanding of mengist enables people to distinguish between good mengist and 
bad mengist and between mengist as a transcendent subject and the structure of the 
administration by which it administers and controls the local population.  
We have also seen how some of the interlocutors treat mengist as a thing which imposes 
its control and power from above. State representatives employ mengist instrumentally to 
either advance their particularistic interests or legitimise development projects. NGO works 
often invoke a version of mengist that is authoritarian and dysfunctional.  
This diverse and complex everyday articulation of mengist demonstrates how the state in 
Ethiopia is culturally constructed as an effect of different practices. Hence, I would argue 
that, in studying the state in Ethiopia, it is essential to dispense with rigid definitions of the 
concept of mengist and investigations that focus on the absence or presence of distinctions 
(such as mengist vs party, mengist vs government, mengist vs hagere-mengist) and to instead 
focus on the social and political processes in which meaning is embedded. It should be 
emphasised that, as Bartelson (2001: 2) has suggested, the concept of the state ‘cannot be 
fully determined by the character of its semantic components or by its inferential 
connections to other concepts, since it is the concept of the state that draws these 
components together into a unity and gives theoretical significance to other concepts on the 
basis of their inferential and metaphorical connections to the concept of the state, rather than 
conversely’. I argue that state formation can be fruitfully explored from a vantage point that 
goes beyond semantic distinctions and explore specific configurations of practices, a process 
shaped by the ongoing contingencies of power relations, as well as the actions, expectations 
and hopes of the people involved in the process.  
Importantly, this is not to say that we should dispense with the term mengist altogether, but 
that we need to recognise and stress the social and political processes that go into its contingent 
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re/production. Certainly, the concept of mengist as an idea is very powerful because it is imbued 
with complex meaning; hence we can learn a great deal from paying critical attention to its 
ideal nature. For example, as we saw in Chapter 7, the semblance of division between the 
subliminal and profane, impartial and partial and the state from above and below serves as a 
source of legitimacy for the national leadership among the rural masses. 
Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 4, the concept of mengist is embedded in the knowledge of 
Ethiopia as a state with self-generated, independent and resilient political and cultural 
institutions. Particularly noteworthy is that this knowledge of Ethiopia for decades imbued 
many educated Ethiopians with a sense of being exceptional, as part of a state civilization vis-
à-vis the rest of Africa. As Clapham (2006: 111) points out, the ‘cognitive dissonance between 
an inherited sense of cultural superiority and an acute awareness of Ethiopian “backwardness” 
has for long driven their aspirations of development’. In the academic literature, the same 
knowledge promoted a single reified Ethiopian state as a trans-historic entity. Conversely, the 
concept of mengist understood as a trans-historic entity produces resistance and imaginations 
of group identities as outside the historical imaginary. 
In this study, I have purposely focused on ongoing local practices and the manner in which 
they contribute to state formation. From this point of view, I have explored mengist as an idea 
and as a constellation of practices and processes. I have therefore not fully examined historical 
imaginary of the state. A fruitful area for further research would therefore be a critical 
examination of the idea of mengist as it is enunciated in religious and ethnic discourses that 
project the state as a trans-historic entity and that tend to produce resistance.  
However, I would also argue that diachronic analysis of the state idea conceals less visible 
aspects of politics such as variations in regimes of practices in relation to different ‘temporal 
and spatial contexts’ (Nugent 2011: 257). I would argue that mengist should be understood as 
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being tied to a particular historical context and not as a sui generis explanatory concept; it 
should not be categorically transferred to a different time or historical context.  
11.4. Centre-periphery revisited 
I now turn to the implications of the thesis for our understanding of geographic variations in 
the conduct of the state in Ethiopia. As I described in the introduction, on the surface, the two 
local communities at the centre of this study seem to differ from one another in every important 
way; they inhabit two geographically distinct spaces, speak different languages, live by 
relatively different modes of subsistence and have relatively distinct cultural identities. These 
regional variations provide a point of entry for scholars to frame the Ethiopian state system as 
being structured in an asymmetry of centre-periphery power relations. The centre-periphery 
paradigm presupposes and reproduces a spatial assumption whereby the Abyssinian (as a centre) 
is depicted as a centre of state power and the periphery (the rest) as areas on the edge of state 
power.  
By contrast, the ethnographic evidence presented throughout this thesis demonstrates that 
this spatial binary is not tenable in practice. Such a rigid centre-periphery framework obscures 
complex power relations and changes that have occurred at the local level, especially for those 
people who live in the lowlands of Ethiopia. I argue that the peripheries are defined more by 
the patchiness of state institutions they once contained as opposed to being based on current 
empirical realities. As I demonstrated in Chapter 9, the reach of state institutions has recently 
been expanded territorially through the presence of schools, health posts and various 
development programmes. In this sense, despite their geographic location, the Borana are 
interconnected in numerous ways to the centre that constitutes Ethiopia. 
The centre-periphery approach universalises the identities of both the peoples of ‘the centre’ 
and ‘the periphery’. It assumes a natural affinity of experiences of the state among similarly 
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identified (geographically, culturally and historically) groups of people. In so doing, it glosses 
over the state practices and development discourses that sustain status distinctions, hierarchies 
and power relations across cross-cultural and geographic boundaries.  
In this thesis, my fieldwork sites, instead of serving as representative cases of the centre and 
periphery, are brought within a single analytical frame in order to illuminate the heterogeneous 
process of state formation. However, my analysis does not merely highlight distinct but 
homogeneous experiences and processes of state formation as they have transpired across 
space. The emphasis on differentially positioned local actors at each of the two field sites offers 
a more complex picture of governance practices and state idea. Hence, there is a variable 
manifestation of a range of different experiences and discourses, and thus of state imaginations, 
which in some circumstances are specific to a particular kebele while in others they are an 
integral component or local variations of more general processes. This reminds us that, in 
studying the state in Ethiopia, our framing needs to reflect the everyday life and experiences 
of people situated not only at the spatial but also at the social, political and economic margins, 
including the ways in which they actively engage with the state in complex and multiple ways. 
At a broader level, my concern was not to explore Borana in isolation. Instead, a central 
concern has been to investigate state formation by looking at the intersection between the local 
and the national as well as mediations by non-state authorities such as NGOs. Chapter 9 
demonstrated that central state projects (such as sedentarisation and territorialisation) are 
mediated by NGOs and shaped by entrenched local social interests and interactions with the 
local population. An important conclusion here is that the performance of state power in Borana 
takes place at the nexus of national and local interests – and through a complex and shifting 
axis of power relations among state actors, non-state actors (NGOs) and diverse local 
population groups (wealthy politicians, ordinary people and welfare dependants). Hence, 
everyday governance practices and power relations at regional and local levels are not merely 
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the result of state formation at the centre; they also inform and constitute the state formation 
process itself. 
In general terms, the thesis has attempted to widen our understanding of state and society 
relations in Ethiopia by taking the level of analysis down to the local level and also by 
questioning the meaning and usefulness of central categories of analysis, such as the state, 
centre-periphery, culture, tradition and modernity. This study, however, has not addressed all 
of the practices, elements and referents related to state formation in Ethiopia. The thesis has 
not, for example, addressed ethnicity. Further studies are needed to analyse the more nuanced 
interface of the micro-politics of identity politics and state formation. The study has also not 
devoted sufficient discussion to the process of state formation in Borana. Carrying out similar 
comparative research in the same or other areas would clearly be beneficial in order to have a 
more balanced picture of state formation in Ethiopia as well as in establishing a wider 
applicability to my findings. Moreover, the study has attempted to bring to the fore the views 
and experiences of farmers, pastoralists, women, rural traders, shopkeepers, daily labourers, 
the rural youth, state functionaries and NGO workers. However, the study has not sufficiently 
explored the voice and experiences of women. Thus, a specific study is needed to deal with the 
experiences and views of women. Finally, what this study has broached or demonstrated about 
the state, political culture and class relations, etc. generates possibilities for further explorations 
of democracy, decentralisation and development intervention, etc. Thus, it is crucial that 
specific studies be devoted to each subject. 
11.5. Towards an Ethnography of the state in Africa 
Finally, I turn to the implications of this study for the general project of the state in Africa. At 
the broadest level, my study has situated state formation within the changing context of African 
political economy. The past few decades have witnessed a number of important transformations 
that have generated new questions about the state in Africa and its conduct. Most especially, 
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development has emerged as the legitimating function of state power. I have argued that in 
light of changing material and ideological conditions, the state in Africa can no longer easily 
be captured under the themes of ‘the politics of the belly’ (Bayart 2009), criminal power 
relations (Bayart et al. 1999) or a particular ‘African political culture’ or any other abstracted 
social norms. The complex conjectures of the livelihood activities pursued by local people, and 
the ways that these are guided by, re/articulated and imbibed in the context of shifts in the 
economy, technologies of rule and development projects such as agricultural and cooperative 
schemes, industrial strategies and programmes of poverty reduction shape the working of the 
state and the way people interact with them on a daily basis.  
Within this context, the state in Africa emerges as central to the dynamics of everyday life 
and power relations in many ways. The empirical material has demonstrated that the different 
local institutions that constitute the state are central to local social and political life. However, 
the centrality of the state does not mean that it controls every aspect of social life, rather that it 
articulates power relations which affect social processes, and thus the conduct of people. This 
means that the state as an idea, and through its bureaucratic presence, shapes social relations at 
least as much as, if not far more than, social relations shape the state. There are different ways 
in which the state exerts its influence. For example, as we saw in Chapter 6, state discourses of 
development and the awareness that development constitutes the responsibility of the state 
perpetually construct subject dispositions that are amenable to the language of development. 
The study has shown that modernist development discourses enable local people to construct 
state power in a way that holds its functionaries responsible for failing to deliver development 
resources, to develop their localities, etc. Thus, state-generated development discourses can at 
once be a mechanism that is used to enunciate rights, press for fair access to government 
programmes, demand material transformations and enact the politics of patronage and 
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inclusion/exclusion. Hence, the state has proven central in how meanings associated with 
responsibilities of the state in relation to development are locally constituted. 
 Moreover, state institutions can mobilise and codify power and class relations, in addition 
to influencing which sections of the local population, how and to what extent are embedded in 
state institutions. Given this, we can conclude that in the everyday workings of the state, 
particular social configurations such as class relations and patronage networks are at least 
partially shaped, influenced and even constituted by the state, and they are definitely predicated 
on the state’s coercive and bureaucratic apparatus to institute and enforce them. Hence, a focus 
on the informal without relating it to the context of bureaucratic power and everyday 
governance practices that enable the production of hierarchies and social classes obfuscates the 
mechanisms and power relations that give the state a material reality and re/produce it as a 
seemingly unified entity. 
Overall, this study shows that the state in Africa matters to the local people in at least two 
significant ways. First, in its local presence, whereby we have seen that state power is exercised 
in active ways through its agents. Secondly, the notion of state is discursively appropriated as 
a resource of legitimation of claims and actions or as a resource to articulate resistance against 
local structures of domination. 
But at the same time, it is important to recognise that the state in Africa is also deeply 
embedded in social networks and is shaped by local values. As I have shown throughout this 
thesis, as much as the local population is encompassed and shaped by the state’s hierarchy and 
power, the state apparatus has in turn been incorporated into the local population to a different 
degree. In other words, local governance practices are anchored in the everyday reality of social 
and economic life, social norms, familial obligations and power interests. The social character 
of governance therefore conditions the working of the state. We have seen that local cultural 
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values and moral economy precepts shape the ways in which people imagine the state’s 
responsibilities by way of, for example, comparison to spiritual patronage. Further, as we saw 
in Chapter 8, what is locally accepted as governance involved petty corruption. This suggests 
that while the organisational structure of the state transcends the local, its institutions, policies 
and personnel are tightly embedded in the local social context, which constitutes the state as ‘a 
part of society and apart from society’ (Migdal 2001: 263). Central to the study of the state in 
Africa in this sense is an understanding that the state and society are neither neatly bounded 
distinct domains nor is the state completely overtaken by social forces.  
In conclusion, this study is a small contribution to the growing body of ethnographic 
scholarship on the state in Africa (Lund 2006; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006; Hagmann 
and Péclard 2010; Friedman 2011). An attempt has been made to distinguish the thesis by 
emphasising its distinctive points of departure on a set of practices, namely governance, 
bureaucratic, development and discursive practices. In so doing, it suggests that study of the 
state in Africa should not only be linked to ethnographic perspectives of state formation but 
also to the changing nature of African political economy and especially to the situated and 
changing contexts and specificities of practices. What my study has revealed, if anything, is 
the complexities of power relations and contradictions and layers of enmeshment between state 
bureaucracy and governance practices as well as the multiplicity of the state idea. This points 
to the need to avoid singular readings of the nature and operation of the state in Africa. Rather, 
based on the findings of this study, I suggest that the various and specific referents that produce 
the state need to be contextually identified. I would argue that situational analysis (Gluckman 
1958; Mitchell 1983; Kapferer1987) and interpretative methods (Geertz 1973; Bevir and 
Rhodes 2010) of local practices can reveal the working of the state as it is practised and 
experienced by local people, state and non-state actors as well as the specific ways in which 
these operations are embedded in social realities. This demands giving primacy to agency and 
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meaning-making. Since agency ‘attributes to individuals the capacity to process social 
experience and to devise ways of coping with life’ (Long 2001:16), it allows us to explore the 
ways in which the state is experienced in contemporary Africa as well as in the public life, 
agricultural and other practices of rural people. This also helps us avoid treating the local level 
as a testing ground for more general processes. Instead, I would argue that, in studying the state 
in Africa, we need to pay attention to specific contingencies of power relations and governance 

















 Books and Articles 
Aalen, L. 2011. The Politics of Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Actors, Power and Mobilisation under 
Ethnic Federalism, Leiden: Brill. 
Abbink, J. 2006. Discomfiture of democracy? The 2005 election crisis in Ethiopia and its 
aftermath. African affairs, 105(419), pp 173-199. 
Abeje B. and Ezana A. 2011. Peasant Entrepreneurship and Rural Poverty Reduction: A Case 
Study of Model Farmers in Bure Woreda West Gojjam Zone, FSS Monograph No. 8. 
Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies. 
Abrams, P. 1988. Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State. Journal of historical sociology, 
1(1), pp 58-89. 
Addis H. 1975. Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, London: Review of African Political 
Economy. 
Agrawal, A. 1999. Community-in-conservation: tracing the outlines of an enchanting concept. 
In A new moral economy for India's forests? Discourses of community and 
participation, edited by R. Jeffery and N. Sundar, 92-108. New Delhi: Sage.  
Andreas E. 2003. Ethnic Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics. In First National 
Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, edited by G. Barnabas, 142–
71. Addis Ababa: United Printers.  
Asafa J. 1993. Oromia & Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict, 1868- 1992, 
Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Asmerom L. 1973. Gada: Three approaches to the study of African society, The Free Press, 
New York. 
Asnake K. 2013. Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: a comparative regional study, 
London; New York: Routledge. 
322 
 
Assefa F. 2014. Development with or without Freedom? In Reflections on Development in 
Ethiopia: New Trends, Sustainability and Challenges, edited by Dessalegn R, et al., 
67–96. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies. 
Bach, D. 2012. Conclusion: Neopatrimonial and developmental—the emerging states’ 
syndrome. In Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond, edited by Bach, D and Gazibo, 
M, 221–24. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
Bach, J.N. 2011. Abyotawi democracy: neither revolutionary nor democratic, a critical review 
of EPRDF's conception of revolutionary democracy in post-1991 Ethiopia. Journal of 
Eastern African Studies, 5(4), pp 641-663. 
Bahru Z. 1991. A history of modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974, London: James Currey. 
Bahru Z. 2008. Society, state, and identity in African history, Addis Ababa: Forum for Social 
Studies. 
Bartelson, J. 2001. The Critique of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bassi, M., 1997. Returnees in Moyale district, Southern Ethiopia: New means for an old inter-
ethnic game. In Pastoralists, ethnicity and the state in Ethiopia, edited by R. Hogg, 23–
54. London: Haan Publishing. 
Bassi, M. 2005. Decisions in the Shade. Political and Juridical Processes among the Oromo-
Borana, Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. 
Bassi, M. 2010. The politics of space in Borana Oromo, Ethiopia: demographics, elections, 
identity and customary institutions. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 4:221–246. 
Baxter, P. T. W., Hultin, J., and Triulzi, A. 1996. Introduction. In Being and Becoming Oromo: 
Historical and Anthropological Enquiries, edited by P. T. W. Baxter, J. Hultin, and A. 
Triulzi, 7–25. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.  
Bayart, J.-F. 2009. The state in Africa: the politics of the belly, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press. 




Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. 2006. Governance Stories, Abingdon: Routledge. 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. 2010. The State as Cultural Practice, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bevir, M. 2013. A Theory of Governance, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. 2015. Interpretive Political Science: Mapping the field. In The 
Routledge handbook of interpretive political science, edited by M. Bevir and R. A. W. 
Rhodes, 3–27. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. 2016. Rethinking Governance: Ruling, rationalities and 
resistance, Abingdon: Routledge. 
Bierschenk, T. & Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 2014. States at work: dynamics of African 
bureaucracies, Leiden; Boston: Brill. 
Blundo, G., and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (ed.) 2006. Everyday Corruption and the State: Citizens 
and Public Officials in Africa, London: Zed Books. 
Blundo, G., and P.-Y. Le Meur. 2009. An Anthropology of Everyday Governance : Collective 
Service Delivery and Subject Making. In The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: 
Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective Services, edited by G. Blundo and 
P.-Y. Le Meur, 1–37. Leiden: Brill. 
Boone, C. 2003. Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and 
Institutional Choice, New York: Cambridge University. 
Borzel, T. A. and Risse, T. 2010. Governance without a state: Can it work? Regulation and 
Governance 4(2): 1-22. 
Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Bourdieu, P. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
324 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1990. The logic of practice, Polity Press. 
Bourdieu, P. 1999. Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. In 
State/culture: state formation after the cultural turn, edited by G. Steinmetz, 52-76. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Branch, D., and N. Cheeseman. 2009. Democratization, sequencing and state failure in Africa: 
Lessons from Kenya. African Affairs, 108. no. 430: 1-26. 
Bratton, M. and Van De Walle, N. 1994. Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in 
Africa. World Politics, 46, pp. 453−-489. 
Bujra, J. 2006. Lost in translation? The use of interpreters in fieldwork. In Doing development 
research, edited by V. Desai & R.B. Potter, 172–179. London: Sage. 
Burawoy, M. 2009. The Extended Case Method. Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great 
Transformations and One Theoretical Tradition, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Carlyle, T. 1841. On Heroes Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History, London: James Fraser. 
Chabal, P. & Daloz, J.-P. 1999. Africa works: disorder as political instrument, Oxford: James 
Currey. 
Cheeseman, N, Whitfield, L & Death, C. (eds.) 2017. The African Affairs Reader: Key Texts 
in Politics, Development, and International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chojnacki, S.1993. The Theme of the Bitter Water in Ethiopian Painting. In Aspects of 
Ethiopian Art from Ancient Aksum to the 20th Century, edited by Paul B. Henze, 53-
67. London: JED Press. 
Clapham, C. 1969. Haile-Selassie's government, London: Longman. 
Clapham, C. 1982. Clientelism and the State. In Private Patronage and Public Power: Political 
Clientelism in the Modern State, edited by Clapham, C, 93-135. London: Frances Pinter. 
Clapham, C. 1988. Transformation and continuity in revolutionary Ethiopia, Cambridge: 
325 
 
Cambridge University Press. 
Clapham, C. 1994. Review article: the longue durée of the African state. African Affairs, 93 
(372), 433–9. 
Clapham, C. 1996. Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Clapham, C. 2002a. Rewriting Ethiopian History. Annales d’Ethiopie, 18, no.3:37-54. 
Clapham, C. 2002b. Controlling Space in Ethiopia. In Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism & After, 
edited by James W., et al., 9–30. Oxford: James Currey. 
Clapham, C. 2006. Ethiopian development: The politics of emulation. Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics, 44(1), pp 137-150. 
Clifford, J. 1986. Introduction: Partial truths. In Writing culture: The poetry and politics of 
ethnography, edited by J. Clifford & G. Marcus, 1–26. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Comaroff, J & Comaroff, J. 1991. Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism and 
Consciousness in South Africa, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Coppock, D.L. 1994. The Borana plateau of southern Ethiopia: Synthesis of pastoral research, 
development and change, 1980-91. Systems study No. 5. Addis Ababa: International 
Livestock Center for Africa. 
Corbridge, S., et al., 2005. Seeing the state: governance and governmentality in India, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Corrigan, P. and D. Sayer 1985. The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural 
Revolution, Oxford, New York: B. Blackwell, 1985. 
Crane, T.A., 2013. The role of local institutions in adaptive processes to climate variability: 
The cases of southern Ethiopia and southern Mali. Oxfam Policy and Practice: Climate 
Change and Resilience, 9(1), pp.5-38. 
326 
 
Crummey, D. 1980. Abyssinian feudalism. Past & Present, (89), pp 115-138. 
Crummey, D. 1986. Banditry and resistance: noble and peasant in nineteenth-century Ethiopia. 
In Banditry, rebellion, and social protest in Africa, edited by D. Crummey, 133–149. 
London: James Curry. 
Crummey, D. 2000. Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia: from the 
Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century, Oxford: James Currey. 
Czarniawska, B. 2007. Shadowing and other techniques for doing fieldwork in modern 
societies, Malmo: Liber and Copenhagen Business School Press. 
Das, V. & Poole, D. 2004. Anthropology in the margins of the state, Santa Fe, NM: School of 
American Research Press. 
De Herdt, T. and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan. 2015. Real Governance and Practical Norms in Sub-
Saharan Africa: The Game of the Rules, New York: Routledge. 
Della Porta, D. and Keating, M.. 2008. How Many Approaches in the Social Sciences: An 
Epistemological Introduction. In Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: 
A Pluralistic Perspective, edited by D., Della Porta and M., Keating, 19–39. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dereje F. 2011. Playing different games. The paradox of Anywaa and Nuer identification 
strategies in the Gambella region, New York and Oxford, Berghahn Books. 
Dessalegn R. 1984. Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia. Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies. 
Dessalegn R. 2014. Large-Scale Land Investments Revisited. In Reflections on Development 
in Ethiopia: New Trends, Sustainability and Challenges, edited by Dessalegn R, et al. 
Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies. 




de Waal, A. 2013. The theory and practice of Meles Zenawi: A reply to René Lefort. African 
Affairs, 112(448), pp 471-475. 
de Waal, A. 2015. The real politics of the Horn of Africa: money, war and the business of 
power, Cambridge; Polity. 
Djaballah, M. 2013. Foucault on Kant, Enlightenment, and Being Critical. In A Companion to 
Foucault, edited by Christopher F., Timothy O'Leary, and Jana S., 264-281. Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Donham, D.L. 1986. Old Abyssinia and the new Ethiopian empire: themes in social history. In 
The Southern marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in history and social anthropology, 
edited by D. Donham & W. James. 3-48. Oxford: James Currey. 
Donham, D. L. & James, W. 1986. The Southern marches of imperial Ethiopia: essays in 
history & social anthropology, Oxford: James Currey. 
Donham, D.L. 1999. Marxist modern: an ethnographic history of the Ethiopian revolution, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Donham, D.L. 2002. The Promise of 1991: Re-Shaping the Future & the Past: Introduction. In 
Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After, edited by W. James, D. Donham, E. 
Kurimoto & A. Triulzi, 151-54. Oxford: James Currey. 
Draude, A. 2007. How to Capture Non-Western Forms of Governance: In Favour of an 
Equivalence Functionalist Observation of Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series 2. 
Ege, S. 2017. Land tenure insecurity in post-certification Amhara, Ethiopia. Land Use Policy, 
vol. 64. 
Emmenegger, R., Keno, S., & Hagmann, T. 2011. Decentralization to the household: expansion 




Englebert, P. 1997. The contemporary African state: Neither African nor state. Third World 
Quarterly, 18(4), pp 767-776. 
Englebert, P. 2002. State Legitimacy and Development in Africa, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Englebert, P. 2009. Africa: unity, sovereignty, and sorrow, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Englebert, P. 2013. Separatism in Africa. In African Security Handbook, edited by J. Hentz, 
147-156. Routledge Press. 
Erdmann, G. and Engel, U. 2007. Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and 
Elaboration of an Elusive Concept. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 45(1), 
95-119. 
Evans, P. (ed.) 1997. State Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Fecadu G. 1994. The post-revolutionary rethinking of arid land policy in Ethiopia. Nomadic 
Peoples, 34/35: 69-79 
Ferguson, J. 1994. The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Ferguson, J. & Gupta, A. 2002. Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal 
Governmentality. American Ethnologist, 29(4), pp. 981–1002. 
Ferguson, J. 2006. Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order, Durham N.C.: Duke 
University Press. 
Foucault, M. 1972. The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Tavistock. 
Foucault, M. 1977. Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison, 1st American ed, New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
Foucault, M. 1978. The History of Sexuality, New York: Random House 
Foucault, M. 1980. Truth and Power. In Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977, 
edited by C Gordon, 146–165. New York: Pantheon Books. 
329 
 
Foucault, M., 1991. Governmentality. The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality, edited 
by Burchell, G., Gordon, C. & Miller, P. Chicago, 119-150: University of Chicago Press. 
Foucault, M. 1997. What is Critique. In The Politics of Truth, edited by S. Lotringer & L. 
Hochroth, 23–87. New York: Semiotexte. 
Foucault, M. 2007. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–
78, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Friedman, J. T. 2011. Imagining the post-apartheid state: An ethnographic account of Namibia, 
New York: Berghahn Books. 
Fuller, C. J. & Harris, J. 2001. For an Anthropology of the Modern Indian State. In The 
Everyday State and Society in Modern India, edited by C. J. Fuller & V. Benei. New 
Delhi: Social Science Press. 
Galaty, J. 1999. Grounding pastoralists: law, politics, and dispossession in East Africa. 
Nomadic Peoples, 3(2):56-73 
Gebru T. 1996. Ethiopia: power & protest: peasant revolts in the twentieth century, 
Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. 
Geertz, C. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books. 
Getachew H. 1986. The unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 24(03), pp 465-487. 
Getie G. 1999. Peasant Poetics and State Discourse in Ethiopia: Amharic Oral Poetry as a 
Response to the 1 996-97 Land Redistribution Policy. Northeast African Studies, vol. 
6, no. 1- 2, pp. 171-206.  
Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society: An Outline of the Theory of Structuration, 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gluckman, M. 1958, Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand, Rhodes Livingstone 
Papers, no.28, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
330 
 
Gluckman, M. (ed.) 1964. Closed Systems and Open Minds: The Limits of Naivety in Social 
Anthropology, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. 
Gold, R. 1958. Roles in Sociological Field Observation. Social Forces, 36 (3): 217–223. 
Gupta, A. 1995. Blurred boundaries - the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and 
the imagined state. American Ethnologist, 22(2), pp 375-402. 
Gupta, A. 1998. Postcolonial developments: agriculture in the making of modern India, 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Gupta, A. 2012. Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India, Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press. 
Gupta, A., & Ferguson, J. 1997. Culture, power, place. Ethnography at the end of an era. In 
Culture, power, place: Explorations in critical anthropology, edited by Gupta, A., & 
Ferguson J, 1–29. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Hagmann, T. & Abbink, J. 2011. Twenty years of revolutionary democratic Ethiopia, 1991 to 
2011. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 5(4), pp 579-595. 
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Interview Codes  
During the interview, I asked participants about their social position, life experiences and self-
understanding. At a later stage, I used the socio-economic position of narrators both to 
thematically examine the interviews and anonymise their identities. The interview codes 
therefore identify social positions and attributes such as gender, socio-economic status, age, 
etc.  
Interviews in West Gojjam (Chapters 5 - 8) 
#1Interview, model farmer and senior kebele official, Degga, October 2014. 
#2 Interview, model farmer, Degga, September 2014. 
#3 Interview, model farmer, Degga, September 2014. 
# 4 Interview, model farmer and senior kebele official, Degga, October 2014. 
#5 Interview, DA, Degga, November 2014 
#6 Interview, DA, Degga, November 2014 
#7 Interview, DA, Degga, November 2014 
#8 Interview, health extension worker, Degga, October 2014.  
#9 Interview, health extension worker, Degga, October 2014.  
#10 Interview, health extension worker, Degga, October 2014.  
#12 Conversation, civil servant, Degga, October 2014. 
#13 Interview, PMU officer, Woreda town, October 2014. 
#14 Interview, senior PMU officer, Woreda town, October 2014. 
#15 Interview, Amhara bureau of water resources official#15, Bahir Dar, October 2014. 
#16 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, October 2014. 
 #17 Interview, middle-aged woman, Degga, October 2014. 
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#18 Interview, middle-aged trader-cum-farmer, Degga, October 2014. 
#19 Interview, a young farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
#20 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
#21 Interview, senior PMU committee member, Woreda town, November 2014. 
#22 Interview, woreda senior civil servant, Degga, October 2014. 
#23 Interview, woreda politician, Woreda town, October 2014. 
#24 Interview, head of the WUA, Degga, November 2014. 
#25 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, October 2014. 
#26 Interview, an elderly man, Degga, October 2014. 
#27 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, October 2014. 
#28 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, October 2014. 
#29 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, October 2014. 
#30 Interview, an elderly man, Degga, October 2014. 
#31 Interview, young man, Degga, October 2014. 
#32 Interview, middle-aged woman, November 2014. 
#33 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
#34 Interview, widowed woman, November 2014. 
#35 Interview, middle-aged farmer, November 2014. 
#36 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, October 2014. 
#37 Conversation with middle-aged farmer, Degga, September 2014. 
#38 Conversation with middle-aged farmer, Degga, September 2014. 
#39 Conversation with a young man, Degga, September 2014. 
#40 Interview, a young labourer, Degga, October 2014. 
#41 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, September 2014. 
#42 Interview, a young farmer, Degga, September 2014. 
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#43 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, September 2014. 
#44 Interview, an elderly man, Degga, November 2014. 
#45 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
#46 Interview, an elderly man, Degga, November 2014. 
#47 Interview, unemployed young man, Degga, November 2014. 
#48 Interview, unemployed young man, Degga, November 2014. 
#49 Conversation with local elder, Degga, November 2014. 
#50 Interview, young woman, Degga, November 2014. 
#51 Conversation, a young resident, Degga, October 2014. 
 #52 Conversation, a young resident, Degga, October 2014. 
Interviews in Borana (Chapters 9 and 10) 
#1 Interview, Abba Reera, Odda, Odda, December 2014. 
#2 Interview, Abba Reera, Odda, Odda, December 2014. 
#3 Interview, Abba Olla, Odda, Odda, December 2014. 
#4 Interview, Abba Olla, Odda, Odda, December 2014. 
#5 Interview, Abba Olla, Odda, Odda, December 2014. 
#6 Interview, Abba Olla, Odda, Odda, December 2014. 
#7 Interview, director of an international NGO, Woreda town, January 2015. 
#8 Interview, head of international NGO, Woreda town, January 2015. 
#9 Interview, senior woreda official, Woreda town, January 2015. 
#10 Interview, senior woreda official, Woreda town, January 2015. 
#11 Interview, middle-aged man, Odda, December 2014. 
#12 Interview, an elderly man, Odda, December 2014. 
#13 Interview, middle-aged herder, Odda, December 2014. 
#14 Interview, middle-aged resident, Odda, December 2014. 
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#15 Interview, middle-aged man, Odda, December 2014. 
#16 Interview, middle-aged cooperative head, Odda, December 2014.  
#17 Interview, middle-aged cooperative head, Odda, January 2015. 
#18 Interview, young cooperative head, Odda, January 2015. 
#19 Interview, senior woreda land administration expert, Woreda town, January 2015. 
#21 Interview, young domestic NGO worker, Woreda town, December 2014. 
#22 Interview, middle-aged domestic NGO worker, Woreda town, December 2014. 
# 23 Interview, a senior member of NGO staff, Woreda town, December 2014. 
 #24 Interview, middle-aged international NGO worker, Woreda town, December 2014. 
 #25 Interview, young domestic NGO worker, Woreda town, December 2014. 
#26 Interview, kebele health extension worker, Odda, December 2014. 
#27 Interview, kebele health extension worker, Odda, December 2014. 
#28 Interview, kebele health extension worker, Odda, December 2014. 
#29 Interview, field coordinator of domestic NGO, Woreda town, December 2014. 
#30 Interview, field coordinator of domestic NGO, Woreda town, December 2014. 
#31 Interview, domestic NGO director, Woreda town, December 2014. 
#32 Interview, young DA, Odda, December 2014. 
#33 Interview, DA, Odda, December 2014. 
#34 Interview, DA, Odda, December 2014. 
#35 Interview, young man, Odda, December 2014. 
#36 Interview, an elderly man, Odda, December 2014. 
#37 Interview, PSNP beneficiary, Odda, December 2014. 
#38 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Odda, December 2014. 
#39 Interview, parent-teacher committee chairperson, Odda, January 2015. 
#40 Interview, school director, Odda, January 2015. 
